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/*
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Unix SMB / CIFS implementation .
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service ( connection ) opening and closing
Copyright ( C ) Andrew Tridgell 1992 - 1998
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This program is free software ; you can redistribute it and / or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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the Free Software Foundation ; either version 3 of the License , or
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( at your option ) any later version .
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This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful ,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY ; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE . See the
GNU General Public License for more details .
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You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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along with this program . If not , see < http : //www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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*/
# include "includes.h"
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# include "system/filesys.h"
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# include "system/passwd.h" /* uid_wrapper */
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# include "../lib/tsocket/tsocket.h"
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# include "smbd/smbd.h"
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# include "smbd/globals.h"
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# include "../librpc/gen_ndr/netlogon.h"
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# include "../libcli/security/security.h"
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# include "printing/pcap.h"
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# include "passdb/lookup_sid.h"
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# include "auth.h"
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# include "lib/param/loadparm.h"
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# include "messages.h"
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static bool canonicalize_connect_path ( connection_struct * conn )
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{
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bool ret ;
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char * resolved_name = SMB_VFS_REALPATH ( conn , conn - > connectpath ) ;
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if ( ! resolved_name ) {
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return false ;
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}
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ret = set_conn_connectpath ( conn , resolved_name ) ;
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SAFE_FREE ( resolved_name ) ;
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return ret ;
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}
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/****************************************************************************
Ensure when setting connectpath it is a canonicalized ( no . / // or ../)
absolute path stating in / and not ending in / .
Observent people will notice a similarity between this and check_path_syntax : - ) .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
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bool set_conn_connectpath ( connection_struct * conn , const char * connectpath )
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{
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char * destname ;
char * d ;
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const char * s = connectpath ;
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bool start_of_name_component = true ;
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if ( connectpath = = NULL | | connectpath [ 0 ] = = ' \0 ' ) {
return false ;
}
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/* Allocate for strlen + '\0' + possible leading '/' */
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destname = ( char * ) talloc_size ( conn , strlen ( connectpath ) + 2 ) ;
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if ( ! destname ) {
return false ;
}
d = destname ;
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* d + + = ' / ' ; /* Always start with root. */
while ( * s ) {
if ( * s = = ' / ' ) {
/* Eat multiple '/' */
while ( * s = = ' / ' ) {
s + + ;
}
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if ( ( d > destname + 1 ) & & ( * s ! = ' \0 ' ) ) {
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* d + + = ' / ' ;
}
start_of_name_component = True ;
continue ;
}
if ( start_of_name_component ) {
if ( ( s [ 0 ] = = ' . ' ) & & ( s [ 1 ] = = ' . ' ) & & ( s [ 2 ] = = ' / ' | | s [ 2 ] = = ' \0 ' ) ) {
/* Uh oh - "/../" or "/..\0" ! */
/* Go past the ../ or .. */
if ( s [ 2 ] = = ' / ' ) {
s + = 3 ;
} else {
s + = 2 ; /* Go past the .. */
}
/* If we just added a '/' - delete it */
if ( ( d > destname ) & & ( * ( d - 1 ) = = ' / ' ) ) {
* ( d - 1 ) = ' \0 ' ;
d - - ;
}
/* Are we at the start ? Can't go back further if so. */
if ( d < = destname ) {
* d + + = ' / ' ; /* Can't delete root */
continue ;
}
/* Go back one level... */
/* Decrement d first as d points to the *next* char to write into. */
for ( d - - ; d > destname ; d - - ) {
if ( * d = = ' / ' ) {
break ;
}
}
/* We're still at the start of a name component, just the previous one. */
continue ;
} else if ( ( s [ 0 ] = = ' . ' ) & & ( ( s [ 1 ] = = ' \0 ' ) | | s [ 1 ] = = ' / ' ) ) {
/* Component of pathname can't be "." only - skip the '.' . */
if ( s [ 1 ] = = ' / ' ) {
s + = 2 ;
} else {
s + + ;
}
continue ;
}
}
if ( ! ( * s & 0x80 ) ) {
* d + + = * s + + ;
} else {
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size_t siz ;
/* Get the size of the next MB character. */
next_codepoint ( s , & siz ) ;
switch ( siz ) {
case 5 :
* d + + = * s + + ;
/*fall through*/
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case 4 :
* d + + = * s + + ;
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/*fall through*/
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case 3 :
* d + + = * s + + ;
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/*fall through*/
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case 2 :
* d + + = * s + + ;
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/*fall through*/
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case 1 :
* d + + = * s + + ;
break ;
default :
break ;
}
}
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start_of_name_component = false ;
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}
* d = ' \0 ' ;
/* And must not end in '/' */
if ( d > destname + 1 & & ( * ( d - 1 ) = = ' / ' ) ) {
* ( d - 1 ) = ' \0 ' ;
}
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DEBUG ( 10 , ( " set_conn_connectpath: service %s, connectpath = %s \n " ,
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lp_servicename ( talloc_tos ( ) , SNUM ( conn ) ) , destname ) ) ;
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talloc_free ( conn - > connectpath ) ;
conn - > connectpath = destname ;
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/* Ensure conn->cwd is initialized - start as conn->connectpath. */
TALLOC_FREE ( conn - > cwd ) ;
conn - > cwd = talloc_strdup ( conn , conn - > connectpath ) ;
if ( ! conn - > cwd ) {
return false ;
}
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return true ;
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}
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/****************************************************************************
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Load parameters specific to a connection / service .
