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resolved: add basic proof of non-existance support for NSEC+NSEC3
Note that this is not complete yet, as we don't handle wildcard domains correctly, nor handle domains correctly that use empty non-terminals.
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parent
d0ae14ff09
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72667f0890
@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
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#include "alloc-util.h"
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#include "dns-domain.h"
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#include "resolved-dns-answer.h"
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#include "resolved-dns-dnssec.h"
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#include "string-util.h"
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DnsAnswer *dns_answer_new(unsigned n) {
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@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
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#include "alloc-util.h"
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#include "dns-domain.h"
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#include "hexdecoct.h"
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#include "resolved-dns-dnssec.h"
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#include "resolved-dns-packet.h"
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#include "string-table.h"
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@ -795,6 +796,187 @@ int dnssec_verify_dnskey_search(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, DnsAnswer *validated_
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return 0;
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}
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int dnssec_nsec3_hash(DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *name, void *ret) {
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uint8_t wire_format[DNS_WIRE_FOMAT_HOSTNAME_MAX];
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gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL;
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size_t hash_size;
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int algorithm;
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void *result;
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unsigned k;
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int r;
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assert(nsec3);
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assert(name);
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assert(ret);
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if (nsec3->key->type != DNS_TYPE_NSEC3)
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return -EINVAL;
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algorithm = digest_to_gcrypt(nsec3->nsec3.algorithm);
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if (algorithm < 0)
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return algorithm;
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initialize_libgcrypt();
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hash_size = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(algorithm);
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assert(hash_size > 0);
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if (nsec3->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size != hash_size)
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return -EINVAL;
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r = dns_name_to_wire_format(name, wire_format, sizeof(wire_format), true);
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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gcry_md_open(&md, algorithm, 0);
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if (!md)
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return -EIO;
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gcry_md_write(md, wire_format, r);
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gcry_md_write(md, nsec3->nsec3.salt, nsec3->nsec3.salt_size);
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result = gcry_md_read(md, 0);
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if (!result) {
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r = -EIO;
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goto finish;
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}
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for (k = 0; k < nsec3->nsec3.iterations; k++) {
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uint8_t tmp[hash_size];
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memcpy(tmp, result, hash_size);
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gcry_md_reset(md);
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gcry_md_write(md, tmp, hash_size);
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gcry_md_write(md, nsec3->nsec3.salt, nsec3->nsec3.salt_size);
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result = gcry_md_read(md, 0);
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if (!result) {
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r = -EIO;
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goto finish;
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}
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}
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memcpy(ret, result, hash_size);
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r = (int) hash_size;
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finish:
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gcry_md_close(md);
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return r;
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}
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int dnssec_test_nsec(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecResult *result) {
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DnsResourceRecord *rr;
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int r;
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assert(key);
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assert(result);
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/* Look for any NSEC/NSEC3 RRs that say something about the specified key. */
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DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, answer) {
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if (rr->key->class != key->class)
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continue;
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switch (rr->key->type) {
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case DNS_TYPE_NSEC:
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r = dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key));
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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if (r > 0) {
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*result = bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, key->type) ? DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND : DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA;
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return 0;
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}
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r = dns_name_between(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key), rr->nsec.next_domain_name);
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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if (r > 0) {
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*result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NXDOMAIN;
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return 0;
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}
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break;
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case DNS_TYPE_NSEC3: {
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_cleanup_free_ void *decoded = NULL;
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size_t decoded_size;
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char label[DNS_LABEL_MAX];
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uint8_t hashed[DNSSEC_HASH_SIZE_MAX];
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int label_length, c, q;
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const char *p;
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bool covered;
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/* RFC 5155, Section 8.2 says we MUST ignore NSEC3 RRs with flags != 0 or 1 */
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if (!IN_SET(rr->nsec3.flags, 0, 1))
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continue;
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p = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key);
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label_length = dns_label_unescape(&p, label, sizeof(label));
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if (label_length < 0)
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return label_length;
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if (label_length == 0)
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continue;
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r = dns_name_endswith(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key), p);
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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if (r == 0)
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continue;
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r = unbase32hexmem(label, label_length, false, &decoded, &decoded_size);
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if (r == -EINVAL)
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continue;
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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if (decoded_size != rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size)
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continue;
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c = memcmp(decoded, rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name, decoded_size);
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if (c == 0)
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continue;
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r = dnssec_nsec3_hash(rr, DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key), hashed);
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/* RFC 5155, Section 8.1 says we MUST ignore NSEC3 RRs with unknown algorithms */
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if (r == -EOPNOTSUPP)
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continue;
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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if ((size_t) r != decoded_size)
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continue;
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r = memcmp(decoded, hashed, decoded_size);
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if (r == 0) {
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*result = bitmap_isset(rr->nsec3.types, key->type) ? DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND : DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA;
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return 0;
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}
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q = memcmp(hashed, rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name, decoded_size);
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covered = c < 0 ?
