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Merge pull request #32635 from poettering/cryptenroll-no-pcrlock-conflict
cryptenroll: don't try to use pcrlock in combination with signed PCR policy if both are available, because we don't actually support that right now
This commit is contained in:
@ -249,8 +249,8 @@ int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd,
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const char *device_key,
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const char *device_key,
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Tpm2PCRValue *hash_pcr_values,
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Tpm2PCRValue *hash_pcr_values,
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size_t n_hash_pcr_values,
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size_t n_hash_pcr_values,
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const char *pubkey_path,
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const char *pcr_pubkey_path,
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bool load_pubkey,
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bool load_pcr_pubkey,
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uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask,
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uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask,
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const char *signature_path,
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const char *signature_path,
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bool use_pin,
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bool use_pin,
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@ -307,10 +307,13 @@ int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd,
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}
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}
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TPM2B_PUBLIC public = {};
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TPM2B_PUBLIC public = {};
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if (load_pubkey) {
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/* Load the PCR public key if specified explicitly, or if no pcrlock policy was specified and
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r = tpm2_load_pcr_public_key(pubkey_path, &pubkey.iov_base, &pubkey.iov_len);
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* automatic loading of PCR public keys wasn't disabled explicitly. The reason we turn this off when
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* pcrlock is configured is simply that we currently not support both in combination. */
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if (pcr_pubkey_path || (load_pcr_pubkey && !pcrlock_path)) {
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r = tpm2_load_pcr_public_key(pcr_pubkey_path, &pubkey.iov_base, &pubkey.iov_len);
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if (r < 0) {
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if (r < 0) {
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if (pubkey_path || signature_path || r != -ENOENT)
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if (pcr_pubkey_path || signature_path || r != -ENOENT)
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return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read TPM PCR public key: %m");
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return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read TPM PCR public key: %m");
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log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to read TPM2 PCR public key, proceeding without: %m");
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log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to read TPM2 PCR public key, proceeding without: %m");
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@ -329,7 +332,8 @@ int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd,
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return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to read TPM PCR signature: %m");
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return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to read TPM PCR signature: %m");
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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} else
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pubkey_pcr_mask = 0;
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bool any_pcr_value_specified = tpm2_pcr_values_has_any_values(hash_pcr_values, n_hash_pcr_values);
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bool any_pcr_value_specified = tpm2_pcr_values_has_any_values(hash_pcr_values, n_hash_pcr_values);
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@ -9,14 +9,14 @@
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#if HAVE_TPM2
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#if HAVE_TPM2
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int load_volume_key_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *cd_node, const char *device, void *ret_vk, size_t *ret_vks);
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int load_volume_key_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *cd_node, const char *device, void *ret_vk, size_t *ret_vks);
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int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd, const void *volume_key, size_t volume_key_size, const char *device, uint32_t seal_key_handle, const char *device_key, Tpm2PCRValue *hash_pcr_values, size_t n_hash_pcr_values, const char *pubkey_path, bool disable_loading_pubkey, uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask, const char *signature_path, bool use_pin, const char *pcrlock_path, int *ret_slot_to_wipe);
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int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd, const void *volume_key, size_t volume_key_size, const char *device, uint32_t seal_key_handle, const char *device_key, Tpm2PCRValue *hash_pcr_values, size_t n_hash_pcr_values, const char *pubkey_path, bool load_pcr_pubkey, uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask, const char *signature_path, bool use_pin, const char *pcrlock_path, int *ret_slot_to_wipe);
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#else
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#else
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static inline int load_volume_key_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *cd_node, const char *device, void *ret_vk, size_t *ret_vks) {
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static inline int load_volume_key_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *cd_node, const char *device, void *ret_vk, size_t *ret_vks) {
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return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
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return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
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"TPM2 unlocking not supported.");
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"TPM2 unlocking not supported.");
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}
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}
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static inline int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd, const void *volume_key, size_t volume_key_size, const char *device, uint32_t seal_key_handle, const char *device_key, Tpm2PCRValue *hash_pcr_values, size_t n_hash_pcr_values, const char *pubkey_path, bool disable_loading_pubkey, uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask, const char *signature_path, bool use_pin, const char *pcrlock_path, int *ret_slot_to_wipe) {
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static inline int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd, const void *volume_key, size_t volume_key_size, const char *device, uint32_t seal_key_handle, const char *device_key, Tpm2PCRValue *hash_pcr_values, size_t n_hash_pcr_values, const char *pubkey_path, bool load_pcr_pubkey, uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask, const char *signature_path, bool use_pin, const char *pcrlock_path, int *ret_slot_to_wipe) {
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return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
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return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
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"TPM2 key enrollment not supported.");
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"TPM2 key enrollment not supported.");
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}
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}
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@ -637,6 +637,7 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
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}
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}
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}
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}
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if (arg_enroll_type == ENROLL_TPM2) {
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if (auto_pcrlock) {
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if (auto_pcrlock) {
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assert(!arg_tpm2_pcrlock);
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assert(!arg_tpm2_pcrlock);
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@ -663,6 +664,7 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
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1))
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1))
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return log_oom();
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return log_oom();
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}
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}
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}
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return 1;
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return 1;
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}
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}
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@ -7382,7 +7382,7 @@ int tpm2_make_luks2_json(
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JSON_BUILD_PAIR("tpm2-pin", JSON_BUILD_BOOLEAN(flags & TPM2_FLAGS_USE_PIN)),
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JSON_BUILD_PAIR("tpm2-pin", JSON_BUILD_BOOLEAN(flags & TPM2_FLAGS_USE_PIN)),
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JSON_BUILD_PAIR("tpm2_pcrlock", JSON_BUILD_BOOLEAN(flags & TPM2_FLAGS_USE_PCRLOCK)),
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JSON_BUILD_PAIR("tpm2_pcrlock", JSON_BUILD_BOOLEAN(flags & TPM2_FLAGS_USE_PCRLOCK)),
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JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(pubkey_pcr_mask != 0, "tpm2_pubkey_pcrs", JSON_BUILD_VARIANT(pkmj)),
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JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(pubkey_pcr_mask != 0, "tpm2_pubkey_pcrs", JSON_BUILD_VARIANT(pkmj)),
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JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(pubkey_pcr_mask != 0, "tpm2_pubkey", JSON_BUILD_IOVEC_BASE64(pubkey)),
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JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(iovec_is_set(pubkey), "tpm2_pubkey", JSON_BUILD_IOVEC_BASE64(pubkey)),
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JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(iovec_is_set(salt), "tpm2_salt", JSON_BUILD_IOVEC_BASE64(salt)),
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JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(iovec_is_set(salt), "tpm2_salt", JSON_BUILD_IOVEC_BASE64(salt)),
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JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(iovec_is_set(srk), "tpm2_srk", JSON_BUILD_IOVEC_BASE64(srk)),
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JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(iovec_is_set(srk), "tpm2_srk", JSON_BUILD_IOVEC_BASE64(srk)),
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JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(iovec_is_set(pcrlock_nv), "tpm2_pcrlock_nv", JSON_BUILD_IOVEC_BASE64(pcrlock_nv))));
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JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(iovec_is_set(pcrlock_nv), "tpm2_pcrlock_nv", JSON_BUILD_IOVEC_BASE64(pcrlock_nv))));
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