Merge pull request #26287 from medhefgo/mkosi-auto-enroll

ci: Test with secure boot enabled under mkosi

.github/workflows/mkosi.yml

@@ -95,8 +95,11 @@ jobs:
         KernelCommandLine=${{ env.KERNEL_CMDLINE }}
         EOF
 
+    - name: Generate secure boot key
+      run: sudo mkosi genkey
+
     - name: Build ${{ matrix.distro }}
-      run: sudo mkosi --idmap no
+      run: sudo mkosi --idmap no --secure-boot
 
     - name: Show ${{ matrix.distro }} image summary
       run: sudo mkosi summary

.gitignore

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ __pycache__/
 /mkosi.output/
 /mkosi.default
 /mkosi.installdir/
+/mkosi.secure-boot.*
 # Ignore any mkosi config files with "local" in the name
 /mkosi.default.d/**/*local*.conf
 /tags

man/loader.conf.xml

@@ -227,12 +227,33 @@
 
         <listitem><para>Danger: this feature might soft-brick your device if used improperly.</para>
 
-        <para>Takes one of <literal>off</literal>, <literal>manual</literal> or <literal>force</literal>.
-        Controls the enrollment of Secure Boot keys. If set to <literal>off</literal>, no action whatsoever
-        is taken. If set to <literal>manual</literal> (the default) and the UEFI firmware is in setup-mode
-        then entries to manually enroll Secure Boot variables are created in the boot menu. If set to
-        <literal>force</literal>, in addition, if a directory named <filename>/loader/keys/auto/</filename>
-        exists on the ESP then the keys in that directory are enrolled automatically.</para>
+        <para>Controls enrollment of secure boot keys found on the ESP if the system is in setup mode:
+        <variablelist>
+          <varlistentry>
+            <term><option>off</option></term>
+            <listitem><para>No action is taken.</para></listitem>
+          </varlistentry>
+
+          <varlistentry>
+            <term><option>manual</option></term>
+            <listitem><para>Boot entries for found secure boot keys are created that allow manual
+            enrollment.</para></listitem>
+          </varlistentry>
+
+          <varlistentry>
+            <term><option>if-safe</option></term>
+            <listitem><para>Same behavior as <option>manual</option>, but will try to automatically
+            enroll the key <literal>auto</literal> if it is considered to be safe. Currently, this is only
+            the case if the system is running inside a virtual machine.</para></listitem>
+          </varlistentry>
+
+          <varlistentry>
+            <term><option>force</option></term>
+            <listitem><para>Always enroll the <literal>auto</literal> key if found. Note that a warning
+            message with a timeout will still be shown if this operation is unknown to be safe.</para></listitem>
+          </varlistentry>
+        </variablelist>
+        </para>
 
         <para>The different sets of variables can be set up under
         <filename>/loader/keys/<replaceable>NAME</replaceable></filename> where
@@ -254,8 +275,8 @@
         <programlisting>uuid=$(systemd-id128 new --uuid)
 for key in PK KEK db; do
   openssl req -new -x509 -subj "/CN=${key}/" -keyout "${key}.key" -out "${key}.crt"
-  openssl x509 -outform DER -in "${key}.crt" -out "${key}.cer"
-  cert-to-efi-sig-list -g "${uuid}" "${key}.crt" "${key}.esl"
+  openssl x509 -outform DER -in "${key}.crt" -out "${key}.der"
+  sbsiglist --owner "${uuid}" --type x509 --output "${key}.esl" "${key}.der"
 done
 
 for key in MicWinProPCA2011_2011-10-19.crt MicCorUEFCA2011_2011-06-27.crt MicCorKEKCA2011_2011-06-24.crt; do
@@ -266,7 +287,7 @@ done
 # Optionally add Microsoft Windows Production CA 2011 (needed to boot into Windows).
 cat MicWinProPCA2011_2011-10-19.esl >> db.esl
 
-# Optionally add Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011 (for firmware drivers / option ROMs
+# Optionally add Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011 for firmware drivers / option ROMs
 # and third-party boot loaders (including shim). This is highly recommended on real
 # hardware as not including this may soft-brick your device (see next paragraph).
 cat MicCorUEFCA2011_2011-06-27.esl >> db.esl
@@ -276,9 +297,10 @@ cat MicCorUEFCA2011_2011-06-27.esl >> db.esl
 # key. The revocation database can be updated with <citerefentry><refentrytitle>fwupdmgr</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum></citerefentry>.
 cat MicCorKEKCA2011_2011-06-24.esl >> KEK.esl
 
-sign-efi-sig-list -c PK.crt -k PK.key PK PK.esl PK.auth
-sign-efi-sig-list -c PK.crt -k PK.key KEK KEK.esl KEK.auth
-sign-efi-sig-list -c KEK.crt -k KEK.key db db.esl db.auth
+attr=NON_VOLATILE,RUNTIME_ACCESS,BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
+sbvarsign --attr ${attr} --key PK.key --cert PK.crt --output PK.auth PK PK.esl
+sbvarsign --attr ${attr} --key PK.key --cert PK.crt --output KEK.auth KEK KEK.esl
+sbvarsign --attr ${attr} --key KEK.key --cert KEK.crt --output db.auth db db.esl
         </programlisting>
 
