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I don't know why this didn't occur to me earlier, but of course, it
*has* to be this data.
(This replaces some German prose about Berlin, that i guess only very
few people will get. With the new blob I think we have a much broader
chance of delivering smiles.)
Let's merge the footnote with the overall explanation of where systemd
parses its options from and reword the section a bit to hopefully make
things a bit more clear.
Many sandboxing options add implicit DeviceAllow rules, which might be confusing
for users running systemd-analyze security and not expecting it.
Print the list.
Fixes https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/23185
1449b0f8a9 fixed seccomp arch check for the offline case,
but broke it for the normal case, as when coming from D-Bus the
list of seccomp architectures is already converted to string.
Fixes https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/23224
People (and build systems) sometimes set flags through -Dc_args=… or $CFLAGS.
Let's catch this common case too. meson will set c_args from $CFLAGS, so we
only need to check the former.
We reject too-short packets in client_receive_message_raw(), so
the packets that dhcp_packet_verify_headers() gets are of sufficient size.
But let's add an assert to clarify this for the reader.
Closes#23223.
This adds support for searching for credentials more comprehensively.
Specifically, unless an absolute source path is specified we'll now
search for the credentials in the system credentials first, and then in
/etc/credstore/, /run/credstore/, and /usr/lib/credstore, making these
dirs hence the recommended place for credentials to leave in the system.
For LoadCredentialEncrypted= we'll also look into
/etc/credstore.encrypted/, /run/credstore.encrypted/, …. These dirs are
hence suitable for credentials whose provenience isn't trusted (e.g.
UEFI creds from systemd-stub), and thus require to be authenticated
before use.
Let's beef up our system credential game a bit, and explicitly import
creds from sd-stub, from qemu fw_cfg and the kernel cmdline and expose
them in the same way as those passed in from nspawn.
Specifically, this will imprt such credentials to
/run/credentials/@system (if the source can be trusted, as in the
qemu/kernel cmdline case) and /run/credentials/@encrypted (otherwise,
such as sd-stub provided ones).
Once imported we'll set the $CREDENTIALS_PATH env var for PID 1, like it
would be done by a container manager for the payload. (Conversely, we'll
also creat a symlink from /run/credentials/@system to whatever is set in
$CREDENTIALS_PATH in case we are invoked by a container manager, thus
providing a fixed path where system credentials are found).
In one of the next commits we want to add support for importing system
credentials from qemu_fw_cfg, very early during boot. (So that we can
use the credentials therein for generators and even earlier). But that
means udev won#t load these modules for us, we have to load them
manually first.
