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samba-mirror/source3/auth/pass_check.c

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2010-08-21 16:42:24 +04:00
/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
Password checking
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1998
2010-08-21 16:42:24 +04:00
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
2010-08-21 16:42:24 +04:00
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
2010-08-21 16:42:24 +04:00
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
/* this module is for checking a username/password against a system
password database. The SMB encrypted password support is elsewhere */
#include "includes.h"
#include "system/passwd.h"
#include "auth.h"
#undef DBGC_CLASS
#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
/* what is the longest significant password available on your system?
Knowing this speeds up password searches a lot */
#ifndef PASSWORD_LENGTH
#define PASSWORD_LENGTH 8
#endif
/* these are kept here to keep the string_combinations function simple */
static char *ths_user;
static const char *get_this_user(void)
{
if (!ths_user) {
return "";
}
return ths_user;
}
#if defined(WITH_PAM) || defined(OSF1_ENH_SEC)
static const char *set_this_user(const char *newuser)
{
char *orig_user = ths_user;
ths_user = SMB_STRDUP(newuser);
SAFE_FREE(orig_user);
return ths_user;
}
#endif
#if !defined(WITH_PAM)
static char *ths_salt;
/* This must be writable. */
static char *get_this_salt(void)
{
return ths_salt;
}
/* We may be setting a modified version of the same
* string, so don't free before use. */
static const char *set_this_salt(const char *newsalt)
{
char *orig_salt = ths_salt;
ths_salt = SMB_STRDUP(newsalt);
SAFE_FREE(orig_salt);
return ths_salt;
}
static char *ths_crypted;
static const char *get_this_crypted(void)
{
if (!ths_crypted) {
return "";
}
return ths_crypted;
}
static const char *set_this_crypted(const char *newcrypted)
{
char *orig_crypted = ths_crypted;
ths_crypted = SMB_STRDUP(newcrypted);
SAFE_FREE(orig_crypted);
return ths_crypted;
}
#endif
#ifdef WITH_AFS
#include <afs/stds.h>
#include <afs/kautils.h>
/*******************************************************************
check on AFS authentication
********************************************************************/
static bool afs_auth(char *user, char *password)
{
long password_expires = 0;
char *reason;
/* For versions of AFS prior to 3.3, this routine has few arguments, */
/* but since I can't find the old documentation... :-) */
setpag();
if (ka_UserAuthenticateGeneral
(KA_USERAUTH_VERSION + KA_USERAUTH_DOSETPAG, user, (char *)0, /* instance */
(char *)0, /* cell */
password, 0, /* lifetime, default */
&password_expires, /*days 'til it expires */
0, /* spare 2 */
&reason) == 0)
{
return (True);
}
DEBUG(1,
("AFS authentication for \"%s\" failed (%s)\n", user, reason));
return (False);
}
#endif
#ifdef WITH_DFS
#include <dce/dce_error.h>
#include <dce/sec_login.h>
/*****************************************************************
This new version of the DFS_AUTH code was donated by Karsten Muuss
<muuss@or.uni-bonn.de>. It fixes the following problems with the
old code :
- Server credentials may expire
- Client credential cache files have wrong owner
- purge_context() function is called with invalid argument
This new code was modified to ensure that on exit the uid/gid is
still root, and the original directory is restored. JRA.
******************************************************************/
sec_login_handle_t my_dce_sec_context;
int dcelogin_atmost_once = 0;
/*******************************************************************
check on a DCE/DFS authentication
********************************************************************/
static bool dfs_auth(char *user, char *password)
{
struct tm *t;
error_status_t err;
int err2;
int prterr;
signed32 expire_time, current_time;
boolean32 password_reset;
struct passwd *pw;
sec_passwd_rec_t passwd_rec;
sec_login_auth_src_t auth_src = sec_login_auth_src_network;
unsigned char dce_errstr[dce_c_error_string_len];
gid_t egid;
if (dcelogin_atmost_once)
return (False);
#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT
/*
* We only go for a DCE login context if the given password
* matches that stored in the local password file..
