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https://github.com/systemd/systemd.git
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Merge pull request #17079 from keszybz/late-exec-resolution
Resolve executable paths before execution, use fexecve()
This commit is contained in:
commit
6dd16814a5
@ -216,6 +216,7 @@ conf.set_quoted('SYSTEM_SYSVRCND_PATH', sysvrcnd_path)
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conf.set_quoted('RC_LOCAL_PATH', get_option('rc-local'))
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conf.set('ANSI_OK_COLOR', 'ANSI_' + get_option('ok-color').underscorify().to_upper())
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conf.set10('ENABLE_FEXECVE', get_option('fexecve'))
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conf.set_quoted('USER_CONFIG_UNIT_DIR', join_paths(pkgsysconfdir, 'user'))
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conf.set_quoted('USER_DATA_UNIT_DIR', userunitdir)
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@ -534,6 +535,7 @@ foreach ident : [
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#include <signal.h>
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#include <sys/wait.h>'''],
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['mallinfo', '''#include <malloc.h>'''],
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['execveat', '''#include <unistd.h>'''],
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['close_range', '''#include <unistd.h>'''],
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]
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@ -3832,6 +3834,7 @@ foreach tuple : [
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['link-timesyncd-shared', get_option('link-timesyncd-shared')],
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['kernel-install', get_option('kernel-install')],
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['systemd-analyze', conf.get('ENABLE_ANALYZE') == 1],
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['fexecve'],
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]
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if tuple.length() >= 2
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@ -375,13 +375,15 @@ option('fuzz-tests', type : 'boolean', value : 'false',
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option('install-tests', type : 'boolean', value : 'false',
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description : 'install test executables')
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option('ok-color', type: 'combo',
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option('ok-color', type : 'combo',
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choices : ['black', 'red', 'green', 'yellow', 'blue', 'magenta', 'cyan',
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'white', 'highlight-black', 'highlight-red', 'highlight-green',
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'highlight-yellow', 'highlight-blue', 'highlight-magenta',
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'highlight-cyan', 'highlight-white'],
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value : 'green',
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description: 'color of the "OK" status message')
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option('fexecve', type : 'boolean', value : 'false',
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description : 'use fexecve() to spawn children')
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option('oss-fuzz', type : 'boolean', value : 'false',
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description : 'build against oss-fuzz')
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@ -749,6 +749,25 @@ static inline int missing_rt_sigqueueinfo(pid_t tgid, int sig, siginfo_t *info)
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# define rt_sigqueueinfo missing_rt_sigqueueinfo
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#endif
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/* ======================================================================= */
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#if !HAVE_EXECVEAT
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static inline int missing_execveat(int dirfd, const char *pathname,
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char *const argv[], char *const envp[],
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int flags) {
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# if defined __NR_execveat && __NR_execveat >= 0
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return syscall(__NR_execveat, dirfd, pathname, argv, envp, flags);
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# else
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errno = ENOSYS;
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return -1;
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# endif
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}
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# undef AT_EMPTY_PATH
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# define AT_EMPTY_PATH 0x1000
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# define execveat missing_execveat
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#endif
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/* ======================================================================= */
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#define systemd_NR_close_range systemd_SC_arch_bias(436)
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@ -585,22 +585,53 @@ char* path_join_internal(const char *first, ...) {
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return joined;
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}
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int find_executable_full(const char *name, bool use_path_envvar, char **ret) {
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static int check_x_access(const char *path, int *ret_fd) {
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if (ret_fd) {
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_cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
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int r;
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/* We need to use O_PATH because there may be executables for which we have only exec
