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core: use setreuid/setregid trick to create session keyring with right ownership (#8447)

Re-use the hacks used to link user keyring, when creating the session
keyring. This way changing ownership of the keyring is not required, and thus
incovation_id can be correctly created in restricted environments.

Creating invocation_id with root permissions works and linking it into session
keyring works, as at that point session keyring is possessed.

Simple way to validate this is with following commands:

$ journalctl -f &
$ sudo systemd-run --uid 1000 /bin/sh -c 'keyctl describe @s; keyctl list @s; keyctl read `keyctl search @s user invocation_id`'

which now works in LXD containers as well as on the host.

Fixes: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/7655
This commit is contained in:
Dimitri John Ledkov 2018-03-27 11:58:10 +01:00 committed by Lennart Poettering
parent 96d4d0244b
commit e64c2d0b5f

View File

@ -2434,7 +2434,9 @@ static int setup_keyring(
uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
key_serial_t keyring;
int r;
int r = 0;
uid_t saved_uid;
gid_t saved_gid;
assert(u);
assert(context);
@ -2453,6 +2455,26 @@ static int setup_keyring(
if (context->keyring_mode == EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT)
return 0;
/* Acquiring a reference to the user keyring is nasty. We briefly change identity in order to get things set up
* properly by the kernel. If we don't do that then we can't create it atomically, and that sucks for parallel
* execution. This mimics what pam_keyinit does, too. Setting up session keyring, to be owned by the right user
* & group is just as nasty as acquiring a reference to the user keyring. */
saved_uid = getuid();
saved_gid = getgid();
if (gid_is_valid(gid) && gid != saved_gid) {
if (setregid(gid, -1) < 0)
return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change GID for user keyring: %m");
}
if (uid_is_valid(uid) && uid != saved_uid) {
if (setreuid(uid, -1) < 0) {
r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change UID for user keyring: %m");
goto out;
}
}
keyring = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, 0, 0, 0);
if (keyring == -1) {
if (errno == ENOSYS)
@ -2462,12 +2484,36 @@ static int setup_keyring(
else if (errno == EDQUOT)
log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "Out of kernel keyrings to allocate, ignoring.");
else
return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Setting up kernel keyring failed: %m");
r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Setting up kernel keyring failed: %m");
return 0;
goto out;
}
/* Populate they keyring with the invocation ID by default. */
/* When requested link the user keyring into the session keyring. */
if (context->keyring_mode == EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED) {
if (keyctl(KEYCTL_LINK,
KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING,
KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, 0) < 0) {
r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to link user keyring into session keyring: %m");
goto out;
}
}
/* Restore uid/gid back */
if (uid_is_valid(uid) && uid != saved_uid) {
if (setreuid(saved_uid, -1) < 0) {
r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change UID back for user keyring: %m");
goto out;
}
}
if (gid_is_valid(gid) && gid != saved_gid) {
if (setregid(saved_gid, -1) < 0)
return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change GID back for user keyring: %m");
}
/* Populate they keyring with the invocation ID by default, as original saved_uid. */
if (!sd_id128_is_null(u->invocation_id)) {
key_serial_t key;
@ -2478,65 +2524,20 @@ static int setup_keyring(
if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, key,
KEY_POS_VIEW|KEY_POS_READ|KEY_POS_SEARCH|
KEY_USR_VIEW|KEY_USR_READ|KEY_USR_SEARCH, 0, 0) < 0)
return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to restrict invocation ID permission: %m");
r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to restrict invocation ID permission: %m");
}
}
/* And now, make the keyring owned by the service's user */
if (uid_is_valid(uid) || gid_is_valid(gid))
if (keyctl(KEYCTL_CHOWN, keyring, uid, gid, 0) < 0)
return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change ownership of session keyring: %m");
out:
/* Revert back uid & gid for the the last time, and exit */
/* no extra logging, as only the first already reported error matters */
if (getuid() != saved_uid)
(void) setreuid(saved_uid, -1);
/* When requested link the user keyring into the session keyring. */
if (context->keyring_mode == EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED) {
uid_t saved_uid;
gid_t saved_gid;
if (getgid() != saved_gid)
(void) setregid(saved_gid, -1);
/* Acquiring a reference to the user keyring is nasty. We briefly change identity in order to get things
* set up properly by the kernel. If we don't do that then we can't create it atomically, and that
* sucks for parallel execution. This mimics what pam_keyinit does, too.*/
saved_uid = getuid();
saved_gid = getgid();
if (gid_is_valid(gid) && gid != saved_gid) {
if (setregid(gid, -1) < 0)
return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change GID for user keyring: %m");
}
if (uid_is_valid(uid) && uid != saved_uid) {
if (setreuid(uid, -1) < 0) {
(void) setregid(saved_gid, -1);
return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change UID for user keyring: %m");
}
}
if (keyctl(KEYCTL_LINK,
KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING,
KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, 0) < 0) {
r = -errno;
(void) setreuid(saved_uid, -1);
(void) setregid(saved_gid, -1);
return log_unit_error_errno(u, r, "Failed to link user keyring into session keyring: %m");
}
if (uid_is_valid(uid) && uid != saved_uid) {
if (setreuid(saved_uid, -1) < 0) {
(void) setregid(saved_gid, -1);
return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change UID back for user keyring: %m");
}
}
if (gid_is_valid(gid) && gid != saved_gid) {
if (setregid(saved_gid, -1) < 0)
return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change GID back for user keyring: %m");
}
}
return 0;
return r;
}
static void append_socket_pair(int *array, unsigned *n, const int pair[2]) {