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samba-mirror/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c

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/*
* Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
* RPC Pipe client / server routines
* Almost completely rewritten by (C) Jeremy Allison 2005 - 2010
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
/* this module apparently provides an implementation of DCE/RPC over a
* named pipe (IPC$ connection using SMBtrans). details of DCE/RPC
* documentation are available (in on-line form) from the X-Open group.
*
* this module should provide a level of abstraction between SMB
* and DCE/RPC, while minimising the amount of mallocs, unnecessary
* data copies, and network traffic.
*
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "srv_pipe_internal.h"
#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_schannel.h"
#include "../libcli/auth/schannel.h"
2009-09-17 02:21:01 +04:00
#include "../libcli/auth/spnego.h"
#include "../libcli/auth/ntlmssp.h"
#include "rpc_server.h"
#undef DBGC_CLASS
#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_RPC_SRV
/**
* Dump everything from the start of the end up of the provided data
* into a file, but only at debug level >= 50
**/
static void dump_pdu_region(const char *name, int v,
DATA_BLOB *data, size_t start, size_t end)
{
int fd, i;
char *fname = NULL;
ssize_t sz;
if (DEBUGLEVEL < 50) return;
if (start > data->length || end > data->length || start > end) return;
for (i = 1; i < 100; i++) {
if (v != -1) {
fname = talloc_asprintf(talloc_tos(),
"/tmp/%s_%d.%d.prs",
name, v, i);
} else {
fname = talloc_asprintf(talloc_tos(),
"/tmp/%s_%d.prs",
name, i);
}
if (!fname) {
return;
}
fd = open(fname, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0644);
if (fd != -1 || errno != EEXIST) break;
}
if (fd != -1) {
sz = write(fd, data->data + start, end - start);
i = close(fd);
if ((sz != end - start) || (i != 0) ) {
DEBUG(0, ("Error writing/closing %s: %ld!=%ld %d\n",
fname, (unsigned long)sz,
(unsigned long)end - start, i));
} else {
DEBUG(0,("created %s\n", fname));
}
}
TALLOC_FREE(fname);
}
static void free_pipe_ntlmssp_auth_data(struct pipe_auth_data *auth)
{
TALLOC_FREE(auth->a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state);
}
static DATA_BLOB generic_session_key(void)
{
return data_blob("SystemLibraryDTC", 16);
}
delineation between smb and msrpc more marked. smbd now constructs pdus, and then feeds them over either a "local" function call or a "remote" function call to an msrpc service. the "remote" msrpc daemon, on the other side of a unix socket, then calls the same "local" function that smbd would, if the msrpc service were being run from inside smbd. this allows a transition from local msrpc services (inside the same smbd process) to remote (over a unix socket). removed reference to pipes_struct in msrpc services. all msrpc processing functions take rpcsrv_struct which is a structure containing state info for the msrpc functions to decode and create pdus. created become_vuser() which does everything not related to connection_struct that become_user() does. removed, as best i could, connection_struct dependencies from the nt spoolss printing code. todo: remove dcinfo from rpcsrv_struct because this stores NETLOGON-specific info on a per-connection basis, and if the connection dies then so does the info, and that's a fairly serious problem. had to put pretty much everything that is in user_struct into parse_creds.c to feed unix user info over to the msrpc daemons. why? because it's expensive to do unix password/group database lookups, and it's definitely expensive to do nt user profile lookups, not to mention pretty difficult and if you did either of these it would introduce a complication / unnecessary interdependency. so, send uid/gid/num_groups/gid_t* + SID+num_rids+domain_group_rids* + unix username + nt username + nt domain + user session key etc. this is the MINIMUM info identified so far that's actually implemented. missing bits include the called and calling netbios names etc. (basically, anything that can be loaded into standard_sub() and standard_sub_basic()...) (This used to be commit aa3c659a8dba0437c17c60055a6ed30fdfecdb6d)
1999-12-12 04:25:49 +03:00
/*******************************************************************
Handle NTLMSSP.
delineation between smb and msrpc more marked. smbd now constructs pdus, and then feeds them over either a "local" function call or a "remote" function call to an msrpc service. the "remote" msrpc daemon, on the other side of a unix socket, then calls the same "local" function that smbd would, if the msrpc service were being run from inside smbd. this allows a transition from local msrpc services (inside the same smbd process) to remote (over a unix socket). removed reference to pipes_struct in msrpc services. all msrpc processing functions take rpcsrv_struct which is a structure containing state info for the msrpc functions to decode and create pdus. created become_vuser() which does everything not related to connection_struct that become_user() does. removed, as best i could, connection_struct dependencies from the nt spoolss printing code. todo: remove dcinfo from rpcsrv_struct because this stores NETLOGON-specific info on a per-connection basis, and if the connection dies then so does the info, and that's a fairly serious problem. had to put pretty much everything that is in user_struct into parse_creds.c to feed unix user info over to the msrpc daemons. why? because it's expensive to do unix password/group database lookups, and it's definitely expensive to do nt user profile lookups, not to mention pretty difficult and if you did either of these it would introduce a complication / unnecessary interdependency. so, send uid/gid/num_groups/gid_t* + SID+num_rids+domain_group_rids* + unix username + nt username + nt domain + user session key etc. this is the MINIMUM info identified so far that's actually implemented. missing bits include the called and calling netbios names etc. (basically, anything that can be loaded into standard_sub() and standard_sub_basic()...) (This used to be commit aa3c659a8dba0437c17c60055a6ed30fdfecdb6d)
1999-12-12 04:25:49 +03:00
********************************************************************/
static bool add_ntlmssp_auth(pipes_struct *p)
{
enum dcerpc_AuthLevel auth_level = p->auth.auth_level;
DATA_BLOB auth_blob = data_blob_null;
NTSTATUS status;
/* FIXME: Is this right ?
* Keeping only to avoid changing semantics during refactoring
* --simo
*/
if (auth_level != DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
auth_level = DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY;
}
/* Generate the auth blob. */
switch (auth_level) {
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY:
/* Data portion is encrypted. */
status = auth_ntlmssp_seal_packet(
p->auth.a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state,
(TALLOC_CTX *)p->out_data.frag.data,
&p->out_data.frag.data[DCERPC_RESPONSE_LENGTH],
p->out_data.frag.length
- DCERPC_RESPONSE_LENGTH
- DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH,
p->out_data.frag.data,
p->out_data.frag.length,
&auth_blob);
break;
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY:
/* Data is signed. */
status = auth_ntlmssp_sign_packet(
p->auth.a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state,
(TALLOC_CTX *)p->out_data.frag.data,
&p->out_data.frag.data[DCERPC_RESPONSE_LENGTH],
p->out_data.frag.length
- DCERPC_RESPONSE_LENGTH
- DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH,
p->out_data.frag.data,
p->out_data.frag.length,
&auth_blob);
break;
default:
status = NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return false;
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(0, ("Failed to add NTLMSSP auth blob: %s\n",
nt_errstr(status)));
data_blob_free(&p->out_data.frag);
return false;
}
/* Finally append the auth blob. */
if (!data_blob_append(p->mem_ctx, &p->out_data.frag,
auth_blob.data, auth_blob.length)) {
DEBUG(0, ("Failed to add %u bytes auth blob.\n",
(unsigned int)auth_blob.length));
data_blob_free(&p->out_data.frag);
return False;
}
data_blob_free(&auth_blob);
return true;
}
/*******************************************************************
Append a schannel authenticated fragment.
********************************************************************/
static bool add_schannel_auth(pipes_struct *p)
{
DATA_BLOB auth_blob = data_blob_null;
NTSTATUS status;
/* Schannel processing. */
switch (p->auth.auth_level) {
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY:
status = netsec_outgoing_packet(
p->auth.a_u.schannel_auth,
(TALLOC_CTX *)p->out_data.frag.data,
true,
&p->out_data.frag.data[DCERPC_RESPONSE_LENGTH],
p->out_data.frag.length
- DCERPC_RESPONSE_LENGTH
- DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH,
&auth_blob);
break;
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY:
status = netsec_outgoing_packet(
p->auth.a_u.schannel_auth,
(TALLOC_CTX *)p->out_data.frag.data,
false,
&p->out_data.frag.data[DCERPC_RESPONSE_LENGTH],
p->out_data.frag.length
- DCERPC_RESPONSE_LENGTH
- DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH,
&auth_blob);
break;
default:
status = NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
break;
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(0, ("Failed to add SCHANNEL auth blob: %s\n",
nt_errstr(status)));
data_blob_free(&p->out_data.frag);
return false;
}
if (DEBUGLEVEL >= 10) {
dump_NL_AUTH_SIGNATURE(talloc_tos(), &auth_blob);
}
if (!data_blob_append(p->mem_ctx, &p->out_data.frag,
auth_blob.data, auth_blob.length)) {
DEBUG(0, ("Failed to add %u bytes auth blob.\n",
(unsigned int)auth_blob.length));
data_blob_free(&p->out_data.frag);
return false;
}
data_blob_free(&auth_blob);
return true;
}
/*******************************************************************
Generate the next PDU to be returned from the data.
********************************************************************/
static bool create_next_packet(pipes_struct *p,
enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type,
enum dcerpc_AuthLevel auth_level,
size_t auth_length)
{
union dcerpc_payload u;
uint8_t pfc_flags;
size_t data_len_left;
size_t data_len;
size_t max_len;
size_t pad_len = 0;
NTSTATUS status;
ZERO_STRUCT(u.response);
/* Set up rpc packet pfc flags. */
if (p->out_data.data_sent_length == 0) {
pfc_flags = DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_FIRST;
} else {
pfc_flags = 0;
}
/* Work out how much we can fit in a single PDU. */
data_len_left = p->out_data.rdata.length -
p->out_data.data_sent_length;
/* Ensure there really is data left to send. */
if (!data_len_left) {
DEBUG(0, ("No data left to send !\n"));
return false;
}
/* Max space available - not including padding. */
if (auth_length) {
max_len = RPC_MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN
- DCERPC_RESPONSE_LENGTH
- DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH
- auth_length;
} else {
max_len = RPC_MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN - DCERPC_RESPONSE_LENGTH;
}
/*
* The amount we send is the minimum of the max_len
* and the amount left to send.
*/
data_len = MIN(data_len_left, max_len);
if (auth_length) {
/* Work out any padding alignment requirements. */
pad_len = (DCERPC_RESPONSE_LENGTH + data_len) %
SERVER_NDR_PADDING_SIZE;
if (pad_len) {
pad_len = SERVER_NDR_PADDING_SIZE - pad_len;
DEBUG(10, ("Padding size is: %d\n", (int)pad_len));
/* If we're over filling the packet, we need to make
* space for the padding at the end of the data. */
if (data_len + pad_len > max_len) {
data_len -= SERVER_NDR_PADDING_SIZE;
}
}
}
/* Set up the alloc hint. This should be the data left to send. */
u.response.alloc_hint = data_len_left;
/* Work out if this PDU will be the last. */
if (p->out_data.data_sent_length
+ data_len >= p->out_data.rdata.length) {
pfc_flags |= DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST;
}
/* Prepare data to be NDR encoded. */
u.response.stub_and_verifier =
data_blob_const(p->out_data.rdata.data +
p->out_data.data_sent_length, data_len);
/* Store the packet in the data stream. */
status = dcerpc_push_ncacn_packet(p->mem_ctx,
DCERPC_PKT_RESPONSE,
pfc_flags,
auth_length,
p->call_id,
&u,
&p->out_data.frag);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(0, ("Failed to marshall RPC Packet.\n"));
return false;
}
if (auth_length) {
DATA_BLOB empty = data_blob_null;
DATA_BLOB auth_hdr;
/* Set the proper length on the pdu, including padding.
* Only needed if an auth trailer will be appended. */
dcerpc_set_frag_length(&p->out_data.frag,
p->out_data.frag.length
+ pad_len
+ DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH
+ auth_length);
if (pad_len) {
size_t offset = p->out_data.frag.length;
if (!data_blob_realloc(p->mem_ctx,
&p->out_data.frag,
offset + pad_len)) {
DEBUG(0, ("Failed to add padding!\n"));
data_blob_free(&p->out_data.frag);
return false;
}
memset(&p->out_data.frag.data[offset], '\0', pad_len);
}
/* auth blob is intentionally empty,
* it will be appended later */
status = dcerpc_push_dcerpc_auth(p->out_data.frag.data,
auth_type,
auth_level,
pad_len,
1, /* context id. */
&empty,
&auth_hdr);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(0, ("Failed to marshall RPC Auth.\n"));
return false;
}
/* Store auth header in the data stream. */
if (!data_blob_append(p->mem_ctx, &p->out_data.frag,
auth_hdr.data, auth_hdr.length)) {
DEBUG(0, ("Out of memory.\n"));
data_blob_free(&p->out_data.frag);
return false;
}
data_blob_free(&auth_hdr);
}
/* Setup the counts for this PDU. */
p->out_data.data_sent_length += data_len;
p->out_data.current_pdu_sent = 0;
return true;
}
/*******************************************************************
Generate the next PDU to be returned from the data in p->rdata.
