shaba/systemd
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/systemd/systemd.git synced 2024-12-26 03:22:00 +03:00
Code

namespace: make setup_namespace() less crazy

Browse Source 
Let's replace the ridiculous number of arguments with a structure, to
make this function less weird.

No change in behaviour, just some refactoring.
This commit is contained in:
Lennart Poettering 2023-10-10 21:36:50 +02:00 committed by Yu Watanabe
parent 22d7fb6646
commit 79d956db34
5 changed files with 332 additions and 426 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

152
src/core/execute.c
View File

@ -3138,7 +3138,6 @@ static int apply_mount_namespace(
*extension_dir = NULL, *host_os_release_stage = NULL; *extension_dir = NULL, *host_os_release_stage = NULL;
const char *root_dir = NULL, *root_image = NULL, *tmp_dir = NULL, *var_tmp_dir = NULL; const char *root_dir = NULL, *root_image = NULL, *tmp_dir = NULL, *var_tmp_dir = NULL;
char **read_write_paths; char **read_write_paths;
NamespaceInfo ns_info;
bool needs_sandboxing, setup_os_release_symlink; bool needs_sandboxing, setup_os_release_symlink;
BindMount *bind_mounts = NULL; BindMount *bind_mounts = NULL;
size_t n_bind_mounts = 0; size_t n_bind_mounts = 0;
@ -3180,10 +3179,9 @@ static int apply_mount_namespace(
needs_sandboxing = (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING) && !(command_flags & EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED); needs_sandboxing = (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING) && !(command_flags & EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED);
if (needs_sandboxing) { if (needs_sandboxing) {
/* The runtime struct only contains the parent of the private /tmp, /* The runtime struct only contains the parent of the private /tmp, which is non-accessible
* which is non-accessible to world users. Inside of it there's a /tmp * to world users. Inside of it there's a /tmp that is sticky, and that's the one we want to
* that is sticky, and that's the one we want to use here. * use here. This does not apply when we are using /run/systemd/empty as fallback. */
* This does not apply when we are using /run/systemd/empty as fallback. */
if (context->private_tmp && runtime && runtime->shared) { if (context->private_tmp && runtime && runtime->shared) {
if (streq_ptr(runtime->shared->tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY)) if (streq_ptr(runtime->shared->tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY))
@ -3196,39 +3194,10 @@ static int apply_mount_namespace(
else if (runtime->shared->var_tmp_dir) else if (runtime->shared->var_tmp_dir)
var_tmp_dir = strjoina(runtime->shared->var_tmp_dir, "/tmp"); var_tmp_dir = strjoina(runtime->shared->var_tmp_dir, "/tmp");
} }
}
ns_info = (NamespaceInfo) {
.ignore_protect_paths = false,
.private_dev = context->private_devices,
.protect_control_groups = context->protect_control_groups,
.protect_kernel_tunables = context->protect_kernel_tunables,
.protect_kernel_modules = context->protect_kernel_modules,
.protect_kernel_logs = context->protect_kernel_logs,
.protect_hostname = context->protect_hostname,
.mount_apivfs = exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(context),
.protect_home = context->protect_home,
.protect_system = context->protect_system,
.protect_proc = context->protect_proc,
.proc_subset = context->proc_subset,
.private_network = exec_needs_network_namespace(context),
.private_ipc = exec_needs_ipc_namespace(context),
/* If NNP is on, we can turn on MS_NOSUID, since it won't have any effect anymore. */
.mount_nosuid = context->no_new_privileges && !mac_selinux_use(),
};
} else if (!context->dynamic_user && root_dir)
/*
* If DynamicUser=no and RootDirectory= is set then lets pass a relaxed
* sandbox info, otherwise enforce it, don't ignore protected paths and
* fail if we are enable to apply the sandbox inside the mount namespace.
*/
ns_info = (NamespaceInfo) {
.ignore_protect_paths = true,
};
else
ns_info = (NamespaceInfo) {};
/* Symlinks (exec dirs, os-release) are set up after other mounts, before they are made read-only. */ /* Symlinks (exec dirs, os-release) are set up after other mounts, before they are made read-only. */
setup_os_release_symlink = ns_info.mount_apivfs && (root_dir || root_image); setup_os_release_symlink = needs_sandboxing && exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(context) && (root_dir || root_image);
r = compile_symlinks(context, params, setup_os_release_symlink, &symlinks); r = compile_symlinks(context, params, setup_os_release_symlink, &symlinks);
if (r < 0) if (r < 0)
return r; return r;
@ -3287,44 +3256,81 @@ static int apply_mount_namespace(
return r; return r;
} }
r = setup_namespace( NamespaceParameters parameters = {
root_dir, .runtime_scope = params->runtime_scope,
root_image,
context->root_image_options,
context->root_image_policy ?: &image_policy_service,
&ns_info,
read_write_paths,
needs_sandboxing ? context->read_only_paths : NULL,
needs_sandboxing ? context->inaccessible_paths : NULL,
needs_sandboxing ? context->exec_paths : NULL,
needs_sandboxing ? context->no_exec_paths : NULL,
empty_directories,
symlinks,
bind_mounts,
n_bind_mounts,
context->temporary_filesystems,
context->n_temporary_filesystems,
context->mount_images,
context->n_mount_images,
context->mount_image_policy ?: &image_policy_service,
tmp_dir,
var_tmp_dir,
creds_path,
context->log_namespace,
context->mount_propagation_flag,
&verity,
context->extension_images,
context->n_extension_images,
context->extension_image_policy ?: &image_policy_sysext,
context->extension_directories,
propagate_dir,
incoming_dir,
extension_dir,
root_dir || root_image ? params->notify_socket : NULL,
host_os_release_stage,
params->runtime_scope,
error_path);
.root_directory = root_dir,
.root_image = root_image,
.root_image_options = context->root_image_options,
.root_image_policy = context->root_image_policy ?: &image_policy_service,
.read_write_paths = read_write_paths,
.read_only_paths = needs_sandboxing ? context->read_only_paths : NULL,
.inaccessible_paths = needs_sandboxing ? context->inaccessible_paths : NULL,
.exec_paths = needs_sandboxing ? context->exec_paths : NULL,
.no_exec_paths = needs_sandboxing ? context->no_exec_paths : NULL,
.empty_directories = empty_directories,
.symlinks = symlinks,
.bind_mounts = bind_mounts,
.n_bind_mounts = n_bind_mounts,
.temporary_filesystems = context->temporary_filesystems,
.n_temporary_filesystems = context->n_temporary_filesystems,
.mount_images = context->mount_images,
.n_mount_images = context->n_mount_images,
.mount_image_policy = context->mount_image_policy ?: &image_policy_service,
.tmp_dir = tmp_dir,
.var_tmp_dir = var_tmp_dir,
.creds_path = creds_path,
.log_namespace = context->log_namespace,
.mount_propagation_flag = context->mount_propagation_flag,
.verity = &verity,
.extension_images = context->extension_images,
.n_extension_images = context->n_extension_images,
.extension_image_policy = context->extension_image_policy ?: &image_policy_sysext,
.extension_directories = context->extension_directories,
.propagate_dir = propagate_dir,
.incoming_dir = incoming_dir,
.extension_dir = extension_dir,
.notify_socket = root_dir || root_image ? params->notify_socket : NULL,
.host_os_release_stage = host_os_release_stage,
/* If DynamicUser=no and RootDirectory= is set then lets pass a relaxed sandbox info,