* Assumes local passwd file is kept in sync w/ DCE RGY!
*/
if (strcmp((char *)crypt(password, get_this_salt()), get_this_crypted()))
{
return (False);
}
#endif
sec_login_get_current_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
if (err != error_status_ok)
{
dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
DEBUG(0, ("DCE can't get current context. %s\n", dce_errstr));
return (False);
}
sec_login_certify_identity(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
if (err != error_status_ok)
{
dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
DEBUG(0, ("DCE can't get current context. %s\n", dce_errstr));
return (False);
}
sec_login_get_expiration(my_dce_sec_context, &expire_time, &err);
if (err != error_status_ok)
{
dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
DEBUG(0, ("DCE can't get expiration. %s\n", dce_errstr));
return (False);
}
time(&current_time);
if (expire_time < (current_time + 60))
{
struct passwd *pw;
sec_passwd_rec_t *key;
sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context,
(sec_login_passwd_t *) & pw, &err);
if (err != error_status_ok)
{
dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
DEBUG(0, ("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
return (False);
}
sec_login_refresh_identity(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
if (err != error_status_ok)
{
dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
DEBUG(0, ("DCE can't refresh identity. %s\n",
dce_errstr));
return (False);
}
sec_key_mgmt_get_key(rpc_c_authn_dce_secret, NULL,
(unsigned char *)pw->pw_name,
sec_c_key_version_none,
(void **)&key, &err);
if (err != error_status_ok)
{
dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
DEBUG(0, ("DCE can't get key for %s. %s\n",
pw->pw_name, dce_errstr));
return (False);
}
sec_login_valid_and_cert_ident(my_dce_sec_context, key,
&password_reset, &auth_src,
&err);
if (err != error_status_ok)
{
dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
DEBUG(0,
("DCE can't validate and certify identity for %s. %s\n",
pw->pw_name, dce_errstr));
}
sec_key_mgmt_free_key(key, &err);
if (err != error_status_ok)
{
dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
DEBUG(0, ("DCE can't free key.\n", dce_errstr));
}
}
if (sec_login_setup_identity((unsigned char *)user,
sec_login_no_flags,
&my_dce_sec_context, &err) == 0)
{
dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
DEBUG(0, ("DCE Setup Identity for %s failed: %s\n",
user, dce_errstr));
return (False);
}
sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context,
(sec_login_passwd_t *) & pw, &err);
if (err != error_status_ok)
{
dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
DEBUG(0, ("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
return (False);
}
sec_login_purge_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
if (err != error_status_ok)
{
dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
DEBUG(0, ("DCE can't purge context. %s\n", dce_errstr));
return (False);
}
/*
* NB. I'd like to change these to call something like change_to_user()
* instead but currently we don't have a connection
* context to become the correct user. This is already
* fairly platform specific code however, so I think
* this should be ok. I have added code to go
* back to being root on error though. JRA.