********************************************************************/
bool create_next_pdu(pipes_struct *p)
{
enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type =
map_pipe_auth_type_to_rpc_auth_type(p->auth.auth_type);
2009-01-06 13:32:07 +03:00
/*
* If we're in the fault state, keep returning fault PDU's until
* the pipe gets closed. JRA.
*/
if (p->fault_state) {
setup_fault_pdu(p, NT_STATUS(DCERPC_FAULT_OP_RNG_ERROR));
return true;
}
switch (p->auth.auth_level) {
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE:
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT:
/* This is incorrect for auth level connect. Fixme. JRA */
/* No authentication done. */
return create_next_packet(p, auth_type,
p->auth.auth_level, 0);
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CALL:
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PACKET:
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY:
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY:
switch(p->auth.auth_type) {
case PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_NTLMSSP:
case PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO_NTLMSSP:
if (!create_next_packet(p, auth_type,
p->auth.auth_level,
NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE)) {
return false;
}
return add_ntlmssp_auth(p);
case PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL:
if (!create_next_packet(p, auth_type,
p->auth.auth_level,
NL_AUTH_SIGNATURE_SIZE)) {
return false;
}
return add_schannel_auth(p);
default:
break;
}
default:
break;
}
DEBUG(0, ("Invalid internal auth level %u / type %u\n",
(unsigned int)p->auth.auth_level,
(unsigned int)p->auth.auth_type));
return false;
}
/*******************************************************************
Process an NTLMSSP authentication response.
If this function succeeds, the user has been authenticated
and their domain, name and calling workstation stored in
the pipe struct.
*******************************************************************/
static bool pipe_ntlmssp_verify_final(pipes_struct *p, DATA_BLOB *p_resp_blob)
{
DATA_BLOB session_key, reply;
NTSTATUS status;
struct auth_ntlmssp_state *a = p->auth.a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state;
bool ret;
DEBUG(5,("pipe_ntlmssp_verify_final: pipe %s checking user details\n",
get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), &p->syntax)));
ZERO_STRUCT(reply);
/* this has to be done as root in order to verify the password */
become_root();
status = auth_ntlmssp_update(a, *p_resp_blob, &reply);
unbecome_root();
/* Don't generate a reply. */
data_blob_free(&reply);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
return False;
}
/* Finally - if the pipe negotiated integrity (sign) or privacy (seal)
ensure the underlying NTLMSSP flags are also set. If not we should
refuse the bind. */
if (p->auth.auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY) {
if (!auth_ntlmssp_negotiated_sign(a)) {
DEBUG(0,("pipe_ntlmssp_verify_final: pipe %s : packet integrity requested "
"but client declined signing.\n",
get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(),
&p->syntax)));
return False;
}
}
if (p->auth.auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
if (!auth_ntlmssp_negotiated_seal(a)) {
DEBUG(0,("pipe_ntlmssp_verify_final: pipe %s : packet privacy requested "
"but client declined sealing.\n",
get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(),
&p->syntax)));
return False;
}
}
DEBUG(5, ("pipe_ntlmssp_verify_final: OK: user: %s domain: %s "
"workstation: %s\n",
auth_ntlmssp_get_username(a),
auth_ntlmssp_get_domain(a),
auth_ntlmssp_get_client(a)));
TALLOC_FREE(p->server_info);
status = auth_ntlmssp_server_info(p, a, &p->server_info);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(0, ("auth_ntlmssp_server_info failed to obtain the server info for authenticated user: %s\n",
nt_errstr(status)));
return false;
}
if (p->server_info->ptok == NULL) {
DEBUG(1,("Error: Authmodule failed to provide nt_user_token\n"));
return False;
}
/*
* We're an authenticated bind over smb, so the session key needs to
* be set to "SystemLibraryDTC". Weird, but this is what Windows
* does. See the RPC-SAMBA3SESSIONKEY.
*/
session_key = generic_session_key();
if (session_key.data == NULL) {
return False;
}
ret = server_info_set_session_key(p->server_info, session_key);
data_blob_free(&session_key);
return True;
}
/*******************************************************************
This is the "stage3" NTLMSSP response after a bind request and reply.
*******************************************************************/
bool api_pipe_bind_auth3(pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
{
struct dcerpc_auth auth_info;
NTSTATUS status;
DEBUG(5, ("api_pipe_bind_auth3: decode request. %d\n", __LINE__));
if (pkt->auth_length == 0) {
DEBUG(0, ("No auth field sent for bind request!\n"));
goto err;
}
Fix bug #7146 - Samba miss-parses authenticated RPC packets. Parts of the Samba RPC client and server code misinterpret authenticated packets. DCE authenticated packets actually look like this : +--------------------------+ |header | | ... frag_len (packet len)| | ... auth_len | +--------------------------+ | | | Data payload | ... .... | | +--------------------------+ | | | auth_pad_len bytes | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth footer | | auth_pad_len value | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth payload | | (auth_len bytes long) | +--------------------------+ That's right. The pad bytes come *before* the footer specifying how many pad bytes there are. In order to read this you must seek to the end of the packet and subtract the auth_len (in the packet header) and the auth footer length (a known value). The client and server code gets this right (mostly) in 3.0.x -> 3.4.x so long as the pad alignment is on an 8 byte boundary (there are some special cases in the code for this). Tridge discovered there are some (DRS replication) cases where on 64-bit machines where the pad alignment is on a 16-byte boundary. This breaks the existing S3 hand-optimized rpc code. This patch removes all the special cases in client and server code, and allows the pad alignment for generated packets to be specified by changing a constant in include/local.h (this doesn't affect received packets, the new code always handles them correctly whatever pad alignment is used). This patch also works correctly with rpcclient using sign+seal from the 3.4.x and 3.3.x builds (testing with 3.0.x and 3.2.x to follow) so even as a server it should still work with older libsmbclient and winbindd code. Jeremy
2010-02-18 02:27:59 +03:00
/* Ensure there's enough data for an authenticated request. */
if (pkt->frag_length < RPC_HEADER_LEN
+ DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH
+ pkt->auth_length) {
Fix bug #7146 - Samba miss-parses authenticated RPC packets. Parts of the Samba RPC client and server code misinterpret authenticated packets. DCE authenticated packets actually look like this : +--------------------------+ |header | | ... frag_len (packet len)| | ... auth_len | +--------------------------+ | | | Data payload | ... .... | | +--------------------------+ | | | auth_pad_len bytes | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth footer | | auth_pad_len value | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth payload | | (auth_len bytes long) | +--------------------------+ That's right. The pad bytes come *before* the footer specifying how many pad bytes there are. In order to read this you must seek to the end of the packet and subtract the auth_len (in the packet header) and the auth footer length (a known value). The client and server code gets this right (mostly) in 3.0.x -> 3.4.x so long as the pad alignment is on an 8 byte boundary (there are some special cases in the code for this). Tridge discovered there are some (DRS replication) cases where on 64-bit machines where the pad alignment is on a 16-byte boundary. This breaks the existing S3 hand-optimized rpc code. This patch removes all the special cases in client and server code, and allows the pad alignment for generated packets to be specified by changing a constant in include/local.h (this doesn't affect received packets, the new code always handles them correctly whatever pad alignment is used). This patch also works correctly with rpcclient using sign+seal from the 3.4.x and 3.3.x builds (testing with 3.0.x and 3.2.x to follow) so even as a server it should still work with older libsmbclient and winbindd code. Jeremy
2010-02-18 02:27:59 +03:00
DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_ntlmssp_auth_process: auth_len "
"%u is too large.\n",
(unsigned int)pkt->auth_length));
Fix bug #7146 - Samba miss-parses authenticated RPC packets. Parts of the Samba RPC client and server code misinterpret authenticated packets. DCE authenticated packets actually look like this : +--------------------------+ |header | | ... frag_len (packet len)| | ... auth_len | +--------------------------+ | | | Data payload | ... .... | | +--------------------------+ | | | auth_pad_len bytes | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth footer | | auth_pad_len value | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth payload | | (auth_len bytes long) | +--------------------------+ That's right. The pad bytes come *before* the footer specifying how many pad bytes there are. In order to read this you must seek to the end of the packet and subtract the auth_len (in the packet header) and the auth footer length (a known value). The client and server code gets this right (mostly) in 3.0.x -> 3.4.x so long as the pad alignment is on an 8 byte boundary (there are some special cases in the code for this). Tridge discovered there are some (DRS replication) cases where on 64-bit machines where the pad alignment is on a 16-byte boundary. This breaks the existing S3 hand-optimized rpc code. This patch removes all the special cases in client and server code, and allows the pad alignment for generated packets to be specified by changing a constant in include/local.h (this doesn't affect received packets, the new code always handles them correctly whatever pad alignment is used). This patch also works correctly with rpcclient using sign+seal from the 3.4.x and 3.3.x builds (testing with 3.0.x and 3.2.x to follow) so even as a server it should still work with older libsmbclient and winbindd code. Jeremy
2010-02-18 02:27:59 +03:00
goto err;
}
/*
* Decode the authentication verifier response.
*/
status = dcerpc_pull_dcerpc_auth(pkt,
&pkt->u.auth3.auth_info,
&auth_info, p->endian);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(0, ("Failed to unmarshall dcerpc_auth.\n"));
goto err;
}
Fix bug #7146 - Samba miss-parses authenticated RPC packets. Parts of the Samba RPC client and server code misinterpret authenticated packets. DCE authenticated packets actually look like this : +--------------------------+ |header | | ... frag_len (packet len)| | ... auth_len | +--------------------------+ | | | Data payload | ... .... | | +--------------------------+ | | | auth_pad_len bytes | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth footer | | auth_pad_len value | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth payload | | (auth_len bytes long) | +--------------------------+ That's right. The pad bytes come *before* the footer specifying how many pad bytes there are. In order to read this you must seek to the end of the packet and subtract the auth_len (in the packet header) and the auth footer length (a known value). The client and server code gets this right (mostly) in 3.0.x -> 3.4.x so long as the pad alignment is on an 8 byte boundary (there are some special cases in the code for this). Tridge discovered there are some (DRS replication) cases where on 64-bit machines where the pad alignment is on a 16-byte boundary. This breaks the existing S3 hand-optimized rpc code. This patch removes all the special cases in client and server code, and allows the pad alignment for generated packets to be specified by changing a constant in include/local.h (this doesn't affect received packets, the new code always handles them correctly whatever pad alignment is used). This patch also works correctly with rpcclient using sign+seal from the 3.4.x and 3.3.x builds (testing with 3.0.x and 3.2.x to follow) so even as a server it should still work with older libsmbclient and winbindd code. Jeremy
2010-02-18 02:27:59 +03:00
/* We must NEVER look at auth_info->auth_pad_len here,
* as old Samba client code gets it wrong and sends it
* as zero. JRA.
*/
if (auth_info.auth_type != DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NTLMSSP) {
DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_auth3: incorrect auth type (%u).\n",
(unsigned int)auth_info.auth_type ));
return False;
}
/*
* The following call actually checks the challenge/response data.
* for correctness against the given DOMAIN\user name.
*/
2009-01-06 13:32:07 +03:00
if (!pipe_ntlmssp_verify_final(p, &auth_info.credentials)) {
goto err;
}
p->pipe_bound = True;
return True;
err:
free_pipe_ntlmssp_auth_data(&p->auth);
p->auth.a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state = NULL;
return False;
}
/*******************************************************************
Marshall a bind_nak pdu.
*******************************************************************/
static bool setup_bind_nak(pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
{
NTSTATUS status;
union dcerpc_payload u;
/* Free any memory in the current return data buffer. */
data_blob_free(&p->out_data.rdata);
/*
* Initialize a bind_nak header.
*/
ZERO_STRUCT(u);
u.bind_nak.reject_reason = 0;
/*
* Marshall directly into the outgoing PDU space. We
* must do this as we need to set to the bind response
* header and are never sending more than one PDU here.