* otherwise enforce it, don't ignore protected paths and fail if we are enable to apply the
* sandbox inside the mount namespace. */
.ignore_protect_paths = !needs_sandboxing && !context->dynamic_user && root_dir,
.protect_control_groups = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_control_groups,
.protect_kernel_tunables = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_kernel_tunables,
.protect_kernel_modules = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_kernel_modules,
.protect_kernel_logs = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_kernel_logs,
.protect_hostname = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_hostname,
.private_dev = needs_sandboxing && context->private_devices,
.private_network = needs_sandboxing && exec_needs_network_namespace(context),
.private_ipc = needs_sandboxing && exec_needs_ipc_namespace(context),
.mount_apivfs = needs_sandboxing && exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(context),
/* If NNP is on, we can turn on MS_NOSUID, since it won't have any effect anymore. */
.mount_nosuid = needs_sandboxing && context->no_new_privileges && !mac_selinux_use(),
.protect_home = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_home,
.protect_system = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_system,
.protect_proc = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_proc,
.proc_subset = needs_sandboxing && context->proc_subset,
};
r = setup_namespace(&parameters, error_path);
/* If we couldn't set up the namespace this is probably due to a missing capability. setup_namespace() reports /* If we couldn't set up the namespace this is probably due to a missing capability. setup_namespace() reports
* that with a special, recognizable error ENOANO. In this case, silently proceed, but only if exclusively * that with a special, recognizable error ENOANO. In this case, silently proceed, but only if exclusively
* sandboxing options were used, i.e. nothing such as RootDirectory= or BindMount= that would result in a * sandboxing options were used, i.e. nothing such as RootDirectory= or BindMount= that would result in a

357
src/core/namespace.c
View File

@ -1121,16 +1121,16 @@ static int mount_private_sysfs(const MountEntry *m) {
return 0; return 0;
} }
static int mount_procfs(const MountEntry *m, const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) { static int mount_procfs(const MountEntry *m, const NamespaceParameters *p) {
_cleanup_free_ char *opts = NULL; _cleanup_free_ char *opts = NULL;
const char *entry_path; const char *entry_path;
int r, n; int r, n;
assert(m); assert(m);
assert(ns_info); assert(p);
if (ns_info->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT || if (p->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ||
ns_info->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL) { p->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL) {
/* Starting with kernel 5.8 procfs' hidepid= logic is truly per-instance (previously it /* Starting with kernel 5.8 procfs' hidepid= logic is truly per-instance (previously it
* pretended to be per-instance but actually was per-namespace), hence let's make use of it * pretended to be per-instance but actually was per-namespace), hence let's make use of it
@ -1138,9 +1138,9 @@ static int mount_procfs(const MountEntry *m, const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
* per-instance, we'll exclusively use the textual value for hidepid=, since support was * per-instance, we'll exclusively use the textual value for hidepid=, since support was
* added in the same commit: if it's supported it is thus also per-instance. */ * added in the same commit: if it's supported it is thus also per-instance. */
const char *hpv = ns_info->protect_proc == PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ? const char *hpv = p->protect_proc == PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ?
"off" : "off" :
protect_proc_to_string(ns_info->protect_proc); protect_proc_to_string(p->protect_proc);
/* hidepid= support was added in 5.8, so we can use fsconfig()/fsopen() (which were added in /* hidepid= support was added in 5.8, so we can use fsconfig()/fsopen() (which were added in
* 5.2) to check if hidepid= is supported. This avoids a noisy dmesg log by the kernel when * 5.2) to check if hidepid= is supported. This avoids a noisy dmesg log by the kernel when
@ -1154,7 +1154,7 @@ static int mount_procfs(const MountEntry *m, const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
return -ENOMEM; return -ENOMEM;
} }
if (ns_info->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID && if (p->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID &&
mount_option_supported("proc", "subset", "pid") != 0) mount_option_supported("proc", "subset", "pid") != 0)
if (!strextend_with_separator(&opts, ",", "subset=pid")) if (!strextend_with_separator(&opts, ",", "subset=pid"))
return -ENOMEM; return -ENOMEM;
@ -1383,10 +1383,7 @@ static int follow_symlink(
static int apply_one_mount( static int apply_one_mount(
const char *root_directory, const char *root_directory,
MountEntry *m, MountEntry *m,
const ImagePolicy *mount_image_policy, const NamespaceParameters *p) {
const ImagePolicy *extension_image_policy,
const NamespaceInfo *ns_info,
RuntimeScope scope) {
_cleanup_free_ char *inaccessible = NULL; _cleanup_free_ char *inaccessible = NULL;
bool rbind = true, make = false; bool rbind = true, make = false;
@ -1394,7 +1391,7 @@ static int apply_one_mount(
int r; int r;
assert(m); assert(m);
assert(ns_info); assert(p);
log_debug("Applying namespace mount on %s", mount_entry_path(m)); log_debug("Applying namespace mount on %s", mount_entry_path(m));
@ -1544,7 +1541,7 @@ static int apply_one_mount(
break; break;
case PRIVATE_DEV: case PRIVATE_DEV:
return mount_private_dev(m, scope); return mount_private_dev(m, p->runtime_scope);
case BIND_DEV: case BIND_DEV:
return mount_bind_dev(m); return mount_bind_dev(m);
@ -1556,7 +1553,7 @@ static int apply_one_mount(
return mount_bind_sysfs(m); return mount_bind_sysfs(m);
case PROCFS: case PROCFS:
return mount_procfs(m, ns_info); return mount_procfs(m, p);
case RUN: case RUN:
return mount_run(m); return mount_run(m);
@ -1565,10 +1562,10 @@ static int apply_one_mount(
return mount_mqueuefs(m); return mount_mqueuefs(m);
case MOUNT_IMAGES: case MOUNT_IMAGES:
return mount_image(m, NULL, mount_image_policy); return mount_image(m, NULL, p->mount_image_policy);
case EXTENSION_IMAGES: case EXTENSION_IMAGES:
return mount_image(m, root_directory, extension_image_policy); return mount_image(m, root_directory, p->extension_image_policy);
case OVERLAY_MOUNT: case OVERLAY_MOUNT:
return mount_overlay(m); return mount_overlay(m);
@ -1709,8 +1706,8 @@ static int make_nosuid(const MountEntry *m, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) {
return 0; return 0;
} }
static bool namespace_info_mount_apivfs(const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) { static bool namespace_parameters_mount_apivfs(const NamespaceParameters *p) {
assert(ns_info); assert(p);
/* /*
* ProtectControlGroups= and ProtectKernelTunables= imply MountAPIVFS=, * ProtectControlGroups= and ProtectKernelTunables= imply MountAPIVFS=,
@ -1718,81 +1715,64 @@ static bool namespace_info_mount_apivfs(const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
* first place... * first place...
