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samba-mirror/source3/include/rpc_dce.h

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/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
SMB parameters and setup
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1997
Copyright (C) Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton 1996-1997
Copyright (C) Paul Ashton 1997
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
*/
#ifndef _DCE_RPC_H /* _DCE_RPC_H */
#define _DCE_RPC_H
#include "rpc_misc.h" /* this only pulls in STRHDR */
/* DCE/RPC packet types */
enum RPC_PKT_TYPE
{
RPC_REQUEST = 0x00,
RPC_RESPONSE = 0x02,
RPC_FAULT = 0x03,
RPC_BIND = 0x0B,
RPC_BINDACK = 0x0C,
RPC_BINDNACK = 0x0D,
RPC_ALTCONT = 0x0E,
RPC_ALTCONTRESP = 0x0F,
RPC_BINDRESP = 0x10 /* not the real name! this is undocumented! */
};
/* DCE/RPC flags */
#define RPC_FLG_FIRST 0x01
#define RPC_FLG_LAST 0x02
#define RPC_FLG_NOCALL 0x20
#define SMBD_NTLMSSP_NEG_FLAGS 0x000082b1 /* ALWAYS_SIGN|NEG_NTLM|NEG_LM|NEG_SEAL|NEG_SIGN|NEG_UNICODE */
/* NTLMSSP signature version */
#define NTLMSSP_SIGN_VERSION 0x01
Jeremy requested that I get my NTLMSSP patch into CVS. He didn't request the schannel code, but I've included that anyway. :-) This patch revives the client-side NTLMSSP support for RPC named pipes in Samba, and cleans up the client and server schannel code. The use of the new code is enabled by the 'sign', 'seal' and 'schannel' commands in rpcclient. The aim was to prove that our separate NTLMSSP client library actually implements NTLMSSP signing and sealing as per Microsoft's NTLMv1 implementation, in the hope that knowing this will assist us in correctly implementing NTLMSSP signing for SMB packets. (Still not yet functional) This patch replaces the NTLMSSP implementation in rpc_client/cli_pipe.c with calls to libsmb/ntlmssp.c. In the process, we have gained the ability to use the more secure NT password, and the ability to sign-only, instead of having to seal the pipe connection. (Previously we were limited to sealing, and could only use the LM-password derived key). Our new client-side NTLMSSP code also needed alteration to cope with our comparatively simple server-side implementation. A future step is to replace it with calls to the same NTLMSSP library. Also included in this patch is the schannel 'sign only' patch I submitted to the team earlier. While not enabled (and not functional, at this stage) the work in this patch makes the code paths *much* easier to follow. I have also included similar hooks in rpccleint to allow the use of schannel on *any* pipe. rpcclient now defaults to not using schannel (or any other extra per-pipe authenticiation) for any connection. The 'schannel' command enables schannel for all pipes until disabled. This code is also much more secure than the previous code, as changes to our cli_pipe routines ensure that the authentication footer cannot be removed by an attacker, and more error states are correctly handled. (The same needs to be done to our server) Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 5472ddc9eaf4e79c5b2e1c8ee8c7f190dc285f19)
2003-07-14 12:46:32 +04:00
/* NTLMSSP auth type */
#define NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE 0xa
Jeremy requested that I get my NTLMSSP patch into CVS. He didn't request the schannel code, but I've included that anyway. :-) This patch revives the client-side NTLMSSP support for RPC named pipes in Samba, and cleans up the client and server schannel code. The use of the new code is enabled by the 'sign', 'seal' and 'schannel' commands in rpcclient. The aim was to prove that our separate NTLMSSP client library actually implements NTLMSSP signing and sealing as per Microsoft's NTLMv1 implementation, in the hope that knowing this will assist us in correctly implementing NTLMSSP signing for SMB packets. (Still not yet functional) This patch replaces the NTLMSSP implementation in rpc_client/cli_pipe.c with calls to libsmb/ntlmssp.c. In the process, we have gained the ability to use the more secure NT password, and the ability to sign-only, instead of having to seal the pipe connection. (Previously we were limited to sealing, and could only use the LM-password derived key). Our new client-side NTLMSSP code also needed alteration to cope with our comparatively simple server-side implementation. A future step is to replace it with calls to the same NTLMSSP library. Also included in this patch is the schannel 'sign only' patch I submitted to the team earlier. While not enabled (and not functional, at this stage) the work in this patch makes the code paths *much* easier to follow. I have also included similar hooks in rpccleint to allow the use of schannel on *any* pipe. rpcclient now defaults to not using schannel (or any other extra per-pipe authenticiation) for any connection. The 'schannel' command enables schannel for all pipes until disabled. This code is also much more secure than the previous code, as changes to our cli_pipe routines ensure that the authentication footer cannot be removed by an attacker, and more error states are correctly handled. (The same needs to be done to our server) Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 5472ddc9eaf4e79c5b2e1c8ee8c7f190dc285f19)
