2003-07-01 21:51:52 +04:00
/*
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Unix SMB / CIFS implementation .
This is my 'Authentication Rewrite' version 1.01, mostly as submitted to
samba-technical a few weeks ago.
The idea here is to standardize the checking of user names and passwords,
thereby ensuring that all authtentications pass the same standards. The
interface currently implemented in as
nt_status = check_password(user_info, server_info)
where user_info contains (mostly) the authentication data, and server_info
contains things like the user-id they got, and their resolved user name.
The current ugliness with the way the structures are created will be killed
the next revision, when they will be created and malloced by creator functions.
This patch also includes the first implementation of NTLMv2 in HEAD, but which
needs some more testing. We also add a hack to allow plaintext passwords to be
compared with smbpasswd, not the system password database.
Finally, this patch probably reintroduces the PAM accounts bug we had in
2.2.0, I'll fix that once this hits the tree. (I've just finished testing
it on a wide variety of platforms, so I want to get this patch in).
(This used to be commit b30b6202f31d339b48d51c0d38174cafd1cfcd42)
2001-08-03 17:09:23 +04:00
Authentication utility functions
Copyright ( C ) Andrew Tridgell 1992 - 1998
2011-07-18 16:26:31 +04:00
Copyright ( C ) Andrew Bartlett 2001 - 2011
2001-11-04 02:34:24 +03:00
Copyright ( C ) Jeremy Allison 2000 - 2001
2002-09-25 19:19:00 +04:00
Copyright ( C ) Rafal Szczesniak 2002
2011-07-18 06:38:05 +04:00
Copyright ( C ) Volker Lendecke 2006 - 2008
This is my 'Authentication Rewrite' version 1.01, mostly as submitted to
samba-technical a few weeks ago.
The idea here is to standardize the checking of user names and passwords,
thereby ensuring that all authtentications pass the same standards. The
interface currently implemented in as
nt_status = check_password(user_info, server_info)
where user_info contains (mostly) the authentication data, and server_info
contains things like the user-id they got, and their resolved user name.
The current ugliness with the way the structures are created will be killed
the next revision, when they will be created and malloced by creator functions.
This patch also includes the first implementation of NTLMv2 in HEAD, but which
needs some more testing. We also add a hack to allow plaintext passwords to be
compared with smbpasswd, not the system password database.
Finally, this patch probably reintroduces the PAM accounts bug we had in
2.2.0, I'll fix that once this hits the tree. (I've just finished testing
it on a wide variety of platforms, so I want to get this patch in).
(This used to be commit b30b6202f31d339b48d51c0d38174cafd1cfcd42)
2001-08-03 17:09:23 +04:00
This program is free software ; you can redistribute it and / or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
2007-07-09 23:25:36 +04:00
the Free Software Foundation ; either version 3 of the License , or
This is my 'Authentication Rewrite' version 1.01, mostly as submitted to
samba-technical a few weeks ago.
The idea here is to standardize the checking of user names and passwords,
thereby ensuring that all authtentications pass the same standards. The
interface currently implemented in as
nt_status = check_password(user_info, server_info)
where user_info contains (mostly) the authentication data, and server_info
contains things like the user-id they got, and their resolved user name.
The current ugliness with the way the structures are created will be killed
the next revision, when they will be created and malloced by creator functions.
This patch also includes the first implementation of NTLMv2 in HEAD, but which
needs some more testing. We also add a hack to allow plaintext passwords to be
compared with smbpasswd, not the system password database.
Finally, this patch probably reintroduces the PAM accounts bug we had in
2.2.0, I'll fix that once this hits the tree. (I've just finished testing
it on a wide variety of platforms, so I want to get this patch in).
(This used to be commit b30b6202f31d339b48d51c0d38174cafd1cfcd42)
2001-08-03 17:09:23 +04:00
( at your option ) any later version .
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
This is my 'Authentication Rewrite' version 1.01, mostly as submitted to
samba-technical a few weeks ago.
The idea here is to standardize the checking of user names and passwords,
thereby ensuring that all authtentications pass the same standards. The
interface currently implemented in as
nt_status = check_password(user_info, server_info)
where user_info contains (mostly) the authentication data, and server_info
contains things like the user-id they got, and their resolved user name.
The current ugliness with the way the structures are created will be killed
the next revision, when they will be created and malloced by creator functions.
This patch also includes the first implementation of NTLMv2 in HEAD, but which
needs some more testing. We also add a hack to allow plaintext passwords to be
compared with smbpasswd, not the system password database.
Finally, this patch probably reintroduces the PAM accounts bug we had in
2.2.0, I'll fix that once this hits the tree. (I've just finished testing
it on a wide variety of platforms, so I want to get this patch in).
(This used to be commit b30b6202f31d339b48d51c0d38174cafd1cfcd42)
2001-08-03 17:09:23 +04:00
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful ,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY ; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE . See the
GNU General Public License for more details .
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
This is my 'Authentication Rewrite' version 1.01, mostly as submitted to
samba-technical a few weeks ago.
The idea here is to standardize the checking of user names and passwords,
thereby ensuring that all authtentications pass the same standards. The
interface currently implemented in as
nt_status = check_password(user_info, server_info)
where user_info contains (mostly) the authentication data, and server_info
contains things like the user-id they got, and their resolved user name.
The current ugliness with the way the structures are created will be killed
the next revision, when they will be created and malloced by creator functions.
This patch also includes the first implementation of NTLMv2 in HEAD, but which
needs some more testing. We also add a hack to allow plaintext passwords to be
compared with smbpasswd, not the system password database.
Finally, this patch probably reintroduces the PAM accounts bug we had in
2.2.0, I'll fix that once this hits the tree. (I've just finished testing
it on a wide variety of platforms, so I want to get this patch in).
(This used to be commit b30b6202f31d339b48d51c0d38174cafd1cfcd42)
2001-08-03 17:09:23 +04:00
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
2007-07-10 04:52:41 +04:00
along with this program . If not , see < http : //www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
This is my 'Authentication Rewrite' version 1.01, mostly as submitted to
samba-technical a few weeks ago.
The idea here is to standardize the checking of user names and passwords,
thereby ensuring that all authtentications pass the same standards. The
interface currently implemented in as
nt_status = check_password(user_info, server_info)
where user_info contains (mostly) the authentication data, and server_info
contains things like the user-id they got, and their resolved user name.
The current ugliness with the way the structures are created will be killed
the next revision, when they will be created and malloced by creator functions.
This patch also includes the first implementation of NTLMv2 in HEAD, but which
needs some more testing. We also add a hack to allow plaintext passwords to be
compared with smbpasswd, not the system password database.
Finally, this patch probably reintroduces the PAM accounts bug we had in
2.2.0, I'll fix that once this hits the tree. (I've just finished testing
it on a wide variety of platforms, so I want to get this patch in).
(This used to be commit b30b6202f31d339b48d51c0d38174cafd1cfcd42)
2001-08-03 17:09:23 +04:00
*/
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# include "includes.h"
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# include "auth.h"
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# include "../libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
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# include "../lib/crypto/arcfour.h"
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# include "rpc_client/init_lsa.h"
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# include "../libcli/security/security.h"
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# include "../lib/util/util_pw.h"
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# include "lib/winbind_util.h"
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# include "passdb.h"
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# include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_auth.h"
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# include "../auth/auth_sam_reply.h"
This is my 'Authentication Rewrite' version 1.01, mostly as submitted to
samba-technical a few weeks ago.
The idea here is to standardize the checking of user names and passwords,
thereby ensuring that all authtentications pass the same standards. The
interface currently implemented in as
nt_status = check_password(user_info, server_info)
where user_info contains (mostly) the authentication data, and server_info
contains things like the user-id they got, and their resolved user name.
The current ugliness with the way the structures are created will be killed
the next revision, when they will be created and malloced by creator functions.
This patch also includes the first implementation of NTLMv2 in HEAD, but which
needs some more testing. We also add a hack to allow plaintext passwords to be
compared with smbpasswd, not the system password database.
Finally, this patch probably reintroduces the PAM accounts bug we had in
2.2.0, I'll fix that once this hits the tree. (I've just finished testing
it on a wide variety of platforms, so I want to get this patch in).
(This used to be commit b30b6202f31d339b48d51c0d38174cafd1cfcd42)
2001-08-03 17:09:23 +04:00
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
# undef DBGC_CLASS
# define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
This is my 'Authentication Rewrite' version 1.01, mostly as submitted to
samba-technical a few weeks ago.
The idea here is to standardize the checking of user names and passwords,
thereby ensuring that all authtentications pass the same standards. The
interface currently implemented in as
nt_status = check_password(user_info, server_info)
where user_info contains (mostly) the authentication data, and server_info
contains things like the user-id they got, and their resolved user name.
The current ugliness with the way the structures are created will be killed
the next revision, when they will be created and malloced by creator functions.
This patch also includes the first implementation of NTLMv2 in HEAD, but which
needs some more testing. We also add a hack to allow plaintext passwords to be
compared with smbpasswd, not the system password database.
Finally, this patch probably reintroduces the PAM accounts bug we had in
2.2.0, I'll fix that once this hits the tree. (I've just finished testing
it on a wide variety of platforms, so I want to get this patch in).
(This used to be commit b30b6202f31d339b48d51c0d38174cafd1cfcd42)
2001-08-03 17:09:23 +04:00
/****************************************************************************
Create a UNIX user on demand .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
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static int _smb_create_user ( const char * domain , const char * unix_username , const char * homedir )
This is my 'Authentication Rewrite' version 1.01, mostly as submitted to
samba-technical a few weeks ago.
The idea here is to standardize the checking of user names and passwords,
thereby ensuring that all authtentications pass the same standards. The
interface currently implemented in as
nt_status = check_password(user_info, server_info)
where user_info contains (mostly) the authentication data, and server_info
contains things like the user-id they got, and their resolved user name.
The current ugliness with the way the structures are created will be killed
the next revision, when they will be created and malloced by creator functions.
This patch also includes the first implementation of NTLMv2 in HEAD, but which
needs some more testing. We also add a hack to allow plaintext passwords to be
compared with smbpasswd, not the system password database.
Finally, this patch probably reintroduces the PAM accounts bug we had in
2.2.0, I'll fix that once this hits the tree. (I've just finished testing
it on a wide variety of platforms, so I want to get this patch in).
(This used to be commit b30b6202f31d339b48d51c0d38174cafd1cfcd42)
2001-08-03 17:09:23 +04:00
{
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TALLOC_CTX * ctx = talloc_tos ( ) ;
char * add_script ;
This is my 'Authentication Rewrite' version 1.01, mostly as submitted to
samba-technical a few weeks ago.
The idea here is to standardize the checking of user names and passwords,
thereby ensuring that all authtentications pass the same standards. The
interface currently implemented in as
nt_status = check_password(user_info, server_info)
where user_info contains (mostly) the authentication data, and server_info
contains things like the user-id they got, and their resolved user name.
The current ugliness with the way the structures are created will be killed
the next revision, when they will be created and malloced by creator functions.
This patch also includes the first implementation of NTLMv2 in HEAD, but which
needs some more testing. We also add a hack to allow plaintext passwords to be
compared with smbpasswd, not the system password database.
Finally, this patch probably reintroduces the PAM accounts bug we had in
2.2.0, I'll fix that once this hits the tree. (I've just finished testing
it on a wide variety of platforms, so I want to get this patch in).
(This used to be commit b30b6202f31d339b48d51c0d38174cafd1cfcd42)
2001-08-03 17:09:23 +04:00
int ret ;
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add_script = talloc_strdup ( ctx , lp_adduser_script ( ) ) ;
if ( ! add_script | | ! * add_script ) {
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return - 1 ;
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}
add_script = talloc_all_string_sub ( ctx ,
add_script ,
" %u " ,
unix_username ) ;
if ( ! add_script ) {
return - 1 ;
}
if ( domain ) {
add_script = talloc_all_string_sub ( ctx ,
add_script ,
" %D " ,
domain ) ;
if ( ! add_script ) {
return - 1 ;
}
}
if ( homedir ) {
add_script = talloc_all_string_sub ( ctx ,
add_script ,
" %H " ,
homedir ) ;
if ( ! add_script ) {
return - 1 ;
}
}
This is my 'Authentication Rewrite' version 1.01, mostly as submitted to
samba-technical a few weeks ago.
The idea here is to standardize the checking of user names and passwords,
thereby ensuring that all authtentications pass the same standards. The
interface currently implemented in as
nt_status = check_password(user_info, server_info)
where user_info contains (mostly) the authentication data, and server_info
contains things like the user-id they got, and their resolved user name.