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r < 0 && q < 0 :
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q < 0 || r < 0;
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if (covered) {
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*result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NXDOMAIN;
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return 0;
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}
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break;
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}
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default:
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break;
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}
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}
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/* No approproate NSEC RR found, report this. */
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*result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR;
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return 0;
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}
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static const char* const dnssec_mode_table[_DNSSEC_MODE_MAX] = {
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[DNSSEC_NO] = "no",
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[DNSSEC_TRUST] = "trust",
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@ -811,5 +993,6 @@ static const char* const dnssec_result_table[_DNSSEC_RESULT_MAX] = {
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[DNSSEC_MISSING_KEY] = "missing-key",
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[DNSSEC_UNSIGNED] = "unsigned",
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[DNSSEC_FAILED_AUXILIARY] = "failed-auxiliary",
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[DNSSEC_NSEC_MISMATCH] = "nsec-mismatch",
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};
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DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(dnssec_result, DnssecResult);
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@ -56,12 +56,16 @@ enum DnssecResult {
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/* These two are added by the DnsTransaction logic */
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DNSSEC_UNSIGNED,
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DNSSEC_FAILED_AUXILIARY,
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DNSSEC_NSEC_MISMATCH,
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_DNSSEC_RESULT_MAX,
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_DNSSEC_RESULT_INVALID = -1
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};
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#define DNSSEC_CANONICAL_HOSTNAME_MAX (DNS_HOSTNAME_MAX + 2)
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/* The longest digest we'll ever generate, of all digest algorithms we support */
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#define DNSSEC_HASH_SIZE_MAX (MAX(20, 32))
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int dnssec_rrsig_match_dnskey(DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, DnsResourceRecord *dnskey);
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int dnssec_key_match_rrsig(DnsResourceKey *key, DnsResourceRecord *rrsig);
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@ -75,6 +79,17 @@ uint16_t dnssec_keytag(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey);
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int dnssec_canonicalize(const char *n, char *buffer, size_t buffer_max);
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int dnssec_nsec3_hash(DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *name, void *ret);
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typedef enum DnssecNsecResult {
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DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR, /* No suitable NSEC/NSEC3 RR found */
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DNSSEC_NSEC_NXDOMAIN,
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DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA,
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DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND,
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} DnssecNsecResult;
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int dnssec_test_nsec(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecResult *result);
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const char* dnssec_mode_to_string(DnssecMode m) _const_;
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DnssecMode dnssec_mode_from_string(const char *s) _pure_;
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/* Everything that's now in t->answer is known to be good, hence cacheable. */
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t->n_answer_cacheable = (unsigned) -1; /* everything! */
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t->answer_authenticated = true;
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t->dnssec_result = DNSSEC_VALIDATED;
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/* At this point the answer only contains validated
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* RRsets. Now, let's see if it actually answers the question
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* we asked. If so, great! If it doesn't, then see if
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* NSEC/NSEC3 can prove this. */
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r = dns_answer_match_key(t->answer, t->key);
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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if (r > 0) {
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/* Yes, it answer the question, everything is authenticated. */
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t->dnssec_result = DNSSEC_VALIDATED;
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t->answer_rcode = DNS_RCODE_SUCCESS;
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t->answer_authenticated = true;
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} else if (r == 0) {
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DnssecNsecResult nr;
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/* Bummer! Let's check NSEC/NSEC3 */