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
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bool set_current_service ( connection_struct * conn , uint16 flags , bool do_chdir )
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{
int snum ;
if ( ! conn ) {
last_conn = NULL ;
return ( False ) ;
}
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conn - > lastused_count + + ;
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snum = SNUM ( conn ) ;
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if ( do_chdir & &
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vfs_ChDir ( conn , conn - > connectpath ) ! = 0 & &
vfs_ChDir ( conn , conn - > origpath ) ! = 0 ) {
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DEBUG ( ( ( errno ! = EACCES ) ? 0 : 3 ) , ( " chdir (%s) failed, reason: %s \n " ,
conn - > connectpath , strerror ( errno ) ) ) ;
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return ( False ) ;
}
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if ( ( conn = = last_conn ) & & ( last_flags = = flags ) ) {
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return ( True ) ;
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}
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last_conn = conn ;
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last_flags = flags ;
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/* Obey the client case sensitivity requests - only for clients that support it. */
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switch ( lp_casesensitive ( snum ) ) {
case Auto :
{
/* We need this uglyness due to DOS/Win9x clients that lie about case insensitivity. */
enum remote_arch_types ra_type = get_remote_arch ( ) ;
if ( ( ra_type ! = RA_SAMBA ) & & ( ra_type ! = RA_CIFSFS ) ) {
/* Client can't support per-packet case sensitive pathnames. */
conn - > case_sensitive = False ;
} else {
conn - > case_sensitive = ! ( flags & FLAG_CASELESS_PATHNAMES ) ;
}
}
break ;
case True :
conn - > case_sensitive = True ;
break ;
default :
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conn - > case_sensitive = False ;
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break ;
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}
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return ( True ) ;
}
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/****************************************************************************
do some basic sainity checks on the share .
This function modifies dev , ecode .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
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static NTSTATUS share_sanity_checks ( const struct tsocket_address * remote_address ,
const char * rhost ,
int snum ,
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fstring dev )
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{
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char * raddr ;
raddr = tsocket_address_inet_addr_string ( remote_address ,
talloc_tos ( ) ) ;
if ( raddr = = NULL ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
if ( ! lp_snum_ok ( snum ) | |
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! allow_access ( lp_hostsdeny ( snum ) , lp_hostsallow ( snum ) ,
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rhost , raddr ) ) {
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return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
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}
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if ( dev [ 0 ] = = ' ? ' | | ! dev [ 0 ] ) {
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if ( lp_print_ok ( snum ) ) {
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fstrcpy ( dev , " LPT1: " ) ;
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} else if ( strequal ( lp_fstype ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) , " IPC " ) ) {
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fstrcpy ( dev , " IPC " ) ;
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} else {
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fstrcpy ( dev , " A: " ) ;
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}
}
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if ( ! strupper_m ( dev ) ) {
DEBUG ( 2 , ( " strupper_m %s failed \n " , dev ) ) ;
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER ;
}
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if ( lp_print_ok ( snum ) ) {
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if ( ! strequal ( dev , " LPT1: " ) ) {
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return NT_STATUS_BAD_DEVICE_TYPE ;
}
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} else if ( strequal ( lp_fstype ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) , " IPC " ) ) {
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if ( ! strequal ( dev , " IPC " ) ) {
return NT_STATUS_BAD_DEVICE_TYPE ;
}
} else if ( ! strequal ( dev , " A: " ) ) {
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return NT_STATUS_BAD_DEVICE_TYPE ;
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}
/* Behave as a printer if we are supposed to */
if ( lp_print_ok ( snum ) & & ( strcmp ( dev , " A: " ) = = 0 ) ) {
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fstrcpy ( dev , " LPT1: " ) ;
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}
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return NT_STATUS_OK ;
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}
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/*
* Go through lookup_name etc to find the force ' d group .