*/
status = dcerpc_push_ncacn_packet(p->mem_ctx,
DCERPC_PKT_BIND_NAK,
DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_FIRST |
DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST,
0,
pkt->call_id,
&u,
&p->out_data.frag);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
return False;
}
p->out_data.data_sent_length = 0;
p->out_data.current_pdu_sent = 0;
if (p->auth.auth_data_free_func) {
(*p->auth.auth_data_free_func)(&p->auth);
}
p->auth.auth_level = DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE;
p->auth.auth_type = PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
p->pipe_bound = False;
return True;
delineation between smb and msrpc more marked. smbd now constructs pdus, and then feeds them over either a "local" function call or a "remote" function call to an msrpc service. the "remote" msrpc daemon, on the other side of a unix socket, then calls the same "local" function that smbd would, if the msrpc service were being run from inside smbd. this allows a transition from local msrpc services (inside the same smbd process) to remote (over a unix socket). removed reference to pipes_struct in msrpc services. all msrpc processing functions take rpcsrv_struct which is a structure containing state info for the msrpc functions to decode and create pdus. created become_vuser() which does everything not related to connection_struct that become_user() does. removed, as best i could, connection_struct dependencies from the nt spoolss printing code. todo: remove dcinfo from rpcsrv_struct because this stores NETLOGON-specific info on a per-connection basis, and if the connection dies then so does the info, and that's a fairly serious problem. had to put pretty much everything that is in user_struct into parse_creds.c to feed unix user info over to the msrpc daemons. why? because it's expensive to do unix password/group database lookups, and it's definitely expensive to do nt user profile lookups, not to mention pretty difficult and if you did either of these it would introduce a complication / unnecessary interdependency. so, send uid/gid/num_groups/gid_t* + SID+num_rids+domain_group_rids* + unix username + nt username + nt domain + user session key etc. this is the MINIMUM info identified so far that's actually implemented. missing bits include the called and calling netbios names etc. (basically, anything that can be loaded into standard_sub() and standard_sub_basic()...) (This used to be commit aa3c659a8dba0437c17c60055a6ed30fdfecdb6d)
1999-12-12 04:25:49 +03:00
}
/*******************************************************************
Marshall a fault pdu.
*******************************************************************/
bool setup_fault_pdu(pipes_struct *p, NTSTATUS fault_status)
{
NTSTATUS status;
union dcerpc_payload u;
/* Free any memory in the current return data buffer. */
data_blob_free(&p->out_data.rdata);
/*
* Initialize a fault header.
*/
ZERO_STRUCT(u);
u.fault.status = NT_STATUS_V(fault_status);
u.fault._pad = data_blob_talloc_zero(p->mem_ctx, 4);
/*
* Marshall directly into the outgoing PDU space. We
* must do this as we need to set to the bind response
* header and are never sending more than one PDU here.
*/
status = dcerpc_push_ncacn_packet(p->mem_ctx,
DCERPC_PKT_FAULT,
DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_FIRST |
DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST |
DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_DID_NOT_EXECUTE,
0,
p->call_id,
&u,
&p->out_data.frag);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
return False;
}
p->out_data.data_sent_length = 0;
p->out_data.current_pdu_sent = 0;
return True;
}
/*******************************************************************
Ensure a bind request has the correct abstract & transfer interface.
Used to reject unknown binds from Win2k.
*******************************************************************/
static bool check_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p,
struct ndr_syntax_id* abstract,
struct ndr_syntax_id* transfer,
uint32 context_id)
{
struct pipe_rpc_fns *context_fns;
DEBUG(3,("check_bind_req for %s\n",
get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), &p->syntax)));
/* we have to check all now since win2k introduced a new UUID on the lsaprpc pipe */
if (rpc_srv_pipe_exists_by_id(abstract) &&
ndr_syntax_id_equal(transfer, &ndr_transfer_syntax)) {
DEBUG(3, ("check_bind_req: \\PIPE\\%s -> \\PIPE\\%s\n",
rpc_srv_get_pipe_cli_name(abstract),
rpc_srv_get_pipe_srv_name(abstract)));
} else {
return false;
}
context_fns = SMB_MALLOC_P(struct pipe_rpc_fns);
if (context_fns == NULL) {
DEBUG(0,("check_bind_req: malloc() failed!\n"));
return False;
}
context_fns->n_cmds = rpc_srv_get_pipe_num_cmds(abstract);
context_fns->cmds = rpc_srv_get_pipe_cmds(abstract);
context_fns->context_id = context_id;
/* add to the list of open contexts */
DLIST_ADD( p->contexts, context_fns );
return True;
}
/**
* Is a named pipe known?
* @param[in] cli_filename The pipe name requested by the client
* @result Do we want to serve this?
*/
bool is_known_pipename(const char *cli_filename, struct ndr_syntax_id *syntax)
{
const char *pipename = cli_filename;
NTSTATUS status;
if (strnequal(pipename, "\\PIPE\\", 6)) {
pipename += 5;
}
if (*pipename == '\\') {
pipename += 1;
}
if (lp_disable_spoolss() && strequal(pipename, "spoolss")) {
DEBUG(10, ("refusing spoolss access\n"));
return false;
}
if (rpc_srv_get_pipe_interface_by_cli_name(pipename, syntax)) {
return true;
}
status = smb_probe_module("rpc", pipename);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(10, ("is_known_pipename: %s unknown\n", cli_filename));
return false;
}
DEBUG(10, ("is_known_pipename: %s loaded dynamically\n", pipename));
/*
* Scan the list again for the interface id
*/
if (rpc_srv_get_pipe_interface_by_cli_name(pipename, syntax)) {
return true;
}
DEBUG(10, ("is_known_pipename: pipe %s did not register itself!\n",
pipename));
return false;
}
/*******************************************************************
Handle a SPNEGO krb5 bind auth.
*******************************************************************/
static bool pipe_spnego_auth_bind_kerberos(pipes_struct *p,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct dcerpc_auth *pauth_info,
DATA_BLOB *psecblob,
DATA_BLOB *response)
{
return False;
}
/*******************************************************************
Handle the first part of a SPNEGO bind auth.
*******************************************************************/
static bool pipe_spnego_auth_bind_negotiate(pipes_struct *p,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct dcerpc_auth *pauth_info,
DATA_BLOB *response)
{
DATA_BLOB secblob;
DATA_BLOB chal;
char *OIDs[ASN1_MAX_OIDS];
int i;
NTSTATUS status;
bool got_kerberos_mechanism = false;
struct auth_ntlmssp_state *a = NULL;
ZERO_STRUCT(secblob);
ZERO_STRUCT(chal);
if (pauth_info->credentials.data[0] != ASN1_APPLICATION(0)) {
goto err;
}
/* parse out the OIDs and the first sec blob */
if (!spnego_parse_negTokenInit(pauth_info->credentials, OIDs, NULL, &secblob)) {
DEBUG(0,("pipe_spnego_auth_bind_negotiate: Failed to parse the security blob.\n"));
goto err;
}
if (strcmp(OID_KERBEROS5, OIDs[0]) == 0 || strcmp(OID_KERBEROS5_OLD, OIDs[0]) == 0) {
got_kerberos_mechanism = true;
}
for (i=0;OIDs[i];i++) {
DEBUG(3,("pipe_spnego_auth_bind_negotiate: Got OID %s\n", OIDs[i]));
2008-10-22 16:06:08 +04:00
TALLOC_FREE(OIDs[i]);
}
DEBUG(3,("pipe_spnego_auth_bind_negotiate: Got secblob of size %lu\n", (unsigned long)secblob.length));
if ( got_kerberos_mechanism && ((lp_security()==SEC_ADS) || USE_KERBEROS_KEYTAB) ) {
bool ret;
ret = pipe_spnego_auth_bind_kerberos(p, mem_ctx, pauth_info,
&secblob, response);
data_blob_free(&secblob);
return ret;
}
if (p->auth.auth_type == PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO_NTLMSSP && p->auth.a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state) {
/* Free any previous auth type. */
free_pipe_ntlmssp_auth_data(&p->auth);
}
if (!got_kerberos_mechanism) {
/* Initialize the NTLM engine. */
status = auth_ntlmssp_start(&a);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
goto err;
}
switch (pauth_info->auth_level) {
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY:
auth_ntlmssp_want_sign(a);
break;
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY:
auth_ntlmssp_want_seal(a);
break;
default:
break;
}
/*
* Pass the first security blob of data to it.
* This can return an error or NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED
* which means we need another packet to complete the bind.
*/
status = auth_ntlmssp_update(a, secblob, &chal);
if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
DEBUG(3,("pipe_spnego_auth_bind_negotiate: auth_ntlmssp_update failed.\n"));
goto err;
}
/* Generate the response blob we need for step 2 of the bind. */
*response = spnego_gen_auth_response(&chal, status, OID_NTLMSSP);
} else {
/*
* SPNEGO negotiate down to NTLMSSP. The subsequent
* code to process follow-up packets is not complete
* yet. JRA.
*/
*response = spnego_gen_auth_response(NULL,
NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED,
OID_NTLMSSP);
}
/* Make sure data is bound to the memctx, to be freed the caller */
talloc_steal(mem_ctx, response->data);
/* auth_pad_len will be handled by the caller */
p->auth.a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state = a;
p->auth.auth_data_free_func = &free_pipe_ntlmssp_auth_data;
p->auth.auth_type = PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO_NTLMSSP;
data_blob_free(&secblob);
data_blob_free(&chal);
/* We can't set pipe_bound True yet - we need an RPC_ALTER_CONTEXT response packet... */
return True;
err:
data_blob_free(&secblob);
data_blob_free(&chal);
p->auth.a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state = NULL;
return False;
}
/*******************************************************************
Handle the second part of a SPNEGO bind auth.
*******************************************************************/
static bool pipe_spnego_auth_bind_continue(pipes_struct *p,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct dcerpc_auth *pauth_info,
DATA_BLOB *response)
{
DATA_BLOB auth_blob;
DATA_BLOB auth_reply;
struct auth_ntlmssp_state *a = p->auth.a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state;
ZERO_STRUCT(auth_blob);
ZERO_STRUCT(auth_reply);
/*
* NB. If we've negotiated down from krb5 to NTLMSSP we'll currently
* fail here as 'a' == NULL.
*/
if (p->auth.auth_type != PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO_NTLMSSP || !a) {
DEBUG(0,("pipe_spnego_auth_bind_continue: not in NTLMSSP auth state.\n"));
goto err;
}
if (pauth_info->credentials.data[0] != ASN1_CONTEXT(1)) {
DEBUG(0,("pipe_spnego_auth_bind_continue: invalid SPNEGO blob type.\n"));
goto err;
}
if (!spnego_parse_auth(pauth_info->credentials, &auth_blob)) {
DEBUG(0,("pipe_spnego_auth_bind_continue: invalid SPNEGO blob.\n"));
goto err;
}
/*
* The following call actually checks the challenge/response data.
* for correctness against the given DOMAIN\user name.
*/
if (!pipe_ntlmssp_verify_final(p, &auth_blob)) {
goto err;
}
data_blob_free(&auth_blob);
/* Generate the spnego "accept completed" blob - no incoming data. */
*response = spnego_gen_auth_response(&auth_reply, NT_STATUS_OK, OID_NTLMSSP);
/* Make sure data is bound to the memctx, to be freed the caller */
talloc_steal(mem_ctx, response->data);
data_blob_free(&auth_reply);
p->pipe_bound = True;
return True;
err:
data_blob_free(&auth_blob);
data_blob_free(&auth_reply);
free_pipe_ntlmssp_auth_data(&p->auth);
p->auth.a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state = NULL;
return False;
}
/*******************************************************************
Handle an schannel bind auth.
*******************************************************************/
static bool pipe_schannel_auth_bind(pipes_struct *p,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct dcerpc_auth *auth_info,
DATA_BLOB *response)
{
struct NL_AUTH_MESSAGE neg;
struct NL_AUTH_MESSAGE reply;
bool ret;
NTSTATUS status;
struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds;
DATA_BLOB session_key;
enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(
&auth_info->credentials, mem_ctx, &neg,
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_NL_AUTH_MESSAGE);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
DEBUG(0,("pipe_schannel_auth_bind: Could not unmarshal SCHANNEL auth neg\n"));
return false;
}
if (DEBUGLEVEL >= 10) {
NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(NL_AUTH_MESSAGE, &neg);
}
if (!(neg.Flags & NL_FLAG_OEM_NETBIOS_COMPUTER_NAME)) {
DEBUG(0,("pipe_schannel_auth_bind: Did not receive netbios computer name\n"));
return false;
}
/*
* The neg.oem_netbios_computer.a key here must match the remote computer name
* given in the DOM_CLNT_SRV.uni_comp_name used on all netlogon pipe
* operations that use credentials.
*/
become_root();
2010-05-10 02:42:06 +04:00
status = schannel_get_creds_state(p, lp_private_dir(),
neg.oem_netbios_computer.a, &creds);
unbecome_root();
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(0, ("pipe_schannel_auth_bind: Attempt to bind using schannel without successful serverauth2\n"));
return False;
}
p->auth.a_u.schannel_auth = talloc(p, struct schannel_state);
if (!p->auth.a_u.schannel_auth) {
TALLOC_FREE(creds);
return False;
}
p->auth.a_u.schannel_auth->state = SCHANNEL_STATE_START;
p->auth.a_u.schannel_auth->seq_num = 0;
p->auth.a_u.schannel_auth->initiator = false;
p->auth.a_u.schannel_auth->creds = creds;
/*
* JRA. Should we also copy the schannel session key into the pipe session key p->session_key
* here ? We do that for NTLMSSP, but the session key is already set up from the vuser
* struct of the person who opened the pipe. I need to test this further. JRA.
