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samba-mirror/source3/libsmb/smbencrypt.c

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/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
SMB parameters and setup
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1998
Modified by Jeremy Allison 1995.
Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 1995-2000.
Copyright (C) Luke Kennethc Casson Leighton 1996-2000.
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2002-2003
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "includes.h"
2008-10-12 16:17:21 +02:00
#include "../lib/util/byteorder.h"
void SMBencrypt_hash(const uchar lm_hash[16], const uchar *c8, uchar p24[24])
{
uchar p21[21];
memset(p21,'\0',21);
memcpy(p21, lm_hash, 16);
SMBOWFencrypt(p21, c8, p24);
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(100,("SMBencrypt_hash: lm#, challenge, response\n"));
dump_data(100, p21, 16);
dump_data(100, c8, 8);
dump_data(100, p24, 24);
#endif
}
/*
This implements the X/Open SMB password encryption
It takes a password ('unix' string), a 8 byte "crypt key"
and puts 24 bytes of encrypted password into p24
Returns False if password must have been truncated to create LM hash
*/
bool SMBencrypt(const char *passwd, const uchar *c8, uchar p24[24])
{
bool ret;
uchar lm_hash[16];
ret = E_deshash(passwd, lm_hash);
SMBencrypt_hash(lm_hash, c8, p24);
return ret;
}
/**
* Creates the MD4 Hash of the users password in NT UNICODE.
* @param passwd password in 'unix' charset.
* @param p16 return password hashed with md4, caller allocated 16 byte buffer
*/
void E_md4hash(const char *passwd, uchar p16[16])
{
int len;
smb_ucs2_t wpwd[129];
/* Password must be converted to NT unicode - null terminated. */
push_ucs2(NULL, wpwd, (const char *)passwd, 256, STR_UNICODE|STR_NOALIGN|STR_TERMINATE);
/* Calculate length in bytes */
len = strlen_w(wpwd) * sizeof(int16);
mdfour(p16, (unsigned char *)wpwd, len);
ZERO_STRUCT(wpwd);
}
/**
* Creates the MD5 Hash of a combination of 16 byte salt and 16 byte NT hash.
* @param 16 byte salt.
* @param 16 byte NT hash.
* @param 16 byte return hashed with md5, caller allocated 16 byte buffer
*/
void E_md5hash(const uchar salt[16], const uchar nthash[16], uchar hash_out[16])
{
struct MD5Context tctx;
uchar array[32];
memset(hash_out, '\0', 16);
memcpy(array, salt, 16);
memcpy(&array[16], nthash, 16);
MD5Init(&tctx);
MD5Update(&tctx, array, 32);
MD5Final(hash_out, &tctx);
}
/**
* Creates the DES forward-only Hash of the users password in DOS ASCII charset
* @param passwd password in 'unix' charset.
* @param p16 return password hashed with DES, caller allocated 16 byte buffer
* @return False if password was > 14 characters, and therefore may be incorrect, otherwise True
* @note p16 is filled in regardless
*/
bool E_deshash(const char *passwd, uchar p16[16])
{
bool ret = True;
fstring dospwd;
ZERO_STRUCT(dospwd);
/* Password must be converted to DOS charset - null terminated, uppercase. */
push_ascii(dospwd, passwd, sizeof(dospwd), STR_UPPER|STR_TERMINATE);
/* Only the fisrt 14 chars are considered, password need not be null terminated. */
E_P16((const unsigned char *)dospwd, p16);
if (strlen(dospwd) > 14) {
ret = False;
}
ZERO_STRUCT(dospwd);
return ret;
}
/**
* Creates the MD4 and DES (LM) Hash of the users password.
* MD4 is of the NT Unicode, DES is of the DOS UPPERCASE password.
* @param passwd password in 'unix' charset.