The current ugliness with the way the structures are created will be killed
the next revision, when they will be created and malloced by creator functions.
This patch also includes the first implementation of NTLMv2 in HEAD, but which
needs some more testing. We also add a hack to allow plaintext passwords to be
compared with smbpasswd, not the system password database.
Finally, this patch probably reintroduces the PAM accounts bug we had in
2.2.0, I'll fix that once this hits the tree. (I've just finished testing
it on a wide variety of platforms, so I want to get this patch in).
(This used to be commit b30b6202f31d339b48d51c0d38174cafd1cfcd42)
2001-08-03 17:09:23 +04:00
ret = smbrun ( add_script , NULL ) ;
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flush_pwnam_cache ( ) ;
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DEBUG ( ret ? 0 : 3 ,
( " smb_create_user: Running the command `%s' gave %d \n " ,
add_script , ret ) ) ;
This is my 'Authentication Rewrite' version 1.01, mostly as submitted to
samba-technical a few weeks ago.
The idea here is to standardize the checking of user names and passwords,
thereby ensuring that all authtentications pass the same standards. The
interface currently implemented in as
nt_status = check_password(user_info, server_info)
where user_info contains (mostly) the authentication data, and server_info
contains things like the user-id they got, and their resolved user name.
The current ugliness with the way the structures are created will be killed
the next revision, when they will be created and malloced by creator functions.
This patch also includes the first implementation of NTLMv2 in HEAD, but which
needs some more testing. We also add a hack to allow plaintext passwords to be
compared with smbpasswd, not the system password database.
Finally, this patch probably reintroduces the PAM accounts bug we had in
2.2.0, I'll fix that once this hits the tree. (I've just finished testing
it on a wide variety of platforms, so I want to get this patch in).
(This used to be commit b30b6202f31d339b48d51c0d38174cafd1cfcd42)
2001-08-03 17:09:23 +04:00
return ret ;
}
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/****************************************************************************
Create an auth_usersupplied_data structure after appropriate mapping .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
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NTSTATUS make_user_info_map ( struct auth_usersupplied_info * * user_info ,
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const char * smb_name ,
const char * client_domain ,
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const char * workstation_name ,
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const struct tsocket_address * remote_address ,
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DATA_BLOB * lm_pwd ,
DATA_BLOB * nt_pwd ,
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const struct samr_Password * lm_interactive_pwd ,
const struct samr_Password * nt_interactive_pwd ,
const char * plaintext ,
enum auth_password_state password_state )
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{
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const char * domain ;
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NTSTATUS result ;
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bool was_mapped ;
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char * internal_username = NULL ;
was_mapped = map_username ( talloc_tos ( ) , smb_name , & internal_username ) ;
if ( ! internal_username ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
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DEBUG ( 5 , ( " Mapping user [%s] \\ [%s] from workstation [%s] \n " ,
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client_domain , smb_name , workstation_name ) ) ;
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domain = client_domain ;
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/* If you connect to a Windows domain member using a bogus domain name,
* the Windows box will map the BOGUS \ user to SAMNAME \ user . Thus , if
* the Windows box is a DC the name will become DOMAIN \ user and be
* authenticated against AD , if the Windows box is a member server but
* not a DC the name will become WORKSTATION \ user . A standalone
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* non - domain member box will also map to WORKSTATION \ user .
* This also deals with the client passing in a " " domain */
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if ( ! is_trusted_domain ( domain ) & &
s3: fix bug #6650, authentication at member servers when winbindd is not running
Authentication of domain users on the member server fails when winbindd
is not running. This is because the is_trusted_domain() check behaves
differently when winbindd is running and when it isn't:
Since wb_is_trusted_domain() calls wbcDomainInfo(), and this will also
give a result for our own domain, this succeeds for the member
server's own domain when winbindd is running. When winbindd is not
running, is_trusted_domain() checks (and possibly updates) the trustdom
cache, and this does the lsa_EnumTrustDom() rpc call to the DC which
does not return its own domain.
In case of winbindd not running, before 3.4, the domain part was _silently_
mapped to the workgroup in auth_util.c:make_user_info_map(),
which effectively did nothing in the member case.
But then the parameter "map untrusted to domain" was introduced
and the mapping was made to the workstation name instead of
the workgroup name by default unless "map untrusted to domain = yes".
(Commits
d8c54fddda2dba3cbc5fc13e93431b152813892e,
5cd4b7b7c03df6e896186d985b6858a06aa40b3f, and
fbca26923915a70031f561b198cfe2cc0d9c3aa6)
This was ok as long as winbindd was running, but with winbindd not running,
these changes actually uncovered the above logic bug in the check.
So the correct check is to treat the workgroup as trusted / or known
in the member case. This is most easily achieved by not comparing the
domain name against get_global_sam_name() which is the host name unless
for a DC but against my_sam_name() which is the workgroup for a DC and for
a member, too. (These names are not very intuitive...)
I admit that this is a very long commit message for a one-liner, but this has
needed some tracking down, and I think the change deserves some justification.
Michael
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! strequal ( domain , my_sam_name ( ) ) )
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{
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if ( lp_map_untrusted_to_domain ( ) )
domain = my_sam_name ( ) ;
else
domain = get_global_sam_name ( ) ;
DEBUG ( 5 , ( " Mapped domain from [%s] to [%s] for user [%s] from "
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" workstation [%s] \n " ,
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client_domain , domain , smb_name , workstation_name ) ) ;
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}
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/* We know that the given domain is trusted (and we are allowing them),
* it is our global SAM name , or for legacy behavior it is our
* primary domain name */
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result = make_user_info ( user_info , smb_name , internal_username ,
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client_domain , domain , workstation_name ,
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remote_address , lm_pwd , nt_pwd ,
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lm_interactive_pwd , nt_interactive_pwd ,
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plaintext , password_state ) ;
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if ( NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( result ) ) {
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/* We have tried mapping */
( * user_info ) - > mapped_state = True ;
/* did we actually map the user to a different name? */
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( * user_info ) - > was_mapped = was_mapped ;
}
return result ;
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}
/****************************************************************************
Create an auth_usersupplied_data , making the DATA_BLOBs here .
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Decrypt and encrypt the passwords .
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
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bool make_user_info_netlogon_network ( struct auth_usersupplied_info * * user_info ,
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const char * smb_name ,
const char * client_domain ,
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const char * workstation_name ,
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const struct tsocket_address * remote_address ,
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uint32 logon_parameters ,
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const uchar * lm_network_pwd ,
int lm_pwd_len ,
const uchar * nt_network_pwd ,
int nt_pwd_len )
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{
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bool ret ;
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NTSTATUS status ;
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DATA_BLOB lm_blob = data_blob ( lm_network_pwd , lm_pwd_len ) ;
DATA_BLOB nt_blob = data_blob ( nt_network_pwd , nt_pwd_len ) ;
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status = make_user_info_map ( user_info ,
smb_name , client_domain ,
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workstation_name ,
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remote_address ,
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lm_pwd_len ? & lm_blob : NULL ,
nt_pwd_len ? & nt_blob : NULL ,
NULL , NULL , NULL ,
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AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE ) ;
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if ( NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
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( * user_info ) - > logon_parameters = logon_parameters ;
}
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ret = NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ? True : False ;
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data_blob_free ( & lm_blob ) ;
data_blob_free ( & nt_blob ) ;
return ret ;
}
/****************************************************************************
Create an auth_usersupplied_data , making the DATA_BLOBs here .
2001-11-22 00:10:13 +03:00
Decrypt and encrypt the passwords .
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
2010-01-10 16:16:04 +03:00
bool make_user_info_netlogon_interactive ( struct auth_usersupplied_info * * user_info ,
2002-01-05 07:55:41 +03:00
const char * smb_name ,
const char * client_domain ,
2010-06-01 05:23:50 +04:00
const char * workstation_name ,
2011-06-08 20:55:37 +04:00
const struct tsocket_address * remote_address ,
2005-11-08 09:19:34 +03:00
uint32 logon_parameters ,
2002-01-05 07:55:41 +03:00
const uchar chal [ 8 ] ,
const uchar lm_interactive_pwd [ 16 ] ,
const uchar nt_interactive_pwd [ 16 ] ,
const uchar * dc_sess_key )
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
{
2010-06-01 15:52:01 +04:00
struct samr_Password lm_pwd ;
struct samr_Password nt_pwd ;
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
unsigned char local_lm_response [ 24 ] ;
unsigned char local_nt_response [ 24 ] ;
unsigned char key [ 16 ] ;
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2009-05-07 15:36:52 +04:00
memcpy ( key , dc_sess_key , 16 ) ;
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
if ( lm_interactive_pwd )
2010-06-01 15:52:01 +04:00
memcpy ( lm_pwd . hash , lm_interactive_pwd , sizeof ( lm_pwd . hash ) ) ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
if ( nt_interactive_pwd )
2010-06-01 15:52:01 +04:00
memcpy ( nt_pwd . hash , nt_interactive_pwd , sizeof ( nt_pwd . hash ) ) ;
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
# ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG ( 100 , ( " key: " ) ) ;
2007-03-28 17:34:59 +04:00
dump_data ( 100 , key , sizeof ( key ) ) ;
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
DEBUG ( 100 , ( " lm owf password: " ) ) ;
2010-06-01 15:52:01 +04:00
dump_data ( 100 , lm_pwd . hash , sizeof ( lm_pwd . hash ) ) ;
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
DEBUG ( 100 , ( " nt owf password: " ) ) ;
2010-06-01 15:52:01 +04:00
dump_data ( 100 , nt_pwd . hash , sizeof ( nt_pwd . hash ) ) ;
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
# endif
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2004-04-03 19:41:32 +04:00
if ( lm_interactive_pwd )
2010-06-01 15:52:01 +04:00
arcfour_crypt ( lm_pwd . hash , key , sizeof ( lm_pwd . hash ) ) ;
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2004-04-03 19:41:32 +04:00
if ( nt_interactive_pwd )
2010-06-01 15:52:01 +04:00
arcfour_crypt ( nt_pwd . hash , key , sizeof ( nt_pwd . hash ) ) ;
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
# ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG ( 100 , ( " decrypt of lm owf password: " ) ) ;
2010-06-01 15:52:01 +04:00
dump_data ( 100 , lm_pwd . hash , sizeof ( lm_pwd ) ) ;
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
DEBUG ( 100 , ( " decrypt of nt owf password: " ) ) ;
2010-06-01 15:52:01 +04:00
dump_data ( 100 , nt_pwd . hash , sizeof ( nt_pwd ) ) ;
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
# endif
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2004-04-03 19:41:32 +04:00
if ( lm_interactive_pwd )
2010-06-01 15:52:01 +04:00
SMBOWFencrypt ( lm_pwd . hash , chal ,
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
local_lm_response ) ;
2004-04-03 19:41:32 +04:00
if ( nt_interactive_pwd )
2010-06-01 15:52:01 +04:00
SMBOWFencrypt ( nt_pwd . hash , chal ,
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
local_nt_response ) ;
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2002-03-25 02:25:05 +03:00
/* Password info paranoia */
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
ZERO_STRUCT ( key ) ;
{
2007-10-19 04:40:25 +04:00
bool ret ;
2002-09-25 19:19:00 +04:00
NTSTATUS nt_status ;
2004-04-03 19:41:32 +04:00
DATA_BLOB local_lm_blob ;
DATA_BLOB local_nt_blob ;
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
2004-04-03 19:41:32 +04:00
if ( lm_interactive_pwd ) {
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
local_lm_blob = data_blob ( local_lm_response ,
sizeof ( local_lm_response ) ) ;
2004-04-03 19:41:32 +04:00
}
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2004-04-03 19:41:32 +04:00
if ( nt_interactive_pwd ) {
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
local_nt_blob = data_blob ( local_nt_response ,
sizeof ( local_nt_response ) ) ;
2004-04-03 19:41:32 +04:00
}
2001-11-01 08:02:41 +03:00
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
nt_status = make_user_info_map (
user_info ,
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smb_name , client_domain , workstation_name ,
2011-06-08 20:55:37 +04:00
remote_address ,
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
lm_interactive_pwd ? & local_lm_blob : NULL ,
nt_interactive_pwd ? & local_nt_blob : NULL ,
2010-06-01 15:52:01 +04:00
lm_interactive_pwd ? & lm_pwd : NULL ,
nt_interactive_pwd ? & nt_pwd : NULL ,
NULL , AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH ) ;
2004-04-03 19:41:32 +04:00
2005-11-08 09:19:34 +03:00
if ( NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( nt_status ) ) {
( * user_info ) - > logon_parameters = logon_parameters ;
}
2002-09-25 19:19:00 +04:00
ret = NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( nt_status ) ? True : False ;
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
data_blob_free ( & local_lm_blob ) ;
data_blob_free ( & local_nt_blob ) ;
return ret ;
}
}
/****************************************************************************
Create an auth_usersupplied_data structure
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
2010-01-10 16:16:04 +03:00
bool make_user_info_for_reply ( struct auth_usersupplied_info * * user_info ,
2002-01-20 11:58:21 +03:00
const char * smb_name ,
const char * client_domain ,
2011-06-08 20:55:37 +04:00
const struct tsocket_address * remote_address ,
2002-01-05 07:55:41 +03:00
const uint8 chal [ 8 ] ,
This is another rather major change to the samba authenticaion
subystem.