*
* Create a new token from src_token , replacing the primary group sid with the
* one found .
*/
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static NTSTATUS find_forced_group ( bool force_user ,
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int snum , const char * username ,
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struct dom_sid * pgroup_sid ,
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gid_t * pgid )
{
NTSTATUS result = NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_GROUP ;
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TALLOC_CTX * frame = talloc_stackframe ( ) ;
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struct dom_sid group_sid ;
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enum lsa_SidType type ;
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char * groupname ;
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bool user_must_be_member = False ;
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gid_t gid ;
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groupname = lp_force_group ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) ;
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if ( groupname = = NULL ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " talloc_strdup failed \n " ) ) ;
result = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
goto done ;
}
if ( groupname [ 0 ] = = ' + ' ) {
user_must_be_member = True ;
groupname + = 1 ;
}
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groupname = talloc_string_sub ( talloc_tos ( ) , groupname ,
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" %S " , lp_servicename ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) ) ;
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if ( groupname = = NULL ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " talloc_string_sub failed \n " ) ) ;
result = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
goto done ;
}
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if ( ! lookup_name_smbconf ( talloc_tos ( ) , groupname ,
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LOOKUP_NAME_ALL | LOOKUP_NAME_GROUP ,
NULL , NULL , & group_sid , & type ) ) {
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DEBUG ( 10 , ( " lookup_name_smbconf(%s) failed \n " ,
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groupname ) ) ;
goto done ;
}
if ( ( type ! = SID_NAME_DOM_GRP ) & & ( type ! = SID_NAME_ALIAS ) & &
( type ! = SID_NAME_WKN_GRP ) ) {
DEBUG ( 10 , ( " %s is a %s, not a group \n " , groupname ,
sid_type_lookup ( type ) ) ) ;
goto done ;
}
if ( ! sid_to_gid ( & group_sid , & gid ) ) {
DEBUG ( 10 , ( " sid_to_gid(%s) for %s failed \n " ,
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sid_string_dbg ( & group_sid ) , groupname ) ) ;
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goto done ;
}
/*
* If the user has been forced and the forced group starts with a ' + ' ,
* then we only set the group to be the forced group if the forced
* user is a member of that group . Otherwise , the meaning of the ' + '
* would be ignored .