*/
egid = getegid();
set_effective_gid(pw->pw_gid);
set_effective_uid(pw->pw_uid);
if (sec_login_setup_identity((unsigned char *)user,
sec_login_no_flags,
&my_dce_sec_context, &err) == 0)
{
dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
DEBUG(0, ("DCE Setup Identity for %s failed: %s\n",
user, dce_errstr));
goto err;
}
sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context,
(sec_login_passwd_t *) & pw, &err);
if (err != error_status_ok)
{
dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
DEBUG(0, ("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
goto err;
}
passwd_rec.version_number = sec_passwd_c_version_none;
passwd_rec.pepper = NULL;
passwd_rec.key.key_type = sec_passwd_plain;
passwd_rec.key.tagged_union.plain = (idl_char *) password;
sec_login_validate_identity(my_dce_sec_context,
&passwd_rec, &password_reset,
&auth_src, &err);
if (err != error_status_ok)
{
dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
DEBUG(0,
("DCE Identity Validation failed for principal %s: %s\n",
user, dce_errstr));
goto err;
}
sec_login_certify_identity(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
if (err != error_status_ok)
{
dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
DEBUG(0, ("DCE certify identity failed: %s\n", dce_errstr));
goto err;
}
if (auth_src != sec_login_auth_src_network)
{
DEBUG(0, ("DCE context has no network credentials.\n"));
}
sec_login_set_context(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
if (err != error_status_ok)
{
dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
DEBUG(0,
("DCE login failed for principal %s, cant set context: %s\n",
user, dce_errstr));
sec_login_purge_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
goto err;
}
sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context,
(sec_login_passwd_t *) & pw, &err);
if (err != error_status_ok)
{
dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
DEBUG(0, ("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
goto err;
}
DEBUG(0, ("DCE login succeeded for principal %s on pid %d\n",
user, getpid()));
DEBUG(3, ("DCE principal: %s\n"
" uid: %d\n"
" gid: %d\n",
pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid));
DEBUG(3, (" info: %s\n"
" dir: %s\n"
" shell: %s\n",
pw->pw_gecos, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_shell));
sec_login_get_expiration(my_dce_sec_context, &expire_time, &err);
if (err != error_status_ok)
{
dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
DEBUG(0, ("DCE can't get expiration. %s\n", dce_errstr));
goto err;
}
set_effective_uid(0);
set_effective_gid(0);
t = localtime(&expire_time);
if (t) {
const char *asct = asctime(t);
if (asct) {
DEBUG(0,("DCE context expires: %s", asct));
}
}
dcelogin_atmost_once = 1;
return (True);
err:
/* Go back to root, JRA. */
set_effective_uid(0);
set_effective_gid(egid);
return (False);
}
void dfs_unlogin(void)
{
error_status_t err;
int err2;
unsigned char dce_errstr[dce_c_error_string_len];
sec_login_purge_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
if (err != error_status_ok)
{
dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
DEBUG(0,
("DCE purge login context failed for server instance %d: %s\n",
getpid(), dce_errstr));
}
}
#endif
#ifdef LINUX_BIGCRYPT
/****************************************************************************
an enhanced crypt for Linux to handle password longer than 8 characters
****************************************************************************/
static int linux_bigcrypt(char *password, char *salt1, char *crypted)
{
#define LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS 8
char salt[3];
int i;
StrnCpy(salt, salt1, 2);
crypted += 2;
for (i = strlen(password); i > 0; i -= LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS) {
char *p = crypt(password, salt) + 2;
if (strncmp(p, crypted, LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS) != 0)
return (0);
password += LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS;
crypted += strlen(p);
}
return (1);
}
#endif
#ifdef OSF1_ENH_SEC
/****************************************************************************
an enhanced crypt for OSF1
****************************************************************************/
static char *osf1_bigcrypt(char *password, char *salt1)
{
static char result[AUTH_MAX_PASSWD_LENGTH] = "";
char *p1;
char *p2 = password;
char salt[3];
int i;