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r = dnssec_test_nsec(t->answer, t->key, &nr);
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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switch (nr) {
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case DNSSEC_NSEC_NXDOMAIN:
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/* NSEC proves the domain doesn't exist. Very good. */
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t->dnssec_result = DNSSEC_VALIDATED;
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t->answer_rcode = DNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN;
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t->answer_authenticated = true;
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break;
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case DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA:
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/* NSEC proves that there's no data here, very good. */
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t->dnssec_result = DNSSEC_VALIDATED;
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t->answer_rcode = DNS_RCODE_SUCCESS;
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t->answer_authenticated = true;
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break;
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case DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR:
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/* No NSEC data? Bummer! */
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t->dnssec_result = DNSSEC_UNSIGNED;
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break;
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case DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND:
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/* NSEC says it needs to be there, but we couldn't find it? Bummer! */
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t->dnssec_result = DNSSEC_NSEC_MISMATCH;
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break;
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default:
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assert_not_reached("Unexpected NSEC result.");
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
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#include "resolved-dns-dnssec.h"
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#include "resolved-dns-rr.h"
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#include "string-util.h"
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#include "hexdecoct.h"
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static void test_dnssec_verify_rrset2(void) {
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@ -305,12 +306,46 @@ static void test_dnssec_canonicalize(void) {
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test_dnssec_canonicalize_one("FOO..bar.", NULL, -EINVAL);
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}
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static void test_dnssec_nsec3_hash(void) {
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static const uint8_t salt[] = { 0xB0, 0x1D, 0xFA, 0xCE };
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static const uint8_t next_hashed_name[] = { 0x84, 0x10, 0x26, 0x53, 0xc9, 0xfa, 0x4d, 0x85, 0x6c, 0x97, 0x82, 0xe2, 0x8f, 0xdf, 0x2d, 0x5e, 0x87, 0x69, 0xc4, 0x52 };
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_cleanup_(dns_resource_record_unrefp) DnsResourceRecord *rr = NULL;
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_cleanup_free_ char *a = NULL, *b = NULL;
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uint8_t h[DNSSEC_HASH_SIZE_MAX];
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int k;
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/* The NSEC3 RR for eurid.eu on 2015-12-14. */
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rr = dns_resource_record_new_full(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_NSEC3, "PJ8S08RR45VIQDAQGE7EN3VHKNROTBMM.eurid.eu.");
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assert_se(rr);
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rr->nsec3.algorithm = DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA1;
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rr->nsec3.flags = 1;
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rr->nsec3.iterations = 1;
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rr->nsec3.salt = memdup(salt, sizeof(salt));
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assert_se(rr->nsec3.salt);
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rr->nsec3.salt_size = sizeof(salt);
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rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name = memdup(next_hashed_name, sizeof(next_hashed_name));
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assert_se(rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name);
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rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size = sizeof(next_hashed_name);
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assert_se(dns_resource_record_to_string(rr, &a) >= 0);
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log_info("NSEC3: %s", a);
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k = dnssec_nsec3_hash(rr, "eurid.eu", &h);
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assert_se(k >= 0);
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b = base32hexmem(h, k, false);
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assert_se(b);
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assert_se(strcasecmp(b, "PJ8S08RR45VIQDAQGE7EN3VHKNROTBMM") == 0);
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}
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int main(int argc, char*argv[]) {
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test_dnssec_canonicalize();
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test_dnssec_verify_dns_key();
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test_dnssec_verify_rrset();
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test_dnssec_verify_rrset2();
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test_dnssec_nsec3_hash();
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return 0;
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}
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