*
* VL. As we are mapping this to guest set the generic key
* "SystemLibraryDTC" key here. It's a bit difficult to test against
* W2k3, as it does not allow schannel binds against SAMR and LSA
* anymore.
*/
session_key = generic_session_key();
if (session_key.data == NULL) {
DEBUG(0, ("pipe_schannel_auth_bind: Could not alloc session"
" key\n"));
return false;
}
ret = server_info_set_session_key(p->server_info, session_key);
data_blob_free(&session_key);
if (!ret) {
DEBUG(0, ("server_info_set_session_key failed\n"));
return false;
}
/*** SCHANNEL verifier ***/
reply.MessageType = NL_NEGOTIATE_RESPONSE;
reply.Flags = 0;
reply.Buffer.dummy = 5; /* ??? actually I don't think
* this has any meaning
* here - gd */
ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(response, mem_ctx, &reply,
(ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_NL_AUTH_MESSAGE);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
DEBUG(0,("Failed to marshall NL_AUTH_MESSAGE.\n"));
return false;
}
if (DEBUGLEVEL >= 10) {
NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(NL_AUTH_MESSAGE, &reply);
}
DEBUG(10,("pipe_schannel_auth_bind: schannel auth: domain [%s] myname [%s]\n",
neg.oem_netbios_domain.a, neg.oem_netbios_computer.a));
/* We're finished with this bind - no more packets. */
p->auth.auth_data_free_func = NULL;
p->auth.auth_type = PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL;
p->pipe_bound = True;
return True;
}
/*******************************************************************
Handle an NTLMSSP bind auth.
*******************************************************************/
static bool pipe_ntlmssp_auth_bind(pipes_struct *p,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct dcerpc_auth *auth_info,
DATA_BLOB *response)
{
NTSTATUS status;
struct auth_ntlmssp_state *a = NULL;
if (strncmp((char *)auth_info->credentials.data, "NTLMSSP", 7) != 0) {
DEBUG(0, ("Failed to read NTLMSSP in blob\n"));
goto err;
}
/* We have an NTLMSSP blob. */
status = auth_ntlmssp_start(&a);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(0,("pipe_ntlmssp_auth_bind: auth_ntlmssp_start failed: %s\n",
nt_errstr(status) ));
goto err;
}
switch (auth_info->auth_level) {
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY:
auth_ntlmssp_want_sign(a);
break;
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY:
auth_ntlmssp_want_seal(a);
break;
default:
break;
}
status = auth_ntlmssp_update(a, auth_info->credentials, response);
if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
DEBUG(0,("pipe_ntlmssp_auth_bind: auth_ntlmssp_update failed: %s\n",
nt_errstr(status) ));
goto err;
}
/* Make sure data is bound to the memctx, to be freed the caller */
talloc_steal(mem_ctx, response->data);
p->auth.a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state = a;
p->auth.auth_data_free_func = &free_pipe_ntlmssp_auth_data;
p->auth.auth_type = PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_NTLMSSP;
DEBUG(10,("pipe_ntlmssp_auth_bind: NTLMSSP auth started\n"));
/* We can't set pipe_bound True yet - we need an DCERPC_PKT_AUTH3 response packet... */
return True;
err:
free_pipe_ntlmssp_auth_data(&p->auth);
p->auth.a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state = NULL;
return False;
}
/*******************************************************************
Respond to a pipe bind request.
*******************************************************************/
bool api_pipe_bind_req(pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
{
struct dcerpc_auth auth_info;
uint16 assoc_gid;
unsigned int auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
NTSTATUS status;
struct ndr_syntax_id id;
union dcerpc_payload u;
struct dcerpc_ack_ctx bind_ack_ctx;
DATA_BLOB auth_resp = data_blob_null;
DATA_BLOB auth_blob = data_blob_null;
/* No rebinds on a bound pipe - use alter context. */
if (p->pipe_bound) {
DEBUG(2,("api_pipe_bind_req: rejecting bind request on bound "
"pipe %s.\n",
get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), &p->syntax)));
return setup_bind_nak(p, pkt);
}
if (pkt->u.bind.num_contexts == 0) {
DEBUG(0, ("api_pipe_bind_req: no rpc contexts around\n"));
goto err_exit;
}
/*
* Try and find the correct pipe name to ensure
* that this is a pipe name we support.
*/
id = pkt->u.bind.ctx_list[0].abstract_syntax;
if (rpc_srv_pipe_exists_by_id(&id)) {
DEBUG(3, ("api_pipe_bind_req: \\PIPE\\%s -> \\PIPE\\%s\n",
rpc_srv_get_pipe_cli_name(&id),
rpc_srv_get_pipe_srv_name(&id)));
} else {
status = smb_probe_module(
"rpc", get_pipe_name_from_syntax(
talloc_tos(),
&pkt->u.bind.ctx_list[0].abstract_syntax));
if (NT_STATUS_IS_ERR(status)) {
DEBUG(3,("api_pipe_bind_req: Unknown pipe name %s in bind request.\n",
get_pipe_name_from_syntax(
talloc_tos(),
&pkt->u.bind.ctx_list[0].abstract_syntax)));
return setup_bind_nak(p, pkt);
}
if (rpc_srv_get_pipe_interface_by_cli_name(
get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(),
&p->syntax),
&id)) {
DEBUG(3, ("api_pipe_bind_req: \\PIPE\\%s -> \\PIPE\\%s\n",
rpc_srv_get_pipe_cli_name(&id),
rpc_srv_get_pipe_srv_name(&id)));
} else {
DEBUG(0, ("module %s doesn't provide functions for "
"pipe %s!\n",
get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(),
&p->syntax),
get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(),
&p->syntax)));
return setup_bind_nak(p, pkt);
}
}
DEBUG(5,("api_pipe_bind_req: make response. %d\n", __LINE__));
if (pkt->u.bind.assoc_group_id != 0) {
assoc_gid = pkt->u.bind.assoc_group_id;
2010-07-08 09:14:16 +04:00
} else {
assoc_gid = 0x53f0;
}
Fix bug #7146 - Samba miss-parses authenticated RPC packets. Parts of the Samba RPC client and server code misinterpret authenticated packets. DCE authenticated packets actually look like this : +--------------------------+ |header | | ... frag_len (packet len)| | ... auth_len | +--------------------------+ | | | Data payload | ... .... | | +--------------------------+ | | | auth_pad_len bytes | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth footer | | auth_pad_len value | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth payload | | (auth_len bytes long) | +--------------------------+ That's right. The pad bytes come *before* the footer specifying how many pad bytes there are. In order to read this you must seek to the end of the packet and subtract the auth_len (in the packet header) and the auth footer length (a known value). The client and server code gets this right (mostly) in 3.0.x -> 3.4.x so long as the pad alignment is on an 8 byte boundary (there are some special cases in the code for this). Tridge discovered there are some (DRS replication) cases where on 64-bit machines where the pad alignment is on a 16-byte boundary. This breaks the existing S3 hand-optimized rpc code. This patch removes all the special cases in client and server code, and allows the pad alignment for generated packets to be specified by changing a constant in include/local.h (this doesn't affect received packets, the new code always handles them correctly whatever pad alignment is used). This patch also works correctly with rpcclient using sign+seal from the 3.4.x and 3.3.x builds (testing with 3.0.x and 3.2.x to follow) so even as a server it should still work with older libsmbclient and winbindd code. Jeremy
2010-02-18 02:27:59 +03:00
/*
* Create the bind response struct.
*/
/* If the requested abstract synt uuid doesn't match our client pipe,
reject the bind_ack & set the transfer interface synt to all 0's,
ver 0 (observed when NT5 attempts to bind to abstract interfaces
unknown to NT4)
Needed when adding entries to a DACL from NT5 - SK */
if (check_bind_req(p,
&pkt->u.bind.ctx_list[0].abstract_syntax,
&pkt->u.bind.ctx_list[0].transfer_syntaxes[0],
pkt->u.bind.ctx_list[0].context_id)) {
bind_ack_ctx.result = 0;
bind_ack_ctx.reason = 0;
bind_ack_ctx.syntax = pkt->u.bind.ctx_list[0].transfer_syntaxes[0];
Fix bug #7146 - Samba miss-parses authenticated RPC packets. Parts of the Samba RPC client and server code misinterpret authenticated packets. DCE authenticated packets actually look like this : +--------------------------+ |header | | ... frag_len (packet len)| | ... auth_len | +--------------------------+ | | | Data payload | ... .... | | +--------------------------+ | | | auth_pad_len bytes | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth footer | | auth_pad_len value | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth payload | | (auth_len bytes long) | +--------------------------+ That's right. The pad bytes come *before* the footer specifying how many pad bytes there are. In order to read this you must seek to the end of the packet and subtract the auth_len (in the packet header) and the auth footer length (a known value). The client and server code gets this right (mostly) in 3.0.x -> 3.4.x so long as the pad alignment is on an 8 byte boundary (there are some special cases in the code for this). Tridge discovered there are some (DRS replication) cases where on 64-bit machines where the pad alignment is on a 16-byte boundary. This breaks the existing S3 hand-optimized rpc code. This patch removes all the special cases in client and server code, and allows the pad alignment for generated packets to be specified by changing a constant in include/local.h (this doesn't affect received packets, the new code always handles them correctly whatever pad alignment is used). This patch also works correctly with rpcclient using sign+seal from the 3.4.x and 3.3.x builds (testing with 3.0.x and 3.2.x to follow) so even as a server it should still work with older libsmbclient and winbindd code. Jeremy
2010-02-18 02:27:59 +03:00
} else {
p->pipe_bound = False;
/* Rejection reason: abstract syntax not supported */
bind_ack_ctx.result = DCERPC_BIND_PROVIDER_REJECT;
bind_ack_ctx.reason = DCERPC_BIND_REASON_ASYNTAX;
bind_ack_ctx.syntax = null_ndr_syntax_id;
Fix bug #7146 - Samba miss-parses authenticated RPC packets. Parts of the Samba RPC client and server code misinterpret authenticated packets. DCE authenticated packets actually look like this : +--------------------------+ |header | | ... frag_len (packet len)| | ... auth_len | +--------------------------+ | | | Data payload | ... .... | | +--------------------------+ | | | auth_pad_len bytes | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth footer | | auth_pad_len value | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth payload | | (auth_len bytes long) | +--------------------------+ That's right. The pad bytes come *before* the footer specifying how many pad bytes there are. In order to read this you must seek to the end of the packet and subtract the auth_len (in the packet header) and the auth footer length (a known value). The client and server code gets this right (mostly) in 3.0.x -> 3.4.x so long as the pad alignment is on an 8 byte boundary (there are some special cases in the code for this). Tridge discovered there are some (DRS replication) cases where on 64-bit machines where the pad alignment is on a 16-byte boundary. This breaks the existing S3 hand-optimized rpc code. This patch removes all the special cases in client and server code, and allows the pad alignment for generated packets to be specified by changing a constant in include/local.h (this doesn't affect received packets, the new code always handles them correctly whatever pad alignment is used). This patch also works correctly with rpcclient using sign+seal from the 3.4.x and 3.3.x builds (testing with 3.0.x and 3.2.x to follow) so even as a server it should still work with older libsmbclient and winbindd code. Jeremy
2010-02-18 02:27:59 +03:00
}
/*
* Check if this is an authenticated bind request.
