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samba-mirror/source3/smbd/password.c

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/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
Password and authentication handling
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1998
Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 2007.
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "smbd/globals.h"
enum server_allocated_state { SERVER_ALLOCATED_REQUIRED_YES,
SERVER_ALLOCATED_REQUIRED_NO,
SERVER_ALLOCATED_REQUIRED_ANY};
static user_struct *get_valid_user_struct_internal(
struct smbd_server_connection *sconn,
uint16 vuid,
enum server_allocated_state server_allocated)
{
user_struct *usp;
int count=0;
if (vuid == UID_FIELD_INVALID)
return NULL;
usp=sconn->smb1.sessions.validated_users;
for (;usp;usp=usp->next,count++) {
if (vuid == usp->vuid) {
switch (server_allocated) {
case SERVER_ALLOCATED_REQUIRED_YES:
if (usp->server_info == NULL) {
continue;
}
break;
case SERVER_ALLOCATED_REQUIRED_NO:
if (usp->server_info != NULL) {
continue;
}
case SERVER_ALLOCATED_REQUIRED_ANY:
break;
}
if (count > 10) {
DLIST_PROMOTE(sconn->smb1.sessions.validated_users,
usp);
}
return usp;
}
}
return NULL;
}
/****************************************************************************
Check if a uid has been validated, and return an pointer to the user_struct
if it has. NULL if not. vuid is biased by an offset. This allows us to
tell random client vuid's (normally zero) from valid vuids.
****************************************************************************/
user_struct *get_valid_user_struct(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn,
uint16 vuid)
{
return get_valid_user_struct_internal(sconn, vuid,
SERVER_ALLOCATED_REQUIRED_YES);
}
bool is_partial_auth_vuid(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn, uint16 vuid)
{
return (get_partial_auth_user_struct(sconn, vuid) != NULL);
}
/****************************************************************************
Get the user struct of a partial NTLMSSP login
****************************************************************************/
user_struct *get_partial_auth_user_struct(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn,
uint16 vuid)
{
return get_valid_user_struct_internal(sconn, vuid,
SERVER_ALLOCATED_REQUIRED_NO);
}
/****************************************************************************
Invalidate a uid.
****************************************************************************/
void invalidate_vuid(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn, uint16 vuid)
{
user_struct *vuser = NULL;
vuser = get_valid_user_struct_internal(sconn, vuid,
SERVER_ALLOCATED_REQUIRED_ANY);
if (vuser == NULL) {
return;
}
session_yield(vuser);
if (vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state) {
auth_ntlmssp_end(&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state);
}
DLIST_REMOVE(sconn->smb1.sessions.validated_users, vuser);
/* clear the vuid from the 'cache' on each connection, and
from the vuid 'owner' of connections */
conn_clear_vuid_caches(sconn, vuid);
TALLOC_FREE(vuser);
sconn->smb1.sessions.num_validated_vuids--;
}
/****************************************************************************
Invalidate all vuid entries for this process.
****************************************************************************/
void invalidate_all_vuids(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn)
{
if (sconn->allow_smb2) {
return;
}
while (sconn->smb1.sessions.validated_users != NULL) {
invalidate_vuid(sconn,
sconn->smb1.sessions.validated_users->vuid);
}
}
static void increment_next_vuid(uint16_t *vuid)
{
*vuid += 1;
/* Check for vuid wrap. */
if (*vuid == UID_FIELD_INVALID) {
*vuid = VUID_OFFSET;
}
}
/****************************************************
Create a new partial auth user struct.
*****************************************************/
int register_initial_vuid(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn)
{
user_struct *vuser;
/* Paranoia check. */
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
if(lp_security() == SEC_SHARE) {
smb_panic("register_initial_vuid: "
"Tried to register uid in security=share");
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
}
/* Limit allowed vuids to 16bits - VUID_OFFSET. */
if (sconn->smb1.sessions.num_validated_vuids >= 0xFFFF-VUID_OFFSET) {
return UID_FIELD_INVALID;
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
}
if((vuser = talloc_zero(NULL, user_struct)) == NULL) {
DEBUG(0,("register_initial_vuid: "
"Failed to talloc users struct!\n"));
return UID_FIELD_INVALID;
}
/* Allocate a free vuid. Yes this is a linear search... */
while( get_valid_user_struct_internal(sconn,
sconn->smb1.sessions.next_vuid,
SERVER_ALLOCATED_REQUIRED_ANY) != NULL ) {
increment_next_vuid(&sconn->smb1.sessions.next_vuid);
}
DEBUG(10,("register_initial_vuid: allocated vuid = %u\n",
(unsigned int)sconn->smb1.sessions.next_vuid ));
vuser->vuid = sconn->smb1.sessions.next_vuid;
/*
* This happens in an unfinished NTLMSSP session setup. We
* need to allocate a vuid between the first and second calls
* to NTLMSSP.
