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tpm2: move local vars in tpm2_seal() to point of use

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No functional change; cosmetic only.
This commit is contained in:
Dan Streetman 2022-12-12 09:46:04 -05:00
parent efe153bdc2
commit ee6a8713ab
1 changed files with 13 additions and 15 deletions
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28
src/shared/tpm2-util.c
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@ -2874,17 +2874,7 @@ int tpm2_seal(const char *device,
void **ret_srk_buf,
size_t *ret_srk_buf_size) {
_cleanup_(Esys_Freep) TPM2B_PRIVATE *private = NULL;
_cleanup_(Esys_Freep) TPM2B_PUBLIC *public = NULL;
_cleanup_(Esys_Freep) uint8_t *srk_buf = NULL;
static const TPML_PCR_SELECTION creation_pcr = {};
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *secret = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ void *hash = NULL;
TPM2B_SENSITIVE_CREATE hmac_sensitive;
TPM2B_PUBLIC hmac_template;
usec_t start;
TSS2_RC rc;
size_t srk_buf_size;
int r;
assert(pubkey || pubkey_size == 0);
@ -2916,9 +2906,7 @@ int tpm2_seal(const char *device,
* is stored in the LUKS2 JSON only in encrypted form with the "primary" key of the TPM2 chip, thus
* binding the unlocking to the TPM2 chip. */
start = now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC);
CLEANUP_ERASE(hmac_sensitive);
usec_t start = now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC);
_cleanup_(tpm2_context_unrefp) Tpm2Context *c = NULL;
r = tpm2_context_new(device, &c);
@ -2971,7 +2959,7 @@ int tpm2_seal(const char *device,
/* We use a keyed hash object (i.e. HMAC) to store the secret key we want to use for unlocking the
* LUKS2 volume with. We don't ever use for HMAC/keyed hash operations however, we just use it
* because it's a key type that is universally supported and suitable for symmetric binary blobs. */
hmac_template = (TPM2B_PUBLIC) {
TPM2B_PUBLIC hmac_template = {
.size = sizeof(TPMT_PUBLIC),
.publicArea = {
.type = TPM2_ALG_KEYEDHASH,
@ -2983,10 +2971,13 @@ int tpm2_seal(const char *device,
},
};
hmac_sensitive = (TPM2B_SENSITIVE_CREATE) {
TPM2B_SENSITIVE_CREATE hmac_sensitive = {
.size = sizeof(hmac_sensitive.sensitive),
.sensitive.data.size = 32,
};
CLEANUP_ERASE(hmac_sensitive);
if (pin) {
r = tpm2_digest_buffer(TPM2_ALG_SHA256, &hmac_sensitive.sensitive.userAuth, pin, strlen(pin), /* extend= */ false);
if (r < 0)
@ -3016,6 +3007,9 @@ int tpm2_seal(const char *device,
log_debug("Creating HMAC key.");
static const TPML_PCR_SELECTION creation_pcr = {};
_cleanup_(Esys_Freep) TPM2B_PUBLIC *public = NULL;
_cleanup_(Esys_Freep) TPM2B_PRIVATE *private = NULL;
rc = sym_Esys_Create(
c->esys_context,
primary_handle->esys_handle,
@ -3035,6 +3029,7 @@ int tpm2_seal(const char *device,
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOTRECOVERABLE),
"Failed to generate HMAC key in TPM: %s", sym_Tss2_RC_Decode(rc));
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *secret = NULL;
secret = memdup(hmac_sensitive.sensitive.data.buffer, hmac_sensitive.sensitive.data.size);
if (!secret)
return log_oom();
@ -3058,6 +3053,7 @@ int tpm2_seal(const char *device,
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOTRECOVERABLE),
"Failed to marshal public key: %s", sym_Tss2_RC_Decode(rc));
_cleanup_free_ void *hash = NULL;
hash = memdup(policy_digest.buffer, policy_digest.size);
if (!hash)
return log_oom();
@ -3066,6 +3062,8 @@ int tpm2_seal(const char *device,
* the raw TPM handle as well as the object name. The object name is used to verify that
* the key we use later is the key we expect to establish the session with.
*/
_cleanup_(Esys_Freep) uint8_t *srk_buf = NULL;
size_t srk_buf_size = 0;
if (ret_srk_buf) {
log_debug("Serializing SRK ESYS_TR reference");
rc = sym_Esys_TR_Serialize(c->esys_context, primary_handle->esys_handle, &srk_buf, &srk_buf_size);