2003-07-14 12:46:32 +04:00
/* DCE-RPC standard identifiers to indicate
signing or sealing of an RPC pipe */
#define RPC_PIPE_AUTH_SIGN_LEVEL 0x5
#define RPC_PIPE_AUTH_SEAL_LEVEL 0x6
/* Netlogon schannel auth type and level */
#define NETSEC_AUTH_TYPE 0x44
#define NETSEC_SIGN_SIGNATURE { 0x77, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00 }
#define NETSEC_SEAL_SIGNATURE { 0x77, 0x00, 0x7a, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00 }
#define RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK_LEN 0x20
/* The 7 here seems to be required to get Win2k not to downgrade us
to NT4. Actually, anything other than 1ff would seem to do... */
#define NETLOGON_NEG_AUTH2_FLAGS 0x000701ff
#define NETLOGON_NEG_SCHANNEL 0x40000000
Jeremy requested that I get my NTLMSSP patch into CVS. He didn't request the schannel code, but I've included that anyway. :-) This patch revives the client-side NTLMSSP support for RPC named pipes in Samba, and cleans up the client and server schannel code. The use of the new code is enabled by the 'sign', 'seal' and 'schannel' commands in rpcclient. The aim was to prove that our separate NTLMSSP client library actually implements NTLMSSP signing and sealing as per Microsoft's NTLMv1 implementation, in the hope that knowing this will assist us in correctly implementing NTLMSSP signing for SMB packets. (Still not yet functional) This patch replaces the NTLMSSP implementation in rpc_client/cli_pipe.c with calls to libsmb/ntlmssp.c. In the process, we have gained the ability to use the more secure NT password, and the ability to sign-only, instead of having to seal the pipe connection. (Previously we were limited to sealing, and could only use the LM-password derived key). Our new client-side NTLMSSP code also needed alteration to cope with our comparatively simple server-side implementation. A future step is to replace it with calls to the same NTLMSSP library. Also included in this patch is the schannel 'sign only' patch I submitted to the team earlier. While not enabled (and not functional, at this stage) the work in this patch makes the code paths *much* easier to follow. I have also included similar hooks in rpccleint to allow the use of schannel on *any* pipe. rpcclient now defaults to not using schannel (or any other extra per-pipe authenticiation) for any connection. The 'schannel' command enables schannel for all pipes until disabled. This code is also much more secure than the previous code, as changes to our cli_pipe routines ensure that the authentication footer cannot be removed by an attacker, and more error states are correctly handled. (The same needs to be done to our server) Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 5472ddc9eaf4e79c5b2e1c8ee8c7f190dc285f19)
2003-07-14 12:46:32 +04:00
enum netsec_direction
{
SENDER_IS_INITIATOR,
SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR
};
/* Internal Flags to indicate what type of authentication on the pipe */
#define AUTH_PIPE_SIGN 0x0001
#define AUTH_PIPE_SEAL 0x0002
#define AUTH_PIPE_NTLMSSP 0x0004
#define AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC 0x0008
/* Maximum PDU fragment size. */
/* #define MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN 0x1630 this is what wnt sets */
#define MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN 0x10b8 /* this is what w2k sets */
/*
* Actual structure of a DCE UUID
*/
typedef struct rpc_uuid
{
uint32 time_low;
uint16 time_mid;
uint16 time_hi_and_version;
uint8 remaining[8];
} RPC_UUID;
#define RPC_UUID_LEN 16
/* RPC_IFACE */
typedef struct rpc_iface_info
{
RPC_UUID uuid; /* 16 bytes of rpc interface identification */
uint32 version; /* the interface version number */
} RPC_IFACE;
#define RPC_IFACE_LEN (RPC_UUID_LEN + 4)
struct pipe_id_info
{
/* the names appear not to matter: the syntaxes _do_ matter */
const char *client_pipe;
RPC_IFACE abstr_syntax; /* this one is the abstract syntax id */
const char *server_pipe; /* this one is the secondary syntax name */
RPC_IFACE trans_syntax; /* this one is the primary syntax id */
};
/* RPC_HDR - dce rpc header */
typedef struct rpc_hdr_info
{
uint8 major; /* 5 - RPC major version */