*/
if (pkt->auth_length) {
Fix bug #7146 - Samba miss-parses authenticated RPC packets. Parts of the Samba RPC client and server code misinterpret authenticated packets. DCE authenticated packets actually look like this : +--------------------------+ |header | | ... frag_len (packet len)| | ... auth_len | +--------------------------+ | | | Data payload | ... .... | | +--------------------------+ | | | auth_pad_len bytes | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth footer | | auth_pad_len value | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth payload | | (auth_len bytes long) | +--------------------------+ That's right. The pad bytes come *before* the footer specifying how many pad bytes there are. In order to read this you must seek to the end of the packet and subtract the auth_len (in the packet header) and the auth footer length (a known value). The client and server code gets this right (mostly) in 3.0.x -> 3.4.x so long as the pad alignment is on an 8 byte boundary (there are some special cases in the code for this). Tridge discovered there are some (DRS replication) cases where on 64-bit machines where the pad alignment is on a 16-byte boundary. This breaks the existing S3 hand-optimized rpc code. This patch removes all the special cases in client and server code, and allows the pad alignment for generated packets to be specified by changing a constant in include/local.h (this doesn't affect received packets, the new code always handles them correctly whatever pad alignment is used). This patch also works correctly with rpcclient using sign+seal from the 3.4.x and 3.3.x builds (testing with 3.0.x and 3.2.x to follow) so even as a server it should still work with older libsmbclient and winbindd code. Jeremy
2010-02-18 02:27:59 +03:00
/* Quick length check. Won't catch a bad auth footer,
* prevents overrun. */
if (pkt->frag_length < RPC_HEADER_LEN +
DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH +
pkt->auth_length) {
Fix bug #7146 - Samba miss-parses authenticated RPC packets. Parts of the Samba RPC client and server code misinterpret authenticated packets. DCE authenticated packets actually look like this : +--------------------------+ |header | | ... frag_len (packet len)| | ... auth_len | +--------------------------+ | | | Data payload | ... .... | | +--------------------------+ | | | auth_pad_len bytes | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth footer | | auth_pad_len value | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth payload | | (auth_len bytes long) | +--------------------------+ That's right. The pad bytes come *before* the footer specifying how many pad bytes there are. In order to read this you must seek to the end of the packet and subtract the auth_len (in the packet header) and the auth footer length (a known value). The client and server code gets this right (mostly) in 3.0.x -> 3.4.x so long as the pad alignment is on an 8 byte boundary (there are some special cases in the code for this). Tridge discovered there are some (DRS replication) cases where on 64-bit machines where the pad alignment is on a 16-byte boundary. This breaks the existing S3 hand-optimized rpc code. This patch removes all the special cases in client and server code, and allows the pad alignment for generated packets to be specified by changing a constant in include/local.h (this doesn't affect received packets, the new code always handles them correctly whatever pad alignment is used). This patch also works correctly with rpcclient using sign+seal from the 3.4.x and 3.3.x builds (testing with 3.0.x and 3.2.x to follow) so even as a server it should still work with older libsmbclient and winbindd code. Jeremy
2010-02-18 02:27:59 +03:00
DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: auth_len (%u) "
"too long for fragment %u.\n",
(unsigned int)pkt->auth_length,
(unsigned int)pkt->frag_length));
Fix bug #7146 - Samba miss-parses authenticated RPC packets. Parts of the Samba RPC client and server code misinterpret authenticated packets. DCE authenticated packets actually look like this : +--------------------------+ |header | | ... frag_len (packet len)| | ... auth_len | +--------------------------+ | | | Data payload | ... .... | | +--------------------------+ | | | auth_pad_len bytes | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth footer | | auth_pad_len value | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth payload | | (auth_len bytes long) | +--------------------------+ That's right. The pad bytes come *before* the footer specifying how many pad bytes there are. In order to read this you must seek to the end of the packet and subtract the auth_len (in the packet header) and the auth footer length (a known value). The client and server code gets this right (mostly) in 3.0.x -> 3.4.x so long as the pad alignment is on an 8 byte boundary (there are some special cases in the code for this). Tridge discovered there are some (DRS replication) cases where on 64-bit machines where the pad alignment is on a 16-byte boundary. This breaks the existing S3 hand-optimized rpc code. This patch removes all the special cases in client and server code, and allows the pad alignment for generated packets to be specified by changing a constant in include/local.h (this doesn't affect received packets, the new code always handles them correctly whatever pad alignment is used). This patch also works correctly with rpcclient using sign+seal from the 3.4.x and 3.3.x builds (testing with 3.0.x and 3.2.x to follow) so even as a server it should still work with older libsmbclient and winbindd code. Jeremy
2010-02-18 02:27:59 +03:00
goto err_exit;
}
/*
* Decode the authentication verifier.
*/
status = dcerpc_pull_dcerpc_auth(pkt,
&pkt->u.bind.auth_info,
&auth_info, p->endian);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(0, ("Unable to unmarshall dcerpc_auth.\n"));
goto err_exit;
}
auth_type = auth_info.auth_type;
/* Work out if we have to sign or seal etc. */
switch (auth_info.auth_level) {
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY:
p->auth.auth_level = DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY;
break;
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY:
p->auth.auth_level = DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY;
break;
default:
DEBUG(0, ("Unexpected auth level (%u).\n",
(unsigned int)auth_info.auth_level ));
goto err_exit;
}
switch (auth_type) {
case DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NTLMSSP:
if (!pipe_ntlmssp_auth_bind(p, pkt,
&auth_info, &auth_resp)) {
goto err_exit;
}
assoc_gid = 0x7a77;
break;
case DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL:
if (!pipe_schannel_auth_bind(p, pkt,
&auth_info, &auth_resp)) {
goto err_exit;
}
break;
case DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO:
if (!pipe_spnego_auth_bind_negotiate(p, pkt,
&auth_info, &auth_resp)) {
goto err_exit;
}
break;
case DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE:
break;
default:
DEBUG(0, ("Unknown auth type %x requested.\n", auth_type));
goto err_exit;
}
}
if (auth_type == DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE) {
/* Unauthenticated bind request. */
/* We're finished - no more packets. */
p->auth.auth_type = PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
/* We must set the pipe auth_level here also. */
p->auth.auth_level = DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE;
p->pipe_bound = True;
/* The session key was initialized from the SMB
* session in make_internal_rpc_pipe_p */
}
ZERO_STRUCT(u.bind_ack);
u.bind_ack.max_xmit_frag = RPC_MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN;
u.bind_ack.max_recv_frag = RPC_MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN;
u.bind_ack.assoc_group_id = assoc_gid;
/* name has to be \PIPE\xxxxx */
u.bind_ack.secondary_address =
talloc_asprintf(pkt, "\\PIPE\\%s",
rpc_srv_get_pipe_srv_name(&id));
if (!u.bind_ack.secondary_address) {
DEBUG(0, ("Out of memory!\n"));
goto err_exit;
}
u.bind_ack.secondary_address_size =
strlen(u.bind_ack.secondary_address) + 1;
u.bind_ack.num_results = 1;
u.bind_ack.ctx_list = &bind_ack_ctx;
/* NOTE: We leave the auth_info empty so we can calculate the padding
* later and then append the auth_info --simo */
/*
* Marshall directly into the outgoing PDU space. We
* must do this as we need to set to the bind response
* header and are never sending more than one PDU here.
*/
status = dcerpc_push_ncacn_packet(p->mem_ctx,
DCERPC_PKT_BIND_ACK,
DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_FIRST |
DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST,
auth_resp.length,
pkt->call_id,
&u,
&p->out_data.frag);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(0, ("Failed to marshall bind_ack packet. (%s)\n",
nt_errstr(status)));
}
if (auth_resp.length) {
status = dcerpc_push_dcerpc_auth(pkt,
auth_type,
auth_info.auth_level,
0,
1, /* auth_context_id */
&auth_resp,
&auth_blob);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(0, ("Marshalling of dcerpc_auth failed.\n"));
goto err_exit;
}
}
/* Now that we have the auth len store it into the right place in
* the dcerpc header */
dcerpc_set_frag_length(&p->out_data.frag,
p->out_data.frag.length + auth_blob.length);
if (auth_blob.length) {
Fix bug #7146 - Samba miss-parses authenticated RPC packets. Parts of the Samba RPC client and server code misinterpret authenticated packets. DCE authenticated packets actually look like this : +--------------------------+ |header | | ... frag_len (packet len)| | ... auth_len | +--------------------------+ | | | Data payload | ... .... | | +--------------------------+ | | | auth_pad_len bytes | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth footer | | auth_pad_len value | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth payload | | (auth_len bytes long) | +--------------------------+ That's right. The pad bytes come *before* the footer specifying how many pad bytes there are. In order to read this you must seek to the end of the packet and subtract the auth_len (in the packet header) and the auth footer length (a known value). The client and server code gets this right (mostly) in 3.0.x -> 3.4.x so long as the pad alignment is on an 8 byte boundary (there are some special cases in the code for this). Tridge discovered there are some (DRS replication) cases where on 64-bit machines where the pad alignment is on a 16-byte boundary. This breaks the existing S3 hand-optimized rpc code. This patch removes all the special cases in client and server code, and allows the pad alignment for generated packets to be specified by changing a constant in include/local.h (this doesn't affect received packets, the new code always handles them correctly whatever pad alignment is used). This patch also works correctly with rpcclient using sign+seal from the 3.4.x and 3.3.x builds (testing with 3.0.x and 3.2.x to follow) so even as a server it should still work with older libsmbclient and winbindd code. Jeremy
2010-02-18 02:27:59 +03:00
if (!data_blob_append(p->mem_ctx, &p->out_data.frag,
auth_blob.data, auth_blob.length)) {
DEBUG(0, ("Append of auth info failed.\n"));
Fix bug #7146 - Samba miss-parses authenticated RPC packets. Parts of the Samba RPC client and server code misinterpret authenticated packets. DCE authenticated packets actually look like this : +--------------------------+ |header | | ... frag_len (packet len)| | ... auth_len | +--------------------------+ | | | Data payload | ... .... | | +--------------------------+ | | | auth_pad_len bytes | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth footer | | auth_pad_len value | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth payload | | (auth_len bytes long) | +--------------------------+ That's right. The pad bytes come *before* the footer specifying how many pad bytes there are. In order to read this you must seek to the end of the packet and subtract the auth_len (in the packet header) and the auth footer length (a known value). The client and server code gets this right (mostly) in 3.0.x -> 3.4.x so long as the pad alignment is on an 8 byte boundary (there are some special cases in the code for this). Tridge discovered there are some (DRS replication) cases where on 64-bit machines where the pad alignment is on a 16-byte boundary. This breaks the existing S3 hand-optimized rpc code. This patch removes all the special cases in client and server code, and allows the pad alignment for generated packets to be specified by changing a constant in include/local.h (this doesn't affect received packets, the new code always handles them correctly whatever pad alignment is used). This patch also works correctly with rpcclient using sign+seal from the 3.4.x and 3.3.x builds (testing with 3.0.x and 3.2.x to follow) so even as a server it should still work with older libsmbclient and winbindd code. Jeremy
2010-02-18 02:27:59 +03:00
goto err_exit;
}
}
/*
* Setup the lengths for the initial reply.
*/
p->out_data.data_sent_length = 0;
p->out_data.current_pdu_sent = 0;
TALLOC_FREE(auth_blob.data);
return True;
err_exit:
data_blob_free(&p->out_data.frag);
TALLOC_FREE(auth_blob.data);
return setup_bind_nak(p, pkt);
}
/****************************************************************************
Deal with an alter context call. Can be third part of 3 leg auth request for
SPNEGO calls.
****************************************************************************/
bool api_pipe_alter_context(pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
{
struct dcerpc_auth auth_info;
uint16 assoc_gid;
2010-07-08 09:14:16 +04:00
NTSTATUS status;
union dcerpc_payload u;
struct dcerpc_ack_ctx bind_ack_ctx;
DATA_BLOB auth_resp = data_blob_null;
DATA_BLOB auth_blob = data_blob_null;
int pad_len = 0;
DEBUG(5,("api_pipe_alter_context: make response. %d\n", __LINE__));
if (pkt->u.bind.assoc_group_id != 0) {
assoc_gid = pkt->u.bind.assoc_group_id;
2010-07-08 09:14:16 +04:00
} else {
assoc_gid = 0x53f0;
}
/*
* Create the bind response struct.
*/
/* If the requested abstract synt uuid doesn't match our client pipe,
reject the bind_ack & set the transfer interface synt to all 0's,
ver 0 (observed when NT5 attempts to bind to abstract interfaces
unknown to NT4)
Needed when adding entries to a DACL from NT5 - SK */
if (check_bind_req(p,
&pkt->u.bind.ctx_list[0].abstract_syntax,
&pkt->u.bind.ctx_list[0].transfer_syntaxes[0],
pkt->u.bind.ctx_list[0].context_id)) {
bind_ack_ctx.result = 0;
bind_ack_ctx.reason = 0;
bind_ack_ctx.syntax = pkt->u.bind.ctx_list[0].transfer_syntaxes[0];
} else {
p->pipe_bound = False;
/* Rejection reason: abstract syntax not supported */
bind_ack_ctx.result = DCERPC_BIND_PROVIDER_REJECT;
bind_ack_ctx.reason = DCERPC_BIND_REASON_ASYNTAX;
bind_ack_ctx.syntax = null_ndr_syntax_id;
}
Fix bug #7146 - Samba miss-parses authenticated RPC packets. Parts of the Samba RPC client and server code misinterpret authenticated packets. DCE authenticated packets actually look like this : +--------------------------+ |header | | ... frag_len (packet len)| | ... auth_len | +--------------------------+ | | | Data payload | ... .... | | +--------------------------+ | | | auth_pad_len bytes | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth footer | | auth_pad_len value | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth payload | | (auth_len bytes long) | +--------------------------+ That's right. The pad bytes come *before* the footer specifying how many pad bytes there are. In order to read this you must seek to the end of the packet and subtract the auth_len (in the packet header) and the auth footer length (a known value). The client and server code gets this right (mostly) in 3.0.x -> 3.4.x so long as the pad alignment is on an 8 byte boundary (there are some special cases in the code for this). Tridge discovered there are some (DRS replication) cases where on 64-bit machines where the pad alignment is on a 16-byte boundary. This breaks the existing S3 hand-optimized rpc code. This patch removes all the special cases in client and server code, and allows the pad alignment for generated packets to be specified by changing a constant in include/local.h (this doesn't affect received packets, the new code always handles them correctly whatever pad alignment is used). This patch also works correctly with rpcclient using sign+seal from the 3.4.x and 3.3.x builds (testing with 3.0.x and 3.2.x to follow) so even as a server it should still work with older libsmbclient and winbindd code. Jeremy
2010-02-18 02:27:59 +03:00
/*
* Check if this is an authenticated alter context request.
