/*
Unix SMB / CIFS implementation .
kerberos utility library
Copyright ( C ) Andrew Tridgell 2001
Copyright ( C ) Remus Koos 2001
Copyright ( C ) Luke Howard 2003
Copyright ( C ) Guenther Deschner 2003
Copyright ( C ) Jim McDonough ( jmcd @ us . ibm . com ) 2003
This program is free software ; you can redistribute it and / or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation ; either version 2 of the License , or
( at your option ) any later version .
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful ,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY ; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE . See the
GNU General Public License for more details .
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program ; if not , write to the Free Software
Foundation , Inc . , 675 Mass Ave , Cambridge , MA 0213 9 , USA .
*/
# include "includes.h"
# ifdef HAVE_KRB5
/*
verify an incoming ticket and parse out the principal name and
authorization_data if available
*/
NTSTATUS ads_verify_ticket ( const char * realm , const DATA_BLOB * ticket ,
char * * principal , DATA_BLOB * auth_data ,
DATA_BLOB * ap_rep ,
Changes all over the shop, but all towards:
- NTLM2 support in the server
- KEY_EXCH support in the server
- variable length session keys.
In detail:
- NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing
domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade).
* This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' *
(This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may
well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password
changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of
NTLM2 on RPC pipes.)
This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we
must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm
being changed. This also needs to be turned off for
'security=server', which does not support this.
- KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key
actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being
the shared-secret directly or indirectly.
- As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem
needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the
backend.
- There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation.
- The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii.
Don't make an ascii version ever.
- The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We
have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded
to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes
long, when the krb5 login uses DES.
* This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. *
- Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of
misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This
should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues.
- Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when
passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate)
REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures...
-
DATA_BLOB * session_key )
{
NTSTATUS sret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE ;
krb5_context context = NULL ;
krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL ;
krb5_data packet ;
krb5_ticket * tkt = NULL ;
krb5_rcache rcache = NULL ;
int ret , i ;
krb5_keyblock * key = NULL ;
krb5_principal host_princ ;
char * host_princ_s = NULL ;
BOOL free_host_princ = False ;
BOOL got_replay_mutex = False ;
fstring myname ;
char * password_s = NULL ;
krb5_data password ;
krb5_enctype * enctypes = NULL ;
#if 0
krb5_address local_addr ;
krb5_address remote_addr ;
# endif
BOOL auth_ok = False ;
ZERO_STRUCT ( packet ) ;
ZERO_STRUCT ( password ) ;
ZERO_STRUCTP ( auth_data ) ;
ZERO_STRUCTP ( ap_rep ) ;
if ( ! secrets_init ( ) ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " ads_verify_ticket: secrets_init failed \n " ) ) ;
return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE ;
}
password_s = secrets_fetch_machine_password ( lp_workgroup ( ) , NULL , NULL ) ;
if ( ! password_s ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " ads_verify_ticket: failed to fetch machine password \n " ) ) ;
return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE ;
}
password . data = password_s ;
password . length = strlen ( password_s ) ;
ret = krb5_init_context ( & context ) ;
if ( ret ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " ads_verify_ticket: krb5_init_context failed (%s) \n " , error_message ( ret ) ) ) ;
return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE ;
}
ret = krb5_set_default_realm ( context , realm ) ;
if ( ret ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " ads_verify_ticket: krb5_set_default_realm failed (%s) \n " , error_message ( ret ) ) ) ;
sret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE ;
goto out ;
}
/* This whole process is far more complex than I would
like . We have to go through all this to allow us to store
the secret internally , instead of using / etc / krb5 . keytab */
ret = krb5_auth_con_init ( context , & auth_context ) ;
if ( ret ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " ads_verify_ticket: krb5_auth_con_init failed (%s) \n " , error_message ( ret ) ) ) ;
sret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE ;
goto out ;
}
fstrcpy ( myname , global_myname ( ) ) ;
strlower_m ( myname ) ;
asprintf ( & host_princ_s , " HOST/%s@%s " , myname , lp_realm ( ) ) ;
ret = krb5_parse_name ( context , host_princ_s , & host_princ ) ;
if ( ret ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " ads_verify_ticket: krb5_parse_name(%s) failed (%s) \n " ,
host_princ_s , error_message ( ret ) ) ) ;
sret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE ;
goto out ;
}
free_host_princ = True ;
/*
* JRA . We must set the rcache here . This will prevent replay attacks .