*/ */
return ns_info->mount_apivfs || return p->mount_apivfs ||
ns_info->protect_control_groups || p->protect_control_groups ||
ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables || p->protect_kernel_tunables ||
ns_info->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT || p->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ||
ns_info->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL; p->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL;
} }
static size_t namespace_calculate_mounts( static size_t namespace_calculate_mounts(
const NamespaceInfo *ns_info, const NamespaceParameters *p,
char** read_write_paths, char **hierarchies,
char** read_only_paths, bool setup_propagate) {
char** inaccessible_paths,
char** exec_paths,
char** no_exec_paths,
char** empty_directories,
size_t n_bind_mounts,
size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
size_t n_mount_images,
size_t n_extension_images,
size_t n_extension_directories,
size_t n_hierarchies,
const char* tmp_dir,
const char* var_tmp_dir,
const char *creds_path,
const char* log_namespace,
bool setup_propagate,
const char* notify_socket,
const char* host_os_release) {
size_t protect_home_cnt; size_t protect_home_cnt;
size_t protect_system_cnt = size_t protect_system_cnt =
(ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT ? (p->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT ?
ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table) : ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table) :
((ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL) ? ((p->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL) ?
ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table) : ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table) :
((ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES) ? ((p->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES) ?
ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table) : 0))); ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table) : 0)));
protect_home_cnt = protect_home_cnt =
(ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_YES ? (p->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_YES ?
ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table) : ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table) :
((ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY) ? ((p->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY) ?
ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table) : ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table) :
((ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS) ? ((p->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS) ?
ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table) : 0))); ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table) : 0)));
return !!tmp_dir + !!var_tmp_dir + return !!p->tmp_dir + !!p->var_tmp_dir +
strv_length(read_write_paths) + strv_length(p->read_write_paths) +
strv_length(read_only_paths) + strv_length(p->read_only_paths) +
strv_length(inaccessible_paths) + strv_length(p->inaccessible_paths) +
strv_length(exec_paths) + strv_length(p->exec_paths) +
strv_length(no_exec_paths) + strv_length(p->no_exec_paths) +
strv_length(empty_directories) + strv_length(p->empty_directories) +
n_bind_mounts + p->n_bind_mounts +
n_mount_images + p->n_mount_images +
(n_extension_images > 0 || n_extension_directories > 0 ? /* Mount each image and directory plus an overlay per hierarchy */ (p->n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(p->extension_directories) ? /* Mount each image and directory plus an overlay per hierarchy */
n_hierarchies + n_extension_images + n_extension_directories: 0) + strv_length(hierarchies) + p->n_extension_images + strv_length(p->extension_directories) : 0) +
n_temporary_filesystems + p->n_temporary_filesystems +
ns_info->private_dev + p->private_dev +
(ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables ? (p->protect_kernel_tunables ?
ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table) + ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table) : 0) + ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table) + ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table) : 0) +
(ns_info->protect_kernel_modules ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table) : 0) + (p->protect_kernel_modules ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table) : 0) +
(ns_info->protect_kernel_logs ? (p->protect_kernel_logs ?
ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_proc_table) + ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_dev_table) : 0) + ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_proc_table) + ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_dev_table) : 0) +
(ns_info->protect_control_groups ? 1 : 0) + (p->protect_control_groups ? 1 : 0) +
protect_home_cnt + protect_system_cnt + protect_home_cnt + protect_system_cnt +
(ns_info->protect_hostname ? 2 : 0) + (p->protect_hostname ? 2 : 0) +
(namespace_info_mount_apivfs(ns_info) ? ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table) : 0) + (namespace_parameters_mount_apivfs(p) ? ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table) : 0) +
(creds_path ? 2 : 1) + (p->creds_path ? 2 : 1) +
!!log_namespace + !!p->log_namespace +
setup_propagate + /* /run/systemd/incoming */ setup_propagate + /* /run/systemd/incoming */
!!notify_socket + !!p->notify_socket +
!!host_os_release + !!p->host_os_release_stage +
ns_info->private_network + /* /sys */ p->private_network + /* /sys */
ns_info->private_ipc; /* /dev/mqueue */ p->private_ipc; /* /dev/mqueue */
} }
/* Walk all mount entries and dropping any unused mounts. This affects all /* Walk all mount entries and dropping any unused mounts. This affects all
@ -1880,13 +1860,9 @@ static void mount_entry_path_debug_string(const char *root, MountEntry *m, char
static int apply_mounts( static int apply_mounts(
const char *root, const char *root,
const ImagePolicy *mount_image_policy, const NamespaceParameters *p,
const ImagePolicy *extension_image_policy,
const NamespaceInfo *ns_info,
MountEntry *mounts, MountEntry *mounts,
size_t *n_mounts, size_t *n_mounts,
RuntimeScope scope,
char **symlinks,
char **error_path) { char **error_path) {
_cleanup_fclose_ FILE *proc_self_mountinfo = NULL; _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *proc_self_mountinfo = NULL;
@ -1936,7 +1912,7 @@ static int apply_mounts(
break; break;
} }
r = apply_one_mount(root, m, mount_image_policy, extension_image_policy, ns_info, scope); r = apply_one_mount(root, m, p);
if (r < 0) { if (r < 0) {
mount_entry_path_debug_string(root, m, error_path); mount_entry_path_debug_string(root, m, error_path);
return r; return r;
@ -1955,7 +1931,7 @@ static int apply_mounts(
* read-only switches are flipped, create the exec dirs and other symlinks. * read-only switches are flipped, create the exec dirs and other symlinks.
