Merge pull request #4450 from poettering/seccompfixes

Various seccomp fixes and NEWS update.

Makefile.am

@@ -1558,6 +1558,11 @@ tests += \
 	test-acl-util
 endif
 
+if HAVE_SECCOMP
+tests += \
+	test-seccomp
+endif
+
 EXTRA_DIST += \
 	test/a.service \
 	test/basic.target \
@@ -2026,6 +2031,12 @@ test_acl_util_SOURCES = \
 test_acl_util_LDADD = \
 	libsystemd-shared.la
 
+test_seccomp_SOURCES = \
+	src/test/test-seccomp.c
+
+test_seccomp_LDADD = \
+	libsystemd-shared.la
+
 test_namespace_LDADD = \
 	libcore.la
 

NEWS

@@ -35,14 +35,14 @@ CHANGES WITH 232 in spe
           ProtectSystem=strict enabled, so they are not able to make any
           permanent modifications to the system.
 
-          The nss-systemd module also always resolves root and nobody, making
+        * The nss-systemd module also always resolves root and nobody, making
           it possible to have no /etc/passwd or /etc/group files in minimal
-          container systems.
+          container or chroot environments.
 
         * Services may be started with their own user namespace using the new
-          PrivateUsers= option. Only root, nobody, and the uid/gid under which
+          boolean PrivateUsers= option. Only root, nobody, and the uid/gid
-          the service is running are mapped. All other users are mapped to
+          under which the service is running are mapped. All other users are
-          nobody.
+          mapped to nobody.
 
         * Support for the cgroup namespace has been added to systemd-nspawn. If
           supported by kernel, the container system started by systemd-nspawn
@@ -57,12 +57,22 @@ CHANGES WITH 232 in spe
           options. This controller requires out-of-tree patches for the kernel
           and the support is provisional.
 
-        * .automount units may now be transient.
+        * Mount and automount units may now be created transiently
+          (i.e. dynamically at runtime via the bus API, instead of requiring
+          unit files in the file system).
 
-        * systemd-mount is a new tool which wraps mount(8) to pull in
+        * systemd-mount is a new tool which may mount file systems – much like
-          additional dependencies through transient .mount and .automount
+          mount(8), optionally pulling in additional dependencies through
-          units. For example, this automatically runs fsck on the block device
+          transient .mount and .automount units. For example, this tool
-          before mounting, and allows the automount logic to be used.
+          automatically runs fsck on a backing block device before mounting,
+          and allows the automount logic to be used dynamically from the
+          command line for establishing mount points. This tool is particularly
+          useful when dealing with removable media, as it will ensure fsck is
+          run – if necessary – before the first access and that the file system
+          is quickly unmounted after each access by utilizing the automount
+          logic. This maximizes the chance that the file system on the
+          removable media stays in a clean state, and if it isn't in a clean
+          state is fixed automatically.
 
         * LazyUnmount=yes option for mount units has been added to expose the
           umount --lazy option. Similarly, ForceUnmount=yes exposes the --force
@@ -75,6 +85,12 @@ CHANGES WITH 232 in spe
           mount the EFI partition on systems where /boot is used for something
           else.
 
+        * When operating on GPT disk images for containers, systemd-nspawn will
+          now mount the ESP to /boot or /efi according to the same rules as PID
+          1 running on a host. This allows tools like "bootctl" to operate
+          correctly within such containers, in order to make container images
+          bootable on physical systems.
+
         * disk/by-id and disk/by-path symlinks are now created for NVMe drives.
 
         * Two new user session targets have been added to support running
@@ -95,7 +111,7 @@ CHANGES WITH 232 in spe
           the top of the process hierarchy (which is usually the init process
           of the container).
 
-        * systemd-journal-gatewayd learned the --directory option to serve
+        * systemd-journal-gatewayd learned the --directory= option to serve
           files from the specified location.
 
         * journalctl --root=… can be used to peruse the journal in the
@@ -112,23 +128,26 @@ CHANGES WITH 232 in spe
           a click rate that is different than the one for the vertical wheel.
 
         * systemd-run gained a new --wait option that makes service execution
-          synchronous.
+          synchronous. (Specifically, the command will not return until the
+          specified service binary exited.)
 
-          systemctl gained a new --wait option that causes the start command to
+        * systemctl gained a new --wait option that causes the start command to
           wait until the units being started have terminated again.
 
-        * A new journal output mode "short-full" has been added which uses
+        * A new journal output mode "short-full" has been added which displays
           timestamps with abbreviated English day names and adds a timezone
-          suffix. Those timestamps include more information and can be parsed
+          suffix. Those timestamps include more information than the default
-          by journalctl.
+          "short" output mode, and can be passed directly to journalctl's
+          --since= and --until= options.
 