* @param nt_p16 return password hashed with md4, caller allocated 16 byte buffer
* @param p16 return password hashed with des, caller allocated 16 byte buffer
*/
/* Does both the NT and LM owfs of a user's password */
void nt_lm_owf_gen(const char *pwd, uchar nt_p16[16], uchar p16[16])
{
/* Calculate the MD4 hash (NT compatible) of the password */
memset(nt_p16, '\0', 16);
E_md4hash(pwd, nt_p16);
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(100,("nt_lm_owf_gen: pwd, nt#\n"));
dump_data(120, (uint8 *)pwd, strlen(pwd));
dump_data(100, nt_p16, 16);
#endif
E_deshash(pwd, (uchar *)p16);
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(100,("nt_lm_owf_gen: pwd, lm#\n"));
dump_data(120, (uint8 *)pwd, strlen(pwd));
dump_data(100, p16, 16);
#endif
}
/* Does both the NTLMv2 owfs of a user's password */
bool ntv2_owf_gen(const uchar owf[16],
const char *user_in, const char *domain_in,
bool upper_case_domain, /* Transform the domain into UPPER case */
uchar kr_buf[16])
{
smb_ucs2_t *user;
smb_ucs2_t *domain;
size_t user_byte_len;
size_t domain_byte_len;
HMACMD5Context ctx;
if (!push_ucs2_allocate(&user, user_in, &user_byte_len)) {
DEBUG(0, ("push_uss2_allocate() for user failed: %s\n",
strerror(errno)));
return False;
}
if (!push_ucs2_allocate(&domain, domain_in, &domain_byte_len)) {
DEBUG(0, ("push_uss2_allocate() for domain failed: %s\n",
strerror(errno)));
SAFE_FREE(user);
return False;
}
strupper_w(user);
if (upper_case_domain)
strupper_w(domain);
SMB_ASSERT(user_byte_len >= 2);
SMB_ASSERT(domain_byte_len >= 2);
/* We don't want null termination */
user_byte_len = user_byte_len - 2;
domain_byte_len = domain_byte_len - 2;
hmac_md5_init_limK_to_64(owf, 16, &ctx);
hmac_md5_update((const unsigned char *)user, user_byte_len, &ctx);
hmac_md5_update((const unsigned char *)domain, domain_byte_len, &ctx);
hmac_md5_final(kr_buf, &ctx);
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(100, ("ntv2_owf_gen: user, domain, owfkey, kr\n"));
dump_data(100, (uint8 *)user, user_byte_len);
dump_data(100, (uint8 *)domain, domain_byte_len);
dump_data(100, (uint8 *)owf, 16);
dump_data(100, (uint8 *)kr_buf, 16);
#endif
SAFE_FREE(user);
SAFE_FREE(domain);
return True;
}
/* Does the des encryption from the NT or LM MD4 hash. */
void SMBOWFencrypt(const uchar passwd[16], const uchar *c8, uchar p24[24])
{
uchar p21[21];
ZERO_STRUCT(p21);
memcpy(p21, passwd, 16);
E_P24(p21, c8, p24);
}
/* Does the des encryption from the FIRST 8 BYTES of the NT or LM MD4 hash. */
void NTLMSSPOWFencrypt(const uchar passwd[8], const uchar *ntlmchalresp, uchar p24[24])
{
uchar p21[21];
memset(p21,'\0',21);
memcpy(p21, passwd, 8);
memset(p21 + 8, 0xbd, 8);
E_P24(p21, ntlmchalresp, p24);
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(100,("NTLMSSPOWFencrypt: p21, c8, p24\n"));
dump_data(100, p21, 21);
dump_data(100, ntlmchalresp, 8);
dump_data(100, p24, 24);
#endif
}
/* Does the des encryption. */
void SMBNTencrypt_hash(const uchar nt_hash[16], uchar *c8, uchar *p24)
{
uchar p21[21];
memset(p21,'\0',21);
memcpy(p21, nt_hash, 16);
SMBOWFencrypt(p21, c8, p24);
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(100,("SMBNTencrypt: nt#, challenge, response\n"));
dump_data(100, p21, 16);
dump_data(100, c8, 8);
dump_data(100, p24, 24);
#endif
}
/* Does the NT MD4 hash then des encryption. Plaintext version of the above. */
void SMBNTencrypt(const char *passwd, uchar *c8, uchar *p24)
{
uchar nt_hash[16];
E_md4hash(passwd, nt_hash);
SMBNTencrypt_hash(nt_hash, c8, p24);
}
/* Does the md5 encryption from the Key Response for NTLMv2. */