* Note that when /var/lib is not empty/tmpfs, these symlinks will already * Note that when /var/lib is not empty/tmpfs, these symlinks will already
* exist, which means this will be a no-op. */ * exist, which means this will be a no-op. */
r = create_symlinks_from_tuples(root, symlinks); r = create_symlinks_from_tuples(root, p->symlinks);
if (r < 0) if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set up symlinks inside mount namespace: %m"); return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set up symlinks inside mount namespace: %m");
@ -1991,7 +1967,7 @@ static int apply_mounts(
} }
/* Fourth round, flip the nosuid bits without a deny list. */ /* Fourth round, flip the nosuid bits without a deny list. */
if (ns_info->mount_nosuid) if (p->mount_nosuid)
for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) { for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
r = make_nosuid(m, proc_self_mountinfo); r = make_nosuid(m, proc_self_mountinfo);
if (r < 0) { if (r < 0) {
@ -2052,49 +2028,13 @@ static bool home_read_only(
return false; return false;
} }
int setup_namespace( int setup_namespace(const NamespaceParameters *p, char **error_path) {
const char* root_directory,
const char* root_image,
const MountOptions *root_image_mount_options,
const ImagePolicy *root_image_policy,
const NamespaceInfo *ns_info,
char** read_write_paths,
char** read_only_paths,
char** inaccessible_paths,
char** exec_paths,
char** no_exec_paths,
char** empty_directories,
char** symlinks,
const BindMount *bind_mounts,
size_t n_bind_mounts,
const TemporaryFileSystem *temporary_filesystems,
size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
const MountImage *mount_images,
size_t n_mount_images,
const ImagePolicy *mount_image_policy,
const char* tmp_dir,
const char* var_tmp_dir,
const char *creds_path,
const char *log_namespace,
unsigned long mount_propagation_flag,
VeritySettings *verity,
const MountImage *extension_images,
size_t n_extension_images,
const ImagePolicy *extension_image_policy,
char **extension_directories,
const char *propagate_dir,
const char *incoming_dir,
const char *extension_dir,
const char *notify_socket,
const char *host_os_release_stage,
RuntimeScope scope,
char **error_path) {
_cleanup_(loop_device_unrefp) LoopDevice *loop_device = NULL; _cleanup_(loop_device_unrefp) LoopDevice *loop_device = NULL;
_cleanup_(dissected_image_unrefp) DissectedImage *dissected_image = NULL; _cleanup_(dissected_image_unrefp) DissectedImage *dissected_image = NULL;
_cleanup_strv_free_ char **hierarchies = NULL; _cleanup_strv_free_ char **hierarchies = NULL;
MountEntry *m = NULL, *mounts = NULL; MountEntry *m = NULL, *mounts = NULL;
bool require_prefix = false, setup_propagate = false; bool require_prefix = false;
const char *root; const char *root;
DissectImageFlags dissect_image_flags = DissectImageFlags dissect_image_flags =
DISSECT_IMAGE_GENERIC_ROOT | DISSECT_IMAGE_GENERIC_ROOT |
@ -2109,32 +2049,29 @@ int setup_namespace(
size_t n_mounts; size_t n_mounts;
int r; int r;
assert(ns_info); assert(p);
/* Make sure that all mknod(), mkdir() calls we do are unaffected by the umask, and the access modes /* Make sure that all mknod(), mkdir() calls we do are unaffected by the umask, and the access modes
* we configure take effect */ * we configure take effect */
BLOCK_WITH_UMASK(0000); BLOCK_WITH_UMASK(0000);
if (!isempty(propagate_dir) && !isempty(incoming_dir)) bool setup_propagate = !isempty(p->propagate_dir) && !isempty(p->incoming_dir);
setup_propagate = true; unsigned long mount_propagation_flag = p->mount_propagation_flag != 0 ? p->mount_propagation_flag : MS_SHARED;
if (mount_propagation_flag == 0) if (p->root_image) {
mount_propagation_flag = MS_SHARED;
if (root_image) {
/* Make the whole image read-only if we can determine that we only access it in a read-only fashion. */ /* Make the whole image read-only if we can determine that we only access it in a read-only fashion. */
if (root_read_only(read_only_paths, if (root_read_only(p->read_only_paths,
ns_info->protect_system) && p->protect_system) &&
home_read_only(read_only_paths, inaccessible_paths, empty_directories, home_read_only(p->read_only_paths, p->inaccessible_paths, p->empty_directories,
bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts, temporary_filesystems, n_temporary_filesystems, p->bind_mounts, p->n_bind_mounts, p->temporary_filesystems, p->n_temporary_filesystems,
ns_info->protect_home) && p->protect_home) &&
strv_isempty(read_write_paths)) strv_isempty(p->read_write_paths))
dissect_image_flags |= DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY; dissect_image_flags |= DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY;
SET_FLAG(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE, verity && verity->data_path); SET_FLAG(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE, p->verity && p->verity->data_path);
r = loop_device_make_by_path( r = loop_device_make_by_path(
root_image, p->root_image,
FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_DEVICE_READ_ONLY) ? O_RDONLY : -1 /* < 0 means writable if possible, read-only as fallback */, FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_DEVICE_READ_ONLY) ? O_RDONLY : -1 /* < 0 means writable if possible, read-only as fallback */,
/* sector_size= */ UINT32_MAX, /* sector_size= */ UINT32_MAX,
FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE) ? 0 : LO_FLAGS_PARTSCAN, FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE) ? 0 : LO_FLAGS_PARTSCAN,
@ -2145,9 +2082,9 @@ int setup_namespace(
r = dissect_loop_device( r = dissect_loop_device(
loop_device, loop_device,
verity, p->verity,
root_image_mount_options, p->root_image_options,
root_image_policy, p->root_image_policy,
dissect_image_flags, dissect_image_flags,
&dissected_image); &dissected_image);
if (r < 0) if (r < 0)
@ -2156,21 +2093,21 @@ int setup_namespace(
r = dissected_image_load_verity_sig_partition( r = dissected_image_load_verity_sig_partition(
dissected_image, dissected_image,
loop_device->fd, loop_device->fd,
verity); p->verity);