         <para>This feature is considered dangerous because even if all the required files are signed with the

src/boot/efi/boot.c

@@ -526,6 +526,9 @@ static void print_status(Config *config, char16_t *loaded_image_path) {
         case ENROLL_MANUAL:
                 printf("    secure-boot-enroll: manual\n");
                 break;
+        case ENROLL_IF_SAFE:
+                printf("    secure-boot-enroll: if-safe\n");
+                break;
         case ENROLL_FORCE:
                 printf("    secure-boot-enroll: force\n");
                 break;
@@ -1259,6 +1262,8 @@ static void config_defaults_load_from_file(Config *config, char *content) {
                                 config->secure_boot_enroll = ENROLL_MANUAL;
                         else if (streq8(value, "force"))
                                 config->secure_boot_enroll = ENROLL_FORCE;
+                        else if (streq8(value, "if-safe"))
+                                config->secure_boot_enroll = ENROLL_IF_SAFE;
                         else if (streq8(value, "off"))
                                 config->secure_boot_enroll = ENROLL_OFF;
                         else
@@ -1572,7 +1577,7 @@ static void config_load_defaults(Config *config, EFI_FILE *root_dir) {
                 .auto_entries = true,
                 .auto_firmware = true,
                 .reboot_for_bitlocker = false,
-                .secure_boot_enroll = ENROLL_MANUAL,
+                .secure_boot_enroll = ENROLL_IF_SAFE,
                 .idx_default_efivar = IDX_INVALID,
                 .console_mode = CONSOLE_MODE_KEEP,
                 .console_mode_efivar = CONSOLE_MODE_KEEP,
@@ -2511,10 +2516,11 @@ static EFI_STATUS secure_boot_discover_keys(Config *config, EFI_FILE *root_dir)
                 };
                 config_add_entry(config, entry);
 
-                if (config->secure_boot_enroll == ENROLL_FORCE && strcaseeq16(dirent->FileName, u"auto"))
+                if (IN_SET(config->secure_boot_enroll, ENROLL_IF_SAFE, ENROLL_FORCE) &&
+                    strcaseeq16(dirent->FileName, u"auto"))
                         /* if we auto enroll successfully this call does not return, if it fails we still
                          * want to add other potential entries to the menu */
-                        secure_boot_enroll_at(root_dir, entry->path);
+                        secure_boot_enroll_at(root_dir, entry->path, config->secure_boot_enroll == ENROLL_FORCE);
         }
 
         return EFI_SUCCESS;
@@ -2700,7 +2706,7 @@ static EFI_STATUS run(EFI_HANDLE image) {
 
                 /* if auto enrollment is activated, we try to load keys for the given entry. */
                 if (entry->type == LOADER_SECURE_BOOT_KEYS && config.secure_boot_enroll != ENROLL_OFF) {
-                        err = secure_boot_enroll_at(root_dir, entry->path);
+                        err = secure_boot_enroll_at(root_dir, entry->path, /*force=*/ true);
                         if (err != EFI_SUCCESS)
                                 return err;
                         continue;

src/boot/efi/secure-boot.c

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ SecureBootMode secure_boot_mode(void) {
 static const char sbat[] _used_ _section_(".sbat") = SBAT_SECTION_TEXT;
 #endif
 
-EFI_STATUS secure_boot_enroll_at(EFI_FILE *root_dir, const char16_t *path) {
+EFI_STATUS secure_boot_enroll_at(EFI_FILE *root_dir, const char16_t *path, bool force) {
         assert(root_dir);
         assert(path);
 
@@ -44,11 +44,16 @@ EFI_STATUS secure_boot_enroll_at(EFI_FILE *root_dir, const char16_t *path) {
 
         clear_screen(COLOR_NORMAL);
 
-        printf("Enrolling secure boot keys from directory: %ls\n", path);
-
         /* Enrolling secure boot keys is safe to do in virtualized environments as there is nothing
          * we can brick there. */
-        if (!in_hypervisor()) {
+        bool is_safe = in_hypervisor();
+
+        if (!is_safe && !force)
+                return EFI_SUCCESS;
+
+        printf("Enrolling secure boot keys from directory: %ls\n", path);
+
+        if (!is_safe) {
                 printf("Warning: Enrolling custom Secure Boot keys might soft-brick your machine!\n");
 
                 unsigned timeout_sec = 15;

src/boot/efi/secure-boot.h

@@ -9,13 +9,14 @@
 typedef enum {
         ENROLL_OFF,         /* no Secure Boot key enrollment whatsoever, even manual entries are not generated */
         ENROLL_MANUAL,      /* Secure Boot key enrollment is strictly manual: manual entries are generated and need to be selected by the user */
+        ENROLL_IF_SAFE,     /* Automatically enroll if it is safe (if we are running inside a VM, for example). */
         ENROLL_FORCE,       /* Secure Boot key enrollment may be automatic if it is available but might not be safe */
 } secure_boot_enroll;
 
 bool secure_boot_enabled(void);
 SecureBootMode secure_boot_mode(void);
 
-EFI_STATUS secure_boot_enroll_at(EFI_FILE *root_dir, const char16_t *path);
+EFI_STATUS secure_boot_enroll_at(EFI_FILE *root_dir, const char16_t *path, bool force);
 
 typedef bool (*security_validator_t)(
                 const void *ctx,

test/mkosi-check-and-shutdown.sh

@@ -3,6 +3,12 @@
 
 systemctl --failed --no-legend | tee /failed-services
 
+# Check that secure boot keys were properly enrolled.
+if [[ -d /sys/firmware/efi/efivars/ ]]; then
+    cmp /sys/firmware/efi/efivars/SecureBoot-8be4df61-93ca-11d2-aa0d-00e098032b8c <(printf '\6\0\0\0\1')
+    cmp /sys/firmware/efi/efivars/SetupMode-8be4df61-93ca-11d2-aa0d-00e098032b8c <(printf '\6\0\0\0\0')
+fi
+
 # Exit with non-zero EC if the /failed-services file is not empty (we have -e set)
 [[ ! -s /failed-services ]]