         * /etc/resolv.conf will be bind-mounted into containers started by
           systemd-nspawn, if possible, so any changes to resolv.conf contents
           are automatically propagated to the container.
 
         * The number of instances for socket-activated services originating
-          from a single IP can be limited with MaxConnectionsPerSource=,
+          from a single IP address can be limited with
-          extending the existing setting of MaxConnections.
+          MaxConnectionsPerSource=, extending the existing setting of
+          MaxConnections=.
 
         * systemd-networkd gained support for vcan ("Virtual CAN") interface
           configuration.
@@ -143,21 +162,23 @@ CHANGES WITH 232 in spe
           GenericReceiveOffload=, LargeReceiveOffload= options in the
           [Link] section of .link files.
 
-          Spanning Tree Protocol enablement, Priority, Aging Time, and the
+        * The Spanning Tree Protocol, Priority, Aging Time, and the Default
-          Default Port VLAN ID can be configured for bridge devices using the
+          Port VLAN ID can be configured for bridge devices using the new STP=,
-          new STP=, Priority=, AgeingTimeSec=, and DefaultPVID= settings in the
+          Priority=, AgeingTimeSec=, and DefaultPVID= settings in the [Bridge]
-          [Bridge] section of .netdev files.
+          section of .netdev files.
 
-          The route table to which routes received over DHCP or RA should be
+        * The route table to which routes received over DHCP or RA should be
           added can be configured with the new RouteTable= option in the [DHCP]
           and [IPv6AcceptRA] sections of .network files.
 
-          Address Resolution Protocol can be disabled on links managed by
+        * The Address Resolution Protocol can be disabled on links managed by
           systemd-networkd using the ARP=no setting in the [Link] section of
           .network files.
 
-        * $SERVICE_RESULT, $EXIT_CODE, $EXIT_STATUS are set for ExecStop= and
+        * New environment variables $SERVICE_RESULT, $EXIT_CODE and
-          ExecStopPost= commands.
+          $EXIT_STATUS are set for ExecStop= and ExecStopPost= commands, and
+          encode information about the result and exit codes of the current
+          service runtime cycle.
 
         * systemd-sysctl will now configure kernel parameters in the order
           they occur in the configuration files. This matches what sysctl
@@ -184,6 +205,30 @@ CHANGES WITH 232 in spe
           $SYSTEMD_NSPAWN_SHARE_NS_UTS may be used to control the unsharing of
           individual namespaces.
 
+        * "machinectl list" now shows the IP address of running containers in
+          the output, as well as OS release information.
+
+        * "loginctl list" now shows the TTY of each session in the output.
+
+        * sd-bus gained new API calls sd_bus_track_set_recursive(),
+          sd_bus_track_get_recursive(), sd_bus_track_count_name(),
+          sd_bus_track_count_sender(). They permit usage of sd_bus_track peer
+          tracking objects in a "recursive" mode, where a single client can be
+          counted multiple times, if it takes multiple references.
+
+        * sd-bus gained new API calls sd_bus_set_exit_on_disconnect() and
+          sd_bus_get_exit_on_disconnect(). They may be used to to make a
+          process using sd-bus automatically exit if the bus connection is
+          severed.
+
+        * Bus clients of the service manager may now "pin" loaded units into
+          memory, by taking an explicit reference on them. This is useful to
+          ensure the client can retrieve runtime data about the service even
+          after the service completed execution. Taking such a reference is
+          available only for privileged clients and should be helpful to watch
+          running services in a race-free manner, and in particular collect
+          information about exit statuses and results.
+
 CHANGES WITH 231:
 
         * In service units the various ExecXYZ= settings have been extended

src/core/execute.c

@@ -1185,18 +1185,19 @@ static void rename_process_from_path(const char *path) {
 #ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
 
 static bool skip_seccomp_unavailable(const Unit* u, const char* msg) {
-        if (!is_seccomp_available()) {
+
+        if (is_seccomp_available())
+                return false;
+
         log_open();
         log_unit_debug(u, "SECCOMP features not detected in the kernel, skipping %s", msg);
         log_close();
         return true;
-        }
-        return false;
 }
 
 static int apply_seccomp(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) {
         uint32_t negative_action, action;
-        scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp;
+        scmp_filter_ctx seccomp;
         Iterator i;
         void *id;
         int r;
@@ -1247,7 +1248,7 @@ finish:
 }
 
 static int apply_address_families(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) {
-        scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp;
+        scmp_filter_ctx seccomp;
         Iterator i;
         int r;
 