uint8 minor; /* 0 - RPC minor version */
uint8 pkt_type; /* RPC_PKT_TYPE - RPC response packet */
uint8 flags; /* DCE/RPC flags */
uint8 pack_type[4]; /* 0x1000 0000 - little-endian packed data representation */
uint16 frag_len; /* fragment length - data size (bytes) inc header and tail. */
uint16 auth_len; /* 0 - authentication length */
uint32 call_id; /* call identifier. matches 12th uint32 of incoming RPC data. */
} RPC_HDR;
#define RPC_HEADER_LEN 16
/* RPC_HDR_REQ - ms request rpc header */
typedef struct rpc_hdr_req_info
{
uint32 alloc_hint; /* allocation hint - data size (bytes) minus header and tail. */
uint16 context_id; /* presentation context identifier */
uint16 opnum; /* opnum */
} RPC_HDR_REQ;
#define RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN 8
/* RPC_HDR_RESP - ms response rpc header */
typedef struct rpc_hdr_resp_info
{
uint32 alloc_hint; /* allocation hint - data size (bytes) minus header and tail. */
uint16 context_id; /* 0 - presentation context identifier */
uint8 cancel_count; /* 0 - cancel count */
uint8 reserved; /* 0 - reserved. */
} RPC_HDR_RESP;
#define RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN 8
/* RPC_HDR_FAULT - fault rpc header */
typedef struct rpc_hdr_fault_info
{
NTSTATUS status;
uint32 reserved; /* 0x0000 0000 */
} RPC_HDR_FAULT;
#define RPC_HDR_FAULT_LEN 8
/* this seems to be the same string name depending on the name of the pipe,
* but is more likely to be linked to the interface name
* "srvsvc", "\\PIPE\\ntsvcs"
* "samr", "\\PIPE\\lsass"
* "wkssvc", "\\PIPE\\wksvcs"
* "NETLOGON", "\\PIPE\\NETLOGON"
*/
/* RPC_ADDR_STR */
typedef struct rpc_addr_info
{
uint16 len; /* length of the string including null terminator */
fstring str; /* the string above in single byte, null terminated form */
} RPC_ADDR_STR;
/* RPC_HDR_BBA */
typedef struct rpc_hdr_bba_info
{
uint16 max_tsize; /* maximum transmission fragment size (0x1630) */
uint16 max_rsize; /* max receive fragment size (0x1630) */
uint32 assoc_gid; /* associated group id (0x0) */
} RPC_HDR_BBA;
#define RPC_HDR_BBA_LEN 8
/* RPC_HDR_AUTHA */
typedef struct rpc_hdr_autha_info
{
uint16 max_tsize; /* maximum transmission fragment size (0x1630) */
uint16 max_rsize; /* max receive fragment size (0x1630) */
uint8 auth_type; /* 0x0a */
uint8 auth_level; /* 0x06 */
uint8 stub_type_len; /* don't know */
uint8 padding; /* padding */
uint32 unknown; /* 0x0014a0c0 */
} RPC_HDR_AUTHA;
#define RPC_HDR_AUTHA_LEN 12
/* RPC_HDR_AUTH */
typedef struct rpc_hdr_auth_info
{
uint8 auth_type; /* 0x0a */
uint8 auth_level; /* 0x06 */
uint8 padding;
uint8 reserved; /* padding */
uint32 auth_context; /* pointer */
} RPC_HDR_AUTH;
#define RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN 8
/* this is TEMPORARILY coded up as a specific structure */
/* this structure comes after the bind request */
/* RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_NEG */
typedef struct rpc_auth_netsec_neg_info
{
uint32 type1; /* Always zero ? */
uint32 type2; /* Types 0x3 and 0x13 seen. Check AcquireSecurityContext() docs.... */
fstring domain; /* calling workstations's domain */
fstring myname; /* calling workstation's name */
} RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_NEG;
/* attached to the end of encrypted rpc requests and responses */
/* RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK */
typedef struct rpc_auth_netsec_chk_info
{
uint8 sig [8]; /* 77 00 7a 00 ff ff 00 00 */
Jeremy requested that I get my NTLMSSP patch into CVS. He didn't request the schannel code, but I've included that anyway. :-) This patch revives the client-side NTLMSSP support for RPC named pipes in Samba, and cleans up the client and server schannel code. The use of the new code is enabled by the 'sign', 'seal' and 'schannel' commands in rpcclient. The aim was to prove that our separate NTLMSSP client library actually implements NTLMSSP signing and sealing as per Microsoft's NTLMv1 implementation, in the hope that knowing this will assist us in correctly implementing NTLMSSP signing for SMB packets. (Still not yet functional) This patch replaces the NTLMSSP implementation in rpc_client/cli_pipe.c with calls to libsmb/ntlmssp.c. In the process, we have gained the ability to use the more secure NT password, and the ability to sign-only, instead of having to seal the pipe connection. (Previously we were limited to sealing, and could only use the LM-password derived key). Our new client-side NTLMSSP code also needed alteration to cope with our comparatively simple server-side implementation. A future step is to replace it with calls to the same NTLMSSP library. Also included in this patch is the schannel 'sign only' patch I submitted to the