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* permissions, but not read (usually suid executables). */
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fd = open(path, O_PATH|O_CLOEXEC);
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if (fd < 0)
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return -errno;
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r = access_fd(fd, X_OK);
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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*ret_fd = TAKE_FD(fd);
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} else {
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/* Let's optimize things a bit by not opening the file if we don't need the fd. */
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if (access(path, X_OK) < 0)
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return -errno;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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int find_executable_full(const char *name, bool use_path_envvar, char **ret_filename, int *ret_fd) {
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int last_error, r;
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const char *p = NULL;
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assert(name);
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if (is_path(name)) {
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if (access(name, X_OK) < 0)
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return -errno;
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_cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
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if (ret) {
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r = path_make_absolute_cwd(name, ret);
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r = check_x_access(name, ret_fd ? &fd : NULL);
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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if (ret_filename) {
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r = path_make_absolute_cwd(name, ret_filename);
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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}
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if (ret_fd)
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*ret_fd = TAKE_FD(fd);
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return 0;
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}
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@ -613,8 +644,10 @@ int find_executable_full(const char *name, bool use_path_envvar, char **ret) {
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last_error = -ENOENT;
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/* Resolve a single-component name to a full path */
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for (;;) {
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_cleanup_free_ char *j = NULL, *element = NULL;
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_cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
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r = extract_first_word(&p, &element, ":", EXTRACT_RELAX|EXTRACT_DONT_COALESCE_SEPARATORS);
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if (r < 0)
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@ -629,7 +662,8 @@ int find_executable_full(const char *name, bool use_path_envvar, char **ret) {
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if (!j)
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return -ENOMEM;
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if (access(j, X_OK) >= 0) {
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r = check_x_access(j, ret_fd ? &fd : NULL);
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if (r >= 0) {
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_cleanup_free_ char *with_dash;
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with_dash = strjoin(j, "/");
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@ -643,8 +677,10 @@ int find_executable_full(const char *name, bool use_path_envvar, char **ret) {
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/* We can't just `continue` inverting this case, since we need to update last_error. */
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if (errno == ENOTDIR) {
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/* Found it! */
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if (ret)
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*ret = path_simplify(TAKE_PTR(j), false);
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if (ret_filename)
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*ret_filename = path_simplify(TAKE_PTR(j), false);
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if (ret_fd)
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*ret_fd = TAKE_FD(fd);
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return 0;
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}
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@ -88,9 +88,9 @@ int path_strv_make_absolute_cwd(char **l);
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char** path_strv_resolve(char **l, const char *root);
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char** path_strv_resolve_uniq(char **l, const char *root);
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int find_executable_full(const char *name, bool use_path_envvar, char **ret);
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static inline int find_executable(const char *name, char **ret) {
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return find_executable_full(name, true, ret);
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int find_executable_full(const char *name, bool use_path_envvar, char **ret_filename, int *ret_fd);
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static inline int find_executable(const char *name, char **ret_filename) {
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return find_executable_full(name, true, ret_filename, NULL);
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}
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bool paths_check_timestamp(const char* const* paths, usec_t *paths_ts_usec, bool update);
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@ -1248,8 +1248,8 @@ static int setup_pam(