@@ -1256,13 +1257,9 @@ static int apply_address_families(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) {
         if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "RestrictAddressFamilies="))
                 return 0;
 
-        seccomp = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
+        r = seccomp_init_conservative(&seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
-        if (!seccomp)
-                return -ENOMEM;
-
-        r = seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp);
         if (r < 0)
-                goto finish;
+                return r;
 
         if (c->address_families_whitelist) {
                 int af, first = 0, last = 0;
@@ -1359,10 +1356,6 @@ static int apply_address_families(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) {
                 }
         }
 
-        r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 0);
-        if (r < 0)
-                goto finish;
-
         r = seccomp_load(seccomp);
 
 finish:
@@ -1371,7 +1364,7 @@ finish:
 }
 
 static int apply_memory_deny_write_execute(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) {
-        scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp;
+        scmp_filter_ctx seccomp;
         int r;
 
         assert(c);
@@ -1379,13 +1372,9 @@ static int apply_memory_deny_write_execute(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c)
         if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "MemoryDenyWriteExecute="))
                 return 0;
 
-        seccomp = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
+        r = seccomp_init_conservative(&seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
-        if (!seccomp)
-                return -ENOMEM;
-
-        r = seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp);
         if (r < 0)
-                goto finish;
+                return r;
 
         r = seccomp_rule_add(
                         seccomp,
@@ -1405,10 +1394,6 @@ static int apply_memory_deny_write_execute(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c)
         if (r < 0)
                 goto finish;
 
-        r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 0);
-        if (r < 0)
-                goto finish;
-
         r = seccomp_load(seccomp);
 
 finish:
@@ -1423,7 +1408,7 @@ static int apply_restrict_realtime(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) {
                 SCHED_IDLE,
         };
 
-        scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp;
+        scmp_filter_ctx seccomp;
         unsigned i;
         int r, p, max_policy = 0;
 
@@ -1432,13 +1417,9 @@ static int apply_restrict_realtime(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) {
         if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "RestrictRealtime="))
                 return 0;
 
-        seccomp = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
+        r = seccomp_init_conservative(&seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
-        if (!seccomp)
-                return -ENOMEM;
-
-        r = seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp);
         if (r < 0)
-                goto finish;
+                return r;
 
         /* Determine the highest policy constant we want to allow */
         for (i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(permitted_policies); i++)
@@ -1482,10 +1463,6 @@ static int apply_restrict_realtime(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) {
         if (r < 0)
                 goto finish;
 
-        r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 0);
-        if (r < 0)
-                goto finish;
-
         r = seccomp_load(seccomp);
 
 finish:
@@ -1494,7 +1471,7 @@ finish:
 }
 
 static int apply_protect_sysctl(Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
-        scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp;
+        scmp_filter_ctx seccomp;
         int r;
 
         assert(c);
@@ -1505,13 +1482,9 @@ static int apply_protect_sysctl(Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
         if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectKernelTunables="))
                 return 0;
 
-        seccomp = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
+        r = seccomp_init_conservative(&seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
-        if (!seccomp)
-                return -ENOMEM;
-
-        r = seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp);
         if (r < 0)
-                goto finish;
+                return r;
 
         r = seccomp_rule_add(
                         seccomp,
@@ -1521,10 +1494,6 @@ static int apply_protect_sysctl(Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
         if (r < 0)
                 goto finish;
 
-        r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 0);
-        if (r < 0)
-                goto finish;
-
         r = seccomp_load(seccomp);
 
 finish:
@@ -1533,56 +1502,17 @@ finish:
 }
 
 static int apply_protect_kernel_modules(Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
-        static const int module_syscalls[] = {
-                SCMP_SYS(delete_module),
-                SCMP_SYS(finit_module),
-                SCMP_SYS(init_module),
-        };
-
-        scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp;
-        unsigned i;
-        int r;
-
         assert(c);
 
-        /* Turn of module syscalls on ProtectKernelModules=yes */
+        /* Turn off module syscalls on ProtectKernelModules=yes */
 
         if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectKernelModules="))
                 return 0;
 
-        seccomp = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
+        return seccomp_load_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MODULE, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM));
-        if (!seccomp)
-                return -ENOMEM;
-
-        r = seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp);
-        if (r < 0)
-                goto finish;
-
-        for (i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(module_syscalls); i++) {
-                r = seccomp_rule_add(seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
-                                     module_syscalls[i], 0);
-                if (r < 0)
-                        goto finish;
-        }
-
-        r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 0);
-        if (r < 0)
-                goto finish;
-
-        r = seccomp_load(seccomp);
-
-finish:
-        seccomp_release(seccomp);
-        return r;
 }
 
 static int apply_private_devices(Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
-        const SystemCallFilterSet *set;
-        scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp;
-        const char *sys;
-        bool syscalls_found = false;
-        int r;
-
         assert(c);
 