*/
if (pkt->auth_length) {
Fix bug #7146 - Samba miss-parses authenticated RPC packets. Parts of the Samba RPC client and server code misinterpret authenticated packets. DCE authenticated packets actually look like this : +--------------------------+ |header | | ... frag_len (packet len)| | ... auth_len | +--------------------------+ | | | Data payload | ... .... | | +--------------------------+ | | | auth_pad_len bytes | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth footer | | auth_pad_len value | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth payload | | (auth_len bytes long) | +--------------------------+ That's right. The pad bytes come *before* the footer specifying how many pad bytes there are. In order to read this you must seek to the end of the packet and subtract the auth_len (in the packet header) and the auth footer length (a known value). The client and server code gets this right (mostly) in 3.0.x -> 3.4.x so long as the pad alignment is on an 8 byte boundary (there are some special cases in the code for this). Tridge discovered there are some (DRS replication) cases where on 64-bit machines where the pad alignment is on a 16-byte boundary. This breaks the existing S3 hand-optimized rpc code. This patch removes all the special cases in client and server code, and allows the pad alignment for generated packets to be specified by changing a constant in include/local.h (this doesn't affect received packets, the new code always handles them correctly whatever pad alignment is used). This patch also works correctly with rpcclient using sign+seal from the 3.4.x and 3.3.x builds (testing with 3.0.x and 3.2.x to follow) so even as a server it should still work with older libsmbclient and winbindd code. Jeremy
2010-02-18 02:27:59 +03:00
/* Quick length check. Won't catch a bad auth footer,
* prevents overrun. */
if (pkt->frag_length < RPC_HEADER_LEN +
DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH +
pkt->auth_length) {
Fix bug #7146 - Samba miss-parses authenticated RPC packets. Parts of the Samba RPC client and server code misinterpret authenticated packets. DCE authenticated packets actually look like this : +--------------------------+ |header | | ... frag_len (packet len)| | ... auth_len | +--------------------------+ | | | Data payload | ... .... | | +--------------------------+ | | | auth_pad_len bytes | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth footer | | auth_pad_len value | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth payload | | (auth_len bytes long) | +--------------------------+ That's right. The pad bytes come *before* the footer specifying how many pad bytes there are. In order to read this you must seek to the end of the packet and subtract the auth_len (in the packet header) and the auth footer length (a known value). The client and server code gets this right (mostly) in 3.0.x -> 3.4.x so long as the pad alignment is on an 8 byte boundary (there are some special cases in the code for this). Tridge discovered there are some (DRS replication) cases where on 64-bit machines where the pad alignment is on a 16-byte boundary. This breaks the existing S3 hand-optimized rpc code. This patch removes all the special cases in client and server code, and allows the pad alignment for generated packets to be specified by changing a constant in include/local.h (this doesn't affect received packets, the new code always handles them correctly whatever pad alignment is used). This patch also works correctly with rpcclient using sign+seal from the 3.4.x and 3.3.x builds (testing with 3.0.x and 3.2.x to follow) so even as a server it should still work with older libsmbclient and winbindd code. Jeremy
2010-02-18 02:27:59 +03:00
DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_alter_context: auth_len (%u) "
"too long for fragment %u.\n",
(unsigned int)pkt->auth_length,
(unsigned int)pkt->frag_length ));
Fix bug #7146 - Samba miss-parses authenticated RPC packets. Parts of the Samba RPC client and server code misinterpret authenticated packets. DCE authenticated packets actually look like this : +--------------------------+ |header | | ... frag_len (packet len)| | ... auth_len | +--------------------------+ | | | Data payload | ... .... | | +--------------------------+ | | | auth_pad_len bytes | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth footer | | auth_pad_len value | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth payload | | (auth_len bytes long) | +--------------------------+ That's right. The pad bytes come *before* the footer specifying how many pad bytes there are. In order to read this you must seek to the end of the packet and subtract the auth_len (in the packet header) and the auth footer length (a known value). The client and server code gets this right (mostly) in 3.0.x -> 3.4.x so long as the pad alignment is on an 8 byte boundary (there are some special cases in the code for this). Tridge discovered there are some (DRS replication) cases where on 64-bit machines where the pad alignment is on a 16-byte boundary. This breaks the existing S3 hand-optimized rpc code. This patch removes all the special cases in client and server code, and allows the pad alignment for generated packets to be specified by changing a constant in include/local.h (this doesn't affect received packets, the new code always handles them correctly whatever pad alignment is used). This patch also works correctly with rpcclient using sign+seal from the 3.4.x and 3.3.x builds (testing with 3.0.x and 3.2.x to follow) so even as a server it should still work with older libsmbclient and winbindd code. Jeremy
2010-02-18 02:27:59 +03:00
goto err_exit;
}
status = dcerpc_pull_dcerpc_auth(pkt,
&pkt->u.bind.auth_info,
&auth_info, p->endian);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(0, ("Unable to unmarshall dcerpc_auth.\n"));
Fix bug #7146 - Samba miss-parses authenticated RPC packets. Parts of the Samba RPC client and server code misinterpret authenticated packets. DCE authenticated packets actually look like this : +--------------------------+ |header | | ... frag_len (packet len)| | ... auth_len | +--------------------------+ | | | Data payload | ... .... | | +--------------------------+ | | | auth_pad_len bytes | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth footer | | auth_pad_len value | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth payload | | (auth_len bytes long) | +--------------------------+ That's right. The pad bytes come *before* the footer specifying how many pad bytes there are. In order to read this you must seek to the end of the packet and subtract the auth_len (in the packet header) and the auth footer length (a known value). The client and server code gets this right (mostly) in 3.0.x -> 3.4.x so long as the pad alignment is on an 8 byte boundary (there are some special cases in the code for this). Tridge discovered there are some (DRS replication) cases where on 64-bit machines where the pad alignment is on a 16-byte boundary. This breaks the existing S3 hand-optimized rpc code. This patch removes all the special cases in client and server code, and allows the pad alignment for generated packets to be specified by changing a constant in include/local.h (this doesn't affect received packets, the new code always handles them correctly whatever pad alignment is used). This patch also works correctly with rpcclient using sign+seal from the 3.4.x and 3.3.x builds (testing with 3.0.x and 3.2.x to follow) so even as a server it should still work with older libsmbclient and winbindd code. Jeremy
2010-02-18 02:27:59 +03:00
goto err_exit;
}
/*
* Currently only the SPNEGO auth type uses the alter ctx
* response in place of the NTLMSSP auth3 type.
*/
if (auth_info.auth_type == DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO) {
/* We can only finish if the pipe is unbound. */
if (!p->pipe_bound) {
if (!pipe_spnego_auth_bind_continue(p, pkt,
&auth_info, &auth_resp)) {
Fix bug #7146 - Samba miss-parses authenticated RPC packets. Parts of the Samba RPC client and server code misinterpret authenticated packets. DCE authenticated packets actually look like this : +--------------------------+ |header | | ... frag_len (packet len)| | ... auth_len | +--------------------------+ | | | Data payload | ... .... | | +--------------------------+ | | | auth_pad_len bytes | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth footer | | auth_pad_len value | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth payload | | (auth_len bytes long) | +--------------------------+ That's right. The pad bytes come *before* the footer specifying how many pad bytes there are. In order to read this you must seek to the end of the packet and subtract the auth_len (in the packet header) and the auth footer length (a known value). The client and server code gets this right (mostly) in 3.0.x -> 3.4.x so long as the pad alignment is on an 8 byte boundary (there are some special cases in the code for this). Tridge discovered there are some (DRS replication) cases where on 64-bit machines where the pad alignment is on a 16-byte boundary. This breaks the existing S3 hand-optimized rpc code. This patch removes all the special cases in client and server code, and allows the pad alignment for generated packets to be specified by changing a constant in include/local.h (this doesn't affect received packets, the new code always handles them correctly whatever pad alignment is used). This patch also works correctly with rpcclient using sign+seal from the 3.4.x and 3.3.x builds (testing with 3.0.x and 3.2.x to follow) so even as a server it should still work with older libsmbclient and winbindd code. Jeremy
2010-02-18 02:27:59 +03:00
goto err_exit;
}
Fix bug #7146 - Samba miss-parses authenticated RPC packets. Parts of the Samba RPC client and server code misinterpret authenticated packets. DCE authenticated packets actually look like this : +--------------------------+ |header | | ... frag_len (packet len)| | ... auth_len | +--------------------------+ | | | Data payload | ... .... | | +--------------------------+ | | | auth_pad_len bytes | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth footer | | auth_pad_len value | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth payload | | (auth_len bytes long) | +--------------------------+ That's right. The pad bytes come *before* the footer specifying how many pad bytes there are. In order to read this you must seek to the end of the packet and subtract the auth_len (in the packet header) and the auth footer length (a known value). The client and server code gets this right (mostly) in 3.0.x -> 3.4.x so long as the pad alignment is on an 8 byte boundary (there are some special cases in the code for this). Tridge discovered there are some (DRS replication) cases where on 64-bit machines where the pad alignment is on a 16-byte boundary. This breaks the existing S3 hand-optimized rpc code. This patch removes all the special cases in client and server code, and allows the pad alignment for generated packets to be specified by changing a constant in include/local.h (this doesn't affect received packets, the new code always handles them correctly whatever pad alignment is used). This patch also works correctly with rpcclient using sign+seal from the 3.4.x and 3.3.x builds (testing with 3.0.x and 3.2.x to follow) so even as a server it should still work with older libsmbclient and winbindd code. Jeremy
2010-02-18 02:27:59 +03:00
} else {
goto err_exit;
}
}
}
ZERO_STRUCT(u.alter_resp);
u.alter_resp.max_xmit_frag = RPC_MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN;
u.alter_resp.max_recv_frag = RPC_MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN;
u.alter_resp.assoc_group_id = assoc_gid;
/* secondary address CAN be NULL
* as the specs say it's ignored.
* It MUST be NULL to have the spoolss working.
*/
u.alter_resp.secondary_address = "";
u.alter_resp.secondary_address_size = 1;
u.alter_resp.num_results = 1;
u.alter_resp.ctx_list = &bind_ack_ctx;
/* NOTE: We leave the auth_info empty so we can calculate the padding
* later and then append the auth_info --simo */
/*
* Marshall directly into the outgoing PDU space. We
* must do this as we need to set to the bind response
* header and are never sending more than one PDU here.