int parts = strlen(password) / AUTH_CLEARTEXT_SEG_CHARS;
if (strlen(password) % AUTH_CLEARTEXT_SEG_CHARS)
parts++;
StrnCpy(salt, salt1, 2);
StrnCpy(result, salt1, 2);
result[2] = '\0';
for (i = 0; i < parts; i++) {
p1 = crypt(p2, salt);
strncat(result, p1 + 2,
AUTH_MAX_PASSWD_LENGTH - strlen(p1 + 2) - 1);
StrnCpy(salt, &result[2 + i * AUTH_CIPHERTEXT_SEG_CHARS], 2);
p2 += AUTH_CLEARTEXT_SEG_CHARS;
}
return (result);
}
#endif
/****************************************************************************
core of password checking routine
****************************************************************************/
2011-05-06 01:22:11 +04:00
static NTSTATUS password_check(const char *password, const void *private_data)
{
#ifdef WITH_PAM
const char *rhost = (const char *)private_data;
return smb_pam_passcheck(get_this_user(), rhost, password);
#else
bool ret;
#ifdef WITH_AFS
if (afs_auth(get_this_user(), password))
return NT_STATUS_OK;
#endif /* WITH_AFS */
#ifdef WITH_DFS
if (dfs_auth(get_this_user(), password))
return NT_STATUS_OK;
#endif /* WITH_DFS */
#ifdef OSF1_ENH_SEC
2010-08-21 16:42:24 +04:00
ret = (strcmp(osf1_bigcrypt(password, get_this_salt()),
get_this_crypted()) == 0);
if (!ret) {
DEBUG(2,
("OSF1_ENH_SEC failed. Trying normal crypt.\n"));
ret = (strcmp((char *)crypt(password, get_this_salt()), get_this_crypted()) == 0);
}
if (ret) {
return NT_STATUS_OK;
} else {
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
2010-08-21 16:42:24 +04:00
#endif /* OSF1_ENH_SEC */
2010-08-21 16:42:24 +04:00
#ifdef ULTRIX_AUTH
ret = (strcmp((char *)crypt16(password, get_this_salt()), get_this_crypted()) == 0);
if (ret) {
return NT_STATUS_OK;
} else {
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
2010-08-21 16:42:24 +04:00
#endif /* ULTRIX_AUTH */
2010-08-21 16:42:24 +04:00
#ifdef LINUX_BIGCRYPT
ret = (linux_bigcrypt(password, get_this_salt(), get_this_crypted()));
if (ret) {
return NT_STATUS_OK;
} else {
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
#endif /* LINUX_BIGCRYPT */
2010-08-21 16:42:24 +04:00
#if defined(HAVE_BIGCRYPT) && defined(HAVE_CRYPT) && defined(USE_BOTH_CRYPT_CALLS)
2010-08-21 16:42:24 +04:00
/*
* Some systems have bigcrypt in the C library but might not
* actually use it for the password hashes (HPUX 10.20) is
* a noteable example. So we try bigcrypt first, followed
* by crypt.
*/
if (strcmp(bigcrypt(password, get_this_salt()), get_this_crypted()) == 0)
return NT_STATUS_OK;
else
ret = (strcmp((char *)crypt(password, get_this_salt()), get_this_crypted()) == 0);
if (ret) {
return NT_STATUS_OK;
} else {
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
#else /* HAVE_BIGCRYPT && HAVE_CRYPT && USE_BOTH_CRYPT_CALLS */
2010-08-21 16:42:24 +04:00
#ifdef HAVE_BIGCRYPT
ret = (strcmp(bigcrypt(password, get_this_salt()), get_this_crypted()) == 0);
if (ret) {
return NT_STATUS_OK;
} else {
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
#endif /* HAVE_BIGCRYPT */
2010-08-21 16:42:24 +04:00
#ifndef HAVE_CRYPT
DEBUG(1, ("Warning - no crypt available\n"));
return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
#else /* HAVE_CRYPT */
ret = (strcmp((char *)crypt(password, get_this_salt()), get_this_crypted()) == 0);
if (ret) {
return NT_STATUS_OK;
} else {
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
#endif /* HAVE_CRYPT */
#endif /* HAVE_BIGCRYPT && HAVE_CRYPT && USE_BOTH_CRYPT_CALLS */
#endif /* WITH_PAM */
}
/****************************************************************************
CHECK if a username/password is OK
the function pointer fn() points to a function to call when a successful
match is found and is used to update the encrypted password file
return NT_STATUS_OK on correct match, appropriate error otherwise
****************************************************************************/
NTSTATUS pass_check(const struct passwd *pass,
const char *user,
const char *rhost,
const char *password,
bool run_cracker)
{
char *pass2 = NULL;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(100, ("checking user=[%s] pass=[%s]\n", user, password));
#endif
if (!password)
return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
if ((!*password) && !lp_null_passwords())
return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
#if defined(WITH_PAM)
/*
* If we're using PAM we want to short-circuit all the
* checks below and dive straight into the PAM code.