*/
increment_next_vuid(&sconn->smb1.sessions.next_vuid);
sconn->smb1.sessions.num_validated_vuids++;
DLIST_ADD(sconn->smb1.sessions.validated_users, vuser);
return vuser->vuid;
}
int register_homes_share(const char *username)
{
int result;
struct passwd *pwd;
result = lp_servicenumber(username);
if (result != -1) {
DEBUG(3, ("Using static (or previously created) service for "
"user '%s'; path = '%s'\n", username,
lp_pathname(result)));
return result;
}
pwd = getpwnam_alloc(talloc_tos(), username);
if ((pwd == NULL) || (pwd->pw_dir[0] == '\0')) {
DEBUG(3, ("No home directory defined for user '%s'\n",
username));
TALLOC_FREE(pwd);
return -1;
}
DEBUG(3, ("Adding homes service for user '%s' using home directory: "
"'%s'\n", username, pwd->pw_dir));
result = add_home_service(username, username, pwd->pw_dir);
TALLOC_FREE(pwd);
return result;
}
/**
* register that a valid login has been performed, establish 'session'.
* @param server_info The token returned from the authentication process.
* (now 'owned' by register_existing_vuid)
*
* @param session_key The User session key for the login session (now also
* 'owned' by register_existing_vuid)
*
* @param respose_blob The NT challenge-response, if available. (May be
* freed after this call)
*
* @param smb_name The untranslated name of the user
*
* @return Newly allocated vuid, biased by an offset. (This allows us to
* tell random client vuid's (normally zero) from valid vuids.)
*
*/
int register_existing_vuid(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn,
uint16 vuid,
struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info,
DATA_BLOB response_blob,
const char *smb_name)
{
fstring tmp;
user_struct *vuser;
vuser = get_partial_auth_user_struct(sconn, vuid);
if (!vuser) {
goto fail;
}
/* Use this to keep tabs on all our info from the authentication */
vuser->server_info = talloc_move(vuser, &server_info);
/* This is a potentially untrusted username */
alpha_strcpy(tmp, smb_name, ". _-$", sizeof(tmp));
vuser->server_info->sanitized_username = talloc_strdup(
vuser->server_info, tmp);
DEBUG(10,("register_existing_vuid: (%u,%u) %s %s %s guest=%d\n",
(unsigned int)vuser->server_info->utok.uid,
(unsigned int)vuser->server_info->utok.gid,
vuser->server_info->unix_name,
vuser->server_info->sanitized_username,
pdb_get_domain(vuser->server_info->sam_account),
vuser->server_info->guest ));
DEBUG(3, ("register_existing_vuid: User name: %s\t"
"Real name: %s\n", vuser->server_info->unix_name,
pdb_get_fullname(vuser->server_info->sam_account)));
if (!vuser->server_info->ptok) {
DEBUG(1, ("register_existing_vuid: server_info does not "
"contain a user_token - cannot continue\n"));
goto fail;
}
DEBUG(3,("register_existing_vuid: UNIX uid %d is UNIX user %s, "
"and will be vuid %u\n", (int)vuser->server_info->utok.uid,
vuser->server_info->unix_name, vuser->vuid));
if (!session_claim(vuser)) {
DEBUG(1, ("register_existing_vuid: Failed to claim session "
"for vuid=%d\n",
vuser->vuid));
goto fail;
}
/* Register a home dir service for this user if
(a) This is not a guest connection,
(b) we have a home directory defined
(c) there s not an existing static share by that name
If a share exists by this name (autoloaded or not) reuse it . */
vuser->homes_snum = -1;
if (!vuser->server_info->guest) {
vuser->homes_snum = register_homes_share(
vuser->server_info->unix_name);
}
if (srv_is_signing_negotiated(smbd_server_conn) &&
!vuser->server_info->guest) {
/* Try and turn on server signing on the first non-guest
* sessionsetup. */
srv_set_signing(smbd_server_conn,
vuser->server_info->user_session_key,
response_blob);
}
/* fill in the current_user_info struct */
set_current_user_info(
vuser->server_info->sanitized_username,
vuser->server_info->unix_name,
pdb_get_domain(vuser->server_info->sam_account));
return vuser->vuid;
fail:
if (vuser) {
invalidate_vuid(sconn, vuid);
}
return UID_FIELD_INVALID;
}
/****************************************************************************
Add a name to the session users list.
