1
0
mirror of https://github.com/systemd/systemd.git synced 2025-07-14 16:59:12 +03:00

Merge pull request #32635 from poettering/cryptenroll-no-pcrlock-conflict

cryptenroll: don't try to use pcrlock in combination with signed PCR policy if both are available, because we don't actually support that right now
This commit is contained in:
Luca Boccassi
2024-05-07 09:49:30 +02:00
committed by GitHub
4 changed files with 36 additions and 30 deletions

View File

@ -249,8 +249,8 @@ int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *device_key, const char *device_key,
Tpm2PCRValue *hash_pcr_values, Tpm2PCRValue *hash_pcr_values,
size_t n_hash_pcr_values, size_t n_hash_pcr_values,
const char *pubkey_path, const char *pcr_pubkey_path,
bool load_pubkey, bool load_pcr_pubkey,
uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask, uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask,
const char *signature_path, const char *signature_path,
bool use_pin, bool use_pin,
@ -307,10 +307,13 @@ int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd,
} }
TPM2B_PUBLIC public = {}; TPM2B_PUBLIC public = {};
if (load_pubkey) { /* Load the PCR public key if specified explicitly, or if no pcrlock policy was specified and
r = tpm2_load_pcr_public_key(pubkey_path, &pubkey.iov_base, &pubkey.iov_len); * automatic loading of PCR public keys wasn't disabled explicitly. The reason we turn this off when
* pcrlock is configured is simply that we currently not support both in combination. */
if (pcr_pubkey_path || (load_pcr_pubkey && !pcrlock_path)) {
r = tpm2_load_pcr_public_key(pcr_pubkey_path, &pubkey.iov_base, &pubkey.iov_len);
if (r < 0) { if (r < 0) {
if (pubkey_path || signature_path || r != -ENOENT) if (pcr_pubkey_path || signature_path || r != -ENOENT)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read TPM PCR public key: %m"); return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read TPM PCR public key: %m");
log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to read TPM2 PCR public key, proceeding without: %m"); log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to read TPM2 PCR public key, proceeding without: %m");
@ -329,7 +332,8 @@ int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd,
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to read TPM PCR signature: %m"); return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to read TPM PCR signature: %m");
} }
} }
} } else
pubkey_pcr_mask = 0;
bool any_pcr_value_specified = tpm2_pcr_values_has_any_values(hash_pcr_values, n_hash_pcr_values); bool any_pcr_value_specified = tpm2_pcr_values_has_any_values(hash_pcr_values, n_hash_pcr_values);

View File

@ -9,14 +9,14 @@
#if HAVE_TPM2 #if HAVE_TPM2
int load_volume_key_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *cd_node, const char *device, void *ret_vk, size_t *ret_vks); int load_volume_key_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *cd_node, const char *device, void *ret_vk, size_t *ret_vks);
int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd, const void *volume_key, size_t volume_key_size, const char *device, uint32_t seal_key_handle, const char *device_key, Tpm2PCRValue *hash_pcr_values, size_t n_hash_pcr_values, const char *pubkey_path, bool disable_loading_pubkey, uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask, const char *signature_path, bool use_pin, const char *pcrlock_path, int *ret_slot_to_wipe); int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd, const void *volume_key, size_t volume_key_size, const char *device, uint32_t seal_key_handle, const char *device_key, Tpm2PCRValue *hash_pcr_values, size_t n_hash_pcr_values, const char *pubkey_path, bool load_pcr_pubkey, uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask, const char *signature_path, bool use_pin, const char *pcrlock_path, int *ret_slot_to_wipe);
#else #else
static inline int load_volume_key_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *cd_node, const char *device, void *ret_vk, size_t *ret_vks) { static inline int load_volume_key_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *cd_node, const char *device, void *ret_vk, size_t *ret_vks) {
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
"TPM2 unlocking not supported."); "TPM2 unlocking not supported.");
} }
static inline int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd, const void *volume_key, size_t volume_key_size, const char *device, uint32_t seal_key_handle, const char *device_key, Tpm2PCRValue *hash_pcr_values, size_t n_hash_pcr_values, const char *pubkey_path, bool disable_loading_pubkey, uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask, const char *signature_path, bool use_pin, const char *pcrlock_path, int *ret_slot_to_wipe) { static inline int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd, const void *volume_key, size_t volume_key_size, const char *device, uint32_t seal_key_handle, const char *device_key, Tpm2PCRValue *hash_pcr_values, size_t n_hash_pcr_values, const char *pubkey_path, bool load_pcr_pubkey, uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask, const char *signature_path, bool use_pin, const char *pcrlock_path, int *ret_slot_to_wipe) {
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
"TPM2 key enrollment not supported."); "TPM2 key enrollment not supported.");
} }

View File

@ -637,6 +637,7 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
} }
} }
if (arg_enroll_type == ENROLL_TPM2) {
if (auto_pcrlock) { if (auto_pcrlock) {
assert(!arg_tpm2_pcrlock); assert(!arg_tpm2_pcrlock);
@ -663,6 +664,7 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
1)) 1))
return log_oom(); return log_oom();
} }
}
return 1; return 1;
} }

View File

@ -7382,7 +7382,7 @@ int tpm2_make_luks2_json(
JSON_BUILD_PAIR("tpm2-pin", JSON_BUILD_BOOLEAN(flags & TPM2_FLAGS_USE_PIN)), JSON_BUILD_PAIR("tpm2-pin", JSON_BUILD_BOOLEAN(flags & TPM2_FLAGS_USE_PIN)),
JSON_BUILD_PAIR("tpm2_pcrlock", JSON_BUILD_BOOLEAN(flags & TPM2_FLAGS_USE_PCRLOCK)), JSON_BUILD_PAIR("tpm2_pcrlock", JSON_BUILD_BOOLEAN(flags & TPM2_FLAGS_USE_PCRLOCK)),
JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(pubkey_pcr_mask != 0, "tpm2_pubkey_pcrs", JSON_BUILD_VARIANT(pkmj)), JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(pubkey_pcr_mask != 0, "tpm2_pubkey_pcrs", JSON_BUILD_VARIANT(pkmj)),
JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(pubkey_pcr_mask != 0, "tpm2_pubkey", JSON_BUILD_IOVEC_BASE64(pubkey)), JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(iovec_is_set(pubkey), "tpm2_pubkey", JSON_BUILD_IOVEC_BASE64(pubkey)),
JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(iovec_is_set(salt), "tpm2_salt", JSON_BUILD_IOVEC_BASE64(salt)), JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(iovec_is_set(salt), "tpm2_salt", JSON_BUILD_IOVEC_BASE64(salt)),
JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(iovec_is_set(srk), "tpm2_srk", JSON_BUILD_IOVEC_BASE64(srk)), JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(iovec_is_set(srk), "tpm2_srk", JSON_BUILD_IOVEC_BASE64(srk)),
JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(iovec_is_set(pcrlock_nv), "tpm2_pcrlock_nv", JSON_BUILD_IOVEC_BASE64(pcrlock_nv)))); JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(iovec_is_set(pcrlock_nv), "tpm2_pcrlock_nv", JSON_BUILD_IOVEC_BASE64(pcrlock_nv))));