*/
if (set_this_user(user) == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
DEBUG(4, ("pass_check: Checking (PAM) password for user %s\n", user));
A nice *big* change to the fundemental way we do things. Samba (ab)uses the returns from getpwnam() a lot - in particular it keeps them around for a long time - often past the next call... This adds a getpwnam_alloc and a getpwuid_alloc to the collection. These function as expected, returning a malloced structure that can be free()ed with passwd_free(&passwd). This patch also cuts down on the number of calls to getpwnam - mostly by taking advantage of the fact that the passdb interface is already case-insensiteve. With this patch most of the recursive cases have been removed (that I know of) and the problems are reduced further by not using the sys_ interface in the new code. This means that pointers to the cache won't be affected. (This is a tempoary HACK, I intend to kill the password cache entirly). The only change I'm a little worried about is the change to rpc_server/srv_samr_nt.c for private groups. In this case we are getting groups from the new group mapping DB. Do we still need to check for private groups? I've toned down the check to a case sensitve match with the new code, but we might be able to kill it entirly. I've also added a make_modifyable_passwd() function, that copies a passwd struct into the form that the old sys_getpw* code provided. As far as I can tell this is only actually used in the pass_check.c crazies, where I moved the final 'special case' for shadow passwords (out of _Get_Pwnam()). The matching case for getpwent() is dealt with already, in lib/util_getent.c Also included in here is a small change to register the [homes] share at vuid creation rather than just in one varient of the session setup. (This picks up the SPNEGO cases). The home directory is now stored on the vuid, and I am hoping this might provide a saner way to do %H substitions. TODO: Kill off remaining Get_Pwnam_Modify calls (they are not needed), change the remaining sys_getpwnam() callers to use getpwnam_alloc() and move Get_Pwnam to return an allocated struct. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 1d86c7f94230bc53daebd4d2cd829da6292e05da)
2002-01-17 11:45:58 +03:00
#else /* Not using PAM */
DEBUG(4, ("pass_check: Checking password for user %s\n", user));
if (!pass) {
DEBUG(3, ("Couldn't find user %s\n", user));
return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
}
/* Copy into global for the convenience of looping code */
/* Also the place to keep the 'password' no matter what
crazy struct it started in... */
if (set_this_crypted(pass->pw_passwd) == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (set_this_salt(pass->pw_passwd) == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
A nice *big* change to the fundemental way we do things. Samba (ab)uses the returns from getpwnam() a lot - in particular it keeps them around for a long time - often past the next call... This adds a getpwnam_alloc and a getpwuid_alloc to the collection. These function as expected, returning a malloced structure that can be free()ed with passwd_free(&passwd). This patch also cuts down on the number of calls to getpwnam - mostly by taking advantage of the fact that the passdb interface is already case-insensiteve. With this patch most of the recursive cases have been removed (that I know of) and the problems are reduced further by not using the sys_ interface in the new code. This means that pointers to the cache won't be affected. (This is a tempoary HACK, I intend to kill the password cache entirly). The only change I'm a little worried about is the change to rpc_server/srv_samr_nt.c for private groups. In this case we are getting groups from the new group mapping DB. Do we still need to check for private groups? I've toned down the check to a case sensitve match with the new code, but we might be able to kill it entirly. I've also added a make_modifyable_passwd() function, that copies a passwd struct into the form that the old sys_getpw* code provided. As far as I can tell this is only actually used in the pass_check.c crazies, where I moved the final 'special case' for shadow passwords (out of _Get_Pwnam()). The matching case for getpwent() is dealt with already, in lib/util_getent.c Also included in here is a small change to register the [homes] share at vuid creation rather than just in one varient of the session setup. (This picks up the SPNEGO cases). The home directory is now stored on the vuid, and I am hoping this might provide a saner way to do %H substitions. TODO: Kill off remaining Get_Pwnam_Modify calls (they are not needed), change the remaining sys_getpwnam() callers to use getpwnam_alloc() and move Get_Pwnam to return an allocated struct. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 1d86c7f94230bc53daebd4d2cd829da6292e05da)