         /* If PrivateDevices= is set, also turn off iopl and all @raw-io syscalls. */
@@ -1590,61 +1520,7 @@ static int apply_private_devices(Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
         if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "PrivateDevices="))
                 return 0;
 
-        seccomp = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
+        return seccomp_load_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM));
-        if (!seccomp)
-                return -ENOMEM;
-
-        r = seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp);
-        if (r < 0)
-                goto finish;
-
-        for (set = syscall_filter_sets; set->set_name; set++)
-                if (streq(set->set_name, "@raw-io")) {
-                        syscalls_found = true;
-                        break;
-                }
-
-        /* We should never fail here */
-        if (!syscalls_found) {
-                r = -EOPNOTSUPP;
-                goto finish;
-        }
-
-        NULSTR_FOREACH(sys, set->value) {
-                int id;
-                bool add = true;
-
-#ifndef __NR_s390_pci_mmio_read
-                if (streq(sys, "s390_pci_mmio_read"))
-                        add = false;
-#endif
-#ifndef __NR_s390_pci_mmio_write
-                if (streq(sys, "s390_pci_mmio_write"))
-                        add = false;
-#endif
-
-                if (!add)
-                        continue;
-
-                id = seccomp_syscall_resolve_name(sys);
-
-                r = seccomp_rule_add(
-                                seccomp,
-                                SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
-                                id, 0);
-                if (r < 0)
-                        goto finish;
-        }
-
-        r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 0);
-        if (r < 0)
-                goto finish;
-
-        r = seccomp_load(seccomp);
-
-finish:
-        seccomp_release(seccomp);
-        return r;
 }
 
 #endif
@@ -1890,9 +1766,9 @@ static int setup_private_users(uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
                 asprintf(&uid_map,
                          "0 0 1\n"                      /* Map root → root */
                          UID_FMT " " UID_FMT " 1\n",    /* Map $UID → $UID */
-                         uid, uid);                     /* The case where the above is the same */
+                         uid, uid);
         else
-                uid_map = strdup("0 0 1\n");
+                uid_map = strdup("0 0 1\n");            /* The case where the above is the same */
         if (!uid_map)
                 return -ENOMEM;
 

src/core/load-fragment.c

@@ -2618,6 +2618,7 @@ int config_parse_documentation(const char *unit,
 }
 
 #ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+
 static int syscall_filter_parse_one(
                 const char *unit,
                 const char *filename,
@@ -2628,27 +2629,29 @@ static int syscall_filter_parse_one(
                 bool warn) {
         int r;
 
-        if (*t == '@') {
+        if (t[0] == '@') {
-                const SystemCallFilterSet *set;
+                const SyscallFilterSet *set;
+                const char *i;
 
-                for (set = syscall_filter_sets; set->set_name; set++)
+                set = syscall_filter_set_find(t);
-                        if (streq(set->set_name, t)) {
+                if (!set) {
-                                const char *sys;
+                        if (warn)
+                                log_syntax(unit, LOG_WARNING, filename, line, 0, "Don't know system call group, ignoring: %s", t);
+                        return 0;
+                }
 
-                                NULSTR_FOREACH(sys, set->value) {
+                NULSTR_FOREACH(i, set->value) {
-                                        r = syscall_filter_parse_one(unit, filename, line, c, invert, sys, false);
+                        r = syscall_filter_parse_one(unit, filename, line, c, invert, i, false);
                         if (r < 0)
                                 return r;
                 }
-                                break;
-                        }
         } else {
                 int id;
 
                 id = seccomp_syscall_resolve_name(t);
                 if (id == __NR_SCMP_ERROR)  {
                         if (warn)
-                                log_syntax(unit, LOG_ERR, filename, line, 0, "Failed to parse system call, ignoring: %s", t);
+                                log_syntax(unit, LOG_WARNING, filename, line, 0, "Failed to parse system call, ignoring: %s", t);
                         return 0;
                 }
 
@@ -2662,8 +2665,9 @@ static int syscall_filter_parse_one(
                         if (r < 0)
                                 return log_oom();
                 } else
-                        set_remove(c->syscall_filter, INT_TO_PTR(id + 1));
+                        (void) set_remove(c->syscall_filter, INT_TO_PTR(id + 1));
         }
+
         return 0;
 }
 