if (r < 0) if (r < 0)
return r; return r;
r = dissected_image_decrypt( r = dissected_image_decrypt(
dissected_image, dissected_image,
NULL, NULL,
verity, p->verity,
dissect_image_flags); dissect_image_flags);
if (r < 0) if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to decrypt dissected image: %m"); return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to decrypt dissected image: %m");
} }
if (root_directory) if (p->root_directory)
root = root_directory; root = p->root_directory;
else { else {
/* /run/systemd should have been created by PID 1 early on already, but in some cases, like /* /run/systemd should have been created by PID 1 early on already, but in some cases, like
* when running tests (test-execute), it might not have been created yet so let's make sure * when running tests (test-execute), it might not have been created yet so let's make sure
@ -2189,7 +2126,7 @@ int setup_namespace(
require_prefix = true; require_prefix = true;
} }
if (n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(extension_directories)) { if (p->n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(p->extension_directories)) {
/* Hierarchy population needs to be done for sysext and confext extension images */ /* Hierarchy population needs to be done for sysext and confext extension images */
r = parse_env_extension_hierarchies(&hierarchies, "SYSTEMD_SYSEXT_AND_CONFEXT_HIERARCHIES"); r = parse_env_extension_hierarchies(&hierarchies, "SYSTEMD_SYSEXT_AND_CONFEXT_HIERARCHIES");
if (r < 0) if (r < 0)
@ -2197,92 +2134,76 @@ int setup_namespace(
} }
n_mounts = namespace_calculate_mounts( n_mounts = namespace_calculate_mounts(
ns_info, p,
read_write_paths, hierarchies,
read_only_paths, setup_propagate);
inaccessible_paths,
exec_paths,
no_exec_paths,
empty_directories,
n_bind_mounts,
n_temporary_filesystems,
n_mount_images,
n_extension_images,
strv_length(extension_directories),
strv_length(hierarchies),
tmp_dir, var_tmp_dir,
creds_path,
log_namespace,
setup_propagate,
notify_socket,
host_os_release_stage);
if (n_mounts > 0) { if (n_mounts > 0) {
m = mounts = new0(MountEntry, n_mounts); m = mounts = new0(MountEntry, n_mounts);
if (!mounts) if (!mounts)
return -ENOMEM; return -ENOMEM;
r = append_access_mounts(&m, read_write_paths, READWRITE, require_prefix); r = append_access_mounts(&m, p->read_write_paths, READWRITE, require_prefix);
if (r < 0) if (r < 0)
goto finish; goto finish;
r = append_access_mounts(&m, read_only_paths, READONLY, require_prefix); r = append_access_mounts(&m, p->read_only_paths, READONLY, require_prefix);
if (r < 0) if (r < 0)
goto finish; goto finish;
r = append_access_mounts(&m, inaccessible_paths, INACCESSIBLE, require_prefix); r = append_access_mounts(&m, p->inaccessible_paths, INACCESSIBLE, require_prefix);
if (r < 0) if (r < 0)
goto finish; goto finish;
r = append_access_mounts(&m, exec_paths, EXEC, require_prefix); r = append_access_mounts(&m, p->exec_paths, EXEC, require_prefix);
if (r < 0) if (r < 0)
goto finish; goto finish;
r = append_access_mounts(&m, no_exec_paths, NOEXEC, require_prefix); r = append_access_mounts(&m, p->no_exec_paths, NOEXEC, require_prefix);
if (r < 0) if (r < 0)
goto finish; goto finish;
r = append_empty_dir_mounts(&m, empty_directories); r = append_empty_dir_mounts(&m, p->empty_directories);
if (r < 0) if (r < 0)
goto finish; goto finish;
r = append_bind_mounts(&m, bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts); r = append_bind_mounts(&m, p->bind_mounts, p->n_bind_mounts);
if (r < 0) if (r < 0)
goto finish; goto finish;
r = append_tmpfs_mounts(&m, temporary_filesystems, n_temporary_filesystems); r = append_tmpfs_mounts(&m, p->temporary_filesystems, p->n_temporary_filesystems);
if (r < 0) if (r < 0)
goto finish; goto finish;
if (tmp_dir) { if (p->tmp_dir) {
bool ro = streq(tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY); bool ro = streq(p->tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
*(m++) = (MountEntry) { *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/tmp", .path_const = "/tmp",
.mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP, .mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP,
.source_const = tmp_dir, .source_const = p->tmp_dir,
}; };
} }
if (var_tmp_dir) { if (p->var_tmp_dir) {
bool ro = streq(var_tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY); bool ro = streq(p->var_tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
*(m++) = (MountEntry) { *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/var/tmp", .path_const = "/var/tmp",
.mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP, .mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP,
.source_const = var_tmp_dir, .source_const = p->var_tmp_dir,
}; };
} }
r = append_mount_images(&m, mount_images, n_mount_images); r = append_mount_images(&m, p->mount_images, p->n_mount_images);
if (r < 0) if (r < 0)
goto finish; goto finish;
r = append_extensions(&m, root, extension_dir, hierarchies, extension_images, n_extension_images, extension_directories); r = append_extensions(&m, root, p->extension_dir, hierarchies, p->extension_images, p->n_extension_images, p->extension_directories);
if (r < 0) if (r < 0)
goto finish; goto finish;
if (ns_info->private_dev) if (p->private_dev)
*(m++) = (MountEntry) { *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/dev", .path_const = "/dev",
.mode = PRIVATE_DEV, .mode = PRIVATE_DEV,
@ -2292,8 +2213,8 @@ int setup_namespace(
/* In case /proc is successfully mounted with pid tree subset only (ProcSubset=pid), the /* In case /proc is successfully mounted with pid tree subset only (ProcSubset=pid), the
protective mounts to non-pid /proc paths would fail. But the pid only option may have protective mounts to non-pid /proc paths would fail. But the pid only option may have
failed gracefully, so let's try the mounts but it's not fatal if they don't succeed. */ failed gracefully, so let's try the mounts but it's not fatal if they don't succeed. */
bool ignore_protect_proc = ns_info->ignore_protect_paths || ns_info->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID; bool ignore_protect_proc = p->ignore_protect_paths || p->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID;