*/
if ( force_user & & user_must_be_member ) {
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if ( user_in_group_sid ( username , & group_sid ) ) {
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sid_copy ( pgroup_sid , & group_sid ) ;
* pgid = gid ;
DEBUG ( 3 , ( " Forced group %s for member %s \n " ,
groupname , username ) ) ;
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} else {
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " find_forced_group: forced user %s is not a member "
" of forced group %s. Disallowing access. \n " ,
username , groupname ) ) ;
result = NT_STATUS_MEMBER_NOT_IN_GROUP ;
goto done ;
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}
} else {
sid_copy ( pgroup_sid , & group_sid ) ;
* pgid = gid ;
DEBUG ( 3 , ( " Forced group %s \n " , groupname ) ) ;
}
result = NT_STATUS_OK ;
done :
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TALLOC_FREE ( frame ) ;
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return result ;
}
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/****************************************************************************
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Create an auth_session_info structure for a connection_struct
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
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static NTSTATUS create_connection_session_info ( struct smbd_server_connection * sconn ,
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TALLOC_CTX * mem_ctx , int snum ,
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struct auth_session_info * session_info ,
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struct auth_session_info * * presult )
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{
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struct auth_session_info * result ;
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if ( lp_guest_only ( snum ) ) {
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return make_session_info_guest ( mem_ctx , presult ) ;
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}
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/*
* This is the normal security ! = share case where we have a
* valid vuid from the session setup . */
if ( security_session_user_level ( session_info , NULL ) < SECURITY_USER ) {
if ( ! lp_guest_ok ( snum ) ) {
DEBUG ( 2 , ( " guest user (from session setup) "
" not permitted to access this share "
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" (%s) \n " , lp_servicename ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) ) ) ;
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return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
}
} else {
if ( ! user_ok_token ( session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ,
session_info - > info - > domain_name ,
session_info - > security_token , snum ) ) {
DEBUG ( 2 , ( " user '%s' (from session setup) not "
" permitted to access this share "
" (%s) \n " ,
session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ,
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lp_servicename ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) ) ) ;
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return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
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}
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}
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2012-03-05 00:47:50 +04:00
result = copy_session_info ( mem_ctx , session_info ) ;
if ( result = = NULL ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
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2012-03-05 00:47:50 +04:00
* presult = result ;
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
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}
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/****************************************************************************
set relavent user and group settings corresponding to force user / group
configuration for the given snum .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
NTSTATUS set_conn_force_user_group ( connection_struct * conn , int snum )
{
NTSTATUS status ;
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if ( * lp_force_user ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) ) {
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/*
* Replace conn - > session_info with a completely faked up one
* from the username we are forced into : - )
*/
char * fuser ;
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char * sanitized_username ;
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struct auth_session_info * forced_serverinfo ;
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bool guest ;
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2012-07-18 09:37:23 +04:00
fuser = talloc_string_sub ( conn , lp_force_user ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) , " %S " ,
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lp_const_servicename ( snum ) ) ;
if ( fuser = = NULL ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
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guest = security_session_user_level ( conn - > session_info , NULL ) < SECURITY_USER ;
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status = make_session_info_from_username (
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conn , fuser ,
guest ,
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& forced_serverinfo ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
return status ;
}
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/* We don't want to replace the original sanitized_username
as it is the original user given in the connect attempt .
This is used in ' % U ' substitutions . */
sanitized_username = discard_const_p ( char ,
forced_serverinfo - > unix_info - > sanitized_username ) ;
TALLOC_FREE ( sanitized_username ) ;
forced_serverinfo - > unix_info - > sanitized_username =
talloc_move ( forced_serverinfo - > unix_info ,
& conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > sanitized_username ) ;
2011-03-02 16:34:28 +03:00
TALLOC_FREE ( conn - > session_info ) ;
conn - > session_info = forced_serverinfo ;
conn - > force_user = true ;
DEBUG ( 3 , ( " Forced user %s \n " , fuser ) ) ;
}
/*
* If force group is true , then override
* any groupid stored for the connecting user .
*/
2012-07-18 09:37:23 +04:00
if ( * lp_force_group ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) ) {
2011-03-02 16:34:28 +03:00
status = find_forced_group (
2011-07-15 09:55:31 +04:00
conn - > force_user , snum , conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ,
2011-03-02 16:34:28 +03:00
& conn - > session_info - > security_token - > sids [ 1 ] ,
2011-07-15 08:59:14 +04:00
& conn - > session_info - > unix_token - > gid ) ;
2011-03-02 16:34:28 +03:00
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
return status ;
}
/*
* We need to cache this gid , to use within
* change_to_user ( ) separately from the conn - > session_info
* struct . We only use conn - > session_info directly if
* " force_user " was set .
*/
2011-07-15 08:59:14 +04:00
conn - > force_group_gid = conn - > session_info - > unix_token - > gid ;
2011-03-02 16:34:28 +03:00
}
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
}
2008-05-06 19:48:22 +04:00
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
/****************************************************************************
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
Make a connection , given the snum to connect to , and the vuser of the
connecting user if appropriate .