@@ -2682,8 +2686,7 @@ int config_parse_syscall_filter(
         ExecContext *c = data;
         Unit *u = userdata;
         bool invert = false;
-        const char *word, *state;
+        const char *p;
-        size_t l;
         int r;
 
         assert(filename);
@@ -2722,19 +2725,24 @@ int config_parse_syscall_filter(
                 }
         }
 
-        FOREACH_WORD_QUOTED(word, l, rvalue, state) {
+        p = rvalue;
-                _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL;
+        for (;;) {
+                _cleanup_free_ char *word = NULL;
 
-                t = strndup(word, l);
+                r = extract_first_word(&p, &word, NULL, 0);
-                if (!t)
+                if (r == 0)
+                        break;
+                if (r == -ENOMEM)
                         return log_oom();
+                if (r < 0) {
+                        log_syntax(unit, LOG_WARNING, filename, line, r, "Invalid syntax, ignoring: %s", rvalue);
+                        break;
+                }
 
-                r = syscall_filter_parse_one(unit, filename, line, c, invert, t, true);
+                r = syscall_filter_parse_one(unit, filename, line, c, invert, word, true);
                 if (r < 0)
                         return r;
         }
-        if (!isempty(state))
-                log_syntax(unit, LOG_ERR, filename, line, 0, "Trailing garbage, ignoring.");
 
         /* Turn on NNP, but only if it wasn't configured explicitly
          * before, and only if we are in user mode. */

src/nspawn/nspawn-seccomp.c

@@ -135,15 +135,9 @@ int setup_seccomp(uint64_t cap_list_retain) {
                 return 0;
         }
 
-        seccomp = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
+        r = seccomp_init_conservative(&seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
-        if (!seccomp)
+        if (r < 0)
-                return log_oom();
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate seccomp object: %m");
-
-        r = seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp);
-        if (r < 0) {
-                log_error_errno(r, "Failed to add secondary archs to seccomp filter: %m");
-                goto finish;
-        }
 
         r = seccomp_add_default_syscall_filter(seccomp, cap_list_retain);
         if (r < 0)
@@ -171,12 +165,6 @@ int setup_seccomp(uint64_t cap_list_retain) {
                 goto finish;
         }
 
-        r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 0);
-        if (r < 0) {
-                log_error_errno(r, "Failed to unset NO_NEW_PRIVS: %m");
-                goto finish;
-        }
-
         r = seccomp_load(seccomp);
         if (r < 0) {
                 log_error_errno(r, "Failed to install seccomp audit filter: %m");

src/shared/condition.c

@@ -329,9 +329,9 @@ static int condition_test_needs_update(Condition *c) {
                 uint64_t timestamp;
                 int r;
 
-                r = parse_env_file(p, NULL, "TimestampNSec", &timestamp_str, NULL);
+                r = parse_env_file(p, NULL, "TIMESTAMP_NSEC", &timestamp_str, NULL);
                 if (r < 0) {
-                        log_error_errno(-r, "Failed to parse timestamp file '%s', using mtime: %m", p);
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse timestamp file '%s', using mtime: %m", p);
                         return true;
                 } else if (r == 0) {
                         log_debug("No data in timestamp file '%s', using mtime", p);
@@ -340,12 +340,11 @@ static int condition_test_needs_update(Condition *c) {
 
                 r = safe_atou64(timestamp_str, &timestamp);
                 if (r < 0) {
-                        log_error_errno(-r, "Failed to parse timestamp value '%s' in file '%s', using mtime: %m",
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse timestamp value '%s' in file '%s', using mtime: %m", timestamp_str, p);
-                                        timestamp_str, p);
                         return true;
                 }
 
-                other.st_mtim.tv_nsec = timestamp % NSEC_PER_SEC;
+                timespec_store(&other.st_mtim, timestamp);
         }
 
         return usr.st_mtim.tv_nsec > other.st_mtim.tv_nsec;

src/shared/seccomp-util.c

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 #include "macro.h"
 #include "seccomp-util.h"
 #include "string-util.h"
+#include "util.h"
 
 const char* seccomp_arch_to_string(uint32_t c) {
 
@@ -73,7 +74,34 @@ int seccomp_arch_from_string(const char *n, uint32_t *ret) {
         return 0;
 }
 
-int seccomp_add_secondary_archs(scmp_filter_ctx *c) {
+int seccomp_init_conservative(scmp_filter_ctx *ret, uint32_t default_action) {
+        scmp_filter_ctx seccomp;
+        int r;
+
+        /* Much like seccomp_init(), but tries to be a bit more conservative in its defaults: all secondary archs are
+         * added by default, and NNP is turned off. */
+
+        seccomp = seccomp_init(default_action);
+        if (!seccomp)
+                return -ENOMEM;
+
+        r = seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp);
+        if (r < 0)
+                goto finish;
+
+        r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 0);
+        if (r < 0)
+                goto finish;
+
+        *ret = seccomp;
+        return 0;
+
+finish:
+        seccomp_release(seccomp);
+        return r;
+}
+
+int seccomp_add_secondary_archs(scmp_filter_ctx c) {
 