The particular aim is to modularized the interface - so that we
can have arbitrary password back-ends.
This code adds one such back-end, a 'winbind' module to authenticate
against the winbind_auth_crap functionality. While fully-functional
this code is mainly useful as a demonstration, because we don't get
back the info3 as we would for direct ntdomain authentication.
This commit introduced the new 'auth methods' parameter, in the
spirit of the 'auth order' discussed on the lists. It is renamed
because not all the methods may be consulted, even if previous
methods fail - they may not have a suitable challenge for example.
Also, we have a 'local' authentication method, for old-style
'unix if plaintext, sam if encrypted' authentication and a
'guest' module to handle guest logins in a single place.
While this current design is not ideal, I feel that it does
provide a better infrastructure than the current design, and can
be built upon.
The following parameters have changed:
- use rhosts =
This has been replaced by the 'rhosts' authentication method,
and can be specified like 'auth methods = guest rhosts'
- hosts equiv =
This needs both this parameter and an 'auth methods' entry
to be effective. (auth methods = guest hostsequiv ....)
- plaintext to smbpasswd =
This is replaced by specifying 'sam' rather than 'local'
in the auth methods.
The security = parameter is unchanged, and now provides defaults
for the 'auth methods' parameter.
The available auth methods are:
guest
rhosts
hostsequiv
sam (passdb direct hash access)
unix (PAM, crypt() etc)
local (the combination of the above, based on encryption)
smbserver (old security=server)
ntdomain (old security=domain)
winbind (use winbind to cache DC connections)
Assistance in testing, or the production of new and interesting
authentication modules is always appreciated.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 8d31eae52a9757739711dbb82035a4dfe6b40c99)
2001-11-24 15:12:38 +03:00
DATA_BLOB plaintext_password )
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
{
DATA_BLOB local_lm_blob ;
DATA_BLOB local_nt_blob ;
2002-09-25 19:19:00 +04:00
NTSTATUS ret = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL ;
2010-06-01 15:52:01 +04:00
char * plaintext_password_string ;
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
/*
* Not encrypted - do so .
*/
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
DEBUG ( 5 , ( " make_user_info_for_reply: User passwords not in encrypted "
" format. \n " ) ) ;
2010-03-22 23:05:29 +03:00
if ( plaintext_password . data & & plaintext_password . length ) {
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
unsigned char local_lm_response [ 24 ] ;
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
This is another rather major change to the samba authenticaion
subystem.
The particular aim is to modularized the interface - so that we
can have arbitrary password back-ends.
This code adds one such back-end, a 'winbind' module to authenticate
against the winbind_auth_crap functionality. While fully-functional
this code is mainly useful as a demonstration, because we don't get
back the info3 as we would for direct ntdomain authentication.
This commit introduced the new 'auth methods' parameter, in the
spirit of the 'auth order' discussed on the lists. It is renamed
because not all the methods may be consulted, even if previous
methods fail - they may not have a suitable challenge for example.
Also, we have a 'local' authentication method, for old-style
'unix if plaintext, sam if encrypted' authentication and a
'guest' module to handle guest logins in a single place.
While this current design is not ideal, I feel that it does
provide a better infrastructure than the current design, and can
be built upon.
The following parameters have changed:
- use rhosts =
This has been replaced by the 'rhosts' authentication method,
and can be specified like 'auth methods = guest rhosts'
- hosts equiv =
This needs both this parameter and an 'auth methods' entry
to be effective. (auth methods = guest hostsequiv ....)
- plaintext to smbpasswd =
This is replaced by specifying 'sam' rather than 'local'
in the auth methods.
The security = parameter is unchanged, and now provides defaults
for the 'auth methods' parameter.
The available auth methods are:
guest
rhosts
hostsequiv
sam (passdb direct hash access)
unix (PAM, crypt() etc)
local (the combination of the above, based on encryption)
smbserver (old security=server)
ntdomain (old security=domain)
winbind (use winbind to cache DC connections)
Assistance in testing, or the production of new and interesting
authentication modules is always appreciated.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 8d31eae52a9757739711dbb82035a4dfe6b40c99)
2001-11-24 15:12:38 +03:00
# ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
DEBUG ( 10 , ( " Unencrypted password (len %d): \n " ,
( int ) plaintext_password . length ) ) ;
2007-03-28 17:34:59 +04:00
dump_data ( 100 , plaintext_password . data ,
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
plaintext_password . length ) ;
This is another rather major change to the samba authenticaion
subystem.
The particular aim is to modularized the interface - so that we
can have arbitrary password back-ends.
This code adds one such back-end, a 'winbind' module to authenticate
against the winbind_auth_crap functionality. While fully-functional
this code is mainly useful as a demonstration, because we don't get
back the info3 as we would for direct ntdomain authentication.
This commit introduced the new 'auth methods' parameter, in the
spirit of the 'auth order' discussed on the lists. It is renamed
because not all the methods may be consulted, even if previous
methods fail - they may not have a suitable challenge for example.
Also, we have a 'local' authentication method, for old-style
'unix if plaintext, sam if encrypted' authentication and a
'guest' module to handle guest logins in a single place.
While this current design is not ideal, I feel that it does
provide a better infrastructure than the current design, and can
be built upon.
The following parameters have changed:
- use rhosts =
This has been replaced by the 'rhosts' authentication method,
and can be specified like 'auth methods = guest rhosts'
- hosts equiv =
This needs both this parameter and an 'auth methods' entry
to be effective. (auth methods = guest hostsequiv ....)
- plaintext to smbpasswd =
This is replaced by specifying 'sam' rather than 'local'
in the auth methods.
The security = parameter is unchanged, and now provides defaults
for the 'auth methods' parameter.
The available auth methods are:
guest
rhosts
hostsequiv
sam (passdb direct hash access)
unix (PAM, crypt() etc)
local (the combination of the above, based on encryption)
smbserver (old security=server)
ntdomain (old security=domain)
winbind (use winbind to cache DC connections)
Assistance in testing, or the production of new and interesting
authentication modules is always appreciated.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 8d31eae52a9757739711dbb82035a4dfe6b40c99)
2001-11-24 15:12:38 +03:00
# endif
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
SMBencrypt ( ( const char * ) plaintext_password . data ,
( const uchar * ) chal , local_lm_response ) ;
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
local_lm_blob = data_blob ( local_lm_response , 24 ) ;
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2001-11-22 00:10:13 +03:00
/* We can't do an NT hash here, as the password needs to be
case insensitive */
2007-05-14 16:16:20 +04:00
local_nt_blob = data_blob_null ;
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
} else {
2007-05-14 16:16:20 +04:00
local_lm_blob = data_blob_null ;
local_nt_blob = data_blob_null ;
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
}
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2010-06-01 15:52:01 +04:00
plaintext_password_string = talloc_strndup ( talloc_tos ( ) ,
( const char * ) plaintext_password . data ,
plaintext_password . length ) ;
if ( ! plaintext_password_string ) {
return False ;
}
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
ret = make_user_info_map (
user_info , smb_name , client_domain ,
get_remote_machine_name ( ) ,
2011-06-08 20:55:37 +04:00
remote_address ,
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
local_lm_blob . data ? & local_lm_blob : NULL ,
local_nt_blob . data ? & local_nt_blob : NULL ,
NULL , NULL ,
2010-06-01 15:52:01 +04:00
plaintext_password_string ,
AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN ) ;
if ( plaintext_password_string ) {
memset ( plaintext_password_string , ' \0 ' , strlen ( plaintext_password_string ) ) ;
talloc_free ( plaintext_password_string ) ;
}
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
data_blob_free ( & local_lm_blob ) ;
2002-09-25 19:19:00 +04:00
return NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( ret ) ? True : False ;
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
}
This is another rather major change to the samba authenticaion
subystem.
The particular aim is to modularized the interface - so that we
can have arbitrary password back-ends.
This code adds one such back-end, a 'winbind' module to authenticate
against the winbind_auth_crap functionality. While fully-functional
this code is mainly useful as a demonstration, because we don't get
back the info3 as we would for direct ntdomain authentication.
This commit introduced the new 'auth methods' parameter, in the
spirit of the 'auth order' discussed on the lists. It is renamed
because not all the methods may be consulted, even if previous
methods fail - they may not have a suitable challenge for example.
Also, we have a 'local' authentication method, for old-style
'unix if plaintext, sam if encrypted' authentication and a
'guest' module to handle guest logins in a single place.
While this current design is not ideal, I feel that it does
provide a better infrastructure than the current design, and can
be built upon.
The following parameters have changed:
- use rhosts =
This has been replaced by the 'rhosts' authentication method,
and can be specified like 'auth methods = guest rhosts'
- hosts equiv =
This needs both this parameter and an 'auth methods' entry
to be effective. (auth methods = guest hostsequiv ....)
- plaintext to smbpasswd =
This is replaced by specifying 'sam' rather than 'local'
in the auth methods.
The security = parameter is unchanged, and now provides defaults
for the 'auth methods' parameter.
The available auth methods are:
guest
rhosts
hostsequiv
sam (passdb direct hash access)
unix (PAM, crypt() etc)
local (the combination of the above, based on encryption)
smbserver (old security=server)
ntdomain (old security=domain)
winbind (use winbind to cache DC connections)
Assistance in testing, or the production of new and interesting
authentication modules is always appreciated.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 8d31eae52a9757739711dbb82035a4dfe6b40c99)
2001-11-24 15:12:38 +03:00
/****************************************************************************
Create an auth_usersupplied_data structure
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
2010-01-10 16:16:04 +03:00
NTSTATUS make_user_info_for_reply_enc ( struct auth_usersupplied_info * * user_info ,
2002-09-25 19:19:00 +04:00
const char * smb_name ,
2011-06-08 20:55:37 +04:00
const char * client_domain ,
const struct tsocket_address * remote_address ,
2002-09-25 19:19:00 +04:00
DATA_BLOB lm_resp , DATA_BLOB nt_resp )
This is another rather major change to the samba authenticaion
subystem.
The particular aim is to modularized the interface - so that we
can have arbitrary password back-ends.
This code adds one such back-end, a 'winbind' module to authenticate
against the winbind_auth_crap functionality. While fully-functional
this code is mainly useful as a demonstration, because we don't get
back the info3 as we would for direct ntdomain authentication.
This commit introduced the new 'auth methods' parameter, in the
spirit of the 'auth order' discussed on the lists. It is renamed
because not all the methods may be consulted, even if previous
methods fail - they may not have a suitable challenge for example.
Also, we have a 'local' authentication method, for old-style
'unix if plaintext, sam if encrypted' authentication and a
'guest' module to handle guest logins in a single place.
While this current design is not ideal, I feel that it does
provide a better infrastructure than the current design, and can
be built upon.
The following parameters have changed:
- use rhosts =
This has been replaced by the 'rhosts' authentication method,
and can be specified like 'auth methods = guest rhosts'
- hosts equiv =
This needs both this parameter and an 'auth methods' entry
to be effective. (auth methods = guest hostsequiv ....)
- plaintext to smbpasswd =
This is replaced by specifying 'sam' rather than 'local'
in the auth methods.
The security = parameter is unchanged, and now provides defaults
for the 'auth methods' parameter.