*/
ret = krb5_get_server_rcache ( context , krb5_princ_component ( context , host_princ , 0 ) , & rcache ) ;
if ( ret ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " ads_verify_ticket: krb5_get_server_rcache failed (%s) \n " , error_message ( ret ) ) ) ;
sret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE ;
goto out ;
}
ret = krb5_auth_con_setrcache ( context , auth_context , rcache ) ;
if ( ret ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " ads_verify_ticket: krb5_auth_con_setrcache failed (%s) \n " , error_message ( ret ) ) ) ;
sret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE ;
goto out ;
}
/* CIFS doesn't use addresses in tickets. This would breat NAT. JRA */
if ( ( ret = get_kerberos_allowed_etypes ( context , & enctypes ) ) ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " ads_verify_ticket: krb5_get_permitted_enctypes failed (%s) \n " ,
error_message ( ret ) ) ) ;
sret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE ;
goto out ;
}
/* Lock a mutex surrounding the replay as there is no locking in the MIT krb5
* code surrounding the replay cache . . . */
if ( ! grab_server_mutex ( " replay cache mutex " ) ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " ads_verify_ticket: unable to protect replay cache with mutex. \n " ) ) ;
sret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE ;
goto out ;
}
got_replay_mutex = True ;
/* We need to setup a auth context with each possible encoding type in turn. */
for ( i = 0 ; enctypes [ i ] ; i + + ) {
if ( ! ( key = ( krb5_keyblock * ) malloc ( sizeof ( * key ) ) ) ) {
sret = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
goto out ;
}
if ( create_kerberos_key_from_string ( context , host_princ , & password , key , enctypes [ i ] ) ) {
continue ;
}
krb5_auth_con_setuseruserkey ( context , auth_context , key ) ;
krb5_free_keyblock ( context , key ) ;
packet . length = ticket - > length ;
packet . data = ( krb5_pointer ) ticket - > data ;
if ( ! ( ret = krb5_rd_req ( context , & auth_context , & packet ,
NULL ,
NULL , NULL , & tkt ) ) ) {
DEBUG ( 10 , ( " ads_verify_ticket: enc type [%u] decrypted message ! \n " ,
( unsigned int ) enctypes [ i ] ) ) ;
auth_ok = True ;
break ;
}
DEBUG ( ( ret ! = KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE ) ? 3 : 10 ,
( " ads_verify_ticket: enc type [%u] failed to decrypt with error %s \n " ,
( unsigned int ) enctypes [ i ] , error_message ( ret ) ) ) ;
}
release_server_mutex ( ) ;
got_replay_mutex = False ;
if ( ! auth_ok ) {
DEBUG ( 3 , ( " ads_verify_ticket: krb5_rd_req with auth failed (%s) \n " ,
error_message ( ret ) ) ) ;
sret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE ;
goto out ;
}
ret = krb5_mk_rep ( context , auth_context , & packet ) ;
if ( ret ) {
DEBUG ( 3 , ( " ads_verify_ticket: Failed to generate mutual authentication reply (%s) \n " ,
error_message ( ret ) ) ) ;
sret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE ;
goto out ;
}
* ap_rep = data_blob ( packet . data , packet . length ) ;
free ( packet . data ) ;
get_krb5_smb_session_key ( context , auth_context , session_key , True ) ;
dump_data_pw ( " SMB session key (from ticket) \n " , session_key - > data , session_key - > length ) ;
#if 0
file_save ( " /tmp/ticket.dat " , ticket - > data , ticket - > length ) ;
# endif
get_auth_data_from_tkt ( auth_data , tkt ) ;
{
TALLOC_CTX * ctx = talloc_init ( " pac data " ) ;
decode_pac_data ( auth_data , ctx ) ;
talloc_destroy ( ctx ) ;
}
#if 0
if ( tkt - > enc_part2 ) {
file_save ( " /tmp/authdata.dat " ,
tkt - > enc_part2 - > authorization_data [ 0 ] - > contents ,
tkt - > enc_part2 - > authorization_data [ 0 ] - > length ) ;
}
# endif
if ( ( ret = krb5_unparse_name ( context , get_principal_from_tkt ( tkt ) ,
principal ) ) ) {
DEBUG ( 3 , ( " ads_verify_ticket: krb5_unparse_name failed (%s) \n " ,
error_message ( ret ) ) ) ;
sret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE ;
goto out ;
}
sret = NT_STATUS_OK ;
out :
if ( got_replay_mutex )
release_server_mutex ( ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( sret ) )
data_blob_free ( auth_data ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( sret ) )
data_blob_free ( ap_rep ) ;
if ( free_host_princ )
krb5_free_principal ( context , host_princ ) ;
if ( tkt ! = NULL )
krb5_free_ticket ( context , tkt ) ;
free_kerberos_etypes ( context , enctypes ) ;
SAFE_FREE ( password_s ) ;
SAFE_FREE ( host_princ_s ) ;
if ( auth_context )
krb5_auth_con_free ( context , auth_context ) ;
if ( context )
krb5_free_context ( context ) ;
return sret ;
}
# endif /* HAVE_KRB5 */