 #if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
         int r;
@@ -110,7 +138,6 @@ int seccomp_add_secondary_archs(scmp_filter_ctx *c) {
 #endif
 
         return 0;
-
 }
 
 static bool is_basic_seccomp_available(void) {
@@ -132,28 +159,30 @@ bool is_seccomp_available(void) {
         return cached_enabled;
 }
 
-const SystemCallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[] = {
+const SyscallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[_SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX] = {
-        {
+        [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CLOCK] = {
                 /* Clock */
-                .set_name = "@clock",
+                .name = "@clock",
                 .value =
                 "adjtimex\0"
                 "clock_adjtime\0"
                 "clock_settime\0"
                 "settimeofday\0"
                 "stime\0"
-        }, {
+        },
+        [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CPU_EMULATION] = {
                 /* CPU emulation calls */
-                .set_name = "@cpu-emulation",
+                .name = "@cpu-emulation",
                 .value =
                 "modify_ldt\0"
                 "subpage_prot\0"
                 "switch_endian\0"
                 "vm86\0"
                 "vm86old\0"
-        }, {
+        },
+        [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEBUG] = {
                 /* Debugging/Performance Monitoring/Tracing */
-                .set_name = "@debug",
+                .name = "@debug",
                 .value =
                 "lookup_dcookie\0"
                 "perf_event_open\0"
@@ -161,11 +190,14 @@ const SystemCallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[] = {
                 "process_vm_writev\0"
                 "ptrace\0"
                 "rtas\0"
+#ifdef __NR_s390_runtime_instr
                 "s390_runtime_instr\0"
+#endif
                 "sys_debug_setcontext\0"
-        }, {
+        },
+        [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEFAULT] = {
                 /* Default list */
-                .set_name = "@default",
+                .name = "@default",
                 .value =
                 "execve\0"
                 "exit\0"
@@ -173,9 +205,10 @@ const SystemCallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[] = {
                 "getrlimit\0"      /* make sure processes can query stack size and such */
                 "rt_sigreturn\0"
                 "sigreturn\0"
-        }, {
+        },
+        [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_IO_EVENT] = {
                 /* Event loop use */
-                .set_name = "@io-event",
+                .name = "@io-event",
                 .value =
                 "_newselect\0"
                 "epoll_create1\0"
@@ -191,9 +224,10 @@ const SystemCallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[] = {
                 "ppoll\0"
                 "pselect6\0"
                 "select\0"
-        }, {
+        },
+        [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_IPC] = {
                 /* Message queues, SYSV IPC or other IPC: unusual */
-                .set_name = "@ipc",
+                .name = "@ipc",
                 .value = "ipc\0"
                 "mq_getsetattr\0"
                 "mq_notify\0"
@@ -215,33 +249,36 @@ const SystemCallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[] = {
                 "shmctl\0"
                 "shmdt\0"
                 "shmget\0"
-        }, {
+        },
+        [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_KEYRING] = {
                 /* Keyring */
-                .set_name = "@keyring",
+                .name = "@keyring",
                 .value =
                 "add_key\0"
                 "keyctl\0"
                 "request_key\0"
-        }, {
+        },
+        [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MODULE] = {
                 /* Kernel module control */
-                .set_name = "@module",
+                .name = "@module",
                 .value =
                 "delete_module\0"
                 "finit_module\0"
                 "init_module\0"
-        }, {
+        },
+        [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MOUNT] = {
                 /* Mounting */
-                .set_name = "@mount",
+                .name = "@mount",
                 .value =
                 "chroot\0"
                 "mount\0"
-                "oldumount\0"
                 "pivot_root\0"
                 "umount2\0"
                 "umount\0"
-        }, {
+        },
+        [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_NETWORK_IO] = {
                 /* Network or Unix socket IO, should not be needed if not network facing */