2002-01-17 11:45:58 +03:00
#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
{
struct spwd *spass;
/* many shadow systems require you to be root to get
the password, in most cases this should already be
the case when this function is called, except
perhaps for IPC password changing requests */
spass = getspnam(pass->pw_name);
if (spass && spass->sp_pwdp) {
if (set_this_crypted(spass->sp_pwdp) == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (set_this_salt(spass->sp_pwdp) == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
}
}
#elif defined(IA_UINFO)
{
/* Need to get password with SVR4.2's ia_ functions
instead of get{sp,pw}ent functions. Required by
UnixWare 2.x, tested on version
2.1. (tangent@cyberport.com) */
uinfo_t uinfo;
if (ia_openinfo(pass->pw_name, &uinfo) != -1)
ia_get_logpwd(uinfo, &(pass->pw_passwd));
}
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_GETPRPWNAM
{
struct pr_passwd *pr_pw = getprpwnam(pass->pw_name);
if (pr_pw && pr_pw->ufld.fd_encrypt) {
if (set_this_crypted(pr_pw->ufld.fd_encrypt) == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
}
}
#endif
A nice *big* change to the fundemental way we do things. Samba (ab)uses the returns from getpwnam() a lot - in particular it keeps them around for a long time - often past the next call... This adds a getpwnam_alloc and a getpwuid_alloc to the collection. These function as expected, returning a malloced structure that can be free()ed with passwd_free(&passwd). This patch also cuts down on the number of calls to getpwnam - mostly by taking advantage of the fact that the passdb interface is already case-insensiteve. With this patch most of the recursive cases have been removed (that I know of) and the problems are reduced further by not using the sys_ interface in the new code. This means that pointers to the cache won't be affected. (This is a tempoary HACK, I intend to kill the password cache entirly). The only change I'm a little worried about is the change to rpc_server/srv_samr_nt.c for private groups. In this case we are getting groups from the new group mapping DB. Do we still need to check for private groups? I've toned down the check to a case sensitve match with the new code, but we might be able to kill it entirly. I've also added a make_modifyable_passwd() function, that copies a passwd struct into the form that the old sys_getpw* code provided. As far as I can tell this is only actually used in the pass_check.c crazies, where I moved the final 'special case' for shadow passwords (out of _Get_Pwnam()). The matching case for getpwent() is dealt with already, in lib/util_getent.c Also included in here is a small change to register the [homes] share at vuid creation rather than just in one varient of the session setup. (This picks up the SPNEGO cases). The home directory is now stored on the vuid, and I am hoping this might provide a saner way to do %H substitions. TODO: Kill off remaining Get_Pwnam_Modify calls (they are not needed), change the remaining sys_getpwnam() callers to use getpwnam_alloc() and move Get_Pwnam to return an allocated struct. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 1d86c7f94230bc53daebd4d2cd829da6292e05da)
2002-01-17 11:45:58 +03:00
#ifdef HAVE_GETPWANAM
{
struct passwd_adjunct *pwret;
pwret = getpwanam(s);
if (pwret && pwret->pwa_passwd) {
if (set_this_crypted(pwret->pwa_passwd) == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
}