*/
status = dcerpc_push_ncacn_packet(p->mem_ctx,
DCERPC_PKT_ALTER_RESP,
DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_FIRST |
DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST,
auth_resp.length,
pkt->call_id,
&u,
&p->out_data.frag);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(0, ("Failed to marshall bind_ack packet. (%s)\n",
nt_errstr(status)));
Fix bug #7146 - Samba miss-parses authenticated RPC packets. Parts of the Samba RPC client and server code misinterpret authenticated packets. DCE authenticated packets actually look like this : +--------------------------+ |header | | ... frag_len (packet len)| | ... auth_len | +--------------------------+ | | | Data payload | ... .... | | +--------------------------+ | | | auth_pad_len bytes | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth footer | | auth_pad_len value | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth payload | | (auth_len bytes long) | +--------------------------+ That's right. The pad bytes come *before* the footer specifying how many pad bytes there are. In order to read this you must seek to the end of the packet and subtract the auth_len (in the packet header) and the auth footer length (a known value). The client and server code gets this right (mostly) in 3.0.x -> 3.4.x so long as the pad alignment is on an 8 byte boundary (there are some special cases in the code for this). Tridge discovered there are some (DRS replication) cases where on 64-bit machines where the pad alignment is on a 16-byte boundary. This breaks the existing S3 hand-optimized rpc code. This patch removes all the special cases in client and server code, and allows the pad alignment for generated packets to be specified by changing a constant in include/local.h (this doesn't affect received packets, the new code always handles them correctly whatever pad alignment is used). This patch also works correctly with rpcclient using sign+seal from the 3.4.x and 3.3.x builds (testing with 3.0.x and 3.2.x to follow) so even as a server it should still work with older libsmbclient and winbindd code. Jeremy
2010-02-18 02:27:59 +03:00
}
if (auth_resp.length) {
/* Work out any padding needed before the auth footer. */
pad_len = p->out_data.frag.length % SERVER_NDR_PADDING_SIZE;
if (pad_len) {
pad_len = SERVER_NDR_PADDING_SIZE - pad_len;
DEBUG(10, ("auth pad_len = %u\n",
(unsigned int)pad_len));
}
status = dcerpc_push_dcerpc_auth(pkt,
auth_info.auth_type,
auth_info.auth_level,
pad_len,
1, /* auth_context_id */
&auth_resp,
&auth_blob);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(0, ("Marshalling of dcerpc_auth failed.\n"));
goto err_exit;
}
}
/* Now that we have the auth len store it into the right place in
* the dcerpc header */
dcerpc_set_frag_length(&p->out_data.frag,
p->out_data.frag.length +
pad_len + auth_blob.length);
if (auth_resp.length) {
if (pad_len) {
Fix bug #7146 - Samba miss-parses authenticated RPC packets. Parts of the Samba RPC client and server code misinterpret authenticated packets. DCE authenticated packets actually look like this : +--------------------------+ |header | | ... frag_len (packet len)| | ... auth_len | +--------------------------+ | | | Data payload | ... .... | | +--------------------------+ | | | auth_pad_len bytes | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth footer | | auth_pad_len value | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth payload | | (auth_len bytes long) | +--------------------------+ That's right. The pad bytes come *before* the footer specifying how many pad bytes there are. In order to read this you must seek to the end of the packet and subtract the auth_len (in the packet header) and the auth footer length (a known value). The client and server code gets this right (mostly) in 3.0.x -> 3.4.x so long as the pad alignment is on an 8 byte boundary (there are some special cases in the code for this). Tridge discovered there are some (DRS replication) cases where on 64-bit machines where the pad alignment is on a 16-byte boundary. This breaks the existing S3 hand-optimized rpc code. This patch removes all the special cases in client and server code, and allows the pad alignment for generated packets to be specified by changing a constant in include/local.h (this doesn't affect received packets, the new code always handles them correctly whatever pad alignment is used). This patch also works correctly with rpcclient using sign+seal from the 3.4.x and 3.3.x builds (testing with 3.0.x and 3.2.x to follow) so even as a server it should still work with older libsmbclient and winbindd code. Jeremy
2010-02-18 02:27:59 +03:00
char pad[SERVER_NDR_PADDING_SIZE];
memset(pad, '\0', SERVER_NDR_PADDING_SIZE);
if (!data_blob_append(p->mem_ctx,
&p->out_data.frag,
pad, pad_len)) {
DEBUG(0, ("api_pipe_bind_req: failed to add "
"%u bytes of pad data.\n",
(unsigned int)pad_len));
Fix bug #7146 - Samba miss-parses authenticated RPC packets. Parts of the Samba RPC client and server code misinterpret authenticated packets. DCE authenticated packets actually look like this : +--------------------------+ |header | | ... frag_len (packet len)| | ... auth_len | +--------------------------+ | | | Data payload | ... .... | | +--------------------------+ | | | auth_pad_len bytes | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth footer | | auth_pad_len value | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth payload | | (auth_len bytes long) | +--------------------------+ That's right. The pad bytes come *before* the footer specifying how many pad bytes there are. In order to read this you must seek to the end of the packet and subtract the auth_len (in the packet header) and the auth footer length (a known value). The client and server code gets this right (mostly) in 3.0.x -> 3.4.x so long as the pad alignment is on an 8 byte boundary (there are some special cases in the code for this). Tridge discovered there are some (DRS replication) cases where on 64-bit machines where the pad alignment is on a 16-byte boundary. This breaks the existing S3 hand-optimized rpc code. This patch removes all the special cases in client and server code, and allows the pad alignment for generated packets to be specified by changing a constant in include/local.h (this doesn't affect received packets, the new code always handles them correctly whatever pad alignment is used). This patch also works correctly with rpcclient using sign+seal from the 3.4.x and 3.3.x builds (testing with 3.0.x and 3.2.x to follow) so even as a server it should still work with older libsmbclient and winbindd code. Jeremy
2010-02-18 02:27:59 +03:00
goto err_exit;
}
}
if (!data_blob_append(p->mem_ctx, &p->out_data.frag,
auth_blob.data, auth_blob.length)) {
DEBUG(0, ("Append of auth info failed.\n"));
Fix bug #7146 - Samba miss-parses authenticated RPC packets. Parts of the Samba RPC client and server code misinterpret authenticated packets. DCE authenticated packets actually look like this : +--------------------------+ |header | | ... frag_len (packet len)| | ... auth_len | +--------------------------+ | | | Data payload | ... .... | | +--------------------------+ | | | auth_pad_len bytes | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth footer | | auth_pad_len value | +--------------------------+ | | | Auth payload | | (auth_len bytes long) | +--------------------------+ That's right. The pad bytes come *before* the footer specifying how many pad bytes there are. In order to read this you must seek to the end of the packet and subtract the auth_len (in the packet header) and the auth footer length (a known value). The client and server code gets this right (mostly) in 3.0.x -> 3.4.x so long as the pad alignment is on an 8 byte boundary (there are some special cases in the code for this). Tridge discovered there are some (DRS replication) cases where on 64-bit machines where the pad alignment is on a 16-byte boundary. This breaks the existing S3 hand-optimized rpc code. This patch removes all the special cases in client and server code, and allows the pad alignment for generated packets to be specified by changing a constant in include/local.h (this doesn't affect received packets, the new code always handles them correctly whatever pad alignment is used). This patch also works correctly with rpcclient using sign+seal from the 3.4.x and 3.3.x builds (testing with 3.0.x and 3.2.x to follow) so even as a server it should still work with older libsmbclient and winbindd code. Jeremy
2010-02-18 02:27:59 +03:00
goto err_exit;
}
}
/*
* Setup the lengths for the initial reply.
*/
p->out_data.data_sent_length = 0;
p->out_data.current_pdu_sent = 0;
TALLOC_FREE(auth_blob.data);
return True;
err_exit:
data_blob_free(&p->out_data.frag);
TALLOC_FREE(auth_blob.data);
return setup_bind_nak(p, pkt);
}
/****************************************************************************
Find the set of RPC functions associated with this context_id
****************************************************************************/
static PIPE_RPC_FNS* find_pipe_fns_by_context( PIPE_RPC_FNS *list, uint32 context_id )
{
PIPE_RPC_FNS *fns = NULL;
2009-01-06 13:32:07 +03:00
if ( !list ) {
DEBUG(0,("find_pipe_fns_by_context: ERROR! No context list for pipe!\n"));
return NULL;
}
2009-01-06 13:32:07 +03:00
for (fns=list; fns; fns=fns->next ) {
if ( fns->context_id == context_id )
return fns;
}
return NULL;
}
/****************************************************************************
Memory cleanup.
****************************************************************************/
void free_pipe_rpc_context( PIPE_RPC_FNS *list )
{
PIPE_RPC_FNS *tmp = list;
PIPE_RPC_FNS *tmp2;
2009-01-06 13:32:07 +03:00
while (tmp) {
tmp2 = tmp->next;
SAFE_FREE(tmp);
tmp = tmp2;
}
return;
}
static bool api_rpcTNP(pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
const struct api_struct *api_rpc_cmds, int n_cmds);
/****************************************************************************
Find the correct RPC function to call for this request.
If the pipe is authenticated then become the correct UNIX user
before doing the call.
****************************************************************************/
bool api_pipe_request(pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
delineation between smb and msrpc more marked. smbd now constructs pdus, and then feeds them over either a "local" function call or a "remote" function call to an msrpc service. the "remote" msrpc daemon, on the other side of a unix socket, then calls the same "local" function that smbd would, if the msrpc service were being run from inside smbd. this allows a transition from local msrpc services (inside the same smbd process) to remote (over a unix socket). removed reference to pipes_struct in msrpc services. all msrpc processing functions take rpcsrv_struct which is a structure containing state info for the msrpc functions to decode and create pdus. created become_vuser() which does everything not related to connection_struct that become_user() does. removed, as best i could, connection_struct dependencies from the nt spoolss printing code. todo: remove dcinfo from rpcsrv_struct because this stores NETLOGON-specific info on a per-connection basis, and if the connection dies then so does the info, and that's a fairly serious problem. had to put pretty much everything that is in user_struct into parse_creds.c to feed unix user info over to the msrpc daemons. why? because it's expensive to do unix password/group database lookups, and it's definitely expensive to do nt user profile lookups, not to mention pretty difficult and if you did either of these it would introduce a complication / unnecessary interdependency. so, send uid/gid/num_groups/gid_t* + SID+num_rids+domain_group_rids* + unix username + nt username + nt domain + user session key etc. this is the MINIMUM info identified so far that's actually implemented. missing bits include the called and calling netbios names etc. (basically, anything that can be loaded into standard_sub() and standard_sub_basic()...) (This used to be commit aa3c659a8dba0437c17c60055a6ed30fdfecdb6d)
1999-12-12 04:25:49 +03:00
{
bool ret = False;
bool changed_user = False;
PIPE_RPC_FNS *pipe_fns;
2009-01-06 13:32:07 +03:00
if (p->pipe_bound &&
((p->auth.auth_type == PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_NTLMSSP) ||
(p->auth.auth_type == PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO_NTLMSSP))) {
if(!become_authenticated_pipe_user(p)) {
data_blob_free(&p->out_data.rdata);
return False;
}
changed_user = True;
}
DEBUG(5, ("Requested \\PIPE\\%s\n",
get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), &p->syntax)));
2009-01-06 13:32:07 +03:00
/* get the set of RPC functions for this context */
2009-01-06 13:32:07 +03:00
pipe_fns = find_pipe_fns_by_context(p->contexts,
pkt->u.request.context_id);
2009-01-06 13:32:07 +03:00
if ( pipe_fns ) {
TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
ret = api_rpcTNP(p, pkt, pipe_fns->cmds, pipe_fns->n_cmds);
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
}
else {
DEBUG(0, ("No rpc function table associated with context "
"[%d] on pipe [%s]\n",
pkt->u.request.context_id,
get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(),
&p->syntax)));
}
if (changed_user) {
unbecome_authenticated_pipe_user();
}
return ret;
}
/*******************************************************************
Calls the underlying RPC function for a named pipe.
********************************************************************/
static bool api_rpcTNP(pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
const struct api_struct *api_rpc_cmds, int n_cmds)
{
int fn_num;
uint32_t offset1;
2009-01-06 13:32:07 +03:00
/* interpret the command */
DEBUG(4,("api_rpcTNP: %s op 0x%x - ",
get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), &p->syntax),
pkt->u.request.opnum));
if (DEBUGLEVEL >= 50) {
fstring name;
slprintf(name, sizeof(name)-1, "in_%s",
get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), &p->syntax));
dump_pdu_region(name, pkt->u.request.opnum,
&p->in_data.data, 0,
p->in_data.data.length);
}
for (fn_num = 0; fn_num < n_cmds; fn_num++) {
if (api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].opnum == pkt->u.request.opnum &&
api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].fn != NULL) {
DEBUG(3, ("api_rpcTNP: rpc command: %s\n",
api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].name));
break;
}
}
if (fn_num == n_cmds) {
/*
* For an unknown RPC just return a fault PDU but
* return True to allow RPC's on the pipe to continue
* and not put the pipe into fault state. JRA.
*/
DEBUG(4, ("unknown\n"));
setup_fault_pdu(p, NT_STATUS(DCERPC_FAULT_OP_RNG_ERROR));
return True;
}
offset1 = p->out_data.rdata.length;
DEBUG(6, ("api_rpc_cmds[%d].fn == %p\n",
fn_num, api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].fn));
/* do the actual command */
if(!api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].fn(p)) {
DEBUG(0,("api_rpcTNP: %s: %s failed.\n",
get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), &p->syntax),
api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].name));
data_blob_free(&p->out_data.rdata);
return False;
}
if (p->bad_handle_fault_state) {
DEBUG(4,("api_rpcTNP: bad handle fault return.\n"));
p->bad_handle_fault_state = False;
setup_fault_pdu(p, NT_STATUS(DCERPC_FAULT_CONTEXT_MISMATCH));
return True;
}
if (p->rng_fault_state) {
DEBUG(4, ("api_rpcTNP: rng fault return\n"));
p->rng_fault_state = False;
setup_fault_pdu(p, NT_STATUS(DCERPC_FAULT_OP_RNG_ERROR));
return True;
}
if (DEBUGLEVEL >= 50) {
fstring name;
slprintf(name, sizeof(name)-1, "out_%s",
get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), &p->syntax));
dump_pdu_region(name, pkt->u.request.opnum,
&p->out_data.rdata, offset1,
p->out_data.rdata.length);
}
DEBUG(5,("api_rpcTNP: called %s successfully\n",
get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), &p->syntax)));
/* Check for buffer underflow in rpc parsing */
if ((DEBUGLEVEL >= 10) &&
(pkt->frag_length < p->in_data.data.length)) {
DEBUG(10, ("api_rpcTNP: rpc input buffer underflow (parse error?)\n"));
dump_data(10, p->in_data.data.data + pkt->frag_length,
p->in_data.data.length - pkt->frag_length);
}
return True;
}
/****************************************************************************
Initialise an outgoing packet.
