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Current kernels with BFQ scheduler do not yet set their IO weight
through "io.weight" but through "io.bfq.weight" (using a slightly
different interface supporting only default weights, not per-device
weights). This commit enables "IOWeight=" to just to that.
This patch may be dropped at some time later.
Github-Link: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/7057
Signed-off-by: Kai Krakow <kai@kaishome.de>
People do have usernames with dots, and it makes them very unhappy that systemd
doesn't like their that. It seems that there is no actual problem with allowing
dots in the username. In particular chown declares ":" as the official
separator, and internally in systemd we never rely on "." as the seperator
between user and group (nor do we call chown directly). Using dots in the name
is probably not a very good idea, but we don't need to care. Debian tools
(adduser) do not allow users with dots to be created.
This patch allows *existing* names with dots to be used in User, Group,
SupplementaryGroups, SocketUser, SocketGroup fields, both in unit files and on
the command line. DynamicUsers and sysusers still follow the strict policy.
user@.service and tmpfiles already allowed arbitrary user names, and this
remains unchanged.
Fixes#12754.
New functions are called valid_user_group_name_compat() and
valid_user_group_name_or_id_compat() and accept dots in the user
or group name. No functional change except the tests.
This reverts commit 8a07b4033e.
The tests are kept. test-networkd-conf is adjusted to pass.
This fixes#13276. I think current rules are extremely confusing, as the
case in test-networkd-conf shows. We apply some kinds of unescaping (relating
to quoting), but not others (related to escaping of special characters).
But fixing this is hard, because people have adjusted quoting to match
our rules, and if we make the rules "better", things might break in unexpected
places.
These tests runs under qemu, and on some testbeds, without acceleration.
On those systems, the current 180 second overall test timeout is too
short to run the test.
Increasing the timeout to 600s should be enough, even for slow
non-accelerated qemu testbeds.
Without this change, the address with PreferredLifetime=0 cannot be ready,
and thus, no consequent setting up process does not start.
The bug was introduced by 6aa5773.
Follow-up for b7ed5384ab.
Fixes#13341.
This dir is created by create_empty_image_rootdir, as well as indirectly
by some other functions, but it should be created by import_initdir so
the newly-exported $initdir exists and can be used immediately without
relying on other functions to create it.
Only umount it during cleanup if the $TESTDIR/root dir is a mountpoint.
This avoids adding noise to the stderr log such as:
mountpoint: /var/tmp/systemd-test.waLOFT/root: No such file or directory
Back in dbbf424c8b, we merged a rule to add
persistent storage for /dev/ubi*, but this rule could have never worked because
of the top-level exclude.
Also set "watch" for /dev/ubi*.
We had two similar lists, but one was accepting many more device types.
I assume that this is by mistake, simply because the lack of device links
is easier to notice than the lack of synthesized event after the device is
written to. This uses the same list in both places, effectively adding
"watch" attribute to /dev/nbd*, /dev/zd*, etc.
This part of the build does not use the normal meson parameters, so
we need to explicitly check for the meson --werror parameter, and if
it's true, set the gcc -Werror parameter for this subdir's build.
This attribute is x86_32-only, so when building on non-intel archs it
generates a compiler warning. When building with -Werror this turns
into an error, so only include the attribute on i386 arch builds.
This attribute is x86-only, so when building on non-intel archs it
generates a compiler warning. When building with -Werror this turns
into an error, so only include the attribute on intel archs.
Add a comment line explaining that the syscall defines might be
defined to invalid negative numbers, as libseccomp redefines them
to negative numbers if not defined by the kernel headers, which is
not obvious just from reading the code checking for defined && > 0
Since bug reports, backtraces, coverage reports and build logs are scattered
across at least four different places and there is no publicly available dashboards
the badge can point to, let's just point it to the build logs, which hopefully are going to be
a little bit more usable once https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/issues/2690 is
addressed.
If rescue.target, multi-user.target and graphical.target are all
inactive, get_current_runlevel() is not able to determine current
runlevel, and returns with zero. This zero runlevel value results to
assertion failure in utmp_put_runlevel().
# systemctl stop rescue.target multi-user.target graphical.target
# systemctl start systemd-update-utmp-runlevel.service
systemd[1]: Stopped target Graphical Interface.
systemd[1]: Stopped target Multi-User System.
systemd[1]: Starting Update UTMP about System Runlevel Changes...
systemd-update-utmp[67]: Assertion 'runlevel > 0' failed at src/shared/utmp-wtmp.c:275, function utmp_put_runlevel(). Aborting.
systemd[1]: systemd-update-utmp-runlevel.service: Main process exited, code=dumped, status=6/ABRT
systemd[1]: systemd-update-utmp-runlevel.service: Failed with result 'core-dump'.
systemd[1]: Failed to start Update UTMP about System Runlevel Changes.
Let's just print a warning in this case and skip the utmp update, to
avoid systemd-update-utmp-runlevel.service failures.
Previously, we'd only set the shell to /usr/bin/nologin and lock the
password for system users. Let's go one step further and also lock the
whole account.
This is a paranoid safety precaution, since neither disabling the shell
like this nor disabling the password is sufficient to lock an account,
since remote shell tools generally allow passing different shells, and
logins into ftp or similar protocols don't know the shell concept anyway.
Moreover, in times of ssh authentication by password is just one
option of authentication among many.
Takes inspiration from the recommendations in usermod(8)'s -L switch:
"Note: if you wish to lock the account (not only access with a
password), you should also set the EXPIRE_DATE to 1."