The available auth methods are:
guest
rhosts
hostsequiv
sam (passdb direct hash access)
unix (PAM, crypt() etc)
local (the combination of the above, based on encryption)
smbserver (old security=server)
ntdomain (old security=domain)
winbind (use winbind to cache DC connections)
Assistance in testing, or the production of new and interesting
authentication modules is always appreciated.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 8d31eae52a9757739711dbb82035a4dfe6b40c99)
2001-11-24 15:12:38 +03:00
{
return make_user_info_map ( user_info , smb_name ,
2004-04-03 19:41:32 +04:00
client_domain ,
2011-06-08 20:55:37 +04:00
get_remote_machine_name ( ) ,
remote_address ,
2010-06-16 16:18:45 +04:00
lm_resp . data & & ( lm_resp . length > 0 ) ? & lm_resp : NULL ,
nt_resp . data & & ( nt_resp . length > 0 ) ? & nt_resp : NULL ,
2004-04-03 19:41:32 +04:00
NULL , NULL , NULL ,
2010-06-01 15:52:01 +04:00
AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE ) ;
This is another rather major change to the samba authenticaion
subystem.
The particular aim is to modularized the interface - so that we
can have arbitrary password back-ends.
This code adds one such back-end, a 'winbind' module to authenticate
against the winbind_auth_crap functionality. While fully-functional
this code is mainly useful as a demonstration, because we don't get
back the info3 as we would for direct ntdomain authentication.
This commit introduced the new 'auth methods' parameter, in the
spirit of the 'auth order' discussed on the lists. It is renamed
because not all the methods may be consulted, even if previous
methods fail - they may not have a suitable challenge for example.
Also, we have a 'local' authentication method, for old-style
'unix if plaintext, sam if encrypted' authentication and a
'guest' module to handle guest logins in a single place.
While this current design is not ideal, I feel that it does
provide a better infrastructure than the current design, and can
be built upon.
The following parameters have changed:
- use rhosts =
This has been replaced by the 'rhosts' authentication method,
and can be specified like 'auth methods = guest rhosts'
- hosts equiv =
This needs both this parameter and an 'auth methods' entry
to be effective. (auth methods = guest hostsequiv ....)
- plaintext to smbpasswd =
This is replaced by specifying 'sam' rather than 'local'
in the auth methods.
The security = parameter is unchanged, and now provides defaults
for the 'auth methods' parameter.
The available auth methods are:
guest
rhosts
hostsequiv
sam (passdb direct hash access)
unix (PAM, crypt() etc)
local (the combination of the above, based on encryption)
smbserver (old security=server)
ntdomain (old security=domain)
winbind (use winbind to cache DC connections)
Assistance in testing, or the production of new and interesting
authentication modules is always appreciated.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 8d31eae52a9757739711dbb82035a4dfe6b40c99)
2001-11-24 15:12:38 +03:00
}
2001-11-09 01:19:01 +03:00
/****************************************************************************
Create a guest user_info blob , for anonymous authenticaion .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
2011-06-08 20:55:37 +04:00
bool make_user_info_guest ( const struct tsocket_address * remote_address ,
struct auth_usersupplied_info * * user_info )
2001-11-09 01:19:01 +03:00
{
2002-09-25 19:19:00 +04:00
NTSTATUS nt_status ;
2001-11-09 01:19:01 +03:00
2002-09-25 19:19:00 +04:00
nt_status = make_user_info ( user_info ,
2004-04-03 19:41:32 +04:00
" " , " " ,
" " , " " ,
" " ,
2011-06-08 20:55:37 +04:00
remote_address ,
2004-04-03 19:41:32 +04:00
NULL , NULL ,
NULL , NULL ,
NULL ,
2010-06-01 15:52:01 +04:00
AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE ) ;
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2002-09-25 19:19:00 +04:00
return NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( nt_status ) ? True : False ;
}
2010-08-26 16:08:22 +04:00
static NTSTATUS log_nt_token ( struct security_token * token )
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
{
2008-08-15 01:36:02 +04:00
TALLOC_CTX * frame = talloc_stackframe ( ) ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
char * command ;
char * group_sidstr ;
size_t i ;
if ( ( lp_log_nt_token_command ( ) = = NULL ) | |
( strlen ( lp_log_nt_token_command ( ) ) = = 0 ) ) {
2008-08-15 01:36:02 +04:00
TALLOC_FREE ( frame ) ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
2005-02-11 13:32:46 +03:00
}
2008-08-15 01:36:02 +04:00
group_sidstr = talloc_strdup ( frame , " " ) ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
for ( i = 1 ; i < token - > num_sids ; i + + ) {
group_sidstr = talloc_asprintf (
2008-08-15 01:36:02 +04:00
frame , " %s %s " , group_sidstr ,
2010-08-31 03:32:52 +04:00
sid_string_talloc ( frame , & token - > sids [ i ] ) ) ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
}
2002-09-25 19:19:00 +04:00
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
command = talloc_string_sub (
2008-08-15 01:36:02 +04:00
frame , lp_log_nt_token_command ( ) ,
2010-08-31 03:32:52 +04:00
" %s " , sid_string_talloc ( frame , & token - > sids [ 0 ] ) ) ;
2008-08-15 01:36:02 +04:00
command = talloc_string_sub ( frame , command , " %t " , group_sidstr ) ;
2002-09-25 19:19:00 +04:00
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
if ( command = = NULL ) {
2008-08-15 01:36:02 +04:00
TALLOC_FREE ( frame ) ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
DEBUG ( 8 , ( " running command: [%s] \n " , command ) ) ;
if ( smbrun ( command , NULL ) ! = 0 ) {
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " Could not log NT token \n " ) ) ;
2008-08-15 01:36:02 +04:00
TALLOC_FREE ( frame ) ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
}
2008-08-15 01:36:02 +04:00
TALLOC_FREE ( frame ) ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
}
2002-09-25 19:19:00 +04:00
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
/*
2010-05-27 11:41:56 +04:00
* Create the token to use from server_info - > info3 and
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
* server_info - > sids ( the info3 / sam groups ) . Find the unix gids .
*/
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
2011-02-11 03:50:37 +03:00
NTSTATUS create_local_token ( TALLOC_CTX * mem_ctx ,
2011-04-06 00:46:26 +04:00
const struct auth_serversupplied_info * server_info ,
2011-02-11 03:50:37 +03:00
DATA_BLOB * session_key ,
2011-07-18 07:06:47 +04:00
struct auth_session_info * * session_info_out )
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
{
2011-03-23 20:31:38 +03:00
struct security_token * t ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
NTSTATUS status ;
size_t i ;
2009-02-11 13:46:18 +03:00
struct dom_sid tmp_sid ;
2011-07-18 07:06:47 +04:00
struct auth_session_info * session_info ;
2011-03-23 20:31:38 +03:00
struct wbcUnixId * ids ;
2011-07-18 06:58:25 +04:00
struct auth_user_info_dc * user_info_dc ;
union netr_Validation val ;
2011-02-11 03:50:37 +03:00
/* Ensure we can't possible take a code path leading to a
* null defref . */
if ( ! server_info ) {
return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE ;
}
2011-07-18 07:06:47 +04:00
session_info = make_auth_session_info ( mem_ctx ) ;
2011-02-11 03:50:37 +03:00
if ( ! session_info ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
2011-07-18 05:40:36 +04:00
session_info - > unix_token = talloc_zero ( session_info , struct security_unix_token ) ;
2011-07-18 05:30:55 +04:00
if ( ! session_info - > unix_token ) {
TALLOC_FREE ( session_info ) ;
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
session_info - > unix_token - > uid = server_info - > utok . uid ;
session_info - > unix_token - > gid = server_info - > utok . gid ;
session_info - > unix_info = talloc_zero ( session_info , struct auth_user_info_unix ) ;
if ( ! session_info - > unix_info ) {
TALLOC_FREE ( session_info ) ;
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name = talloc_strdup ( session_info , server_info - > unix_name ) ;
if ( ! session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ) {
TALLOC_FREE ( session_info ) ;
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
session_info - > unix_info - > sanitized_username = talloc_strdup ( session_info , server_info - > sanitized_username ) ;
if ( ! session_info - > unix_info - > sanitized_username ) {
TALLOC_FREE ( session_info ) ;
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
session_info - > unix_info - > guest = server_info - > guest ;
session_info - > unix_info - > system = server_info - > system ;
2011-02-11 03:50:37 +03:00
if ( session_key ) {
2011-02-14 03:35:21 +03:00
data_blob_free ( & session_info - > session_key ) ;
session_info - > session_key = data_blob_talloc ( session_info ,
2011-02-11 03:50:37 +03:00
session_key - > data ,
session_key - > length ) ;
2011-02-14 03:35:21 +03:00
if ( ! session_info - > session_key . data & & session_key - > length ) {
2011-02-11 03:50:37 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
2011-07-18 05:40:36 +04:00
} else {
session_info - > session_key = data_blob_talloc ( session_info , server_info - > session_key . data ,
server_info - > session_key . length ) ;
2011-02-11 03:50:37 +03:00
}
if ( session_info - > security_token ) {
/* Just copy the token, it has already been finalised
* ( nasty hack to support a cached guest session_info ,
* and a possible strategy for auth_samba4 to pass in
* a finalised session ) */
2011-07-18 05:40:36 +04:00
session_info - > security_token = dup_nt_token ( session_info , server_info - > security_token ) ;
if ( ! session_info - > security_token ) {
TALLOC_FREE ( session_info ) ;
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
session_info - > unix_token - > ngroups = server_info - > utok . ngroups ;
if ( server_info - > utok . ngroups ! = 0 ) {
session_info - > unix_token - > groups = ( gid_t * ) talloc_memdup (
session_info - > unix_token , server_info - > utok . groups ,
sizeof ( gid_t ) * session_info - > unix_token - > ngroups ) ;
} else {
session_info - > unix_token - > groups = NULL ;
}
2011-02-11 03:50:37 +03:00
* session_info_out = session_info ;
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
}
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
2011-07-18 06:58:25 +04:00
val . sam3 = server_info - > info3 ;
/* Convert into something we can build a struct
* auth_session_info from . Most of the work here
* will be to convert the SIDS , which we will then ignore , but
* this is the easier way to handle it */
status = make_user_info_dc_netlogon_validation ( talloc_tos ( ) , " " , 3 , & val , & user_info_dc ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " conversion of info3 into user_info_dc failed! \n " ) ) ;
TALLOC_FREE ( session_info ) ;
return status ;
}
session_info - > info = talloc_move ( session_info , & user_info_dc - > info ) ;
talloc_free ( user_info_dc ) ;
2006-07-13 20:28:38 +04:00
/*
* If winbind is not around , we can not make much use of the SIDs the
* domain controller provided us with . Likewise if the user name was
* mapped to some local unix user .
*/
2006-08-04 04:00:15 +04:00
if ( ( ( lp_server_role ( ) = = ROLE_DOMAIN_MEMBER ) & & ! winbind_ping ( ) ) | |
2011-07-15 11:57:35 +04:00
( server_info - > nss_token ) ) {
2011-02-11 03:50:37 +03:00
status = create_token_from_username ( session_info ,
2011-07-18 04:14:19 +04:00
server_info - > unix_name ,
server_info - > guest ,
2011-07-15 08:59:14 +04:00
& session_info - > unix_token - > uid ,
& session_info - > unix_token - > gid ,
2011-07-15 09:55:31 +04:00
& session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ,
2011-02-11 03:50:37 +03:00
& session_info - > security_token ) ;
2008-08-15 01:36:02 +04:00
2006-05-06 23:24:35 +04:00
} else {
2011-02-11 03:50:37 +03:00
status = create_local_nt_token_from_info3 ( session_info ,
2011-07-18 04:14:19 +04:00
server_info - > guest ,
server_info - > info3 ,
& server_info - > extra ,
2011-02-11 03:50:37 +03:00
& session_info - > security_token ) ;
2006-03-08 18:18:14 +03:00
}
2006-07-13 19:03:46 +04:00
2006-07-13 19:37:58 +04:00
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
return status ;
}
2008-08-15 01:36:02 +04:00
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
/* Convert the SIDs to gids. */
2011-07-15 08:59:14 +04:00
session_info - > unix_token - > ngroups = 0 ;
session_info - > unix_token - > groups = NULL ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
2011-03-23 20:31:38 +03:00
t = session_info - > security_token ;
2011-06-07 05:30:12 +04:00
ids = talloc_array ( talloc_tos ( ) , struct wbcUnixId ,
2011-03-23 20:31:38 +03:00
t - > num_sids ) ;
if ( ids = = NULL ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
if ( ! sids_to_unix_ids ( t - > sids , t - > num_sids , ids ) ) {
TALLOC_FREE ( ids ) ;
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
/* Start at index 1, where the groups start. */
2011-03-23 20:31:38 +03:00
for ( i = 1 ; i < t - > num_sids ; i + + ) {
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
2011-03-23 20:31:38 +03:00
if ( ids [ i ] . type ! = WBC_ID_TYPE_GID ) {
2007-04-20 02:26:09 +04:00
DEBUG ( 10 , ( " Could not convert SID %s to gid, "
2011-03-23 20:31:38 +03:00
" ignoring it \n " ,
sid_string_dbg ( & t - > sids [ i ] ) ) ) ;
2007-04-20 02:26:09 +04:00
continue ;
2006-12-09 05:58:18 +03:00
}
2011-03-23 20:31:38 +03:00
if ( ! add_gid_to_array_unique ( session_info , ids [ i ] . id . gid ,
2011-07-15 08:59:14 +04:00
& session_info - > unix_token - > groups ,
& session_info - > unix_token - > ngroups ) ) {
2011-03-16 20:45:50 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
}
2009-02-11 13:46:18 +03:00
/*
* Add the " Unix Group " SID for each gid to catch mapped groups
* and their Unix equivalent . This is to solve the backwards
* compatibility problem of ' valid users = + ntadmin ' where
* ntadmin has been paired with " Domain Admins " in the group
* mapping table . Otherwise smb . conf would need to be changed
* to ' valid user = " Domain Admins " ' . - - jerry
*
* For consistency we also add the " Unix User " SID ,
* so that the complete unix token is represented within
* the nt token .