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* termination */
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barrier_set_role(&barrier, BARRIER_CHILD);
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/* Make sure we don't keep open the passed fds in this child. We assume that otherwise only those fds
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* are open here that have been opened by PAM. */
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/* Make sure we don't keep open the passed fds in this child. We assume that otherwise only
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* those fds are open here that have been opened by PAM. */
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(void) close_many(fds, n_fds);
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/* Drop privileges - we don't need any to pam_close_session
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@ -2893,11 +2893,11 @@ static int setup_credentials(
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#if ENABLE_SMACK
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static int setup_smack(
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const ExecContext *context,
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const char *executable) {
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int executable_fd) {
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int r;
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assert(context);
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assert(executable);
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assert(executable_fd >= 0);
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if (context->smack_process_label) {
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r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context->smack_process_label);
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@ -2908,7 +2908,7 @@ static int setup_smack(
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else {
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_cleanup_free_ char *exec_label = NULL;
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r = mac_smack_read(executable, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC, &exec_label);
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r = mac_smack_read_fd(executable_fd, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC, &exec_label);
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if (r < 0 && !IN_SET(r, -ENODATA, -EOPNOTSUPP))
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return r;
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@ -3419,7 +3419,6 @@ static int close_remaining_fds(
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const DynamicCreds *dcreds,
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int user_lookup_fd,
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int socket_fd,
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int exec_fd,
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const int *fds, size_t n_fds) {
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size_t n_dont_close = 0;
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@ -3436,8 +3435,6 @@ static int close_remaining_fds(
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if (socket_fd >= 0)
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dont_close[n_dont_close++] = socket_fd;
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if (exec_fd >= 0)
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dont_close[n_dont_close++] = exec_fd;
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if (n_fds > 0) {
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memcpy(dont_close + n_dont_close, fds, sizeof(int) * n_fds);
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n_dont_close += n_fds;
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@ -3614,6 +3611,35 @@ bool exec_context_get_cpu_affinity_from_numa(const ExecContext *c) {
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return c->cpu_affinity_from_numa;
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}
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static int add_shifted_fd(int *fds, size_t fds_size, size_t *n_fds, int fd, int *ret_fd) {
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int r;
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assert(fds);
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assert(n_fds);
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assert(*n_fds < fds_size);
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assert(ret_fd);
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if (fd < 0) {
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*ret_fd = -1;
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return 0;
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}
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if (fd < 3 + (int) *n_fds) {
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/* Let's move the fd up, so that it's outside of the fd range we will use to store
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* the fds we pass to the process (or which are closed only during execve). */
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r = fcntl(fd, F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC, 3 + (int) *n_fds);
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if (r < 0)
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return -errno;
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CLOSE_AND_REPLACE(fd, r);
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}
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*ret_fd = fds[*n_fds] = fd;
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(*n_fds) ++;
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return 1;
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}
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static int exec_child(
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Unit *unit,
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const ExecCommand *command,
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@ -3631,7 +3657,7 @@ static int exec_child(
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int *exit_status) {
