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Commit Graph

16 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
David Herrmann
15411c0cb1 tree-wide: there is no ENOTSUP on linux
Replace ENOTSUP by EOPNOTSUPP as this is what linux actually uses.
2015-03-13 14:10:39 +01:00
Lennart Poettering
fae5694e1a smack-util: remove warning when building without SMACK support 2014-12-04 16:17:34 +01:00
Michal Schmidt
56f64d9576 treewide: use log_*_errno whenever %m is in the format string
If the format string contains %m, clearly errno must have a meaningful
value, so we might as well use log_*_errno to have ERRNO= logged.

Using:
find . -name '*.[ch]' | xargs sed -r -i -e \
's/log_(debug|info|notice|warning|error|emergency)\((".*%m.*")/log_\1_errno(errno, \2/'

Plus some whitespace, linewrap, and indent adjustments.
2014-11-28 19:49:27 +01:00
WaLyong Cho
2ca620c4ed smack: introduce new SmackProcessLabel option
In service file, if the file has some of special SMACK label in
ExecStart= and systemd has no permission for the special SMACK label
then permission error will occurred. To resolve this, systemd should
be able to set its SMACK label to something accessible of ExecStart=.
So introduce new SmackProcessLabel. If label is specified with
SmackProcessLabel= then the child systemd will set its label to
that. To successfully execute the ExecStart=, accessible label should
be specified with SmackProcessLabel=.
Additionally, by SMACK policy, if the file in ExecStart= has no
SMACK64EXEC then the executed process will have given label by
SmackProcessLabel=. But if the file has SMACK64EXEC then the
SMACK64EXEC label will be overridden.

[zj: reword man page]
2014-11-24 10:20:53 -05:00
Lennart Poettering
376a298096 smack: we don't need the special labels exported, hence don't 2014-10-23 21:36:56 +02:00
Lennart Poettering
5dfc54615a smack: rework SMACK label fixing code to follow more closely the semantics of the matching selinux code 2014-10-23 21:36:56 +02:00
Lennart Poettering
d1ce2089b4 smack: never follow symlinks when relabelling
previously mac_smack_apply(path, NULL) would operate on the symlink
itself while mac_smack_apply(path, "foo") would follow the symlink.
Let's clean this up an always operate on the symlink, which appears to
be the safer option.
2014-10-23 21:36:56 +02:00
Lennart Poettering
d53e386db6 smack: rework smack APIs a bit
a) always return negative errno error codes
b) always become a noop if smack is off
c) always take a NULL label as a request to remove it
2014-10-23 21:36:56 +02:00
Lennart Poettering
c80d766c80 mac: rename all calls that apply a label mac_{selinux|smack}_apply_xyz(), and all that reset it to defaults mac_{selinux|smack}_fix()
Let's clean up the naming schemes a bit and use the same one for SMACK
and for SELINUX.
2014-10-23 21:36:56 +02:00
Lennart Poettering
6baa7db008 mac: also rename use_{smack,selinux,apparmor}() calls so that they share the new mac_{smack,selinux,apparmor}_xyz() convention 2014-10-23 17:34:30 +02:00
WaLyong Cho
cc56fafeeb mac: rename apis with mac_{selinux/smack}_ prefix 2014-10-23 17:13:15 +02:00
WaLyong Cho
66b6d9d5b5 label: rearrange mandatory access control(MAC) apis
move label apis to selinux-util.ch or smack-util.ch appropriately.
2014-10-23 17:10:05 +02:00
Kay Sievers
d2edfae0f9 build-sys: use glibc's xattr support instead of requiring libattr 2014-05-28 17:36:40 +08:00
Kay Sievers
9a4e038c15 smack: minimize ifdef use, and move all labeling to smack-util.c 2013-10-11 10:16:41 +02:00
Lennart Poettering
d682b3a7e7 security: rework selinux, smack, ima, apparmor detection logic
Always cache the results, and bypass low-level security calls when the
respective subsystem is not enabled.
2013-10-10 16:35:44 +02:00
Auke Kok
8552b17660 Smack: Test if smack is enabled before mounting
Since on most systems with xattr systemd will compile with Smack
support enabled, we still attempt to mount various fs's with
Smack-only options.

Before mounting any of these Smack-related filesystems with
Smack specific mount options, check if Smack is functionally
active on the running kernel.

If Smack is really enabled in the kernel, all these Smack mounts
are now *fatal*, as they should be.

We no longer mount smackfs if systemd was compiled without
Smack support. This makes it easier to make smackfs mount
failures a critical error when Smack is enabled.

We no longer mount these filesystems with their Smack specific
options inside containers. There these filesystems will be
mounted with there non-mount smack options for now.
2013-10-09 15:06:17 -07:00