*/
2011-07-15 08:59:14 +04:00
uid_to_unix_users_sid ( session_info - > unix_token - > uid , & tmp_sid ) ;
2010-07-11 19:30:53 +04:00
2011-02-11 03:50:37 +03:00
add_sid_to_array_unique ( session_info - > security_token , & tmp_sid ,
& session_info - > security_token - > sids ,
& session_info - > security_token - > num_sids ) ;
2009-02-11 13:46:18 +03:00
2011-07-15 08:59:14 +04:00
for ( i = 0 ; i < session_info - > unix_token - > ngroups ; i + + ) {
gid_to_unix_groups_sid ( session_info - > unix_token - > groups [ i ] , & tmp_sid ) ;
2011-02-11 03:50:37 +03:00
add_sid_to_array_unique ( session_info - > security_token , & tmp_sid ,
& session_info - > security_token - > sids ,
& session_info - > security_token - > num_sids ) ;
2009-02-11 13:46:18 +03:00
}
2011-02-11 03:50:37 +03:00
security_token_debug ( DBGC_AUTH , 10 , session_info - > security_token ) ;
2009-02-11 13:46:18 +03:00
debug_unix_user_token ( DBGC_AUTH , 10 ,
2011-07-15 08:59:14 +04:00
session_info - > unix_token - > uid ,
session_info - > unix_token - > gid ,
session_info - > unix_token - > ngroups ,
session_info - > unix_token - > groups ) ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
2011-02-11 03:50:37 +03:00
status = log_nt_token ( session_info - > security_token ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
return status ;
}
* session_info_out = session_info ;
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
}
2001-11-11 14:34:46 +03:00
/***************************************************************************
2008-05-03 11:52:24 +04:00
Make ( and fill ) a server_info struct from a ' struct passwd ' by conversion
2006-02-20 23:09:36 +03:00
to a struct samu
2001-11-11 14:34:46 +03:00
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
2010-01-10 16:24:22 +03:00
NTSTATUS make_server_info_pw ( struct auth_serversupplied_info * * server_info ,
2004-03-16 19:41:54 +03:00
char * unix_username ,
struct passwd * pwd )
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
{
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
NTSTATUS status ;
2006-02-20 23:09:36 +03:00
struct samu * sampass = NULL ;
2008-09-03 22:36:43 +04:00
char * qualified_name = NULL ;
2007-06-17 23:23:32 +04:00
TALLOC_CTX * mem_ctx = NULL ;
2010-05-21 05:25:01 +04:00
struct dom_sid u_sid ;
2007-06-17 23:23:32 +04:00
enum lsa_SidType type ;
2010-01-10 16:24:22 +03:00
struct auth_serversupplied_info * result ;
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2010-05-28 19:14:01 +04:00
/*
* The SID returned in server_info - > sam_account is based
* on our SAM sid even though for a pure UNIX account this should
* not be the case as it doesn ' t really exist in the SAM db .
* This causes lookups on " [in]valid users " to fail as they
* will lookup this name as a " Unix User " SID to check against
* the user token . Fix this by adding the " Unix User " \ unix_username
* SID to the sid array . The correct fix should probably be
* changing the server_info - > sam_account user SID to be a
* S - 1 - 22 Unix SID , but this might break old configs where
* plaintext passwords were used with no SAM backend .
*/
mem_ctx = talloc_init ( " make_server_info_pw_tmp " ) ;
if ( ! mem_ctx ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
qualified_name = talloc_asprintf ( mem_ctx , " %s \\ %s " ,
unix_users_domain_name ( ) ,
unix_username ) ;
if ( ! qualified_name ) {
TALLOC_FREE ( mem_ctx ) ;
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
if ( ! lookup_name ( mem_ctx , qualified_name , LOOKUP_NAME_ALL ,
NULL , NULL ,
& u_sid , & type ) ) {
TALLOC_FREE ( mem_ctx ) ;
return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER ;
}
TALLOC_FREE ( mem_ctx ) ;
if ( type ! = SID_NAME_USER ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER ;
}
2006-02-21 17:34:11 +03:00
if ( ! ( sampass = samu_new ( NULL ) ) ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2006-02-21 17:34:11 +03:00
status = samu_set_unix ( sampass , pwd ) ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
return status ;
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
}
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
2010-05-28 19:07:49 +04:00
/* In pathological cases the above call can set the account
* name to the DOMAIN \ username form . Reset the account name
* using unix_username */
pdb_set_username ( sampass , unix_username , PDB_SET ) ;
2010-05-28 21:22:41 +04:00
/* set the user sid to be the calculated u_sid */
pdb_set_user_sid ( sampass , & u_sid , PDB_SET ) ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
result = make_server_info ( NULL ) ;
2006-06-12 15:03:49 +04:00
if ( result = = NULL ) {
2006-02-20 23:09:36 +03:00
TALLOC_FREE ( sampass ) ;
2006-06-12 15:03:49 +04:00
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
2003-06-12 18:24:15 +04:00
}
2011-06-09 09:31:03 +04:00
status = samu_to_SamInfo3 ( result , sampass , lp_netbios_name ( ) ,
2010-05-28 21:18:13 +04:00
& result - > info3 , & result - > extra ) ;
2010-07-08 15:32:48 +04:00
TALLOC_FREE ( sampass ) ;
2010-05-27 11:41:56 +04:00
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
DEBUG ( 10 , ( " Failed to convert samu to info3: %s \n " ,
nt_errstr ( status ) ) ) ;
TALLOC_FREE ( result ) ;
return status ;
}
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
result - > unix_name = talloc_strdup ( result , unix_username ) ;
2008-05-11 02:25:55 +04:00
result - > sanitized_username = sanitize_username ( result , unix_username ) ;
if ( ( result - > unix_name = = NULL )
| | ( result - > sanitized_username = = NULL ) ) {
TALLOC_FREE ( result ) ;
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
2008-06-19 18:54:12 +04:00
result - > utok . uid = pwd - > pw_uid ;
result - > utok . gid = pwd - > pw_gid ;
2003-06-12 18:24:15 +04:00
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
* server_info = result ;
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
}
2010-08-18 19:17:42 +04:00
static NTSTATUS get_guest_info3 ( TALLOC_CTX * mem_ctx ,
struct netr_SamInfo3 * info3 )
{
const char * guest_account = lp_guestaccount ( ) ;
struct dom_sid domain_sid ;
struct passwd * pwd ;
const char * tmp ;
2010-10-20 19:16:23 +04:00
pwd = Get_Pwnam_alloc ( mem_ctx , guest_account ) ;
2010-08-18 19:17:42 +04:00
if ( pwd = = NULL ) {
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " SamInfo3_for_guest: Unable to locate guest "
" account [%s]! \n " , guest_account ) ) ;
return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER ;
}
/* Set acount name */
tmp = talloc_strdup ( mem_ctx , pwd - > pw_name ) ;
if ( tmp = = NULL ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
init_lsa_String ( & info3 - > base . account_name , tmp ) ;
/* Set domain name */
tmp = talloc_strdup ( mem_ctx , get_global_sam_name ( ) ) ;
if ( tmp = = NULL ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
init_lsa_StringLarge ( & info3 - > base . domain , tmp ) ;
/* Domain sid */
sid_copy ( & domain_sid , get_global_sam_sid ( ) ) ;
2010-08-26 19:21:39 +04:00
info3 - > base . domain_sid = dom_sid_dup ( mem_ctx , & domain_sid ) ;
2010-08-18 19:17:42 +04:00
if ( info3 - > base . domain_sid = = NULL ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
/* Guest rid */
info3 - > base . rid = DOMAIN_RID_GUEST ;
/* Primary gid */
info3 - > base . primary_gid = BUILTIN_RID_GUESTS ;
TALLOC_FREE ( pwd ) ;
2010-09-01 12:51:13 +04:00
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
2010-08-18 19:17:42 +04:00
}
2001-11-11 14:34:46 +03:00
/***************************************************************************
2002-09-25 19:19:00 +04:00
Make ( and fill ) a user_info struct for a guest login .
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
This * must * succeed for smbd to start . If there is no mapping entry for
the guest gid , then create one .
2011-02-11 03:50:37 +03:00
The resulting structure is a ' session_info ' because
create_local_token ( ) has already been called on it . This is quite
nasty , as the auth subsystem isn ' t expect this , but the behaviour is
left as - is for now .
2006-06-11 20:13:41 +04:00
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
2001-11-11 14:34:46 +03:00
2011-07-18 07:06:47 +04:00
static NTSTATUS make_new_session_info_guest ( struct auth_session_info * * session_info , struct auth_serversupplied_info * * server_info )
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
{
2010-08-18 19:17:42 +04:00
static const char zeros [ 16 ] = { 0 } ;
const char * guest_account = lp_guestaccount ( ) ;
2011-06-09 09:31:03 +04:00
const char * domain = lp_netbios_name ( ) ;
2010-08-18 19:17:42 +04:00
struct netr_SamInfo3 info3 ;
TALLOC_CTX * tmp_ctx ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
NTSTATUS status ;
2008-04-30 19:42:39 +04:00
fstring tmp ;
2002-09-25 19:19:00 +04:00
2010-08-18 19:17:42 +04:00
tmp_ctx = talloc_stackframe ( ) ;
if ( tmp_ctx = = NULL ) {
2006-02-21 17:34:11 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
}
2010-08-18 19:17:42 +04:00
ZERO_STRUCT ( info3 ) ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
2010-08-18 19:17:42 +04:00
status = get_guest_info3 ( tmp_ctx , & info3 ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
2011-06-15 16:08:23 +04:00
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " get_guest_info3 failed with %s \n " ,
nt_errstr ( status ) ) ) ;
2010-08-18 19:17:42 +04:00
goto done ;
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
}
2010-08-18 19:17:42 +04:00
status = make_server_info_info3 ( tmp_ctx ,
guest_account ,
domain ,
2011-07-18 05:22:50 +04:00
server_info ,
2010-08-18 19:17:42 +04:00
& info3 ) ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
2011-06-15 16:08:23 +04:00
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " make_server_info_info3 failed with %s \n " ,
nt_errstr ( status ) ) ) ;
2010-08-18 19:17:42 +04:00
goto done ;
2003-02-24 05:35:54 +03:00
}
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2011-07-18 05:22:50 +04:00
( * server_info ) - > guest = True ;
2002-09-25 19:19:00 +04:00
2011-02-11 03:50:37 +03:00
/* This should not be done here (we should produce a server
* info , and later construct a session info from it ) , but for
* now this does not change the previous behaviours */
2011-07-18 05:22:50 +04:00
status = create_local_token ( tmp_ctx , * server_info , NULL , session_info ) ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
2011-06-15 16:08:23 +04:00
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " create_local_token failed: %s \n " ,
nt_errstr ( status ) ) ) ;
2010-08-18 19:17:42 +04:00
goto done ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
}
2011-02-11 03:50:37 +03:00
talloc_steal ( NULL , * session_info ) ;
2011-07-18 05:22:50 +04:00
talloc_steal ( NULL , * server_info ) ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
/* annoying, but the Guest really does have a session key, and it is
all zeros ! */
2011-02-14 03:35:21 +03:00
( * session_info ) - > session_key = data_blob ( zeros , sizeof ( zeros ) ) ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
2011-07-18 06:58:25 +04:00
alpha_strcpy ( tmp , ( * server_info ) - > info3 - > base . account_name . string ,
2010-05-27 13:31:45 +04:00
" . _-$ " , sizeof ( tmp ) ) ;
2011-07-15 09:55:31 +04:00
( * session_info ) - > unix_info - > sanitized_username = talloc_strdup ( * session_info , tmp ) ;
2008-04-30 19:42:39 +04:00
2010-08-18 19:17:42 +04:00
status = NT_STATUS_OK ;
done :
TALLOC_FREE ( tmp_ctx ) ;
2011-06-15 16:09:50 +04:00
return status ;
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
}
2010-04-14 17:15:32 +04:00
/***************************************************************************
2011-02-21 12:25:52 +03:00
Make ( and fill ) a auth_session_info struct for a system user login .