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_cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL, **pass_env = NULL, **accum_env = NULL, **replaced_argv = NULL;
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int *fds_with_exec_fd, n_fds_with_exec_fd, r, ngids = 0, exec_fd = -1;
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int r, ngids = 0, exec_fd;
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_cleanup_free_ gid_t *supplementary_gids = NULL;
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const char *username = NULL, *groupname = NULL;
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_cleanup_free_ char *home_buffer = NULL;
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@ -3658,7 +3684,8 @@ static int exec_child(
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gid_t saved_gid = getgid();
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uid_t uid = UID_INVALID;
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gid_t gid = GID_INVALID;
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size_t n_fds;
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size_t n_fds = n_socket_fds + n_storage_fds, /* fds to pass to the child */
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n_keep_fds; /* total number of fds not to close */
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int secure_bits;
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_cleanup_free_ gid_t *gids_after_pam = NULL;
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int ngids_after_pam = 0;
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@ -3702,8 +3729,17 @@ static int exec_child(
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/* In case anything used libc syslog(), close this here, too */
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closelog();
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n_fds = n_socket_fds + n_storage_fds;
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r = close_remaining_fds(params, runtime, dcreds, user_lookup_fd, socket_fd, params->exec_fd, fds, n_fds);
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int keep_fds[n_fds + 2];
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memcpy_safe(keep_fds, fds, n_fds * sizeof(int));
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n_keep_fds = n_fds;
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r = add_shifted_fd(keep_fds, ELEMENTSOF(keep_fds), &n_keep_fds, params->exec_fd, &exec_fd);
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if (r < 0) {
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*exit_status = EXIT_FDS;
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return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to shift fd and set FD_CLOEXEC: %m");
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}
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r = close_remaining_fds(params, runtime, dcreds, user_lookup_fd, socket_fd, keep_fds, n_keep_fds);
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if (r < 0) {
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*exit_status = EXIT_FDS;
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return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to close unwanted file descriptors: %m");
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@ -4095,6 +4131,7 @@ static int exec_child(
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/* Let's call into PAM after we set up our own idea of resource limits to that pam_limits
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* wins here. (See above.) */
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/* All fds passed in the fds array will be closed in the pam child process. */
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r = setup_pam(context->pam_name, username, uid, gid, context->tty_path, &accum_env, fds, n_fds);
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if (r < 0) {
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*exit_status = EXIT_PAM;
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@ -4202,7 +4239,8 @@ static int exec_child(
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* shall execute. */
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_cleanup_free_ char *executable = NULL;
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r = find_executable_full(command->path, false, &executable);
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_cleanup_close_ int executable_fd = -1;
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r = find_executable_full(command->path, false, &executable, &executable_fd);
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if (r < 0) {
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if (r != -ENOMEM && (command->flags & EXEC_COMMAND_IGNORE_FAILURE)) {
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log_struct_errno(LOG_INFO, r,
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@ -4225,6 +4263,12 @@ static int exec_child(
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"EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path);
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}
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r = add_shifted_fd(keep_fds, ELEMENTSOF(keep_fds), &n_keep_fds, executable_fd, &executable_fd);
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if (r < 0) {
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*exit_status = EXIT_FDS;
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return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to shift fd and set FD_CLOEXEC: %m");
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}
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#if HAVE_SELINUX
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if (needs_sandboxing && use_selinux && params->selinux_context_net && socket_fd >= 0) {
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r = mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd, executable, context->selinux_context, &mac_selinux_context_net);
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@ -4239,41 +4283,7 @@ static int exec_child(
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* more aggressive this time since socket_fd and the netns fds we don't need anymore. We do keep the exec_fd
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* however if we have it as we want to keep it open until the final execve(). */