if (ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables) { if (p->protect_kernel_tunables) {
r = append_static_mounts(&m, r = append_static_mounts(&m,
protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table, protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table,
ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table), ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table),
@ -2304,21 +2225,21 @@ int setup_namespace(
r = append_static_mounts(&m, r = append_static_mounts(&m,
protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table, protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table,
ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table), ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table),
ns_info->ignore_protect_paths); p->ignore_protect_paths);
if (r < 0) if (r < 0)
goto finish; goto finish;
} }
if (ns_info->protect_kernel_modules) { if (p->protect_kernel_modules) {
r = append_static_mounts(&m, r = append_static_mounts(&m,
protect_kernel_modules_table, protect_kernel_modules_table,
ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table), ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table),
ns_info->ignore_protect_paths); p->ignore_protect_paths);
if (r < 0) if (r < 0)
goto finish; goto finish;
} }
if (ns_info->protect_kernel_logs) { if (p->protect_kernel_logs) {
r = append_static_mounts(&m, r = append_static_mounts(&m,
protect_kernel_logs_proc_table, protect_kernel_logs_proc_table,
ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_proc_table), ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_proc_table),
@ -2329,30 +2250,30 @@ int setup_namespace(
r = append_static_mounts(&m, r = append_static_mounts(&m,
protect_kernel_logs_dev_table, protect_kernel_logs_dev_table,
ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_dev_table), ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_dev_table),
ns_info->ignore_protect_paths); p->ignore_protect_paths);
if (r < 0) if (r < 0)
goto finish; goto finish;
} }
if (ns_info->protect_control_groups) if (p->protect_control_groups)
*(m++) = (MountEntry) { *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/sys/fs/cgroup", .path_const = "/sys/fs/cgroup",
.mode = READONLY, .mode = READONLY,
}; };
r = append_protect_home(&m, ns_info->protect_home, ns_info->ignore_protect_paths); r = append_protect_home(&m, p->protect_home, p->ignore_protect_paths);
if (r < 0) if (r < 0)
goto finish; goto finish;
r = append_protect_system(&m, ns_info->protect_system, false); r = append_protect_system(&m, p->protect_system, false);
if (r < 0) if (r < 0)
goto finish; goto finish;
if (namespace_info_mount_apivfs(ns_info)) { if (namespace_parameters_mount_apivfs(p)) {
r = append_static_mounts(&m, r = append_static_mounts(&m,
apivfs_table, apivfs_table,
ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table), ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table),
ns_info->ignore_protect_paths); p->ignore_protect_paths);
if (r < 0) if (r < 0)
goto finish; goto finish;
} }
@ -2360,7 +2281,7 @@ int setup_namespace(
/* Note, if proc is mounted with subset=pid then neither of the /* Note, if proc is mounted with subset=pid then neither of the
* two paths will exist, i.e. they are implicitly protected by * two paths will exist, i.e. they are implicitly protected by
* the mount option. */ * the mount option. */
if (ns_info->protect_hostname) { if (p->protect_hostname) {
*(m++) = (MountEntry) { *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/hostname", .path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/hostname",
.mode = READONLY, .mode = READONLY,
@ -2373,20 +2294,20 @@ int setup_namespace(
}; };
} }
if (ns_info->private_network) if (p->private_network)
*(m++) = (MountEntry) { *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/sys", .path_const = "/sys",
.mode = PRIVATE_SYSFS, .mode = PRIVATE_SYSFS,
}; };
if (ns_info->private_ipc) if (p->private_ipc)
*(m++) = (MountEntry) { *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/dev/mqueue", .path_const = "/dev/mqueue",
.mode = MQUEUEFS, .mode = MQUEUEFS,
.flags = MS_NOSUID | MS_NODEV | MS_NOEXEC | MS_RELATIME, .flags = MS_NOSUID | MS_NODEV | MS_NOEXEC | MS_RELATIME,
}; };
if (creds_path) { if (p->creds_path) {
/* If our service has a credentials store configured, then bind that one in, but hide /* If our service has a credentials store configured, then bind that one in, but hide
* everything else. */ * everything else. */
@ -2399,10 +2320,10 @@ int setup_namespace(
}; };
*(m++) = (MountEntry) { *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = creds_path, .path_const = p->creds_path,
.mode = BIND_MOUNT, .mode = BIND_MOUNT,
.read_only = true, .read_only = true,
.source_const = creds_path, .source_const = p->creds_path,
.ignore = true, .ignore = true,
}; };
} else { } else {
@ -2416,10 +2337,10 @@ int setup_namespace(
}; };
} }
if (log_namespace) { if (p->log_namespace) {
_cleanup_free_ char *q = NULL; _cleanup_free_ char *q = NULL;
q = strjoin("/run/systemd/journal.", log_namespace); q = strjoin("/run/systemd/journal.", p->log_namespace);
if (!q) { if (!q) {
r = -ENOMEM; r = -ENOMEM;
goto finish; goto finish;
@ -2436,24 +2357,24 @@ int setup_namespace(
/* Will be used to add bind mounts at runtime */ /* Will be used to add bind mounts at runtime */
if (setup_propagate) if (setup_propagate)
*(m++) = (MountEntry) { *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
.source_const = propagate_dir, .source_const = p->propagate_dir,
.path_const = incoming_dir, .path_const = p->incoming_dir,
.mode = BIND_MOUNT, .mode = BIND_MOUNT,
.read_only = true, .read_only = true,
}; };
if (notify_socket) if (p->notify_socket)
*(m++) = (MountEntry) { *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = notify_socket, .path_const = p->notify_socket,
.source_const = notify_socket, .source_const = p->notify_socket,
.mode = BIND_MOUNT, .mode = BIND_MOUNT,
.read_only = true, .read_only = true,