void SMBOWFencrypt_ntv2(const uchar kr[16],
const DATA_BLOB *srv_chal,
const DATA_BLOB *cli_chal,
uchar resp_buf[16])
{
HMACMD5Context ctx;
hmac_md5_init_limK_to_64(kr, 16, &ctx);
hmac_md5_update(srv_chal->data, srv_chal->length, &ctx);
hmac_md5_update(cli_chal->data, cli_chal->length, &ctx);
hmac_md5_final(resp_buf, &ctx);
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(100, ("SMBOWFencrypt_ntv2: srv_chal, cli_chal, resp_buf\n"));
dump_data(100, srv_chal->data, srv_chal->length);
dump_data(100, cli_chal->data, cli_chal->length);
dump_data(100, resp_buf, 16);
#endif
}
void SMBsesskeygen_ntv2(const uchar kr[16],
const uchar * nt_resp, uint8 sess_key[16])
{
Jeremy requested that I get my NTLMSSP patch into CVS. He didn't request the schannel code, but I've included that anyway. :-) This patch revives the client-side NTLMSSP support for RPC named pipes in Samba, and cleans up the client and server schannel code. The use of the new code is enabled by the 'sign', 'seal' and 'schannel' commands in rpcclient. The aim was to prove that our separate NTLMSSP client library actually implements NTLMSSP signing and sealing as per Microsoft's NTLMv1 implementation, in the hope that knowing this will assist us in correctly implementing NTLMSSP signing for SMB packets. (Still not yet functional) This patch replaces the NTLMSSP implementation in rpc_client/cli_pipe.c with calls to libsmb/ntlmssp.c. In the process, we have gained the ability to use the more secure NT password, and the ability to sign-only, instead of having to seal the pipe connection. (Previously we were limited to sealing, and could only use the LM-password derived key). Our new client-side NTLMSSP code also needed alteration to cope with our comparatively simple server-side implementation. A future step is to replace it with calls to the same NTLMSSP library. Also included in this patch is the schannel 'sign only' patch I submitted to the team earlier. While not enabled (and not functional, at this stage) the work in this patch makes the code paths *much* easier to follow. I have also included similar hooks in rpccleint to allow the use of schannel on *any* pipe. rpcclient now defaults to not using schannel (or any other extra per-pipe authenticiation) for any connection. The 'schannel' command enables schannel for all pipes until disabled. This code is also much more secure than the previous code, as changes to our cli_pipe routines ensure that the authentication footer cannot be removed by an attacker, and more error states are correctly handled. (The same needs to be done to our server) Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 5472ddc9eaf4e79c5b2e1c8ee8c7f190dc285f19)
2003-07-14 08:46:32 +00:00
/* a very nice, 128 bit, variable session key */
HMACMD5Context ctx;
hmac_md5_init_limK_to_64(kr, 16, &ctx);
hmac_md5_update(nt_resp, 16, &ctx);
hmac_md5_final((unsigned char *)sess_key, &ctx);
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(100, ("SMBsesskeygen_ntv2:\n"));
dump_data(100, sess_key, 16);
#endif
}
void SMBsesskeygen_ntv1(const uchar kr[16],
const uchar * nt_resp, uint8 sess_key[16])
{