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if (params->exec_fd >= 0) {
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exec_fd = params->exec_fd;
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if (exec_fd < 3 + (int) n_fds) {
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int moved_fd;
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/* Let's move the exec fd far up, so that it's outside of the fd range we want to pass to the
|
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* process we are about to execute. */
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moved_fd = fcntl(exec_fd, F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC, 3 + (int) n_fds);
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if (moved_fd < 0) {
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*exit_status = EXIT_FDS;
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return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Couldn't move exec fd up: %m");
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}
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CLOSE_AND_REPLACE(exec_fd, moved_fd);
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} else {
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/* This fd should be FD_CLOEXEC already, but let's make sure. */
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r = fd_cloexec(exec_fd, true);
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if (r < 0) {
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*exit_status = EXIT_FDS;
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return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to make exec fd FD_CLOEXEC: %m");
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}
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}
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fds_with_exec_fd = newa(int, n_fds + 1);
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memcpy_safe(fds_with_exec_fd, fds, n_fds * sizeof(int));
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fds_with_exec_fd[n_fds] = exec_fd;
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n_fds_with_exec_fd = n_fds + 1;
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} else {
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fds_with_exec_fd = fds;
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n_fds_with_exec_fd = n_fds;
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}
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r = close_all_fds(fds_with_exec_fd, n_fds_with_exec_fd);
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r = close_all_fds(keep_fds, n_keep_fds);
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if (r >= 0)
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r = shift_fds(fds, n_fds);
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if (r >= 0)
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@ -4307,7 +4317,7 @@ static int exec_child(
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/* LSM Smack needs the capability CAP_MAC_ADMIN to change the current execution security context of the
|
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* process. This is the latest place before dropping capabilities. Other MAC context are set later. */
|
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if (use_smack) {
|
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r = setup_smack(context, executable);
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r = setup_smack(context, executable_fd);
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if (r < 0) {
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*exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL;
|
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return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set SMACK process label: %m");
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@ -4577,8 +4587,7 @@ static int exec_child(
|
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}
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}
|
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execve(executable, final_argv, accum_env);
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r = -errno;
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r = fexecve_or_execve(executable_fd, executable, final_argv, accum_env);
|
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|
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if (exec_fd >= 0) {
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uint8_t hot = 0;
|
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|
@ -11,11 +11,13 @@
|
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#include "conf-files.h"
|
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#include "env-file.h"
|
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#include "env-util.h"
|
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#include "errno-util.h"
|
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#include "exec-util.h"
|
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#include "fd-util.h"
|
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#include "fileio.h"
|
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#include "hashmap.h"
|
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#include "macro.h"
|
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#include "missing_syscall.h"
|
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#include "process-util.h"
|
||||
#include "rlimit-util.h"
|
||||
#include "serialize.h"
|
||||
@ -33,7 +35,6 @@
|
||||
assert_cc(EAGAIN == EWOULDBLOCK);
|
||||
|
||||
static int do_spawn(const char *path, char *argv[], int stdout_fd, pid_t *pid) {
|
||||
|
||||
pid_t _pid;
|
||||
int r;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -444,3 +445,26 @@ ExecCommandFlags exec_command_flags_from_string(const char *s) {
|
||||
else
|
||||
return 1 << idx;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int fexecve_or_execve(int executable_fd, const char *executable, char *const argv[], char *const envp[]) {
|
||||
#if ENABLE_FEXECVE
|
||||
execveat(executable_fd, "", argv, envp, AT_EMPTY_PATH);
|
||||
|
||||
if (IN_SET(errno, ENOSYS, ENOENT) || ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(errno))
|
||||
/* Old kernel or a script or an overzealous seccomp filter? Let's fall back to execve().
|
||||
*
|
||||