}; };
if (host_os_release_stage) if (p->host_os_release_stage)
*(m++) = (MountEntry) { *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/run/host/.os-release-stage/", .path_const = "/run/host/.os-release-stage/",
.source_const = host_os_release_stage, .source_const = p->host_os_release_stage,
.mode = BIND_MOUNT, .mode = BIND_MOUNT,
.read_only = true, .read_only = true,
.ignore = true, /* Live copy, don't hard-fail if it goes missing */ .ignore = true, /* Live copy, don't hard-fail if it goes missing */
@ -2486,12 +2407,12 @@ int setup_namespace(
/* Create the source directory to allow runtime propagation of mounts */ /* Create the source directory to allow runtime propagation of mounts */
if (setup_propagate) if (setup_propagate)
(void) mkdir_p(propagate_dir, 0600); (void) mkdir_p(p->propagate_dir, 0600);
if (n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(extension_directories)) if (p->n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(p->extension_directories))
/* ExtensionImages/Directories mountpoint directories will be created while parsing the /* ExtensionImages/Directories mountpoint directories will be created while parsing the
* mounts to create, so have the parent ready */ * mounts to create, so have the parent ready */
(void) mkdir_p(extension_dir, 0600); (void) mkdir_p(p->extension_dir, 0600);
/* Remount / as SLAVE so that nothing now mounted in the namespace /* Remount / as SLAVE so that nothing now mounted in the namespace
* shows up in the parent */ * shows up in the parent */
@ -2500,7 +2421,7 @@ int setup_namespace(
goto finish; goto finish;
} }
if (root_image) { if (p->root_image) {
/* A root image is specified, mount it to the right place */ /* A root image is specified, mount it to the right place */
r = dissected_image_mount( r = dissected_image_mount(
dissected_image, dissected_image,
@ -2528,7 +2449,7 @@ int setup_namespace(
goto finish; goto finish;
} }
} else if (root_directory) { } else if (p->root_directory) {
/* A root directory is specified. Turn its directory into bind mount, if it isn't one yet. */ /* A root directory is specified. Turn its directory into bind mount, if it isn't one yet. */
r = path_is_mount_point(root, NULL, AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW); r = path_is_mount_point(root, NULL, AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW);
@ -2550,24 +2471,20 @@ int setup_namespace(
} }
/* Try to set up the new root directory before mounting anything else there. */ /* Try to set up the new root directory before mounting anything else there. */
if (root_image || root_directory) if (p->root_image || p->root_directory)
(void) base_filesystem_create(root, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID); (void) base_filesystem_create(root, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID);
/* Now make the magic happen */ /* Now make the magic happen */
r = apply_mounts(root, r = apply_mounts(root,
mount_image_policy, p,
extension_image_policy,
ns_info,
mounts, &n_mounts, mounts, &n_mounts,
scope,
symlinks,
error_path); error_path);
if (r < 0) if (r < 0)
goto finish; goto finish;
/* MS_MOVE does not work on MS_SHARED so the remount MS_SHARED will be done later */ /* MS_MOVE does not work on MS_SHARED so the remount MS_SHARED will be done later */
r = mount_switch_root(root, /* mount_propagation_flag = */ 0); r = mount_switch_root(root, /* mount_propagation_flag = */ 0);
if (r == -EINVAL && root_directory) { if (r == -EINVAL && p->root_directory) {
/* If we are using root_directory and we don't have privileges (ie: user manager in a user /* If we are using root_directory and we don't have privileges (ie: user manager in a user
* namespace) and the root_directory is already a mount point in the parent namespace, * namespace) and the root_directory is already a mount point in the parent namespace,
* MS_MOVE will fail as we don't have permission to change it (with EINVAL rather than * MS_MOVE will fail as we don't have permission to change it (with EINVAL rather than
@ -2593,9 +2510,9 @@ int setup_namespace(
/* bind_mount_in_namespace() will MS_MOVE into that directory, and that's only /* bind_mount_in_namespace() will MS_MOVE into that directory, and that's only
* supported for non-shared mounts. This needs to happen after remounting / or it will fail. */ * supported for non-shared mounts. This needs to happen after remounting / or it will fail. */
if (setup_propagate) { if (setup_propagate) {
r = mount(NULL, incoming_dir, NULL, MS_SLAVE, NULL); r = mount(NULL, p->incoming_dir, NULL, MS_SLAVE, NULL);
if (r < 0) { if (r < 0) {
log_error_errno(r, "Failed to remount %s with MS_SLAVE: %m", incoming_dir); log_error_errno(r, "Failed to remount %s with MS_SLAVE: %m", p->incoming_dir);
goto finish; goto finish;
} }
} }

128
src/core/namespace.h
View File

@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
Copyright © 2016 Djalal Harouni Copyright © 2016 Djalal Harouni
***/ ***/
typedef struct NamespaceInfo NamespaceInfo; typedef struct NamespaceParameters NamespaceParameters;
typedef struct BindMount BindMount; typedef struct BindMount BindMount;
typedef struct TemporaryFileSystem TemporaryFileSystem; typedef struct TemporaryFileSystem TemporaryFileSystem;
typedef struct MountImage MountImage; typedef struct MountImage MountImage;
@ -53,24 +53,6 @@ typedef enum ProcSubset {
_PROC_SUBSET_INVALID = -EINVAL, _PROC_SUBSET_INVALID = -EINVAL,
} ProcSubset; } ProcSubset;
struct NamespaceInfo {
bool ignore_protect_paths;
bool private_dev;
bool protect_control_groups;
bool protect_kernel_tunables;
bool protect_kernel_modules;
bool protect_kernel_logs;
bool mount_apivfs;
bool protect_hostname;
bool private_network;
bool private_ipc;
bool mount_nosuid;
ProtectHome protect_home;
ProtectSystem protect_system;
ProtectProc protect_proc;
ProcSubset proc_subset;
};
struct BindMount { struct BindMount {
char *source; char *source;
char *destination; char *destination;
@ -100,43 +82,77 @@ struct MountImage {
MountImageType type; MountImageType type;
}; };
int setup_namespace( struct NamespaceParameters {
