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Initially I thought this is a good idea, but when reviewing a different PR
(https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/13862#discussion_r340604313) I changed
my mind about this. At some point we probably should start warning about the
old option name, and yet later remove it. But it'll make it easier for people
to transition to the new option name if there's a period of support for both
names without any fuss. There's nothing particularly wrong about the old name,
and there is no support cost.
Fixes#13919 (by avoiding the issue completely).
If udevd receives an exit signal, it releases its reference on the udev
monitor in manager_exit(). If at this time a worker is hanging, and if
the event timeout for this worker expires before udevd exits, udevd
crashes in on_sigchld()->udev_monitor_send_device(), because the monitor
has already been freed.
Fix this by releasing the main process's monitor ref later, in
manager_free().
This patch is a new attempt to fix the race originally described in issue #9754.
The initial fix (commit ad96887a12) consisted in
spawning a sub process that became the controlling process of the VT and hence
kicked the old controlling process off to make sure that the VT wouldn't have
entered in HUP state while logind restored the VT.
But it introduced a regression (see issue #11269) and thus was reverted. But
unlike it was described in the revert commit message, commit
adb8688b3f alone doen't fix the initial race.
This patch fixes the race in a simpler way by trying to restore the VT a second
time after making sure to re-open it if the first attempt fails.
Indeed if the old controlling process dies before or during the first attempt,
logind will fail to restore the VT. At this point the VT is in HUP state but
we're sure that it won't enter in a HUP state a second time. Therefore we will
retry by re-opening the VT to clear the HUP state and by restoring the VT a
second time, which should be safe this time.
Fixes: #9754Fixes: #13241
On some systems with lots of devices, device probing for certain drivers can
take a very long time. If systemd-udevd detects a timeout and kills the worker
running modprobe using SIGKILL, some devices will not be probed, or end up in
unusable state. The --event-timeout option can be used to modify the maximum
time spent in an uevent handler. But if systemd-udevd exits, it uses a
different timeout, hard-coded to 30s, and exits when this timeout expires,
causing all workers to be KILLed by systemd afterwards. In practice, this may
lead to workers being killed after significantly less time than specified with
the event-timeout. This is particularly significant during initrd processing:
systemd-udevd will be stopped by systemd when initrd-switch-root.target is
about to be isolated, which usually happens quickly after finding and mounting
the root FS.
If systemd-udevd is started by PID 1 (i.e. basically always), systemd will
kill both udevd and the workers after expiry of TimeoutStopSec. This is
actually better than the built-in udevd timeout, because it's more transparent
and configurable for users. This way users can avoid the mentioned boot problem
by simply increasing StopTimeoutSec= in systemd-udevd.service.
If udevd is not started by systemd (standalone), this is still an
improvement. udevd will kill hanging workers when the event timeout is
reached, which is configurable via the udev.event_timeout= kernel
command line parameter. Before this patch, udevd would simply exit with
workers still running, which would then become zombie processes.
With the timeout removed, the sd_event_now() assertion in manager_exit() can be
dropped.
This makes it easier to see what unit_name_is_valid() returns at a glance.
The output is not whitespace clean, but I think it's good enough for a test.
We compile some c++ code for tests. We would simply use the default options for
those. When the previous commit raised the default warning level, we started
getting warnings from c++ code. Let's add the most important options to the c++
command, so that we get a compilation without any warnings again.
I don't think it makes sense to add *all* the options that we add for c to the
c++ flags, because testing them takes quite a while, and the c++ compilations
are for small amounts of code, mostly to check that the headers have compatible
syntax.
Let's bump up the warning level, and not add by -Wextra by hand. This is the
approach recommended by meson. The idea is that all projects should be as
similar as possible to make it easier for users to switch between projects.
With meson-0.52.0-1.module_f31+6771+f5d842eb.noarch I get:
src/test/meson.build:19: WARNING: Overriding previous value of environment variable 'PATH' with a new one
When we're using *prepend*, the whole point is to modify an existing variable,
so meson shouldn't warn. But let's set avoid the warning and shorten things by
setting the final value immediately.
The code in cgroup.c has support for all hierarchies, but the test,
as written, will only work on unified. Since the test is really about
bpf code, and not the legacy devices controller, let's just skip
the test.
We already handle it specially in get_timezones(), hence we should OK it
here too, even if the timezone file doesn't actually exist.
Prompted by:
https://serverfault.com/questions/991172/invalid-time-zone-utc
(Yes, Ubuntu should install the UTC timezone data unconditionally: it
should not be an option, even if all other timezone data is excluded,
but since it's our business to validate user input but not out business
to validate distros, let's just accept "UTC" unconditionally, it's magic
after all)
It turns out that the kernel verifier would reject a program we would build
if there was a whitelist, but no entries in the whitelist matched.
The program would approximately like this:
0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +0)
1: (54) w2 &= 65535
2: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +0)
3: (74) w3 >>= 16
4: (61) r4 = *(u32 *)(r1 +4)
5: (61) r5 = *(u32 *)(r1 +8)
48: (b7) r0 = 0
49: (05) goto pc+1
50: (b7) r0 = 1
51: (95) exit
and insn 50 is unreachable, which is illegal. We would then either keep a
previous version of the program or allow everything. Make sure we build a
valid program that simply rejects everything.
Most of the time, we specify the allowed access mode as "rwm", so the check
always trivially passes. In that case, skip the check.
The repeating part changes from:
5: (55) if r2 != 0x2 goto pc+6
6: (bc) w1 = w3
7: (54) w1 &= 7
8: (5d) if r1 != r3 goto pc+3
9: (55) if r4 != 0x1 goto pc+2
10: (55) if r5 != 0x3 goto pc+1
11: (05) goto pc+8
to
6: (55) if r2 != 0x2 goto pc+3
7: (55) if r4 != 0x1 goto pc+2
8: (55) if r5 != 0x3 goto pc+1
9: (05) goto pc+40
This makes the code a bit longer, but easier to read I think, because
the cgroup v1 and v2 code paths are more similar. And whent he type is
a char, any backtrace is easier to interpret.