2010-04-14 17:15:32 +04:00
This * must * succeed for smbd to start .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
2011-02-21 12:25:52 +03:00
static NTSTATUS make_new_session_info_system ( TALLOC_CTX * mem_ctx ,
2011-07-18 07:06:47 +04:00
struct auth_session_info * * session_info )
2010-04-14 17:15:32 +04:00
{
struct passwd * pwd ;
2010-05-28 16:19:28 +04:00
NTSTATUS status ;
2010-04-14 17:15:32 +04:00
pwd = getpwuid_alloc ( mem_ctx , sec_initial_uid ( ) ) ;
if ( pwd = = NULL ) {
2011-02-20 01:20:34 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER ;
2010-04-14 17:15:32 +04:00
}
2011-02-11 03:50:37 +03:00
status = make_session_info_from_username ( mem_ctx ,
pwd - > pw_name ,
false ,
session_info ) ;
2010-09-26 01:47:42 +04:00
TALLOC_FREE ( pwd ) ;
2010-05-28 16:19:28 +04:00
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
return status ;
}
2011-07-15 10:12:41 +04:00
( * session_info ) - > unix_info - > system = true ;
2010-05-28 16:19:28 +04:00
2011-02-21 12:25:52 +03:00
status = add_sid_to_array_unique ( ( * session_info ) - > security_token - > sids ,
2010-09-28 09:45:47 +04:00
& global_sid_System ,
2011-02-21 12:25:52 +03:00
& ( * session_info ) - > security_token - > sids ,
& ( * session_info ) - > security_token - > num_sids ) ;
2010-09-28 09:45:47 +04:00
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
2011-02-21 12:25:52 +03:00
TALLOC_FREE ( ( * session_info ) ) ;
2010-09-28 09:45:47 +04:00
return status ;
}
2010-05-28 16:19:28 +04:00
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
2010-04-14 17:15:32 +04:00
}
2008-05-06 19:47:26 +04:00
/****************************************************************************
2011-07-18 07:06:47 +04:00
Fake a auth_session_info just from a username ( as a
2011-02-11 03:50:37 +03:00
session_info structure , with create_local_token ( ) already called on
it .
2008-05-06 19:47:26 +04:00
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
2011-02-11 03:50:37 +03:00
NTSTATUS make_session_info_from_username ( TALLOC_CTX * mem_ctx ,
const char * username ,
bool is_guest ,
2011-07-18 07:06:47 +04:00
struct auth_session_info * * session_info )
2008-05-06 19:47:26 +04:00
{
struct auth_serversupplied_info * result ;
2008-05-11 02:25:55 +04:00
struct passwd * pwd ;
2008-05-06 19:47:26 +04:00
NTSTATUS status ;
2010-10-20 19:16:23 +04:00
pwd = Get_Pwnam_alloc ( talloc_tos ( ) , username ) ;
2008-05-11 02:25:55 +04:00
if ( pwd = = NULL ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER ;
2008-05-06 19:47:26 +04:00
}
2008-05-11 02:25:55 +04:00
status = make_server_info_pw ( & result , pwd - > pw_name , pwd ) ;
2008-05-06 19:47:26 +04:00
2008-05-11 02:25:55 +04:00
TALLOC_FREE ( pwd ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
return status ;
2008-05-06 19:47:26 +04:00
}
2008-05-11 02:25:55 +04:00
result - > nss_token = true ;
result - > guest = is_guest ;
2011-02-11 03:50:37 +03:00
/* Now turn the server_info into a session_info with the full token etc */
status = create_local_token ( mem_ctx , result , NULL , session_info ) ;
talloc_free ( result ) ;
return status ;
2008-05-06 19:47:26 +04:00
}
2011-07-15 12:05:42 +04:00
/* This function MUST only used to create the cached server_info for
* guest .
*
* This is a lossy conversion . Variables known to be lost so far
2011-07-18 04:20:25 +04:00
* include :
*
* - nss_token ( not needed because the only read doesn ' t happen
2011-07-15 12:05:42 +04:00
* for the GUEST user , as this routine populates - > security_token
2011-07-18 04:20:25 +04:00
*
2011-07-18 05:31:49 +04:00
* - extra ( not needed because the guest account must have valid RIDs per the output of get_guest_info3 ( ) )
2011-07-18 05:22:50 +04:00
*
* - The ' server_info ' parameter allows the missing ' info3 ' to be copied across .
2011-07-15 12:05:42 +04:00
*/
2011-07-18 05:22:50 +04:00
static struct auth_serversupplied_info * copy_session_info_serverinfo_guest ( TALLOC_CTX * mem_ctx ,
2011-07-18 07:06:47 +04:00
const struct auth_session_info * src ,
2011-07-18 05:22:50 +04:00
struct auth_serversupplied_info * server_info )
2011-07-15 05:38:49 +04:00
{
struct auth_serversupplied_info * dst ;
dst = make_server_info ( mem_ctx ) ;
if ( dst = = NULL ) {
return NULL ;
}
2011-07-15 10:09:52 +04:00
/* This element must be provided to convert back to an auth_serversupplied_info */
SMB_ASSERT ( src - > unix_info ) ;
dst - > guest = src - > unix_info - > guest ;
2011-07-15 10:12:41 +04:00
dst - > system = src - > unix_info - > system ;
2011-07-15 08:59:14 +04:00
2011-07-18 05:31:49 +04:00
/* This element must be provided to convert back to an
* auth_serversupplied_info . This needs to be from hte
2011-07-18 07:06:47 +04:00
* auth_session_info because the group values in particular
2011-07-18 05:31:49 +04:00
* may change during create_local_token ( ) processing */
2011-07-15 08:59:14 +04:00
SMB_ASSERT ( src - > unix_token ) ;
dst - > utok . uid = src - > unix_token - > uid ;
dst - > utok . gid = src - > unix_token - > gid ;
dst - > utok . ngroups = src - > unix_token - > ngroups ;
if ( src - > unix_token - > ngroups ! = 0 ) {
2011-07-15 05:38:49 +04:00
dst - > utok . groups = ( gid_t * ) talloc_memdup (
2011-07-15 08:59:14 +04:00
dst , src - > unix_token - > groups ,
2011-07-15 05:38:49 +04:00
sizeof ( gid_t ) * dst - > utok . ngroups ) ;
} else {
dst - > utok . groups = NULL ;
}
2011-07-15 12:05:42 +04:00
/* We must have a security_token as otherwise the lossy
* conversion without nss_token would cause create_local_token
* to take the wrong path */
SMB_ASSERT ( src - > security_token ) ;
dst - > security_token = dup_nt_token ( dst , src - > security_token ) ;
if ( ! dst - > security_token ) {
TALLOC_FREE ( dst ) ;
return NULL ;
2011-07-15 05:38:49 +04:00
}
dst - > session_key = data_blob_talloc ( dst , src - > session_key . data ,
src - > session_key . length ) ;
2011-07-15 11:45:48 +04:00
/* This is OK because this functions is only used for the
* GUEST account , which has all - zero keys for both values */
dst - > lm_session_key = data_blob_talloc ( dst , src - > session_key . data ,
src - > session_key . length ) ;
2011-07-15 05:38:49 +04:00
2011-07-18 05:22:50 +04:00
dst - > info3 = copy_netr_SamInfo3 ( dst , server_info - > info3 ) ;
2011-07-15 05:38:49 +04:00
if ( ! dst - > info3 ) {
TALLOC_FREE ( dst ) ;
return NULL ;
}
2011-07-15 09:55:31 +04:00
dst - > unix_name = talloc_strdup ( dst , src - > unix_info - > unix_name ) ;
2011-07-15 05:38:49 +04:00
if ( ! dst - > unix_name ) {
TALLOC_FREE ( dst ) ;
return NULL ;
}
2011-07-15 09:55:31 +04:00
dst - > sanitized_username = talloc_strdup ( dst , src - > unix_info - > sanitized_username ) ;
2011-07-15 05:38:49 +04:00
if ( ! dst - > sanitized_username ) {
TALLOC_FREE ( dst ) ;
return NULL ;
}
return dst ;
}
2011-07-18 07:06:47 +04:00
struct auth_session_info * copy_session_info ( TALLOC_CTX * mem_ctx ,
const struct auth_session_info * src )
2011-07-15 05:38:49 +04:00
{
2011-07-18 07:06:47 +04:00
struct auth_session_info * dst ;
2011-07-18 06:38:05 +04:00
DATA_BLOB blob ;
enum ndr_err_code ndr_err ;
ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob (
& blob , talloc_tos ( ) , src ,
2011-07-18 07:06:47 +04:00
( ndr_push_flags_fn_t ) ndr_push_auth_session_info ) ;
2011-07-18 06:38:05 +04:00
if ( ! NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS ( ndr_err ) ) {
2011-07-18 07:06:47 +04:00
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " copy_session_info(): ndr_push_auth_session_info failed: "
2011-07-18 06:38:05 +04:00
" %s \n " , ndr_errstr ( ndr_err ) ) ) ;
2011-07-15 05:38:49 +04:00
return NULL ;
}
2011-07-18 07:06:47 +04:00
dst = talloc ( mem_ctx , struct auth_session_info ) ;
2011-07-18 06:38:05 +04:00
if ( dst = = NULL ) {
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " talloc failed \n " ) ) ;
TALLOC_FREE ( blob . data ) ;
return NULL ;
2011-07-15 05:38:49 +04:00
}
2011-07-18 06:38:05 +04:00
ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob (
& blob , dst , dst ,
2011-07-18 07:06:47 +04:00
( ndr_pull_flags_fn_t ) ndr_pull_auth_session_info ) ;
2011-07-18 06:38:05 +04:00
TALLOC_FREE ( blob . data ) ;
2011-07-15 05:38:49 +04:00
2011-07-18 06:38:05 +04:00
if ( ! NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS ( ndr_err ) ) {
2011-07-18 07:06:47 +04:00
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " copy_session_info(): ndr_pull_auth_session_info failed: "
2011-07-18 06:38:05 +04:00
" %s \n " , ndr_errstr ( ndr_err ) ) ) ;
2006-06-15 05:54:09 +04:00
TALLOC_FREE ( dst ) ;
return NULL ;
}
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2004-11-06 01:53:35 +03:00
return dst ;
}
2008-06-24 16:18:55 +04:00
/*
* Set a new session key . Used in the rpc server where we have to override the
* SMB level session key with SystemLibraryDTC
*/
2011-07-18 07:06:47 +04:00
bool session_info_set_session_key ( struct auth_session_info * info ,
2008-06-24 16:18:55 +04:00
DATA_BLOB session_key )
{
2011-02-14 03:35:21 +03:00
TALLOC_FREE ( info - > session_key . data ) ;
2008-06-24 16:18:55 +04:00
2011-02-14 03:35:21 +03:00
info - > session_key = data_blob_talloc (
2008-06-24 16:18:55 +04:00
info , session_key . data , session_key . length ) ;
2011-02-14 03:35:21 +03:00
return ( info - > session_key . data ! = NULL ) ;
2008-06-24 16:18:55 +04:00
}
2011-07-18 07:06:47 +04:00
static struct auth_session_info * guest_info = NULL ;
2004-11-06 01:53:35 +03:00
2011-07-18 05:22:50 +04:00
static struct auth_serversupplied_info * guest_server_info = NULL ;
2007-10-19 04:40:25 +04:00
bool init_guest_info ( void )
2004-11-06 01:53:35 +03:00
{
if ( guest_info ! = NULL )
return True ;
2011-07-18 05:22:50 +04:00
return NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( make_new_session_info_guest ( & guest_info , & guest_server_info ) ) ;
2004-11-06 01:53:35 +03:00
}
2008-05-06 19:26:49 +04:00
NTSTATUS make_server_info_guest ( TALLOC_CTX * mem_ctx ,
2010-01-10 16:24:22 +03:00
struct auth_serversupplied_info * * server_info )
2004-11-06 01:53:35 +03:00
{
2011-07-18 05:22:50 +04:00
/* This is trickier than it would appear to need to be because
* we are trying to avoid certain costly operations when the
2011-07-18 07:06:47 +04:00
* structure is converted to a ' auth_session_info ' again in
2011-07-18 05:22:50 +04:00
* create_local_token ( ) */
* server_info = copy_session_info_serverinfo_guest ( mem_ctx , guest_info , guest_server_info ) ;
2004-11-06 01:53:35 +03:00
return ( * server_info ! = NULL ) ? NT_STATUS_OK : NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
2011-07-15 06:45:17 +04:00
NTSTATUS make_session_info_guest ( TALLOC_CTX * mem_ctx ,
2011-07-18 07:06:47 +04:00
struct auth_session_info * * session_info )
2011-07-15 06:45:17 +04:00
{
* session_info = copy_session_info ( mem_ctx , guest_info ) ;
return ( * session_info ! = NULL ) ? NT_STATUS_OK : NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
2011-07-18 07:06:47 +04:00
static struct auth_session_info * system_info = NULL ;
2010-04-14 17:15:32 +04:00
2011-02-19 22:05:07 +03:00
NTSTATUS init_system_info ( void )
2010-04-14 17:15:32 +04:00
{
if ( system_info ! = NULL )
2011-02-19 22:05:07 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
2010-04-14 17:15:32 +04:00
2011-02-21 12:25:52 +03:00