****************************************************************************/
void add_session_user(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn,
const char *user)
{
struct passwd *pw;
char *tmp;
pw = Get_Pwnam_alloc(talloc_tos(), user);
if (pw == NULL) {
return;
}
if (sconn->smb1.sessions.session_userlist == NULL) {
sconn->smb1.sessions.session_userlist = SMB_STRDUP(pw->pw_name);
goto done;
}
if (in_list(pw->pw_name,sconn->smb1.sessions.session_userlist,false)) {
goto done;
}
if (strlen(sconn->smb1.sessions.session_userlist) > 128 * 1024) {
DEBUG(3,("add_session_user: session userlist already "
"too large.\n"));
goto done;
}
if (asprintf(&tmp, "%s %s",
sconn->smb1.sessions.session_userlist, pw->pw_name) == -1) {
DEBUG(3, ("asprintf failed\n"));
goto done;
}
SAFE_FREE(sconn->smb1.sessions.session_userlist);
sconn->smb1.sessions.session_userlist = tmp;
done:
TALLOC_FREE(pw);
}
/****************************************************************************
In security=share mode we need to store the client workgroup, as that's
what Vista uses for the NTLMv2 calculation.
****************************************************************************/
void add_session_workgroup(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn,
const char *workgroup)
{
if (sconn->smb1.sessions.session_workgroup) {
SAFE_FREE(sconn->smb1.sessions.session_workgroup);
}
sconn->smb1.sessions.session_workgroup = smb_xstrdup(workgroup);
}
/****************************************************************************
In security=share mode we need to return the client workgroup, as that's
what Vista uses for the NTLMv2 calculation.
****************************************************************************/
const char *get_session_workgroup(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn)
{
return sconn->smb1.sessions.session_workgroup;
}
/****************************************************************************
Check if a user is in a netgroup user list. If at first we don't succeed,
try lower case.
****************************************************************************/
bool user_in_netgroup(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn,
const char *user, const char *ngname)
{
#ifdef HAVE_NETGROUP
fstring lowercase_user;
if (sconn->smb1.sessions.my_yp_domain == NULL) {
yp_get_default_domain(&sconn->smb1.sessions.my_yp_domain);
}
if (sconn->smb1.sessions.my_yp_domain == NULL) {
DEBUG(5,("Unable to get default yp domain, "
"let's try without specifying it\n"));
}
DEBUG(5,("looking for user %s of domain %s in netgroup %s\n",
user,
sconn->smb1.sessions.my_yp_domain?
sconn->smb1.sessions.my_yp_domain:"(ANY)",
ngname));
if (innetgr(ngname, NULL, user, sconn->smb1.sessions.my_yp_domain)) {
DEBUG(5,("user_in_netgroup: Found\n"));
return true;
}
/*
* Ok, innetgr is case sensitive. Try once more with lowercase
* just in case. Attempt to fix #703. JRA.
*/
fstrcpy(lowercase_user, user);
strlower_m(lowercase_user);
if (strcmp(user,lowercase_user) == 0) {
/* user name was already lower case! */
return false;
}
DEBUG(5,("looking for user %s of domain %s in netgroup %s\n",
lowercase_user,
sconn->smb1.sessions.my_yp_domain?
sconn->smb1.sessions.my_yp_domain:"(ANY)",
ngname));
if (innetgr(ngname, NULL, lowercase_user,
sconn->smb1.sessions.my_yp_domain)) {
DEBUG(5,("user_in_netgroup: Found\n"));
return true;
}
#endif /* HAVE_NETGROUP */
return false;
}
/****************************************************************************
Check if a user is in a user list - can check combinations of UNIX
and netgroup lists.
****************************************************************************/
bool user_in_list(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn,
const char *user,const char **list)
{
if (!list || !*list)
return False;
DEBUG(10,("user_in_list: checking user %s in list\n", user));
while (*list) {
DEBUG(10,("user_in_list: checking user |%s| against |%s|\n",
user, *list));
/*
* Check raw username.
*/
if (strequal(user, *list))
return(True);
/*
* Now check to see if any combination
* of UNIX and netgroups has been specified.