Jeremy requested that I get my NTLMSSP patch into CVS. He didn't request the schannel code, but I've included that anyway. :-) This patch revives the client-side NTLMSSP support for RPC named pipes in Samba, and cleans up the client and server schannel code. The use of the new code is enabled by the 'sign', 'seal' and 'schannel' commands in rpcclient. The aim was to prove that our separate NTLMSSP client library actually implements NTLMSSP signing and sealing as per Microsoft's NTLMv1 implementation, in the hope that knowing this will assist us in correctly implementing NTLMSSP signing for SMB packets. (Still not yet functional) This patch replaces the NTLMSSP implementation in rpc_client/cli_pipe.c with calls to libsmb/ntlmssp.c. In the process, we have gained the ability to use the more secure NT password, and the ability to sign-only, instead of having to seal the pipe connection. (Previously we were limited to sealing, and could only use the LM-password derived key). Our new client-side NTLMSSP code also needed alteration to cope with our comparatively simple server-side implementation. A future step is to replace it with calls to the same NTLMSSP library. Also included in this patch is the schannel 'sign only' patch I submitted to the team earlier. While not enabled (and not functional, at this stage) the work in this patch makes the code paths *much* easier to follow. I have also included similar hooks in rpccleint to allow the use of schannel on *any* pipe. rpcclient now defaults to not using schannel (or any other extra per-pipe authenticiation) for any connection. The 'schannel' command enables schannel for all pipes until disabled. This code is also much more secure than the previous code, as changes to our cli_pipe routines ensure that the authentication footer cannot be removed by an attacker, and more error states are correctly handled. (The same needs to be done to our server) Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 5472ddc9eaf4e79c5b2e1c8ee8c7f190dc285f19)
2003-07-14 08:46:32 +00:00
/* yes, this session key does not change - yes, this
is a problem - but it is 128 bits */
mdfour((unsigned char *)sess_key, kr, 16);
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(100, ("SMBsesskeygen_ntv1:\n"));
dump_data(100, sess_key, 16);
#endif
}
void SMBsesskeygen_lm_sess_key(const uchar lm_hash[16],
const uchar lm_resp[24], /* only uses 8 */
uint8 sess_key[16])
{
uchar p24[24];
uchar partial_lm_hash[16];
memcpy(partial_lm_hash, lm_hash, 8);
memset(partial_lm_hash + 8, 0xbd, 8);
SMBOWFencrypt(partial_lm_hash, lm_resp, p24);
memcpy(sess_key, p24, 16);
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(100, ("SMBsesskeygen_lmv1_jerry:\n"));
dump_data(100, sess_key, 16);
#endif
}
DATA_BLOB NTLMv2_generate_names_blob(const char *hostname,
const char *domain)
{
DATA_BLOB names_blob = data_blob_null;
msrpc_gen(&names_blob, "aaa",
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 13:19:38 +00:00
NTLMSSP_NAME_TYPE_DOMAIN, domain,
NTLMSSP_NAME_TYPE_SERVER, hostname,
0, "");
return names_blob;
}
static DATA_BLOB NTLMv2_generate_client_data(const DATA_BLOB *names_blob)
{
uchar client_chal[8];
DATA_BLOB response = data_blob_null;
char long_date[8];
generate_random_buffer(client_chal, sizeof(client_chal));
put_long_date(long_date, time(NULL));
/* See http://www.ubiqx.org/cifs/SMB.html#SMB.8.5 */
msrpc_gen(&response, "ddbbdb",
0x00000101, /* Header */
0, /* 'Reserved' */
long_date, 8, /* Timestamp */
client_chal, 8, /* client challenge */
0, /* Unknown */
names_blob->data, names_blob->length); /* End of name list */
return response;
}
static DATA_BLOB NTLMv2_generate_response(const uchar ntlm_v2_hash[16],
const DATA_BLOB *server_chal,
const DATA_BLOB *names_blob)
{
uchar ntlmv2_response[16];
DATA_BLOB ntlmv2_client_data;
DATA_BLOB final_response;
/* NTLMv2 */
/* generate some data to pass into the response function - including