return make_new_session_info_system ( NULL , & system_info ) ;
2010-04-14 17:15:32 +04:00
}
2011-02-21 12:25:52 +03:00
NTSTATUS make_session_info_system ( TALLOC_CTX * mem_ctx ,
2011-07-18 07:06:47 +04:00
struct auth_session_info * * session_info )
2010-04-14 17:15:32 +04:00
{
if ( system_info = = NULL ) return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL ;
2011-07-15 06:45:17 +04:00
* session_info = copy_session_info ( mem_ctx , system_info ) ;
2011-02-21 12:25:52 +03:00
return ( * session_info ! = NULL ) ? NT_STATUS_OK : NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
2010-04-14 17:15:32 +04:00
}
2011-07-18 07:06:47 +04:00
const struct auth_session_info * get_session_info_system ( void )
2010-09-09 13:00:18 +04:00
{
return system_info ;
}
2007-10-19 04:40:25 +04:00
bool copy_current_user ( struct current_user * dst , struct current_user * src )
2006-07-11 22:01:26 +04:00
{
gid_t * groups ;
2010-08-26 16:08:22 +04:00
struct security_token * nt_token ;
2006-07-11 22:01:26 +04:00
2006-08-04 16:15:53 +04:00
groups = ( gid_t * ) memdup ( src - > ut . groups ,
sizeof ( gid_t ) * src - > ut . ngroups ) ;
2006-07-11 22:01:26 +04:00
if ( ( src - > ut . ngroups ! = 0 ) & & ( groups = = NULL ) ) {
return False ;
}
nt_token = dup_nt_token ( NULL , src - > nt_user_token ) ;
if ( nt_token = = NULL ) {
SAFE_FREE ( groups ) ;
return False ;
}
dst - > conn = src - > conn ;
dst - > vuid = src - > vuid ;
dst - > ut . uid = src - > ut . uid ;
dst - > ut . gid = src - > ut . gid ;
dst - > ut . ngroups = src - > ut . ngroups ;
dst - > ut . groups = groups ;
dst - > nt_user_token = nt_token ;
return True ;
}
2003-06-12 11:21:26 +04:00
/***************************************************************************
Purely internal function for make_server_info_info3
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
2010-05-27 11:41:56 +04:00
static NTSTATUS check_account ( TALLOC_CTX * mem_ctx , const char * domain ,
const char * username , char * * found_username ,
2010-05-29 19:02:47 +04:00
struct passwd * * pwd ,
2010-05-27 11:41:56 +04:00
bool * username_was_mapped )
2003-06-11 20:36:04 +04:00
{
2010-11-09 23:07:25 +03:00
char * orig_dom_user = NULL ;
char * dom_user = NULL ;
char * lower_username = NULL ;
char * real_username = NULL ;
2003-06-11 20:36:04 +04:00
struct passwd * passwd ;
2010-11-09 23:07:25 +03:00
lower_username = talloc_strdup ( mem_ctx , username ) ;
if ( ! lower_username ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
2004-10-23 00:15:24 +04:00
strlower_m ( lower_username ) ;
2010-11-09 23:07:25 +03:00
orig_dom_user = talloc_asprintf ( mem_ctx ,
" %s%c%s " ,
domain ,
* lp_winbind_separator ( ) ,
lower_username ) ;
if ( ! orig_dom_user ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
2003-06-11 20:36:04 +04:00
2010-05-27 11:41:56 +04:00
/* Get the passwd struct. Try to create the account if necessary. */
2003-06-11 20:36:04 +04:00
2010-11-09 23:07:25 +03:00
* username_was_mapped = map_username ( mem_ctx , orig_dom_user , & dom_user ) ;
if ( ! dom_user ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
2004-10-23 00:15:24 +04:00
2010-11-09 23:07:25 +03:00
passwd = smb_getpwnam ( mem_ctx , dom_user , & real_username , True ) ;
2010-05-28 22:14:27 +04:00
if ( ! passwd ) {
DEBUG ( 3 , ( " Failed to find authenticated user %s via "
" getpwnam(), denying access. \n " , dom_user ) ) ;
2003-06-11 20:36:04 +04:00
return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER ;
2010-05-28 22:14:27 +04:00
}
2003-06-11 20:36:04 +04:00
2010-11-09 23:07:25 +03:00
if ( ! real_username ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
2010-05-29 19:02:47 +04:00
* pwd = passwd ;
2003-06-12 18:24:15 +04:00
2004-03-16 19:41:54 +03:00
/* This is pointless -- there is no suport for differing
2003-10-07 20:34:23 +04:00
unix and windows names . Make sure to always store the
2003-10-20 20:49:45 +04:00
one we actually looked up and succeeded . Have I mentioned
2003-10-07 20:34:23 +04:00
why I hate the ' winbind use default domain ' parameter ?
- - jerry */
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2004-03-16 19:41:54 +03:00
* found_username = talloc_strdup ( mem_ctx , real_username ) ;
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2010-05-28 22:14:27 +04:00
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
2003-06-11 20:36:04 +04:00
}
2003-10-20 20:49:45 +04:00
/****************************************************************************
2003-11-06 20:28:44 +03:00
Wrapper to allow the getpwnam ( ) call to strip the domain name and
try again in case a local UNIX user is already there . Also run through
the username if we fallback to the username only .
2003-10-20 20:49:45 +04:00
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2010-08-21 02:56:37 +04:00
struct passwd * smb_getpwnam ( TALLOC_CTX * mem_ctx , const char * domuser ,
2010-11-09 23:07:25 +03:00
char * * p_save_username , bool create )
2003-10-20 20:49:45 +04:00
{
2003-12-06 05:34:02 +03:00
struct passwd * pw = NULL ;
2010-11-09 23:07:25 +03:00
char * p = NULL ;
char * username = NULL ;
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2004-03-16 19:41:54 +03:00
/* we only save a copy of the username it has been mangled
by winbindd use default domain */
2010-11-09 23:07:25 +03:00
* p_save_username = NULL ;
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2004-07-07 01:43:12 +04:00
/* don't call map_username() here since it has to be done higher
2010-04-09 18:49:02 +04:00
up the stack so we don ' t call it multiple times */
2004-07-07 01:43:12 +04:00
2010-11-09 23:07:25 +03:00
username = talloc_strdup ( mem_ctx , domuser ) ;
if ( ! username ) {
return NULL ;
}
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2004-07-07 01:43:12 +04:00
p = strchr_m ( username , * lp_winbind_separator ( ) ) ;
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2004-03-16 19:41:54 +03:00
/* code for a DOMAIN\user string */
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2004-03-16 19:41:54 +03:00
if ( p ) {
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
pw = Get_Pwnam_alloc ( mem_ctx , domuser ) ;
2010-11-09 23:07:25 +03:00
if ( pw ) {
2004-03-16 19:41:54 +03:00
/* make sure we get the case of the username correct */
/* work around 'winbind use default domain = yes' */
if ( ! strchr_m ( pw - > pw_name , * lp_winbind_separator ( ) ) ) {
char * domain ;
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2004-07-07 01:43:12 +04:00
/* split the domain and username into 2 strings */
2004-03-16 19:41:54 +03:00
* p = ' \0 ' ;
2004-07-07 01:43:12 +04:00
domain = username ;
2010-11-09 23:07:25 +03:00
* p_save_username = talloc_asprintf ( mem_ctx ,
" %s%c%s " ,
domain ,
* lp_winbind_separator ( ) ,
pw - > pw_name ) ;
if ( ! * p_save_username ) {
TALLOC_FREE ( pw ) ;
return NULL ;
}
} else {
* p_save_username = talloc_strdup ( mem_ctx , pw - > pw_name ) ;
2004-03-16 19:41:54 +03:00
}
2003-10-20 20:49:45 +04:00
2010-11-09 23:07:25 +03:00
/* whew -- done! */
2004-03-16 19:41:54 +03:00
return pw ;
}
2003-10-20 20:49:45 +04:00
2004-03-16 19:41:54 +03:00
/* setup for lookup of just the username */
2004-07-07 01:43:12 +04:00
/* remember that p and username are overlapping memory */
2003-10-20 20:49:45 +04:00
2004-03-16 23:28:47 +03:00
p + + ;
2010-11-09 23:07:25 +03:00
username = talloc_strdup ( mem_ctx , p ) ;
if ( ! username ) {
return NULL ;
}
2004-03-16 19:41:54 +03:00
}
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2004-03-16 19:41:54 +03:00
/* just lookup a plain username */
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
pw = Get_Pwnam_alloc ( mem_ctx , username ) ;
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2006-04-14 23:36:36 +04:00
/* Create local user if requested but only if winbindd
is not running . We need to protect against cases
where winbindd is failing and then prematurely
creating users in / etc / passwd */
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2006-04-14 23:36:36 +04:00
if ( ! pw & & create & & ! winbind_ping ( ) ) {
2004-03-16 19:41:54 +03:00
/* Don't add a machine account. */
2004-07-07 01:43:12 +04:00
if ( username [ strlen ( username ) - 1 ] = = ' $ ' )
2004-03-16 19:41:54 +03:00
return NULL ;
2003-10-20 20:49:45 +04:00
2009-04-01 23:42:47 +04:00
_smb_create_user ( NULL , username , NULL ) ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
pw = Get_Pwnam_alloc ( mem_ctx , username ) ;
2003-11-06 20:28:44 +03:00
}
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2004-03-16 19:41:54 +03:00
/* one last check for a valid passwd struct */
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2010-11-09 23:07:25 +03:00
if ( pw ) {
* p_save_username = talloc_strdup ( mem_ctx , pw - > pw_name ) ;
}
2003-12-06 05:34:02 +03:00
return pw ;
2003-10-20 20:49:45 +04:00
}
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
/***************************************************************************
Make a server_info struct from the info3 returned by a domain logon
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
NTSTATUS make_server_info_info3 ( TALLOC_CTX * mem_ctx ,
const char * sent_nt_username ,
const char * domain ,
2010-01-10 16:24:22 +03:00
struct auth_serversupplied_info * * server_info ,
2008-02-16 21:08:22 +03:00
struct netr_SamInfo3 * info3 )
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
{
2010-01-24 15:46:59 +03:00
static const char zeros [ 16 ] = { 0 , } ;
Changes all over the shop, but all towards:
- NTLM2 support in the server
- KEY_EXCH support in the server
- variable length session keys.
In detail:
- NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing
domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade).
* This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' *
(This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may
well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password
changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of
NTLM2 on RPC pipes.)
This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we
must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm
being changed. This also needs to be turned off for
'security=server', which does not support this.
- KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key
actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being
the shared-secret directly or indirectly.
- As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem
needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the
backend.
- There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation.
- The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii.
Don't make an ascii version ever.
- The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We
have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded
to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes
long, when the krb5 login uses DES.
* This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. *
- Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of
misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This
should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues.
- Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when
passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate)
REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures...
