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systemd-cryptsetup supports a FIDO2 mode with manual parameters, where
the user provides all the information necessary for recreating the
secret, such as: credential ID, relaying party ID and the salt. This
feature works great for implementing 2FA schemes, where the salt file
is for example a secret unsealed from the TPM or some other source.
While the unlocking part is quite straightforward to set up, enrolling
such a keyslot - not so easy. There is no clearly documented
way on how to set this up and online resources are scarce on this topic
too. By implementing a straightforward way to enroll such a keyslot
directly from systemd-cryptenroll we streamline the enrollment process
and reduce chances for user error when doing such things manually.
Like much English text, the systemd documentation uses "may not" in the
sense of both "will possibly not" and "is forbidden to". In many cases
this is OK because the context makes it clear, but in others I felt it
was possible to read the "is forbidden to" sense by mistake: in
particular, I tripped over "the target file may not exist" in
systemd.unit(5) before realizing the correct interpretation.
Use "might not" or "may choose not to" in these cases to make it clear
which sense we mean.
With 1df4b21abd we started to default to
enrolling into the LUKS device backing the root fs if none was specified
(and no wipe operation is used). This changes to look for /var/ instead.
On most systems /var/ is going to be on the root fs, hence this change
is with little effect.
However, on systems where / and /var/ is separate it makes more sense to
default to /var/ because that's where the persistent and variable data
is placed (i.e. where LUKS should be used) while / doesn't really have
to be variable, could as well be immutable, or ephemeral. Hence /var/
should be a safer default.
Or to say this differently: I think it makes sense to support systems
with /var/ being on / well. I also think it makes sense to support
systems with them being separate, and /var/ being variable and
persistent. But any other kind of system I find much less interesting to
support, and in that case people should just specify the device name.
Also, while we are at it, tighten the checks a bit, insist on a dm-crypt
+ LUKS superblock before continuing.
And finally, let's print a short message indicating the device we
operate on.
cryptenroll accepts only PKCS#11 URIs that match both a certificate and a private key in a token.
This patch allows users to provide a PKCS#11 URI that points to a certificate only, and makes possible to use output of some PKCS#11 tools directly.
Internally the patch changes 'type=cert' in the provided PKCS#11 URI to 'type=private' before storing in a LUKS2 header.
Fixes: #23479
Since EC keys doesn't support encryption directly, we use ECDH protocol.
We generate a pair of EC keys in the same EC group, then derive a shared secret using the generated private key and the public key in the token.
The derived shared secret is used as a volume key. The generated public key is stored in the LUKS2 JSON token header area. The generated private key is erased.
To unlock a volume, we derive the shared secret with the stored public key and a private key in the token.
Co-authored-by: MkfsSion <mkfssion@mkfssion.com>
Instead of enrolling the local TPM to a luks volume, use the public key from a
TPM to enroll it into the luks volume. This is useful when enrolling a TPM that
is not currently accessible, for example if the TPM is located on a different
system.
I was missing an example of how to use cryptenroll. We have that, but in
another page. Instead of repeating, let's just direct the user to the right
place.
Also, reformat synopsis to the "official" non-nested syntax.
This tries to add information about when each option was added. It goes
back to version 183.
The version info is included from a separate file to allow generating it,
which would allow more control on the formatting of the final output.
The previous commit extended the accepted format of --tpm2-pcrs to allow
specifying the hash algorithm (i.e. PCR bank) and hash digest value, this
updates the man page with those changes.
Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem. We had a list of PCRs in the
man page which was already half out-of-date. Instead, link to web page with the
"authoritative" list. Here, drop the descriptions of what shim and grub do. Instead,
just give some short descriptions and mention what systemd components do.
systemd-pcrmachine.service and systemd-pcrfs@.service are now mentioned too.
d0e590b1e2
extended the table in the specs repo.
https://github.com/uapi-group/specifications/pull/59 adds some more text there
too.
Also, rework the recommendation: hint that PCR 11 is useful, and recommend
binding to policy signatures instead of direct PCR values. This new text is
intentionally vague: doing this correctly is hard, but let's at least not imply
that just binding to PCR 7 is useful in any way.
Also, change "string alias" to "name" in discussion of PCR names.
Inspired by https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/future-of-encryption-in-fedora/80397/17
Fixes#25780.
