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We'd try to map a zero-byte buffer from a NULL pointer, which is undefined behaviour.
src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:3161:60: runtime error: applying zero offset to null pointer
#0 0x7f6ff064e691 in find_part /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:3161:60
#1 0x7f6ff0640788 in message_peek_body /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:3283:16
#2 0x7f6ff064e8db in enter_struct_or_dict_entry /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:3967:21
#3 0x7f6ff06444ac in bus_message_enter_struct /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:4009:13
#4 0x7f6ff0641dde in sd_bus_message_enter_container /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:4136:21
#5 0x7f6ff0619874 in sd_bus_message_dump /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-dump.c:178:29
#6 0x4293d9 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/fuzz/fuzz-bus-message.c:39:9
#7 0x441986 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:558:15
#8 0x44121e in fuzzer::Fuzzer::RunOne(unsigned char const*, unsigned long, bool, fuzzer::InputInfo*, bool*) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:470:3
#9 0x443164 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ReadAndExecuteSeedCorpora(std::__1::vector<fuzzer::SizedFile, fuzzer::fuzzer_allocator<fuzzer::SizedFile> >&) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:770:7
#10 0x4434bc in fuzzer::Fuzzer::Loop(std::__1::vector<fuzzer::SizedFile, fuzzer::fuzzer_allocator<fuzzer::SizedFile> >&) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:799:3
#11 0x42d2bc in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerDriver.cpp:846:6
#12 0x42978a in main /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerMain.cpp:19:10
#13 0x7f6fef13c82f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f)
#14 0x407808 in _start (out/fuzz-bus-message+0x407808)
In the linked reproducer, m->fields_size == 0, and we calculate ri == -1, which
of course doesn't end well. Skip the whole calculation if m->fields_size == 0,
and also check that we don't go negative even if it is non-zero.
Fixes https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=19446 and #15583.
We would accept a message with 40k signature and spend a lot of time iterating
over the nested arrays. Let's just reject it early, as we do for !gvariant
messages.
We would read (-1), and then add 1 to it, call message_peek_body(..., 0, ...),
and when trying to make use of the data.
The fuzzer test case is just for one site, but they all look similar.
v2: fix two UINT8_MAX/UINT32_MAX mismatches founds by LGTM
We copied part of the string into a buffer that was off by two.
If the element signature had length one, we'd copy 0 bytes and crash when
looking at the "first" byte. Otherwise, we would crash because strncpy would
not terminate the string.
This is similar to the grandparent commit 'fix calculation of offsets table',
except that now the change is for array elements. Same story as before: we need
to make sure that the offsets increase enough taking alignment into account.
While at it, rename 'p' to 'previous' to match similar code in other places.
The offsets specify the ends of variable length data. We would trust the
incoming data, putting the offsets specified in our message
into the offsets tables after doing some superficial verification.
But when actually reading the data we apply alignment, so we would take
the previous offset, align it, making it bigger then current offset, and
then we'd try to read data of negative length.
In the attached example, the message specifies the following offsets:
[1, 4]
but the alignment of those items is
[1, 8]
so we'd calculate the second item as starting at 8 and ending at 4.
The alternative would be to treat gvariant and !gvariant messages differently.
But this is a problem because we check signatures is variuos places before we
have an actual message, for example in sd_bus_add_object_vtable(). It seems
better to treat things consistent (i.e. follow the lowest common denominator)
and disallow empty structures everywhere.
We didn't free one of the fields in two of the places.
$ valgrind --show-leak-kinds=all --leak-check=full \
build/fuzz-bus-message \
test/fuzz/fuzz-bus-message/leak-c09c0e2256d43bc5e2d02748c8d8760e7bc25d20
...
==14457== HEAP SUMMARY:
==14457== in use at exit: 3 bytes in 1 blocks
==14457== total heap usage: 509 allocs, 508 frees, 51,016 bytes allocated
==14457==
==14457== 3 bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 1 of 1
==14457== at 0x4C2EBAB: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:299)
==14457== by 0x53AFE79: strndup (in /usr/lib64/libc-2.27.so)
==14457== by 0x4F52EB8: free_and_strndup (string-util.c:1039)
==14457== by 0x4F8E1AB: sd_bus_message_peek_type (bus-message.c:4193)
==14457== by 0x4F76CB5: bus_message_dump (bus-dump.c:144)
==14457== by 0x108F12: LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput (fuzz-bus-message.c:24)
==14457== by 0x1090F7: main (fuzz-main.c:34)
==14457==
==14457== LEAK SUMMARY:
==14457== definitely lost: 3 bytes in 1 blocks
v2: fix error in free_and_strndup()
When the orignal and copied message were the same, but shorter than specified
length l, memory read past the end of the buffer would be performed. A test
case is included: a string that had an embedded NUL ("q\0") is used to replace
"q".
v3: Fix one more bug in free_and_strndup and add tests.
v4: Some style fixed based on review, one more use of free_and_replace, and
make the tests more comprehensive.