****************************************************************************/
static bool pipe_init_outgoing_data(pipes_struct *p)
{
output_data *o_data = &p->out_data;
/* Reset the offset counters. */
o_data->data_sent_length = 0;
o_data->current_pdu_sent = 0;
data_blob_free(&o_data->frag);
/* Free any memory in the current return data buffer. */
data_blob_free(&o_data->rdata);
return True;
}
/****************************************************************************
Sets the fault state on incoming packets.
****************************************************************************/
void set_incoming_fault(pipes_struct *p)
{
data_blob_free(&p->in_data.data);
p->in_data.pdu_needed_len = 0;
p->in_data.pdu.length = 0;
p->fault_state = True;
DEBUG(10, ("set_incoming_fault: Setting fault state on pipe %s\n",
get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), &p->syntax)));
}
static bool dcesrv_auth_request(pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
{
NTSTATUS status;
size_t hdr_size = DCERPC_REQUEST_LENGTH;
struct dcerpc_auth auth;
uint32_t auth_length;
DATA_BLOB data;
DATA_BLOB full_pkt;
DEBUG(10, ("Checking request auth.\n"));
if (pkt->pfc_flags & DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_OBJECT_UUID) {
hdr_size += 16;
}
switch (p->auth.auth_level) {
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY:
DEBUG(10, ("Requested Privacy.\n"));
break;
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY:
DEBUG(10, ("Requested Integrity.\n"));
break;
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT:
if (pkt->auth_length != 0) {
break;
}
return true;
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE:
if (pkt->auth_length != 0) {
return false;
}
return true;
default:
return false;
}
status = dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(pkt, pkt,
&pkt->u.request.stub_and_verifier,
&auth, &auth_length, false);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
return false;
}
pkt->u.request.stub_and_verifier.length -= auth_length;
data.data = p->in_data.pdu.data + hdr_size;
data.length = pkt->u.request.stub_and_verifier.length;
full_pkt.data = p->in_data.pdu.data;
full_pkt.length = p->in_data.pdu.length - auth.credentials.length;
switch (p->auth.auth_type) {
case PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_NONE:
return true;
case PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO_NTLMSSP:
case PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_NTLMSSP:
DEBUG(10, ("NTLMSSP auth\n"));
if (!p->auth.a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state) {
DEBUG(0, ("Invalid auth level, "
"failed to process packet auth.\n"));
return false;
}
switch (p->auth.auth_level) {
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY:
status = auth_ntlmssp_unseal_packet(
p->auth.a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state,
data.data, data.length,
full_pkt.data, full_pkt.length,
&auth.credentials);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
return false;
}
memcpy(pkt->u.request.stub_and_verifier.data,
data.data, data.length);
break;
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY:
status = auth_ntlmssp_check_packet(
p->auth.a_u.auth_ntlmssp_state,
data.data, data.length,
full_pkt.data, full_pkt.length,
&auth.credentials);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
return false;
}
break;
default:
DEBUG(0, ("Invalid auth level, "
"failed to process packet auth.\n"));
return false;
}
break;
case PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL:
DEBUG(10, ("SCHANNEL auth\n"));
switch (p->auth.auth_level) {
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY:
status = netsec_incoming_packet(
p->auth.a_u.schannel_auth,
pkt, true,
data.data, data.length,
&auth.credentials);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
return false;
}
memcpy(pkt->u.request.stub_and_verifier.data,
data.data, data.length);
break;
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY:
status = netsec_incoming_packet(
p->auth.a_u.schannel_auth,
pkt, false,
data.data, data.length,
&auth.credentials);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
return false;
}
break;
default:
DEBUG(0, ("Invalid auth level, "
"failed to process packet auth.\n"));
return false;
}
break;
default:
DEBUG(0, ("process_request_pdu: "
"unknown auth type %u set.\n",
(unsigned int)p->auth.auth_type));
set_incoming_fault(p);
return false;
}
/* remove the indicated amount of padding */
if (pkt->u.request.stub_and_verifier.length < auth.auth_pad_length) {
return false;
}
pkt->u.request.stub_and_verifier.length -= auth.auth_pad_length;
return true;
}
/****************************************************************************
Processes a request pdu. This will do auth processing if needed, and
appends the data into the complete stream if the LAST flag is not set.
****************************************************************************/
static bool process_request_pdu(pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
{
DATA_BLOB data;
if (!p->pipe_bound) {
DEBUG(0,("process_request_pdu: rpc request with no bind.\n"));
set_incoming_fault(p);
return False;
}
/* Store the opnum */
p->opnum = pkt->u.request.opnum;
if (!dcesrv_auth_request(p, pkt)) {
DEBUG(0,("Failed to check packet auth.\n"));
set_incoming_fault(p);
return false;
}
data = pkt->u.request.stub_and_verifier;
/*
* Check the data length doesn't go over the 15Mb limit.
* increased after observing a bug in the Windows NT 4.0 SP6a
* spoolsv.exe when the response to a GETPRINTERDRIVER2 RPC
* will not fit in the initial buffer of size 0x1068 --jerry 22/01/2002
*/
if (p->in_data.data.length + data.length > MAX_RPC_DATA_SIZE) {
DEBUG(0, ("process_request_pdu: "
"rpc data buffer too large (%u) + (%u)\n",
(unsigned int)p->in_data.data.length,
(unsigned int)data.length));
set_incoming_fault(p);
return False;
}
/*
* Append the data portion into the buffer and return.
*/
if (data.length) {
if (!data_blob_append(p->mem_ctx, &p->in_data.data,
data.data, data.length)) {
DEBUG(0, ("Unable to append data size %u "
"to parse buffer of size %u.\n",
(unsigned int)data.length,
(unsigned int)p->in_data.data.length));
set_incoming_fault(p);
return False;
}
}
if (pkt->pfc_flags & DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST) {
bool ret = False;
/*
* Ok - we finally have a complete RPC stream.
* Call the rpc command to process it.
*/
/*
* Process the complete data stream here.
*/
if (pipe_init_outgoing_data(p)) {
ret = api_pipe_request(p, pkt);
}
return ret;
}
return True;
}
/****************************************************************************
Processes a finished PDU stored in p->in_data.pdu.
****************************************************************************/
void process_complete_pdu(pipes_struct *p)
{
struct ncacn_packet *pkt = NULL;
NTSTATUS status;
bool reply = False;
if(p->fault_state) {
DEBUG(10,("process_complete_pdu: pipe %s in fault state.\n",
get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), &p->syntax)));
goto done;
}
pkt = talloc(p->mem_ctx, struct ncacn_packet);
if (!pkt) {
DEBUG(0, ("Out of memory!\n"));
goto done;
}
/*
* Ensure we're using the corrent endianness for both the
* RPC header flags and the raw data we will be reading from.
*/
if (dcerpc_get_endian_flag(&p->in_data.pdu) & DCERPC_DREP_LE) {
p->endian = RPC_LITTLE_ENDIAN;
} else {
p->endian = RPC_BIG_ENDIAN;
}
DEBUG(10, ("PDU is in %s Endian format!\n", p->endian?"Big":"Little"));
status = dcerpc_pull_ncacn_packet(pkt, &p->in_data.pdu,
pkt, p->endian);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(0, ("Failed to unmarshal rpc packet: %s!\n",
nt_errstr(status)));
goto done;
}
/* Store the call_id */
p->call_id = pkt->call_id;
DEBUG(10, ("Processing packet type %d\n", (int)pkt->ptype));
switch (pkt->ptype) {
case DCERPC_PKT_REQUEST:
reply = process_request_pdu(p, pkt);
break;
case DCERPC_PKT_PING: /* CL request - ignore... */
DEBUG(0, ("process_complete_pdu: Error. "
"Connectionless packet type %d received on "
"pipe %s.\n", (int)pkt->ptype,
get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(),
&p->syntax)));
break;
case DCERPC_PKT_RESPONSE: /* No responses here. */
DEBUG(0, ("process_complete_pdu: Error. "
"DCERPC_PKT_RESPONSE received from client "
"on pipe %s.\n",
get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(),
&p->syntax)));
break;
case DCERPC_PKT_FAULT:
case DCERPC_PKT_WORKING:
/* CL request - reply to a ping when a call in process. */
case DCERPC_PKT_NOCALL:
/* CL - server reply to a ping call. */
case DCERPC_PKT_REJECT:
case DCERPC_PKT_ACK:
case DCERPC_PKT_CL_CANCEL:
case DCERPC_PKT_FACK:
case DCERPC_PKT_CANCEL_ACK:
DEBUG(0, ("process_complete_pdu: Error. "
"Connectionless packet type %u received on "
"pipe %s.\n", (unsigned int)pkt->ptype,
get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(),
&p->syntax)));
break;
case DCERPC_PKT_BIND:
/*
* We assume that a pipe bind is only in one pdu.
*/
if (pipe_init_outgoing_data(p)) {
reply = api_pipe_bind_req(p, pkt);
}
break;
case DCERPC_PKT_BIND_ACK:
case DCERPC_PKT_BIND_NAK:
DEBUG(0, ("process_complete_pdu: Error. "
"DCERPC_PKT_BINDACK/DCERPC_PKT_BINDNACK "
"packet type %u received on pipe %s.\n",
(unsigned int)pkt->ptype,
get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(),
&p->syntax)));
break;
case DCERPC_PKT_ALTER:
/*
* We assume that a pipe bind is only in one pdu.
*/
if (pipe_init_outgoing_data(p)) {
reply = api_pipe_alter_context(p, pkt);
}
break;
case DCERPC_PKT_ALTER_RESP:
DEBUG(0, ("process_complete_pdu: Error. "
"DCERPC_PKT_ALTER_RESP on pipe %s: "
"Should only be server -> client.\n",
get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(),
&p->syntax)));
break;
case DCERPC_PKT_AUTH3:
/*
* The third packet in an NTLMSSP auth exchange.
*/
if (pipe_init_outgoing_data(p)) {
reply = api_pipe_bind_auth3(p, pkt);
}
break;
case DCERPC_PKT_SHUTDOWN:
DEBUG(0, ("process_complete_pdu: Error. "
"DCERPC_PKT_SHUTDOWN on pipe %s: "
"Should only be server -> client.\n",
get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(),
&p->syntax)));
break;
case DCERPC_PKT_CO_CANCEL:
/* For now just free all client data and continue
* processing. */
DEBUG(3,("process_complete_pdu: DCERPC_PKT_CO_CANCEL."
" Abandoning rpc call.\n"));
/* As we never do asynchronous RPC serving, we can
* never cancel a call (as far as I know).
* If we ever did we'd have to send a cancel_ack reply.
* For now, just free all client data and continue
* processing. */
reply = True;
break;
#if 0
/* Enable this if we're doing async rpc. */
/* We must check the outstanding callid matches. */
if (pipe_init_outgoing_data(p)) {
/* Send a cancel_ack PDU reply. */
/* We should probably check the auth-verifier here. */
reply = setup_cancel_ack_reply(p, pkt);
}
break;
#endif
case DCERPC_PKT_ORPHANED:
/* We should probably check the auth-verifier here.
* For now just free all client data and continue
* processing. */
DEBUG(3, ("process_complete_pdu: DCERPC_PKT_ORPHANED."
" Abandoning rpc call.\n"));
reply = True;
break;
default:
DEBUG(0, ("process_complete_pdu: "
"Unknown rpc type = %u received.\n",
(unsigned int)pkt->ptype));
break;
}
done:
if (!reply) {
DEBUG(3,("process_complete_pdu: DCE/RPC fault sent on "
"pipe %s\n", get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(),
&p->syntax)));
set_incoming_fault(p);
setup_fault_pdu(p, NT_STATUS(DCERPC_FAULT_OP_RNG_ERROR));
TALLOC_FREE(pkt);
} else {
/*
* Reset the lengths. We're ready for a new pdu.
*/
TALLOC_FREE(p->in_data.pdu.data);
p->in_data.pdu_needed_len = 0;
p->in_data.pdu.length = 0;
}
TALLOC_FREE(pkt);
}