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Otherwise, when the test is executed on a system with signed PCRs,
cryptenroll will automatically pick up the public key from the UKI
which results in a volume that can't be unlocked because the pcrextend
tests appends extra things to pcr 11.
The .cred suffix is stripped from a credential as it is imported from
the ESP, hence it should not be included in the credential name embedded
in the credential.
Fixes: #33497
So far you had to pick:
1. Use a signed PCR TPM2 policy to lock your disk to (i.e. UKI vendor
blesses your setup via signature)
or
2. Use a pcrlock policy (i.e. local system blesses your setup via
dynamic local policy stored in NV index)
It was not possible combine these two, because TPM2 access policies do
not allow the combination of PolicyAuthorize (used to implement #1
above) and PolicyAuthorizeNV (used to implement #2) in a single policy,
unless one is "further upstream" (and can simply remove the other from
the policy freely).
This is quite limiting of course, since we actually do want to enforce
on each TPM object that both the OS vendor policy and the local policy
must be fulfilled, without the chance for the vendor or the local system
to disable the other.
This patch addresses this: instead of trying to find a way to come up
with some adventurous scheme to combine both policy into one TPM2
policy, we simply shard the symmetric LUKS decryption key: one half we
protect via the signed PCR policy, and the other we protect via the
pcrlock policy. Only if both halves can be acquired the disk can be
decrypted.
This means:
1. we simply double the unlock key in length in case both policies shall
be used.
2. We store two resulting TPM policy hashes in the LUKS token JSON, one
for each policy
3. We store two sealed TPM policy key blobs in the LUKS token JSON, for
both halves of the LUKS unlock key.
This patch keeps the "sharding" logic relatively generic (i.e. the low
level logic is actually fine with more than 2 shards), because I figure
sooner or later we might have to encode more shards, for example if we
add further TPM2-based access policies, for example when combining FIDO2
with TPM2, or implementing TOTP for this.
Running the following commands:
# mkdir -p /var/lib/pcrlock.d/123-empty.pcrlock.d
# /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-pcrlock predict --pcr=1+2+3+4+5+16
Will result in:
...
Floating point exception
Running the following commands:
# mkdir -p /var/lib/pcrlock.d/123-empty.pcrlock.d
# /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-pcrlock make-policy --pcr=1+2+3+4+5+16
Will result to this (partial) log:
...
Predicted future PCRs in 133us.
[]
...
Written policy digest 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 to NV index 0x1921da6
...
So, add missing checks to handle gracefully cases where there's no variant
inside the component.
Signed-off-by: Arnaud Patard <arnaud.patard@collabora.com>
Having these named differently than the test itself mostly creates
unecessary confusion and makes writing logic against the tests harder
so let's rename the testsuite-xx units and scripts to just use the
test name itself.