-                .set_name = "@network-io",
+                .name = "@network-io",
                 .value =
                 "accept4\0"
                 "accept\0"
@@ -264,9 +301,10 @@ const SystemCallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[] = {
                 "socket\0"
                 "socketcall\0"
                 "socketpair\0"
-        }, {
+        },
+        [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_OBSOLETE] = {
                 /* Unusual, obsolete or unimplemented, some unknown even to libseccomp */
-                .set_name = "@obsolete",
+                .name = "@obsolete",
                 .value =
                 "_sysctl\0"
                 "afs_syscall\0"
@@ -292,9 +330,10 @@ const SystemCallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[] = {
                 "uselib\0"
                 "ustat\0"
                 "vserver\0"
-        }, {
+        },
+        [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_PRIVILEGED] = {
                 /* Nice grab-bag of all system calls which need superuser capabilities */
-                .set_name = "@privileged",
+                .name = "@privileged",
                 .value =
                 "@clock\0"
                 "@module\0"
@@ -331,11 +370,12 @@ const SystemCallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[] = {
                 "setuid\0"
                 "swapoff\0"
                 "swapon\0"
-                "sysctl\0"
+                "_sysctl\0"
                 "vhangup\0"
-        }, {
+        },
+        [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_PROCESS] = {
                 /* Process control, execution, namespaces */
-                .set_name = "@process",
+                .name = "@process",
                 .value =
                 "arch_prctl\0"
                 "clone\0"
@@ -349,19 +389,90 @@ const SystemCallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[] = {
                 "tkill\0"
                 "unshare\0"
                 "vfork\0"
-        }, {
+        },
+        [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO] = {
                 /* Raw I/O ports */
-                .set_name = "@raw-io",
+                .name = "@raw-io",
                 .value =
                 "ioperm\0"
                 "iopl\0"
                 "pciconfig_iobase\0"
                 "pciconfig_read\0"
                 "pciconfig_write\0"
+#ifdef __NR_s390_pci_mmio_read
                 "s390_pci_mmio_read\0"
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_s390_pci_mmio_write
                 "s390_pci_mmio_write\0"
-        }, {
+#endif
-                .set_name = NULL,
+        },
-                .value = NULL
-        }
 };
+
+const SyscallFilterSet *syscall_filter_set_find(const char *name) {
+        unsigned i;
+
+        if (isempty(name) || name[0] != '@')
+                return NULL;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < _SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX; i++)
+                if (streq(syscall_filter_sets[i].name, name))
+                        return syscall_filter_sets + i;
+
+        return NULL;
+}
+
+int seccomp_add_syscall_filter_set(scmp_filter_ctx seccomp, const SyscallFilterSet *set, uint32_t action) {
+        const char *sys;
+        int r;
+
+        assert(seccomp);
+        assert(set);
+
+        NULSTR_FOREACH(sys, set->value) {
+                int id;
+
+                if (sys[0] == '@') {
+                        const SyscallFilterSet *other;
+
+                        other = syscall_filter_set_find(sys);
+                        if (!other)
+                                return -EINVAL;
+
+                        r = seccomp_add_syscall_filter_set(seccomp, other, action);
+                } else {
+                        id = seccomp_syscall_resolve_name(sys);
+                        if (id == __NR_SCMP_ERROR)
+                                return -EINVAL;
+
+                        r = seccomp_rule_add(seccomp, action, id, 0);
+                }
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return r;
+        }
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int seccomp_load_filter_set(uint32_t default_action, const SyscallFilterSet *set, uint32_t action) {
+        scmp_filter_ctx seccomp;
+        int r;
+
+        assert(set);
+
+        /* The one-stop solution: allocate a seccomp object, add a filter to it, and apply it */
+
+        r = seccomp_init_conservative(&seccomp, default_action);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return r;
+
+        r = seccomp_add_syscall_filter_set(seccomp, set, action);
+        if (r < 0)
+                goto finish;
+
+        r = seccomp_load(seccomp);
+
+finish:
+        seccomp_release(seccomp);
+        return r;
+
+}