*/
if(**list == '@') {
/*
* Old behaviour. Check netgroup list
* followed by UNIX list.
*/
if(user_in_netgroup(sconn, user, *list +1))
return True;
if(user_in_group(user, *list +1))
return True;
} else if (**list == '+') {
if((*(*list +1)) == '&') {
/*
* Search UNIX list followed by netgroup.
*/
if(user_in_group(user, *list +2))
return True;
if(user_in_netgroup(sconn, user, *list +2))
return True;
} else {
/*
* Just search UNIX list.
*/
if(user_in_group(user, *list +1))
return True;
}
} else if (**list == '&') {
if(*(*list +1) == '+') {
/*
* Search netgroup list followed by UNIX list.
*/
if(user_in_netgroup(sconn, user, *list +2))
return True;
if(user_in_group(user, *list +2))
return True;
} else {
/*
* Just search netgroup list.
*/
if(user_in_netgroup(sconn, user, *list +1))
return True;
}
}
list++;
}
return(False);
}
/****************************************************************************
Check if a username is valid.
****************************************************************************/
static bool user_ok(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn,
const char *user, int snum)
{
bool ret;
ret = True;
if (lp_invalid_users(snum)) {
char **invalid = str_list_copy(talloc_tos(),
lp_invalid_users(snum));
if (invalid &&
str_list_substitute(invalid, "%S", lp_servicename(snum))) {
/* This is used in sec=share only, so no current user
* around to pass to str_list_sub_basic() */
if ( invalid && str_list_sub_basic(invalid, "", "") ) {
ret = !user_in_list(sconn, user,
(const char **)invalid);
}
}
TALLOC_FREE(invalid);
}
if (ret && lp_valid_users(snum)) {
char **valid = str_list_copy(talloc_tos(),
lp_valid_users(snum));
if ( valid &&
str_list_substitute(valid, "%S", lp_servicename(snum)) ) {
/* This is used in sec=share only, so no current user
* around to pass to str_list_sub_basic() */
if ( valid && str_list_sub_basic(valid, "", "") ) {
ret = user_in_list(sconn, user,
(const char **)valid);
}
}
TALLOC_FREE(valid);
}
if (ret && lp_onlyuser(snum)) {
char **user_list = str_list_make_v3(
talloc_tos(), lp_username(snum), NULL);
if (user_list &&
str_list_substitute(user_list, "%S",
lp_servicename(snum))) {
ret = user_in_list(sconn, user,
(const char **)user_list);
}
TALLOC_FREE(user_list);
}
return(ret);
}
/****************************************************************************
Validate a group username entry. Return the username or NULL.
****************************************************************************/
static char *validate_group(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn,
char *group, DATA_BLOB password,int snum)
{
#ifdef HAVE_NETGROUP
{
char *host, *user, *domain;
struct auth_context *actx = sconn->smb1.negprot.auth_context;
bool enc = sconn->smb1.negprot.encrypted_passwords;
setnetgrent(group);
while (getnetgrent(&host, &user, &domain)) {
if (user) {
if (user_ok(sconn, user, snum) &&
password_ok(actx, enc,
get_session_workgroup(sconn),
user,password)) {
endnetgrent();
return(user);
}
}
}
endnetgrent();
}
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_GETGRENT
{
struct group *gptr;
struct auth_context *actx = sconn->smb1.negprot.auth_context;
bool enc = sconn->smb1.negprot.encrypted_passwords;
setgrent();
while ((gptr = (struct group *)getgrent())) {
if (strequal(gptr->gr_name,group))
break;
}
/*
* As user_ok can recurse doing a getgrent(), we must
* copy the member list onto the heap before
* use. Bug pointed out by leon@eatworms.swmed.edu.
*/
if (gptr) {
char *member_list = NULL;
size_t list_len = 0;
char *member;
int i;
for(i = 0; gptr->gr_mem && gptr->gr_mem[i]; i++) {
list_len += strlen(gptr->gr_mem[i])+1;
}
list_len++;
member_list = (char *)SMB_MALLOC(list_len);
if (!member_list) {
endgrent();
return NULL;
}
*member_list = '\0';
member = member_list;
for(i = 0; gptr->gr_mem && gptr->gr_mem[i]; i++) {
size_t member_len = strlen(gptr->gr_mem[i])+1;
DEBUG(10,("validate_group: = gr_mem = "
"%s\n", gptr->gr_mem[i]));
safe_strcpy(member, gptr->gr_mem[i],
list_len - (member-member_list));
member += member_len;
}
endgrent();
member = member_list;
while (*member) {
if (user_ok(sconn, member,snum) &&
password_ok(actx, enc,
get_session_workgroup(sconn),
member,password)) {
char *name = talloc_strdup(talloc_tos(),
member);
SAFE_FREE(member_list);
return name;
}
DEBUG(10,("validate_group = member = %s\n",
member));
member += strlen(member) + 1;
}
SAFE_FREE(member_list);
} else {
endgrent();
return NULL;
}
}
#endif
return(NULL);
}
/****************************************************************************
Check for authority to login to a service with a given username/password.