> Man page: crypttab.5
> Issue 1: Missing fullstop
> Issue 2: I<cipher=>, I<hash=>, I<size=> → B<cipher=>, B<hash=>, B<size=>
>
> "Force LUKS mode\\&. When this mode is used, the following options are "
> "ignored since they are provided by the LUKS header on the device: "
> "I<cipher=>, I<hash=>, I<size=>"
Seems OK to me. The full stop is there and has been for at least a few years. And we use <option> for the markup, which is appropriate here.
> Man page: crypttab.5
> Issue 1: Missing fullstop
> Issue 2: I<cipher=>, I<hash=>, I<keyfile-offset=>, I<keyfile-size=>, I<size=> → B<cipher=>, B<hash=>, B<keyfile-offset=>, B<keyfile-size=>, B<size=>
>
> "Use TrueCrypt encryption mode\\&. When this mode is used, the following "
> "options are ignored since they are provided by the TrueCrypt header on the "
> "device or do not apply: I<cipher=>, I<hash=>, I<keyfile-offset=>, I<keyfile-"
> "size=>, I<size=>"
Same.
> Man page: journalctl.1
> Issue 1: make be → may be
Fixed.
> Issue 2: below\\&. → below:
Fixed.
> Man page: journalctl.1
> Issue: Colon at the end?
>
> "The following commands are understood\\&. If none is specified the default "
> "is to display journal records\\&."
> msgstr ""
> "Die folgenden Befehle werden verstanden\\&. Falls keiner festgelegt ist, ist "
> "die Anzeige von Journal-Datensätzen die Vorgabe\\&."
This is a bit awkward, but I'm not sure how to fix it.
> Man page: kernel-install.8
> Issue: methods a fallback → methods fallback
It was correct, but I added a comma to make the sense clearer.
> Man page: loader.conf.5
> Issue 1: secure boot variables → Secure Boot variables
> Issue 2: one → one for (multiple times)
>
> "Supported secure boot variables are one database for authorized images, one "
> "key exchange key (KEK) and one platform key (PK)\\&. For more information, "
> "refer to the \\m[blue]B<UEFI specification>\\m[]\\&\\s-2\\u[2]\\d\\s+2, "
> "under Secure Boot and Driver Signing\\&. Another resource that describe the "
> "interplay of the different variables is the \\m[blue]B<EDK2 "
> "documentation>\\m[]\\&\\s-2\\u[3]\\d\\s+2\\&."
"one of" would sound strange. "One this and one that" is OK.
> Man page: loader.conf.5
> Issue: systemd-boot → B<systemd-boot>(7)
Fixed.
> Man page: logind.conf.5
> Issue: systemd-logind → B<systemd-logind>(8)
We use <filename>systemd-logind</> on subsequent references… I think that's good enough.
> Man page: nss-myhostname.8
> Issue: B<getent> → B<getent>(1)
Fixed.
> Man page: nss-resolve.8
> Issue: B<systemd-resolved> → B<systemd-resolved>(8)
The first reference does this, subsequent are shorter.
> Man page: os-release.5
> Issue: Portable Services → Portable Services Documentation?
Updated.
> Man page: pam_systemd_home.8
> Issue: auth and account use "reason", while session and password do not?
Reworded.
> Man page: portablectl.1
> Issue: In systemd-portabled.service(8): Portable Services Documentation
Updated.
> Man page: repart.d.5
> Issue: The partition → the partition
Fixed.
> Man page: repart.d.5
> Issue: B<systemd-repart> → B<systemd-repart>(8)
The first reference does this. I also change this one, because it's pretty far down in the text.
> Man page: systemd.1
> Issue: kernel command line twice?
>
> "Takes a boolean argument\\&. If false disables importing credentials from "
> "the kernel command line, qemu_fw_cfg subsystem or the kernel command line\\&."
Apparently this was fixed already.
> Man page: systemd-boot.7
> Issue: enrollement → enrollment
Fixed.
> Man page: systemd-cryptenroll.1
> Issue: multiple cases: any specified → the specified
Reworded.
> Man page: systemd-cryptenroll.1
> Issue: If this this → If this
Fixed tree-wide.
> Man page: systemd-cryptsetup-generator.8
> Issue: and the initrd → and in the initrd
"Is honoured by the initrd" is OK, because we often speak about the initrd as a single unit. But in the same paragraph we also used "in the initrd", which makes the other use look sloppy. I changed it to "in the initrd" everywhere in that file.
> Man page: systemd.directives.7
> Issue: Why are these two quoted (but not others)?
>
> "B<\\*(Aqh\\*(Aq>"
>
> B<\\*(Aqs\\*(Aq>"
>
> "B<\\*(Aqy\\*(Aq>"
This is autogenerated from files… We use slightly different markup in different files, and it's just too hard to make it consistent. We gave up on this.