the hostname and domain name of the server */
ntlmv2_client_data = NTLMv2_generate_client_data(names_blob);
/* Given that data, and the challenge from the server, generate a response */
SMBOWFencrypt_ntv2(ntlm_v2_hash, server_chal, &ntlmv2_client_data, ntlmv2_response);
final_response = data_blob(NULL, sizeof(ntlmv2_response) + ntlmv2_client_data.length);
memcpy(final_response.data, ntlmv2_response, sizeof(ntlmv2_response));
memcpy(final_response.data+sizeof(ntlmv2_response),
ntlmv2_client_data.data, ntlmv2_client_data.length);
data_blob_free(&ntlmv2_client_data);
return final_response;
}
static DATA_BLOB LMv2_generate_response(const uchar ntlm_v2_hash[16],
const DATA_BLOB *server_chal)
{
uchar lmv2_response[16];
DATA_BLOB lmv2_client_data = data_blob(NULL, 8);
DATA_BLOB final_response = data_blob(NULL, 24);
/* LMv2 */
/* client-supplied random data */
generate_random_buffer(lmv2_client_data.data, lmv2_client_data.length);
/* Given that data, and the challenge from the server, generate a response */
SMBOWFencrypt_ntv2(ntlm_v2_hash, server_chal, &lmv2_client_data, lmv2_response);
memcpy(final_response.data, lmv2_response, sizeof(lmv2_response));
/* after the first 16 bytes is the random data we generated above,
so the server can verify us with it */
memcpy(final_response.data+sizeof(lmv2_response),
lmv2_client_data.data, lmv2_client_data.length);
data_blob_free(&lmv2_client_data);
return final_response;
}
bool SMBNTLMv2encrypt_hash(const char *user, const char *domain, const uchar nt_hash[16],
const DATA_BLOB *server_chal,
const DATA_BLOB *names_blob,
DATA_BLOB *lm_response, DATA_BLOB *nt_response,
DATA_BLOB *user_session_key)
{
uchar ntlm_v2_hash[16];
/* We don't use the NT# directly. Instead we use it mashed up with
the username and domain.
This prevents username swapping during the auth exchange
*/
if (!ntv2_owf_gen(nt_hash, user, domain, False, ntlm_v2_hash)) {
return False;
}
if (nt_response) {
*nt_response = NTLMv2_generate_response(ntlm_v2_hash, server_chal,
names_blob);
if (user_session_key) {
*user_session_key = data_blob(NULL, 16);
/* The NTLMv2 calculations also provide a session key, for signing etc later */
/* use only the first 16 bytes of nt_response for session key */
SMBsesskeygen_ntv2(ntlm_v2_hash, nt_response->data, user_session_key->data);
}
}
/* LMv2 */
if (lm_response) {
*lm_response = LMv2_generate_response(ntlm_v2_hash, server_chal);
}
return True;
}
/* Plaintext version of the above. */
bool SMBNTLMv2encrypt(const char *user, const char *domain, const char *password,
const DATA_BLOB *server_chal,
const DATA_BLOB *names_blob,
DATA_BLOB *lm_response, DATA_BLOB *nt_response,
DATA_BLOB *user_session_key)
{
uchar nt_hash[16];
E_md4hash(password, nt_hash);
return SMBNTLMv2encrypt_hash(user, domain, nt_hash,
server_chal,
names_blob,
lm_response, nt_response,
user_session_key);
}
/***********************************************************
encode a password buffer with a unicode password. The buffer
is filled with random data to make it harder to attack.
************************************************************/
bool encode_pw_buffer(uint8 buffer[516], const char *password, int string_flags)
{
uchar new_pw[512];
size_t new_pw_len;
/* the incoming buffer can be any alignment. */
string_flags |= STR_NOALIGN;
new_pw_len = push_string(NULL, new_pw,
password,
sizeof(new_pw), string_flags);
memcpy(&buffer[512 - new_pw_len], new_pw, new_pw_len);
generate_random_buffer(buffer, 512 - new_pw_len);
/*
* The length of the new password is in the last 4 bytes of
* the data buffer.