(This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
NTSTATUS nt_status = NT_STATUS_OK ;
2007-12-23 01:10:06 +03:00
char * found_username = NULL ;
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
const char * nt_domain ;
const char * nt_username ;
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bool username_was_mapped ;
2010-05-29 19:02:47 +04:00
struct passwd * pwd ;
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struct auth_serversupplied_info * result ;
2010-05-29 19:29:29 +04:00
struct dom_sid * group_sid ;
struct netr_SamInfo3 * i3 ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
/*
Here is where we should check the list of
trusted domains , and verify that the SID
matches .
*/
2008-02-16 21:08:22 +03:00
nt_username = talloc_strdup ( mem_ctx , info3 - > base . account_name . string ) ;
if ( ! nt_username ) {
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
/* If the server didn't give us one, just use the one we sent
* them */
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
nt_username = sent_nt_username ;
}
2008-02-16 21:08:22 +03:00
nt_domain = talloc_strdup ( mem_ctx , info3 - > base . domain . string ) ;
if ( ! nt_domain ) {
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
/* If the server didn't give us one, just use the one we sent
* them */
2003-12-31 03:31:43 +03:00
nt_domain = domain ;
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
}
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2010-05-27 11:41:56 +04:00
/* If getpwnam() fails try the add user script (2.2.x behavior).
2004-10-23 00:15:24 +04:00
We use the _unmapped_ username here in an attempt to provide
consistent username mapping behavior between kerberos and NTLM [ SSP ]
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
authentication in domain mode security . I . E . Username mapping
should be applied to the fully qualified username
( e . g . DOMAIN \ user ) and not just the login name . Yes this means we
called map_username ( ) unnecessarily in make_user_info_map ( ) but
that is how the current code is designed . Making the change here
is the least disruptive place . - - jerry */
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2006-05-02 16:13:23 +04:00
/* this call will try to create the user if necessary */
2010-05-27 11:41:56 +04:00
nt_status = check_account ( mem_ctx , nt_domain , sent_nt_username ,
2010-05-29 19:02:47 +04:00
& found_username , & pwd ,
2006-05-06 23:24:35 +04:00
& username_was_mapped ) ;
2003-07-07 09:11:10 +04:00
2010-05-28 22:14:27 +04:00
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( nt_status ) ) {
return nt_status ;
}
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
result = make_server_info ( NULL ) ;
if ( result = = NULL ) {
2002-09-25 19:19:00 +04:00
DEBUG ( 4 , ( " make_server_info failed! \n " ) ) ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
}
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
result - > unix_name = talloc_strdup ( result , found_username ) ;
2003-07-03 18:36:42 +04:00
2008-05-11 02:25:55 +04:00
result - > sanitized_username = sanitize_username ( result ,
result - > unix_name ) ;
if ( result - > sanitized_username = = NULL ) {
TALLOC_FREE ( result ) ;
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
2010-05-27 11:41:56 +04:00
/* copy in the info3 */
2010-05-29 19:29:29 +04:00
result - > info3 = i3 = copy_netr_SamInfo3 ( result , info3 ) ;
2010-06-25 19:06:00 +04:00
if ( result - > info3 = = NULL ) {
TALLOC_FREE ( result ) ;
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
2010-05-27 11:41:56 +04:00
2003-06-12 18:24:15 +04:00
/* Fill in the unix info we found on the way */
2010-05-29 19:02:47 +04:00
result - > utok . uid = pwd - > pw_uid ;
result - > utok . gid = pwd - > pw_gid ;
2002-09-25 19:19:00 +04:00
2010-05-29 19:29:29 +04:00
/* We can't just trust that the primary group sid sent us is something
* we can really use . Obtain the useable sid , and store the original
* one as an additional group if it had to be replaced */
nt_status = get_primary_group_sid ( mem_ctx , found_username ,
& pwd , & group_sid ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( nt_status ) ) {
TALLOC_FREE ( result ) ;
return nt_status ;
}
/* store and check if it is the same we got originally */
sid_peek_rid ( group_sid , & i3 - > base . primary_gid ) ;
if ( i3 - > base . primary_gid ! = info3 - > base . primary_gid ) {
uint32_t n = i3 - > base . groups . count ;
/* not the same, store the original as an additional group */
i3 - > base . groups . rids =
talloc_realloc ( i3 , i3 - > base . groups . rids ,
struct samr_RidWithAttribute , n + 1 ) ;
if ( i3 - > base . groups . rids = = NULL ) {
TALLOC_FREE ( result ) ;
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
i3 - > base . groups . rids [ n ] . rid = info3 - > base . primary_gid ;
i3 - > base . groups . rids [ n ] . attributes = SE_GROUP_ENABLED ;
i3 - > base . groups . count = n + 1 ;
}
Changes all over the shop, but all towards:
- NTLM2 support in the server
- KEY_EXCH support in the server
- variable length session keys.
In detail:
- NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing
domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade).
* This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' *
(This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may
well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password
changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of
NTLM2 on RPC pipes.)
This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we
must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm
being changed. This also needs to be turned off for
'security=server', which does not support this.
- KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key
actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being
the shared-secret directly or indirectly.
- As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem
needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the
backend.
- There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation.
- The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii.
Don't make an ascii version ever.
- The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We
have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded
to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes
long, when the krb5 login uses DES.
* This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. *
- Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of
misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This
should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues.
- Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when
passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate)
REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures...
(This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
/* ensure we are never given NULL session keys */
2007-12-28 19:02:34 +03:00
2008-02-16 21:08:22 +03:00
if ( memcmp ( info3 - > base . key . key , zeros , sizeof ( zeros ) ) = = 0 ) {
2011-02-14 03:35:21 +03:00
result - > session_key = data_blob_null ;
Changes all over the shop, but all towards:
- NTLM2 support in the server
- KEY_EXCH support in the server
- variable length session keys.
In detail:
- NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing
domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade).
* This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' *
(This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may
well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password
changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of
NTLM2 on RPC pipes.)
This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we
must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm
being changed. This also needs to be turned off for
'security=server', which does not support this.
- KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key
actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being
the shared-secret directly or indirectly.
- As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem
needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the
backend.
- There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation.
- The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii.
Don't make an ascii version ever.
- The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We
have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded
to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes
long, when the krb5 login uses DES.
* This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. *
- Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of
misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This
should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues.
- Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when
passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate)
REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures...
(This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
} else {
2011-02-14 03:35:21 +03:00
result - > session_key = data_blob_talloc (
2008-02-16 21:08:22 +03:00
result , info3 - > base . key . key ,
sizeof ( info3 - > base . key . key ) ) ;
Changes all over the shop, but all towards:
- NTLM2 support in the server
- KEY_EXCH support in the server
- variable length session keys.
In detail:
- NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing
domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade).
* This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' *
(This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may
well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password
changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of
NTLM2 on RPC pipes.)
This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we
must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm
being changed. This also needs to be turned off for
'security=server', which does not support this.
- KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key
actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being
the shared-secret directly or indirectly.
- As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem
needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the
backend.
- There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation.
- The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii.
Don't make an ascii version ever.
- The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We
have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded
to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes
long, when the krb5 login uses DES.
* This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. *
- Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of
misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This
should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues.
- Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when
passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate)
REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures...
(This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
}
2003-03-24 12:54:13 +03:00
2008-02-16 21:08:22 +03:00
if ( memcmp ( info3 - > base . LMSessKey . key , zeros , 8 ) = = 0 ) {
2007-05-14 16:16:20 +04:00
result - > lm_session_key = data_blob_null ;
Changes all over the shop, but all towards:
- NTLM2 support in the server
- KEY_EXCH support in the server
- variable length session keys.
In detail:
- NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing
domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade).
* This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' *
(This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may
well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password
changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of
NTLM2 on RPC pipes.)
This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we
must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm
being changed. This also needs to be turned off for
'security=server', which does not support this.
- KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key
actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being
the shared-secret directly or indirectly.
- As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem
needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the
backend.
- There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation.
- The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii.
Don't make an ascii version ever.
- The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We
have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded
to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes
long, when the krb5 login uses DES.
* This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. *
- Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of
misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This
should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues.
- Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when
passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate)
REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures...
(This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
} else {
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
result - > lm_session_key = data_blob_talloc (
2008-02-16 21:08:22 +03:00
result , info3 - > base . LMSessKey . key ,
sizeof ( info3 - > base . LMSessKey . key ) ) ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
}
2008-05-06 19:37:00 +04:00
result - > nss_token | = username_was_mapped ;
2006-05-06 23:24:35 +04:00
2011-07-19 04:43:23 +04:00
result - > guest = ( info3 - > base . user_flags & NETLOGON_GUEST ) ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
* server_info = result ;
2004-12-20 14:36:39 +03:00
2008-02-04 20:18:36 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
}
/*****************************************************************************
Make a server_info struct from the wbcAuthUserInfo returned by a domain logon
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
NTSTATUS make_server_info_wbcAuthUserInfo ( TALLOC_CTX * mem_ctx ,
const char * sent_nt_username ,
const char * domain ,
const struct wbcAuthUserInfo * info ,
2010-01-10 16:24:22 +03:00
struct auth_serversupplied_info * * server_info )
2008-02-04 20:18:36 +03:00
{
2010-05-27 11:41:56 +04:00
struct netr_SamInfo3 * info3 ;
2008-02-04 20:18:36 +03:00
2010-05-27 11:41:56 +04:00
info3 = wbcAuthUserInfo_to_netr_SamInfo3 ( mem_ctx , info ) ;
if ( ! info3 ) {
2008-02-04 20:18:36 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
2010-05-27 11:41:56 +04:00
return make_server_info_info3 ( mem_ctx ,
sent_nt_username , domain ,
server_info , info3 ) ;
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
}
2003-07-01 21:51:52 +04:00
/**
* Verify whether or not given domain is trusted .
*
* @ param domain_name name of the domain to be verified
2009-11-14 03:23:05 +03:00
* @ return true if domain is one of the trusted ones or
2003-07-01 21:51:52 +04:00
* false if otherwise
* */
2007-10-19 04:40:25 +04:00
bool is_trusted_domain ( const char * dom_name )
2003-07-01 21:51:52 +04:00
{
2010-05-21 05:25:01 +04:00
struct dom_sid trustdom_sid ;
2007-10-19 04:40:25 +04:00
bool ret ;
2003-07-01 21:51:52 +04:00
2003-07-08 21:19:37 +04:00
/* no trusted domains for a standalone server */
if ( lp_server_role ( ) = = ROLE_STANDALONE )
return False ;
2009-11-14 03:12:22 +03:00
if ( dom_name = = NULL | | dom_name [ 0 ] = = ' \0 ' ) {
return false ;
2009-11-14 03:21:42 +03:00
}
if ( strequal ( dom_name , get_global_sam_name ( ) ) ) {
return false ;
2009-11-14 03:12:22 +03:00
}
2003-07-01 21:51:52 +04:00
/* if we are a DC, then check for a direct trust relationships */
2004-06-03 22:00:22 +04:00
if ( IS_DC ) {
2003-07-01 21:51:52 +04:00
become_root ( ) ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
DEBUG ( 5 , ( " is_trusted_domain: Checking for domain trust with "
" [%s] \n " , dom_name ) ) ;
2007-01-16 11:17:26 +03:00
ret = pdb_get_trusteddom_pw ( dom_name , NULL , NULL , NULL ) ;
2003-07-01 21:51:52 +04:00
unbecome_root ( ) ;
if ( ret )
return True ;
}
else {
2007-12-21 20:59:56 +03:00
wbcErr result ;
2003-07-01 21:51:52 +04:00
2005-06-03 19:42:03 +04:00
/* If winbind is around, ask it */
result = wb_is_trusted_domain ( dom_name ) ;
2007-12-21 20:59:56 +03:00
if ( result = = WBC_ERR_SUCCESS ) {
2005-06-03 19:42:03 +04:00
return True ;
}
2007-12-21 20:59:56 +03:00
if ( result = = WBC_ERR_DOMAIN_NOT_FOUND ) {
2005-06-03 19:42:03 +04:00
/* winbind could not find the domain */
return False ;
}
/* The only other possible result is that winbind is not up
and running . We need to update the trustdom_cache
ourselves */
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
2005-06-03 19:42:03 +04:00
update_trustdom_cache ( ) ;
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}
/* now the trustdom cache should be available a DC could still
* have a transitive trust so fall back to the cache of trusted
* domains ( like a domain member would use */
if ( trustdom_cache_fetch ( dom_name , & trustdom_sid ) ) {
return True ;
}
return False ;
}
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