> Man page: systemd.exec.5
> Issue 1: B<at>(1p) → B<at>(1)
> Issue 2: B<crontab>(1p) → B<crontab>(1)
Fixed.
> Man page: systemd.exec.5
> Issue: B<select()> → B<select>(2)
Fixed.
> Man page: systemd.exec.5
> Issue: qemu → B<qemu>(1)
The man page doesn't seem to be in any of the canonical places on the web.
I added a link to online docs.
> Man page: systemd.exec.5
> Issue: variable → variables
Seems to be fixed already.
> Man page: systemd-integritysetup-generator.8
> Issue: systemd-integritysetup-generator → B<systemd-integritysetup-generator>
I changed <filename> to <command>.
> Man page: systemd-integritysetup-generator.8
> Issue: superfluous comma at the end
Already fixed.
> Man page: systemd-measure.1
> Issue: (see B<--pcr-bank=>) below → (see B<--pcr-bank=> below)
Reworded.
> Man page: systemd-measure.1
> Issue: =PATH> → =>I<PATH>
Fixed.
> Man page: systemd-measure.1.po
> Issue: B<--bank=DIGEST> → B<--bank=>I<DIGEST>
Fixed.
> Man page: systemd.netdev.5
> Issue: os the → on the
Appears to have been fixed already.
> Man page: systemd.netdev.5
> Issue: Onboard → On-board (as in previous string)
Updated.
> Man page: systemd.network.5
> Issue: B<systemd-networkd> -> B<systemd-networkd>(8)
First reference does this, subsequent do not.
> Man page: systemd.network.5
> Issue: B<netlabelctl> → B<netlabelctl>(8)
First reference does this, subsequent do not.
> Man page: systemd.network.5
> Issue: Missing verb (aquired? configured?) in the half sentence starting with "or by a "
I dropped the comma.
> Man page: systemd-nspawn.1
> Issue: All host users outside of that range → All other host users
Reworded.
> # FIXME no effect → no effect\\&.
> #. type: Plain text
> #: archlinux debian-unstable fedora-rawhide mageia-cauldron opensuse-tumbleweed
> msgid ""
> "Whichever ID mapping option is used, the same mapping will be used for users "
> "and groups IDs\\&. If B<rootidmap> is used, the group owning the bind "
> "mounted directory will have no effect"
A period is added. Not sure if there's some other issue.
> Man page: systemd-oomd.service.8
> Issue: B<systemd> → B<systemd>(1)
Done.
> Man page: systemd.path.5
> Issue 1: B<systemd.exec>(1) → B<systemd.exec>(5)
> Issue 2: This section does not (yet?) exist
Fixed.
> Man page: systemd-pcrphase.service.8
> Issue 1: indicate phases into TPM2 PCR 11 ??
> Issue 2: Colon at the end of the paragraph?
Fixed.
> Man page: systemd-pcrphase.service.8
> Issue: final boot phase → final shutdown phase?
Updated.
> Man page: systemd-pcrphase.service.8
> Issue: for the the → for the
Fixed tree-wide.
> Man page: systemd-portabled.service.8
> Issue: In systemd-portabled.service(8): Portable Services Documentation
Updated.
> Man page: systemd-pstore.service.8
> Issue: Here and the following paragraphs: . → \\&. // Upstream: What does this comment mean? // You normally write \\&. for a full dot (full stop etc.); here you write only "." (i.e. a plain dot).
>
> "and we look up \"localhost\", nss-dns will send the following queries to "
> "systemd-resolved listening on 127.0.0.53:53: first \"localhost.foobar.com\", "
> "then \"localhost.barbar.com\", and finally \"localhost\". If (hopefully) the "
> "first two queries fail, systemd-resolved will synthesize an answer for the "
> "third query."
Looks all OK to me.
> Man page: systemd.resource-control.5
> Issue: Missing closing bracket after link to Control Groups version 1
Fixed.
> Man page: systemd-sysext.8
> Issue: In systemd-portabled.service(8): Portable Services Documentation
Updated.
> Man page: systemd.timer.5
> Issue 1: B<systemd.exec>(1) → B<systemd.exec>(5)
> Issue 2: This section does not (yet?) exist
Fixed.
> Man page: systemd.unit.5
> Issue: that is → that are
Fixed.
> Man page: systemd-veritysetup-generator.8
> Issue: systemd-veritysetup-generator → B<systemd-veritysetup-generator>
>
> "systemd-veritysetup-generator implements B<systemd.generator>(7)\\&."