src/shared/seccomp-util.h

@@ -20,18 +20,45 @@
 ***/
 
 #include <seccomp.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
 #include <stdint.h>
 
 const char* seccomp_arch_to_string(uint32_t c);
 int seccomp_arch_from_string(const char *n, uint32_t *ret);
 
-int seccomp_add_secondary_archs(scmp_filter_ctx *c);
+int seccomp_init_conservative(scmp_filter_ctx *ret, uint32_t default_action);
+
+int seccomp_add_secondary_archs(scmp_filter_ctx c);
 
 bool is_seccomp_available(void);
 
-typedef struct SystemCallFilterSet {
+typedef struct SyscallFilterSet {
-        const char *set_name;
+        const char *name;
         const char *value;
-} SystemCallFilterSet;
+} SyscallFilterSet;
 
-extern const SystemCallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[];
+enum {
+        SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CLOCK,
+        SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CPU_EMULATION,
+        SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEBUG,
+        SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEFAULT,
+        SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_IO_EVENT,
+        SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_IPC,
+        SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_KEYRING,
+        SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MODULE,
+        SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MOUNT,
+        SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_NETWORK_IO,
+        SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_OBSOLETE,
+        SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_PRIVILEGED,
+        SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_PROCESS,
+        SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO,
+        _SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX
+};
+
+extern const SyscallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[];
+
+const SyscallFilterSet *syscall_filter_set_find(const char *name);
+
+int seccomp_add_syscall_filter_set(scmp_filter_ctx seccomp, const SyscallFilterSet *set, uint32_t action);
+
+int seccomp_load_filter_set(uint32_t default_action, const SyscallFilterSet *set, uint32_t action);

src/test/test-seccomp.c

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+/***
+  This file is part of systemd.
+
+  Copyright 2016 Lennart Poettering
+
+  systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+  under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
+  the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
+  (at your option) any later version.
+
+  systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+  WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+  Lesser General Public License for more details.
+
+  You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
+  along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+***/
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/eventfd.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "fd-util.h"
+#include "macro.h"
+#include "process-util.h"
+#include "seccomp-util.h"
+
+static void test_seccomp_arch_to_string(void) {
+        uint32_t a, b;
+        const char *name;
+
+        a = seccomp_arch_native();
+        assert_se(a > 0);
+        name = seccomp_arch_to_string(a);
+        assert_se(name);
+        assert_se(seccomp_arch_from_string(name, &b) >= 0);
+        assert_se(a == b);
+}
+
+static void test_syscall_filter_set_find(void) {
+        assert_se(!syscall_filter_set_find(NULL));
+        assert_se(!syscall_filter_set_find(""));
+        assert_se(!syscall_filter_set_find("quux"));
+        assert_se(!syscall_filter_set_find("@quux"));
+
+        assert_se(syscall_filter_set_find("@clock") == syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CLOCK);
+        assert_se(syscall_filter_set_find("@default") == syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEFAULT);
+        assert_se(syscall_filter_set_find("@raw-io") == syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO);
+}
+
+static void test_filter_sets(void) {
+        unsigned i;
+        int r;
+
+        if (!is_seccomp_available())
+                return;
+
+        if (geteuid() != 0)
+                return;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < _SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX; i++) {
+                pid_t pid;
+
+                log_info("Testing %s", syscall_filter_sets[i].name);
+
+                pid = fork();
+                assert_se(pid >= 0);
+
+                if (pid == 0) { /* Child? */
+                        int fd;
+
+                        if (i == SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEFAULT) /* if we look at the default set, whitelist instead of blacklist */
+                                r = seccomp_load_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), syscall_filter_sets + i, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
+                        else
+                                r = seccomp_load_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + i, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM));
+                        if (r < 0)
+                                _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+
+                        /* Test the sycall filter with one random system call */
+                        fd = eventfd(0, EFD_NONBLOCK|EFD_CLOEXEC);
+                        if (IN_SET(i, SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_IO_EVENT, SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEFAULT))
+                                assert_se(fd < 0 && errno == EPERM);
+                        else {
+                                assert_se(fd >= 0);
+                                safe_close(fd);
+                        }
+
+                        _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+                }
+
+                assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_warn(syscall_filter_sets[i].name, pid, true) == EXIT_SUCCESS);
+        }
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
+
+        test_seccomp_arch_to_string();
+        test_syscall_filter_set_find();
+        test_filter_sets();
+
+        return 0;
+}

src/update-done/update-done.c

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 ***/
 
 #include "fd-util.h"
+#include "fileio.h"
 #include "io-util.h"
 #include "selinux-util.h"
 #include "util.h"
@@ -32,8 +33,8 @@ static int apply_timestamp(const char *path, struct timespec *ts) {
                 *ts,
                 *ts
         };
-        int fd = -1;
         _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *f = NULL;
+        int fd = -1;
         int r;
 
         assert(path);
@@ -59,18 +60,20 @@ static int apply_timestamp(const char *path, struct timespec *ts) {
                 return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to create/open timestamp file %s: %m", path);
         }
 
-        f = fdopen(fd, "w");
+        f = fdopen(fd, "we");
         if (!f) {
                 safe_close(fd);
                 return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to fdopen() timestamp file %s: %m", path);
         }
 
         (void) fprintf(f,
-                       "%s"
+                       MESSAGE
-                       "TimestampNSec=" NSEC_FMT "\n",
+                       "TIMESTAMP_NSEC=" NSEC_FMT "\n",
-                       MESSAGE, timespec_load_nsec(ts));
+                       timespec_load_nsec(ts));
 
-        fflush(f);
+        r = fflush_and_check(f);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write timestamp file: %m");
 
         if (futimens(fd, twice) < 0)
                 return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to update timestamp on %s: %m", path);