team earlier. While not enabled (and not functional, at this stage) the work in this patch makes the code paths *much* easier to follow. I have also included similar hooks in rpccleint to allow the use of schannel on *any* pipe. rpcclient now defaults to not using schannel (or any other extra per-pipe authenticiation) for any connection. The 'schannel' command enables schannel for all pipes until disabled. This code is also much more secure than the previous code, as changes to our cli_pipe routines ensure that the authentication footer cannot be removed by an attacker, and more error states are correctly handled. (The same needs to be done to our server) Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 5472ddc9eaf4e79c5b2e1c8ee8c7f190dc285f19)
2003-07-14 12:46:32 +04:00
uint8 packet_digest[8]; /* checksum over the packet, MD5'ed with session key */
uint8 seq_num[8]; /* verifier, seq num */
uint8 confounder[8]; /* random 8-byte nonce */
} RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK;
struct netsec_auth_struct
{
uchar sess_key[16];
uint32 seq_num;
int auth_flags;
};
/* RPC_BIND_REQ - ms req bind */
typedef struct rpc_bind_req_info
{
RPC_HDR_BBA bba;
uint32 num_elements; /* the number of elements (0x1) */
uint16 context_id; /* presentation context identifier (0x0) */
uint8 num_syntaxes; /* the number of syntaxes (has always been 1?)(0x1) */
RPC_IFACE abstract; /* num and vers. of interface client is using */
RPC_IFACE transfer; /* num and vers. of interface to use for replies */
} RPC_HDR_RB;
/*
* The following length is 8 bytes RPC_HDR_BBA_LEN, 8 bytes internals
* (with 3 bytes padding), + 2 x RPC_IFACE_LEN bytes for RPC_IFACE structs.
*/
#define RPC_HDR_RB_LEN (RPC_HDR_BBA_LEN + 8 + (2*RPC_IFACE_LEN))
/* RPC_RESULTS - can only cope with one reason, right now... */
typedef struct rpc_results_info
{
/* uint8[] # 4-byte alignment padding, against SMB header */
uint8 num_results; /* the number of results (0x01) */
/* uint8[] # 4-byte alignment padding, against SMB header */
uint16 result; /* result (0x00 = accept) */
uint16 reason; /* reason (0x00 = no reason specified) */
} RPC_RESULTS;
/* RPC_HDR_BA */
typedef struct rpc_hdr_ba_info
{
RPC_HDR_BBA bba;
RPC_ADDR_STR addr ; /* the secondary address string, as described earlier */
RPC_RESULTS res ; /* results and reasons */
RPC_IFACE transfer; /* the transfer syntax from the request */
} RPC_HDR_BA;
/* RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER */
typedef struct rpc_auth_verif_info
{
fstring signature; /* "NTLMSSP".. Ok, not quite anymore */
uint32 msg_type; /* NTLMSSP_MESSAGE_TYPE (1,2,3) and 5 for schannel */
} RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER;
/* this is TEMPORARILY coded up as a specific structure */
/* this structure comes after the bind request */
/* RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_NEG */
typedef struct rpc_auth_ntlmssp_neg_info
{
uint32 neg_flgs; /* 0x0000 b2b3 */
STRHDR hdr_myname; /* offset is against START of this structure */
STRHDR hdr_domain; /* offset is against START of this structure */
fstring myname; /* calling workstation's name */
fstring domain; /* calling workstations's domain */
} RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_NEG;
/* this is TEMPORARILY coded up as a specific structure */
/* this structure comes after the bind acknowledgement */
/* RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHAL */
typedef struct rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chal_info
{
uint32 unknown_1; /* 0x0000 0000 */
uint32 unknown_2; /* 0x0000 0028 */
uint32 neg_flags; /* 0x0000 82b1 */
uint8 challenge[8]; /* ntlm challenge */
uint8 reserved [8]; /* zeros */
} RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHAL;
/* RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_RESP */
typedef struct rpc_auth_ntlmssp_resp_info
{
STRHDR hdr_lm_resp; /* 24 byte response */
STRHDR hdr_nt_resp; /* 24 byte response */
STRHDR hdr_domain;
STRHDR hdr_usr;
STRHDR hdr_wks;
STRHDR hdr_sess_key; /* NULL unless negotiated */
uint32 neg_flags; /* 0x0000 82b1 */
fstring sess_key;
fstring wks;
fstring user;
fstring domain;
fstring nt_resp;
fstring lm_resp;
} RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_RESP;
/* attached to the end of encrypted rpc requests and responses */
/* RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK */
typedef struct rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chk_info
{
uint32 ver; /* 0x0000 0001 */
uint32 reserved;
uint32 crc32; /* checksum using 0xEDB8 8320 as a polynomial */
uint32 seq_num;
} RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK;
#define RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN 16
#endif /* _DCE_RPC_H */