*/
SIVAL(buffer, 512, new_pw_len);
ZERO_STRUCT(new_pw);
return True;
}
/***********************************************************
decode a password buffer
*new_pw_len is the length in bytes of the possibly mulitbyte
returned password including termination.
************************************************************/
bool decode_pw_buffer(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
uint8 in_buffer[516],
char **pp_new_pwrd,
uint32 *new_pw_len,
int string_flags)
{
int byte_len=0;
*pp_new_pwrd = NULL;
*new_pw_len = 0;
/* the incoming buffer can be any alignment. */
string_flags |= STR_NOALIGN;
/*
Warning !!! : This function is called from some rpc call.
The password IN the buffer may be a UNICODE string.
The password IN new_pwrd is an ASCII string
If you reuse that code somewhere else check first.
*/
/* The length of the new password is in the last 4 bytes of the data buffer. */
byte_len = IVAL(in_buffer, 512);
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
dump_data(100, in_buffer, 516);
#endif
/* Password cannot be longer than the size of the password buffer */
if ( (byte_len < 0) || (byte_len > 512)) {
DEBUG(0, ("decode_pw_buffer: incorrect password length (%d).\n", byte_len));
DEBUG(0, ("decode_pw_buffer: check that 'encrypt passwords = yes'\n"));
return false;
}
/* decode into the return buffer. */
*new_pw_len = pull_string_talloc(ctx,
NULL,
0,
pp_new_pwrd,
&in_buffer[512 - byte_len],
byte_len,
string_flags);
if (!*pp_new_pwrd || *new_pw_len == 0) {
DEBUG(0, ("decode_pw_buffer: pull_string_talloc failed\n"));
return false;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(100,("decode_pw_buffer: new_pwrd: "));
dump_data(100, (uint8 *)*pp_new_pwrd, *new_pw_len);
DEBUG(100,("multibyte len:%d\n", *new_pw_len));
DEBUG(100,("original char len:%d\n", byte_len/2));
#endif
return true;
}
/***********************************************************
Decode an arc4 encrypted password change buffer.
************************************************************/
void encode_or_decode_arc4_passwd_buffer(unsigned char pw_buf[532], const DATA_BLOB *psession_key)
{
struct MD5Context tctx;
unsigned char key_out[16];
/* Confounder is last 16 bytes. */
MD5Init(&tctx);
MD5Update(&tctx, &pw_buf[516], 16);
MD5Update(&tctx, psession_key->data, psession_key->length);
MD5Final(key_out, &tctx);
/* arc4 with key_out. */
SamOEMhash(pw_buf, key_out, 516);
}
/***********************************************************
Encrypt/Decrypt used for LSA secrets and trusted domain
passwords.