Note this is *NOT* used when logging on using sessionsetup_and_X.
****************************************************************************/
bool authorise_login(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn,
int snum, fstring user, DATA_BLOB password,
bool *guest)
{
bool ok = False;
struct auth_context *actx = sconn->smb1.negprot.auth_context;
bool enc = sconn->smb1.negprot.encrypted_passwords;
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(100,("authorise_login: checking authorisation on "
"user=%s pass=%s\n", user,password.data));
#endif
*guest = False;
/* there are several possibilities:
1) login as the given user with given password
2) login as a previously registered username with the given
password
3) login as a session list username with the given password
4) login as a previously validated user/password pair
5) login as the "user =" user with given password
6) login as the "user =" user with no password
(guest connection)
7) login as guest user with no password
if the service is guest_only then steps 1 to 5 are skipped
*/
/* now check the list of session users */
if (!ok) {
char *auser;
char *user_list = NULL;
char *saveptr;
if (sconn->smb1.sessions.session_userlist)
user_list = SMB_STRDUP(sconn->smb1.sessions.session_userlist);
else
user_list = SMB_STRDUP("");
if (!user_list)
return(False);
for (auser = strtok_r(user_list, LIST_SEP, &saveptr);
!ok && auser;
auser = strtok_r(NULL, LIST_SEP, &saveptr)) {
fstring user2;
fstrcpy(user2,auser);
if (!user_ok(sconn,user2,snum))
continue;
if (password_ok(actx, enc,
get_session_workgroup(sconn),
user2,password)) {
ok = True;
fstrcpy(user,user2);
DEBUG(3,("authorise_login: ACCEPTED: session "
"list username (%s) and given "
"password ok\n", user));
}
}
SAFE_FREE(user_list);
}
/* check the user= fields and the given password */
if (!ok && lp_username(snum)) {
TALLOC_CTX *ctx = talloc_tos();
char *auser;
char *user_list = talloc_strdup(ctx, lp_username(snum));
char *saveptr;
if (!user_list) {
goto check_guest;
}
user_list = talloc_string_sub(ctx,
user_list,
"%S",
lp_servicename(snum));
if (!user_list) {
goto check_guest;
}
for (auser = strtok_r(user_list, LIST_SEP, &saveptr);
auser && !ok;
auser = strtok_r(NULL, LIST_SEP, &saveptr)) {
if (*auser == '@') {
auser = validate_group(sconn,auser+1,
password,snum);
if (auser) {
ok = True;
fstrcpy(user,auser);
DEBUG(3,("authorise_login: ACCEPTED: "
"group username and given "
"password ok (%s)\n", user));
}
} else {
fstring user2;
fstrcpy(user2,auser);
if (user_ok(sconn,user2,snum) &&
password_ok(actx, enc,
get_session_workgroup(sconn),
user2,password)) {
ok = True;
fstrcpy(user,user2);
DEBUG(3,("authorise_login: ACCEPTED: "
"user list username and "
"given password ok (%s)\n",
user));
}
}
}
}
check_guest:
/* check for a normal guest connection */
if (!ok && GUEST_OK(snum)) {
struct passwd *guest_pw;
fstring guestname;
fstrcpy(guestname,lp_guestaccount());
guest_pw = Get_Pwnam_alloc(talloc_tos(), guestname);
if (guest_pw != NULL) {
fstrcpy(user,guestname);
ok = True;
DEBUG(3,("authorise_login: ACCEPTED: guest account "
"and guest ok (%s)\n", user));
} else {
DEBUG(0,("authorise_login: Invalid guest account "
"%s??\n",guestname));
}
TALLOC_FREE(guest_pw);
*guest = True;
}
if (ok && !user_ok(sconn, user, snum)) {
DEBUG(0,("authorise_login: rejected invalid user %s\n",user));
ok = False;
}
return(ok);
}