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
static NTSTATUS make_connection_snum ( struct smbd_server_connection * sconn ,
2012-01-19 00:38:14 +04:00
connection_struct * conn ,
2012-06-05 14:04:15 +04:00
int snum , struct user_struct * vuser ,
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
const char * pdev )
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
{
2009-06-23 02:26:56 +04:00
struct smb_filename * smb_fname_cpath = NULL ;
2003-03-19 02:49:03 +03:00
fstring dev ;
2005-10-03 22:14:09 +04:00
int ret ;
2007-11-11 01:43:39 +03:00
bool on_err_call_dis_hook = false ;
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
uid_t effuid ;
gid_t effgid ;
2008-05-06 23:50:08 +04:00
NTSTATUS status ;
2003-03-19 02:49:03 +03:00
fstrcpy ( dev , pdev ) ;
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
status = share_sanity_checks ( sconn - > remote_address ,
2011-06-16 17:49:41 +04:00
sconn - > remote_hostname ,
snum ,
dev ) ;
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
if ( NT_STATUS_IS_ERR ( status ) ) {
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
goto err_root_exit ;
}
2000-07-25 10:10:59 +04:00
2006-12-10 08:23:47 +03:00
conn - > params - > service = snum ;
2006-05-14 19:24:14 +04:00
2011-02-21 12:25:52 +03:00
status = create_connection_session_info ( sconn ,
2012-03-05 00:47:50 +04:00
conn , snum , vuser - > session_info ,
2011-02-21 12:25:52 +03:00
& conn - > session_info ) ;
2008-05-07 14:20:18 +04:00
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
2011-02-21 12:25:52 +03:00
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " create_connection_session_info failed: %s \n " ,
2008-05-07 14:20:18 +04:00
nt_errstr ( status ) ) ) ;
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
goto err_root_exit ;
2008-05-07 14:20:18 +04:00
}
2012-02-03 11:03:10 +04:00
if ( lp_guest_only ( snum ) ) {
2008-05-07 14:20:18 +04:00
conn - > force_user = true ;
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
}
conn - > num_files_open = 0 ;
2006-04-15 08:07:10 +04:00
conn - > lastused = conn - > lastused_count = time ( NULL ) ;
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
conn - > printer = ( strncmp ( dev , " LPT " , 3 ) = = 0 ) ;
2005-12-17 20:13:45 +03:00
conn - > ipc = ( ( strncmp ( dev , " IPC " , 3 ) = = 0 ) | |
( lp_enable_asu_support ( ) & & strequal ( dev , " ADMIN$ " ) ) ) ;
2004-05-07 22:37:47 +04:00
/* Case options for the share. */
2004-06-15 22:36:45 +04:00
if ( lp_casesensitive ( snum ) = = Auto ) {
2005-12-17 20:13:45 +03:00
/* We will be setting this per packet. Set to be case
* insensitive for now . */
2004-06-15 22:36:45 +04:00
conn - > case_sensitive = False ;
} else {
2007-10-19 04:40:25 +04:00
conn - > case_sensitive = ( bool ) lp_casesensitive ( snum ) ;
2004-06-15 22:36:45 +04:00
}
2004-05-07 22:37:47 +04:00
conn - > case_preserve = lp_preservecase ( snum ) ;
conn - > short_case_preserve = lp_shortpreservecase ( snum ) ;
2007-12-28 10:51:03 +03:00
conn - > encrypt_level = lp_smb_encrypt ( snum ) ;
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
conn - > veto_list = NULL ;
conn - > hide_list = NULL ;
conn - > veto_oplock_list = NULL ;
2007-10-11 00:34:30 +04:00
conn - > aio_write_behind_list = NULL ;
2004-02-13 22:05:25 +03:00
2006-07-11 22:01:26 +04:00
conn - > read_only = lp_readonly ( SNUM ( conn ) ) ;
2001-08-17 12:12:33 +04:00
2011-03-02 16:34:28 +03:00
status = set_conn_force_user_group ( conn , snum ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
goto err_root_exit ;
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
}
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
2012-02-03 11:03:10 +04:00
conn - > vuid = vuser - > vuid ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
{
2007-11-11 01:43:39 +03:00
char * s = talloc_sub_advanced ( talloc_tos ( ) ,
2012-07-18 09:37:23 +04:00
lp_servicename ( talloc_tos ( ) , SNUM ( conn ) ) ,
2011-07-15 09:55:31 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ,
2008-05-08 17:53:55 +04:00
conn - > connectpath ,
2011-07-15 08:59:14 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_token - > gid ,
2011-07-15 09:55:31 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > sanitized_username ,