************************************************************/
void sess_crypt_blob(DATA_BLOB *out, const DATA_BLOB *in, const DATA_BLOB *session_key, int forward)
{
int i, k;
for (i=0,k=0;
i<in->length;
i += 8, k += 7) {
uint8 bin[8], bout[8], key[7];
memset(bin, 0, 8);
memcpy(bin, &in->data[i], MIN(8, in->length-i));
if (k + 7 > session_key->length) {
k = (session_key->length - k);
}
memcpy(key, &session_key->data[k], 7);
des_crypt56(bout, bin, key, forward?1:0);
memcpy(&out->data[i], bout, MIN(8, in->length-i));
}
}
/* Decrypts password-blob with session-key
* @param nt_hash NT hash for the session key
* @param data_in DATA_BLOB encrypted password
*
* Returns cleartext password in CH_UNIX
* Caller must free the returned string
*/
char *decrypt_trustdom_secret(uint8_t nt_hash[16], DATA_BLOB *data_in)
{
DATA_BLOB data_out, sess_key;
uint32_t length;
uint32_t version;
fstring cleartextpwd;
if (!data_in || !nt_hash)
return NULL;
/* hashed twice with md4 */
mdfour(nt_hash, nt_hash, 16);
/* 16-Byte session-key */
sess_key = data_blob(nt_hash, 16);
if (sess_key.data == NULL)
return NULL;
data_out = data_blob(NULL, data_in->length);
if (data_out.data == NULL)
return NULL;
/* decrypt with des3 */
sess_crypt_blob(&data_out, data_in, &sess_key, 0);
/* 4 Byte length, 4 Byte version */
length = IVAL(data_out.data, 0);
version = IVAL(data_out.data, 4);
if (length > data_in->length - 8) {
DEBUG(0,("decrypt_trustdom_secret: invalid length (%d)\n", length));
return NULL;
}
if (version != 1) {
DEBUG(0,("decrypt_trustdom_secret: unknown version number (%d)\n", version));
return NULL;
}
rpcstr_pull(cleartextpwd, data_out.data + 8, sizeof(fstring), length, 0 );
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(100,("decrypt_trustdom_secret: length is: %d, version is: %d, password is: %s\n",
length, version, cleartextpwd));
#endif
data_blob_free(&data_out);
data_blob_free(&sess_key);
return SMB_STRDUP(cleartextpwd);
}
/* encode a wkssvc_PasswordBuffer:
*
* similar to samr_CryptPasswordEx. Different: 8byte confounder (instead of
* 16byte), confounder in front of the 516 byte buffer (instead of after that
* buffer), calling MD5Update() first with session_key and then with confounder
* (vice versa in samr) - Guenther */
void encode_wkssvc_join_password_buffer(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const char *pwd,
DATA_BLOB *session_key,
struct wkssvc_PasswordBuffer **pwd_buf)
{
uint8_t buffer[516];
struct MD5Context ctx;
struct wkssvc_PasswordBuffer *my_pwd_buf = NULL;
DATA_BLOB confounded_session_key;
int confounder_len = 8;
uint8_t confounder[8];
my_pwd_buf = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct wkssvc_PasswordBuffer);
if (!my_pwd_buf) {
return;
}
confounded_session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
encode_pw_buffer(buffer, pwd, STR_UNICODE);
generate_random_buffer((uint8_t *)confounder, confounder_len);
MD5Init(&ctx);
MD5Update(&ctx, session_key->data, session_key->length);
MD5Update(&ctx, confounder, confounder_len);
MD5Final(confounded_session_key.data, &ctx);
SamOEMhashBlob(buffer, 516, &confounded_session_key);
memcpy(&my_pwd_buf->data[0], confounder, confounder_len);
memcpy(&my_pwd_buf->data[8], buffer, 516);
data_blob_free(&confounded_session_key);
*pwd_buf = my_pwd_buf;
}
WERROR decode_wkssvc_join_password_buffer(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct wkssvc_PasswordBuffer *pwd_buf,
DATA_BLOB *session_key,
char **pwd)
{
uint8_t buffer[516];
struct MD5Context ctx;
uint32_t pwd_len;
DATA_BLOB confounded_session_key;
int confounder_len = 8;
uint8_t confounder[8];
*pwd = NULL;
if (!pwd_buf) {
return WERR_BAD_PASSWORD;
}
if (session_key->length != 16) {
DEBUG(10,("invalid session key\n"));
return WERR_BAD_PASSWORD;
}
confounded_session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
memcpy(&confounder, &pwd_buf->data[0], confounder_len);
memcpy(&buffer, &pwd_buf->data[8], 516);
MD5Init(&ctx);
MD5Update(&ctx, session_key->data, session_key->length);
MD5Update(&ctx, confounder, confounder_len);
MD5Final(confounded_session_key.data, &ctx);
SamOEMhashBlob(buffer, 516, &confounded_session_key);
if (!decode_pw_buffer(mem_ctx, buffer, pwd, &pwd_len, STR_UNICODE)) {
data_blob_free(&confounded_session_key);
return WERR_BAD_PASSWORD;
}
data_blob_free(&confounded_session_key);
return WERR_OK;
}
DATA_BLOB decrypt_drsuapi_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const DATA_BLOB *session_key,
bool rcrypt,
uint32_t rid,
const DATA_BLOB *buffer)
{
DATA_BLOB confounder;
DATA_BLOB enc_buffer;
struct MD5Context md5;
uint8_t _enc_key[16];
DATA_BLOB enc_key;
DATA_BLOB dec_buffer;
uint32_t crc32_given;
uint32_t crc32_calc;
DATA_BLOB checked_buffer;
DATA_BLOB plain_buffer;
/*
* the combination "c[3] s[1] e[1] d[0]..."