>
> "systemd-veritysetup-generator understands the following kernel command line "
> "parameters:"
Updated.
> Man page: systemd-volatile-root.service.8
> Issue: initrdyes → Initrd
Fixed.
> Man page: sysupdate.d.5
> Issue: : → \\&. (As above in TRANSFER)
Updated.
> Man page: sysupdate.d.5
> Issue: some → certain
Updated.
> Man page: sysupdate.d.5
> Issue 1: i\\&.e\\& → I\\&.e\\&
Fixed.
> Issue 2: the image → the system
"image" seems correct.
> Man page: tmpfiles.d.5
> Issue: systemd-tmpfiles → B<systemd-tmpfiles>(8)
Updated.
In many places we spelled out the phrase behind "initrd" in full, but this
isn't terribly useful. In fact, no "RAM disk" is used, so emphasizing this
is just confusing to the reader. Let's just say "initrd" everywhere, people
understand what this refers to, and that it's in fact an initramfs image.
Also, s/i.e./e.g./ where appropriate.
Also, don't say "in RAM", when in fact it's virtual memory, whose pages
may or may not be loaded in page frames in RAM, and we have no control over
this.
Also, add <filename></filename> and other minor cleanups.
Let's grab another so far unused PCR, and measure all sysext images into
it that we load from the ESP. Note that this is possibly partly redundant,
since sysext images should have dm-verity enabled, and that is hooked up
to IMA. However, measuring this explicitly has the benefit that we can
measure filenames too, easily, and that all without need for IMA or
anything like that.
This means: when booting a unified sd-stub kernel through sd-boot we'll
now have:
1. PCR 11: unified kernel image payload (i.e. kernel, initrd, boot
splash, dtb, osrelease)
2. PCR 12: kernel command line (i.e. the one embedded in the image, plus
optionally an overriden one) + any credential files picked up by
sd-stub
3. PCR 13: sysext images picked up by sd-stub
And each of these three PCRs should carry just the above, and start from
zero, thus be pre-calculatable.
Thus, all components and parameters of the OS boot process (i.e.
everything after the boot loader) is now nicely pre-calculable.
NOTE: this actually replaces previous measuring of the syext images into
PCR 4. I added this back in 845707aae2,
following the train of thought, that sysext images for the initrd should
be measured like the initrd itself they are for, and according to my
thinking that would be a unified kernel which is measured by firmware
into PCR 4 like any other UEFI executables.
However, I think we should depart from that idea. First and foremost
that makes it harder to pre-calculate PCR 4 (since we actually measured
quite incompatible records to the TPM event log), but also I think
there's great value in being able to write policies that bind to the
used sysexts independently of the earlier boot chain (i.e. shim, boot
loader, unified kernel), hence a separate PCR makes more sense.
Strictly speaking, this is a compatibility break, but I think one we can
get away with, simply because the initrd sysext images are currently not
picked up by systemd-sysext yet in the initrd, and because of that we
can be reasonably sure noone uses this yet, and hence relies on the PCR
register used. Hence, let's clean this up before people actually do
start relying on this.
Here we grab a new – on Linux so far unused (by my Googling skills, that
is) – and measure all static components of the PE kernel image into.
This is useful since for the first time we'll have a PCR that contains
only a PCR of the booted kernel, nothing else. That allows putting
together TPM policies that bind to a specific kernel (+ builtin initrd),
without having to have booted that kernel first. PCRs can be
pre-calculated. Yay!
You might wonder, why we measure just the discovered PE sections we are
about to use, instead of the whole PE image. That's because of the next
step I have in mind: PE images should also be able to carry an
additional section that contains a signature for its own expected,
pre-calculated PCR values. This signature data should then be passed
into the booted kernel and can be used there in TPM policies. Benefit:
TPM policies can now be bound to *signatures* of PCRs, instead of the
raw hash values themselves. This makes update management a *lot* easier,
as policies don't need to be updated whenever a kernel is updated, as
long as the signature is available. Now, if the PCR signature is
embedded in the kernel PE image it cannot be of a PCR hash of the kernel
PE image itself, because that would be a chicken-and-egg problem. Hence,
by only measuring the relavent payload sections (and that means
excluding the future section that will contain the PCR hash signature)
we avoid this problem, naturally.
Let's document this for now. We should be able to lift these limitations
sooner or later, at which point we can drop this documentation again.
These two limitations are a pitfall that people should be aware of,
before going FIDO2-only.
See: #20230#19208