* fexecve(3): "If fd refers to a script (i.e., it is an executable text file that names a
|
||||
* script interpreter with a first line that begins with the characters #!) and the
|
||||
* close-on-exec flag has been set for fd, then fexecve() fails with the error ENOENT. This
|
||||
* error occurs because, by the time the script interpreter is executed, fd has already been
|
||||
* closed because of the close-on-exec flag. Thus, the close-on-exec flag can't be set on fd
|
||||
* if it refers to a script."
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Unfortunately, if we unset close-on-exec, the script will be executed just fine, but (at
|
||||
* least in case of bash) the script name, $0, will be shown as /dev/fd/nnn, which breaks
|
||||
* scripts which make use of $0. Thus, let's fall back to execve() in this case.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
execve(executable, argv, envp);
|
||||
return -errno;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -45,3 +45,5 @@ extern const gather_stdout_callback_t gather_environment[_STDOUT_CONSUME_MAX];
|
||||
|
||||
const char* exec_command_flags_to_string(ExecCommandFlags i);
|
||||
ExecCommandFlags exec_command_flags_from_string(const char *s);
|
||||
|
||||
int fexecve_or_execve(int executable_fd, const char *executable, char *const argv[], char *const envp[]);
|
||||
|
@ -4,10 +4,12 @@
|
||||
#include <unistd.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include "alloc-util.h"
|
||||
#include "exec-util.h"
|
||||
#include "fd-util.h"
|
||||
#include "macro.h"
|
||||
#include "mountpoint-util.h"
|
||||
#include "path-util.h"
|
||||
#include "process-util.h"
|
||||
#include "rm-rf.h"
|
||||
#include "stat-util.h"
|
||||
#include "string-util.h"
|
||||
@ -169,12 +171,12 @@ static void test_find_executable_full(void) {
|
||||
|
||||
log_info("/* %s */", __func__);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_se(find_executable_full("sh", true, &p) == 0);
|
||||
assert_se(find_executable_full("sh", true, &p, NULL) == 0);
|
||||
puts(p);
|
||||
assert_se(streq(basename(p), "sh"));
|
||||
free(p);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_se(find_executable_full("sh", false, &p) == 0);
|
||||
assert_se(find_executable_full("sh", false, &p, NULL) == 0);
|
||||
puts(p);
|
||||
assert_se(streq(basename(p), "sh"));
|
||||
free(p);
|
||||
@ -186,12 +188,12 @@ static void test_find_executable_full(void) {
|
||||
|
||||
assert_se(unsetenv("PATH") == 0);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_se(find_executable_full("sh", true, &p) == 0);
|
||||
assert_se(find_executable_full("sh", true, &p, NULL) == 0);
|
||||
puts(p);
|
||||
assert_se(streq(basename(p), "sh"));
|
||||
free(p);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_se(find_executable_full("sh", false, &p) == 0);
|
||||
assert_se(find_executable_full("sh", false, &p, NULL) == 0);
|
||||
puts(p);
|
||||
assert_se(streq(basename(p), "sh"));
|
||||
free(p);
|
||||
@ -236,6 +238,43 @@ static void test_find_executable(const char *self) {
|
||||
assert_se(find_executable("/proc/filesystems", &p) == -EACCES);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void test_find_executable_exec_one(const char *path) {
|
||||
_cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL;
|
||||
_cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
|
||||
pid_t pid;
|
||||
int r;
|
||||
|
||||
r = find_executable_full(path, false, &t, &fd);
|
||||
|
||||
log_info_errno(r, "%s: %s → %s: %d/%m", __func__, path, t ?: "-", fd);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_se(fd > STDERR_FILENO);
|
||||
assert_se(path_is_absolute(t));
|
||||
if (path_is_absolute(path))
|
||||
assert_se(streq(t, path));
|
||||
|
||||
pid = fork();
|
||||
assert_se(pid >= 0);
|
||||
if (pid == 0) {
|
||||
r = fexecve_or_execve(fd, t, STRV_MAKE(t, "--version"), STRV_MAKE(NULL));
|
||||
log_error_errno(r, "[f]execve: %m");
|
||||
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_check(t, pid, WAIT_LOG) == 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void test_find_executable_exec(void) {
|
||||
log_info("/* %s */", __func__);
|
||||
|
||||
test_find_executable_exec_one("touch");
|
||||
test_find_executable_exec_one("/bin/touch");
|
||||
|
||||
_cleanup_free_ char *script = NULL;
|
||||
assert_se(get_testdata_dir("test-path-util/script.sh", &script) >= 0);
|
||||
test_find_executable_exec_one(script);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void test_prefixes(void) {
|
||||
static const char* const values[] = {
|
||||
"/a/b/c/d",
|
||||
@ -717,6 +756,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
|
||||
test_path_equal_root();
|
||||
test_find_executable_full();
|
||||
test_find_executable(argv[0]);
|
||||
test_find_executable_exec();
|
||||
test_prefixes();
|
||||
test_path_join();
|
||||
test_fsck_exists();
|
||||
|
@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ if install_tests
|
||||
install_dir : testdata_dir)
|
||||
install_subdir('test-path',
|
||||
install_dir : testdata_dir)
|
||||
install_subdir('test-path-util',
|
||||
install_dir : testdata_dir)
|
||||
install_subdir('test-umount',
|
||||
install_dir : testdata_dir)
|
||||
install_subdir('test-network-generator-conversion',
|
||||
|
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
Description=Test for SystemCallFilter
|
||||
|
||||
[Service]
|
||||
ExecStart=/bin/sh -c 'echo "This should not be seen"'
|
||||
ExecStart=/bin/sh -c '/bin/echo "This should not be seen"'
|
||||
Type=oneshot
|
||||
LimitCORE=0
|
||||
SystemCallFilter=ioperm
|
||||
|
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
Description=Test for SystemCallFilter
|
||||
|
||||
[Service]
|
||||
ExecStart=/bin/sh -c 'echo "This should not be seen"'
|
||||
ExecStart=/bin/sh -c '/bin/echo "This should not be seen"'
|
||||
Type=oneshot
|
||||
LimitCORE=0
|
||||
SystemCallFilter=~write open execve exit_group close mmap munmap fstat DONOTEXIST
|
||||
SystemCallFilter=~write open execve fexecve execveat exit_group close mmap munmap fstat DONOTEXIST
|
||||
|
6
test/test-path-util/script.sh
Executable file
6
test/test-path-util/script.sh
Executable file
@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#!/bin/sh
|
||||
|
||||
echo "$0 $@"
|
||||
test "$(basename $0)" = "script.sh" || exit 1
|
||||
test "$1" = "--version" || exit 2
|
||||
echo "Life is good"
|
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user