* was successful!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
*/
/*
* the first 16 bytes at the beginning are the confounder
* followed by the 4 byte crc32 checksum
*/
if (buffer->length < 20) {
return data_blob_const(NULL, 0);
}
confounder = data_blob_const(buffer->data, 16);
enc_buffer = data_blob_const(buffer->data + 16, buffer->length - 16);
/*
* build the encryption key md5 over the session key followed
* by the confounder
*
* here the gensec session key is used and
* not the dcerpc ncacn_ip_tcp "SystemLibraryDTC" key!
*/
enc_key = data_blob_const(_enc_key, sizeof(_enc_key));
MD5Init(&md5);
MD5Update(&md5, session_key->data, session_key->length);
MD5Update(&md5, confounder.data, confounder.length);
MD5Final(enc_key.data, &md5);
/*
* copy the encrypted buffer part and
* decrypt it using the created encryption key using arcfour
*/
dec_buffer = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, enc_buffer.data, enc_buffer.length);
if (!dec_buffer.data) {
return data_blob_const(NULL, 0);
}
SamOEMhashBlob(dec_buffer.data, dec_buffer.length, &enc_key);
/*
* the first 4 byte are the crc32 checksum
* of the remaining bytes
*/
crc32_given = IVAL(dec_buffer.data, 0);
2008-09-24 16:46:02 +02:00
crc32_calc = crc32_calc_buffer(dec_buffer.data + 4 , dec_buffer.length - 4);
if (crc32_given != crc32_calc) {
DEBUG(1,("CRC32: given[0x%08X] calc[0x%08X]\n",
crc32_given, crc32_calc));
return data_blob_const(NULL, 0);
}
checked_buffer = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, dec_buffer.data + 4, dec_buffer.length - 4);
if (!checked_buffer.data) {
return data_blob_const(NULL, 0);
}
/*
* some attributes seem to be in a usable form after this decryption
* (supplementalCredentials, priorValue, currentValue, trustAuthOutgoing,
* trustAuthIncoming, initialAuthOutgoing, initialAuthIncoming)
* At least supplementalCredentials contains plaintext
* like "Primary:Kerberos" (in unicode form)
*
* some attributes seem to have some additional encryption
* dBCSPwd, unicodePwd, ntPwdHistory, lmPwdHistory
*
* it's the sam_rid_crypt() function, as the value is constant,
* so it doesn't depend on sessionkeys.
*/
if (rcrypt) {
uint32_t i, num_hashes;
if ((checked_buffer.length % 16) != 0) {
return data_blob_const(NULL, 0);
}
plain_buffer = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, checked_buffer.data, checked_buffer.length);
if (!plain_buffer.data) {
return data_blob_const(NULL, 0);
}
num_hashes = plain_buffer.length / 16;
for (i = 0; i < num_hashes; i++) {
uint32_t offset = i * 16;
sam_pwd_hash(rid, checked_buffer.data + offset, plain_buffer.data + offset, 0);
}
} else {
plain_buffer = checked_buffer;
}
return plain_buffer;
}