A nice *big* change to the fundemental way we do things. Samba (ab)uses the returns from getpwnam() a lot - in particular it keeps them around for a long time - often past the next call... This adds a getpwnam_alloc and a getpwuid_alloc to the collection. These function as expected, returning a malloced structure that can be free()ed with passwd_free(&passwd). This patch also cuts down on the number of calls to getpwnam - mostly by taking advantage of the fact that the passdb interface is already case-insensiteve. With this patch most of the recursive cases have been removed (that I know of) and the problems are reduced further by not using the sys_ interface in the new code. This means that pointers to the cache won't be affected. (This is a tempoary HACK, I intend to kill the password cache entirly). The only change I'm a little worried about is the change to rpc_server/srv_samr_nt.c for private groups. In this case we are getting groups from the new group mapping DB. Do we still need to check for private groups? I've toned down the check to a case sensitve match with the new code, but we might be able to kill it entirly. I've also added a make_modifyable_passwd() function, that copies a passwd struct into the form that the old sys_getpw* code provided. As far as I can tell this is only actually used in the pass_check.c crazies, where I moved the final 'special case' for shadow passwords (out of _Get_Pwnam()). The matching case for getpwent() is dealt with already, in lib/util_getent.c Also included in here is a small change to register the [homes] share at vuid creation rather than just in one varient of the session setup. (This picks up the SPNEGO cases). The home directory is now stored on the vuid, and I am hoping this might provide a saner way to do %H substitions. TODO: Kill off remaining Get_Pwnam_Modify calls (they are not needed), change the remaining sys_getpwnam() callers to use getpwnam_alloc() and move Get_Pwnam to return an allocated struct. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 1d86c7f94230bc53daebd4d2cd829da6292e05da)
2002-01-17 11:45:58 +03:00
}
#endif
#ifdef OSF1_ENH_SEC
{
struct pr_passwd *mypasswd;
DEBUG(5, ("Checking password for user %s in OSF1_ENH_SEC\n",
user));
mypasswd = getprpwnam(user);
if (mypasswd) {
if (set_this_user(mypasswd->ufld.fd_name) == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (set_this_crypted(mypasswd->ufld.fd_encrypt) == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
} else {
DEBUG(5,
("OSF1_ENH_SEC: No entry for user %s in protected database !\n",
user));
}
}
#endif
#ifdef ULTRIX_AUTH
{
AUTHORIZATION *ap = getauthuid(pass->pw_uid);
if (ap) {
if (set_this_crypted(ap->a_password) == NULL) {
endauthent();
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
endauthent();
}
}
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_TRUNCATED_SALT)
/* crypt on some platforms (HPUX in particular)
won't work with more than 2 salt characters. */
{
char *trunc_salt = get_this_salt();
if (!trunc_salt || strlen(trunc_salt) < 2) {
return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
}
trunc_salt[2] = 0;
if (set_this_salt(trunc_salt) == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
}
#endif
if (!get_this_crypted() || !*get_this_crypted()) {
if (!lp_null_passwords()) {
DEBUG(2, ("Disallowing %s with null password\n",
get_this_user()));
return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
}
if (!*password) {
DEBUG(3,
("Allowing access to %s with null password\n",
get_this_user()));
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
}
#endif /* defined(WITH_PAM) */
/* try it as it came to us */
2011-05-06 01:22:11 +04:00
nt_status = password_check(password, (const void *)rhost);
if NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status) {
return (nt_status);
} else if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD)) {
/* No point continuing if its not the password thats to blame (ie PAM disabled). */
return (nt_status);
}
if (!run_cracker) {
return (nt_status);
}
/* if the password was given to us with mixed case then we don't
* need to proceed as we know it hasn't been case modified by the
* client */
if (strhasupper(password) && strhaslower(password)) {
return nt_status;
}
/* make a copy of it */
pass2 = talloc_strdup(talloc_tos(), password);
if (!pass2) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
/* try all lowercase if it's currently all uppercase */
if (strhasupper(pass2)) {
if (!strlower_m(pass2)) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
2011-05-06 01:22:11 +04:00
nt_status = password_check(pass2, (const void *)rhost);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
return (nt_status);
}
}
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}