const char *root_directory, RuntimeScope runtime_scope;
const char *root_image,
const MountOptions *root_image_options, const char *root_directory;
const ImagePolicy *root_image_policy, const char *root_image;
const NamespaceInfo *ns_info, const MountOptions *root_image_options;
char **read_write_paths, const ImagePolicy *root_image_policy;
char **read_only_paths,
char **inaccessible_paths, char **read_write_paths;
char **exec_paths, char **read_only_paths;
char **no_exec_paths, char **inaccessible_paths;
char **empty_directories,
char **symlinks, char **exec_paths;
const BindMount *bind_mounts, char **no_exec_paths;
size_t n_bind_mounts,
const TemporaryFileSystem *temporary_filesystems, char **empty_directories;
size_t n_temporary_filesystems, char **symlinks;
const MountImage *mount_images,
size_t n_mount_images, const BindMount *bind_mounts;
const ImagePolicy *mount_image_policy, size_t n_bind_mounts;
const char *tmp_dir,
const char *var_tmp_dir, const TemporaryFileSystem *temporary_filesystems;
const char *creds_path, size_t n_temporary_filesystems;
const char *log_namespace,
unsigned long mount_propagation_flag, const MountImage *mount_images;
VeritySettings *verity, size_t n_mount_images;
const MountImage *extension_images, const ImagePolicy *mount_image_policy;
size_t n_extension_images,
const ImagePolicy *extension_image_policy, const char *tmp_dir;
char **extension_directories, const char *var_tmp_dir;
const char *propagate_dir,
const char *incoming_dir, const char *creds_path;
const char *extension_dir, const char *log_namespace;
const char *notify_socket,
const char *host_os_release_stage, unsigned long mount_propagation_flag;
RuntimeScope scope, VeritySettings *verity;
char **error_path);
const MountImage *extension_images;
size_t n_extension_images;
const ImagePolicy *extension_image_policy;
char **extension_directories;
const char *propagate_dir;
const char *incoming_dir;
const char *extension_dir;
const char *notify_socket;
const char *host_os_release_stage;
bool ignore_protect_paths;
bool protect_control_groups;
bool protect_kernel_tunables;
bool protect_kernel_modules;
bool protect_kernel_logs;
bool protect_hostname;
bool private_dev;
bool private_network;
bool private_ipc;
bool mount_apivfs;
bool mount_nosuid;
ProtectHome protect_home;
ProtectSystem protect_system;
ProtectProc protect_proc;
ProcSubset proc_subset;
};
int setup_namespace(const NamespaceParameters *p, char **error_path);
#define RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY "/run/systemd/empty" #define RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY "/run/systemd/empty"

41
src/test/test-namespace.c
View File

@ -149,11 +149,12 @@ TEST(ipcns) {
} }
TEST(protect_kernel_logs) { TEST(protect_kernel_logs) {
int r; static const NamespaceParameters p = {
pid_t pid; .runtime_scope = RUNTIME_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
static const NamespaceInfo ns_info = {
.protect_kernel_logs = true, .protect_kernel_logs = true,
}; };
pid_t pid;
int r;
if (geteuid() > 0) { if (geteuid() > 0) {
(void) log_tests_skipped("not root"); (void) log_tests_skipped("not root");
@ -175,39 +176,7 @@ TEST(protect_kernel_logs) {
fd = open("/dev/kmsg", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); fd = open("/dev/kmsg", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
assert_se(fd > 0); assert_se(fd > 0);
r = setup_namespace(NULL, r = setup_namespace(&p, NULL);
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
&ns_info,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL, 0,
NULL, 0,
NULL, 0,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
0,
NULL,
NULL,
0,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
RUNTIME_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
NULL);
assert_se(r == 0); assert_se(r == 0);
assert_se(setresuid(UID_NOBODY, UID_NOBODY, UID_NOBODY) >= 0); assert_se(setresuid(UID_NOBODY, UID_NOBODY, UID_NOBODY) >= 0);

80
src/test/test-ns.c
View File

@ -44,13 +44,15 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
NULL NULL
}; };
static const NamespaceInfo ns_info = { static const BindMount bind_mount = {
.private_dev = true, .source = (char*) "/usr/bin",
.protect_control_groups = true, .destination = (char*) "/etc/systemd",
.protect_kernel_tunables = true, .read_only = true,
.protect_kernel_modules = true, };
.protect_proc = PROTECT_PROC_NOACCESS,
.proc_subset = PROC_SUBSET_PID, static const TemporaryFileSystem tmpfs = {
.path = (char*) "/var",
.options = (char*) "ro",
}; };
char *root_directory; char *root_directory;
@ -76,40 +78,36 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
else else
log_info("Not chrooted"); log_info("Not chrooted");
r = setup_namespace(root_directory, NamespaceParameters p = {
NULL, .runtime_scope = RUNTIME_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
NULL,
NULL, .root_directory = root_directory,
&ns_info,
(char **) writable, .read_write_paths = (char**) writable,
(char **) readonly, .read_only_paths = (char**) readonly,
(char **) inaccessible, .inaccessible_paths = (char**) inaccessible,
NULL,
(char **) exec, .exec_paths = (char**) exec,
(char **) no_exec, .no_exec_paths = (char**) no_exec,
NULL,
&(BindMount) { .source = (char*) "/usr/bin", .destination = (char*) "/etc/systemd", .read_only = true }, 1, .tmp_dir = tmp_dir,
&(TemporaryFileSystem) { .path = (char*) "/var", .options = (char*) "ro" }, 1, .var_tmp_dir = var_tmp_dir,
NULL,
0, .bind_mounts = &bind_mount,
NULL, .n_bind_mounts = 1,
tmp_dir,
var_tmp_dir, .temporary_filesystems = &tmpfs,
NULL, .n_temporary_filesystems = 1,
NULL,
0, .private_dev = true,
NULL, .protect_control_groups = true,
NULL, .protect_kernel_tunables = true,
0, .protect_kernel_modules = true,
NULL, .protect_proc = PROTECT_PROC_NOACCESS,
NULL, .proc_subset = PROC_SUBSET_PID,
NULL, };
NULL,
NULL, r = setup_namespace(&p, NULL);
NULL,
NULL,
RUNTIME_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
NULL);
if (r < 0) { if (r < 0) {
log_error_errno(r, "Failed to set up namespace: %m"); log_error_errno(r, "Failed to set up namespace: %m");