2011-07-18 06:58:25 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > info - > domain_name ,
2014-02-02 17:04:46 +04:00
lp_path ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) ) ;
2007-11-11 01:43:39 +03:00
if ( ! s ) {
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
goto err_root_exit ;
2007-11-11 01:43:39 +03:00
}
if ( ! set_conn_connectpath ( conn , s ) ) {
TALLOC_FREE ( s ) ;
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
goto err_root_exit ;
2007-11-11 01:43:39 +03:00
}
2005-12-17 20:13:45 +03:00
DEBUG ( 3 , ( " Connect path is '%s' for service [%s] \n " , s ,
2012-07-18 09:37:23 +04:00
lp_servicename ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) ) ) ;
2007-11-11 01:43:39 +03:00
TALLOC_FREE ( s ) ;
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
}
2001-04-12 01:19:25 +04:00
/*
2013-01-06 17:39:07 +04:00
* Set up the share security descriptor
2001-04-12 01:19:25 +04:00
*/
2013-01-05 02:40:05 +04:00
status = check_user_share_access ( conn ,
conn - > session_info ,
& conn - > share_access ,
& conn - > read_only ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
goto err_root_exit ;
2001-04-12 01:19:25 +04:00
}
2013-01-05 02:40:05 +04:00
2000-08-04 02:38:43 +04:00
/* Initialise VFS function pointers */
2001-10-18 04:27:20 +04:00
if ( ! smbd_vfs_init ( conn ) ) {
2005-12-17 20:13:45 +03:00
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " vfs_init failed for service %s \n " ,
2012-07-18 09:37:23 +04:00
lp_servicename ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) ) ) ;
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
status = NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME ;
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
goto err_root_exit ;
2000-08-04 02:38:43 +04:00
}
2010-02-12 02:16:23 +03:00
/* ROOT Activities: */
/* explicitly check widelinks here so that we can correctly warn
2010-02-12 00:12:29 +03:00
* in the logs . */
2010-02-12 02:16:23 +03:00
widelinks_warning ( snum ) ;
2007-05-27 20:34:49 +04:00
/*
* Enforce the max connections parameter .
*/
if ( ( lp_max_connections ( snum ) > 0 )
2012-07-18 09:37:23 +04:00
& & ( count_current_connections ( lp_servicename ( talloc_tos ( ) , SNUM ( conn ) ) , True ) > =
2007-05-27 20:34:49 +04:00
lp_max_connections ( snum ) ) ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " Max connections (%d) exceeded for %s \n " ,
2012-07-18 09:37:23 +04:00
lp_max_connections ( snum ) ,
lp_servicename ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) ) ) ;
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
status = NT_STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES ;
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
goto err_root_exit ;
}
2001-09-20 11:09:28 +04:00
2010-02-17 22:13:35 +03:00
/* Invoke VFS make connection hook - this must be the first
filesystem operation that we do . */
2012-07-18 09:37:23 +04:00
if ( SMB_VFS_CONNECT ( conn , lp_servicename ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) ,
2011-07-15 09:55:31 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ) < 0 ) {
2010-02-17 22:13:35 +03:00
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " make_connection: VFS make connection failed! \n " ) ) ;
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
status = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL ;
2010-02-17 22:13:35 +03:00
goto err_root_exit ;
}
/* Any error exit after here needs to call the disconnect hook. */
on_err_call_dis_hook = true ;
2012-03-21 14:59:27 +04:00
if ( ( ! conn - > printer ) & & ( ! conn - > ipc ) & &
2012-03-22 17:58:24 +04:00
lp_change_notify ( conn - > params ) ) {
if ( sconn - > notify_ctx = = NULL ) {
sconn - > notify_ctx = notify_init (
sconn , sconn - > msg_ctx , sconn - > ev_ctx ) ;
}
if ( sconn - > sys_notify_ctx = = NULL ) {
sconn - > sys_notify_ctx = sys_notify_context_create (
sconn , sconn - > ev_ctx ) ;
}
2010-02-17 22:13:35 +03:00
}
2012-03-30 18:00:15 +04:00
if ( lp_kernel_oplocks ( snum ) ) {
init_kernel_oplocks ( conn - > sconn ) ;
}
2010-02-12 01:45:53 +03:00
/*
* Fix compatibility issue pointed out by Volker .
* We pass the conn - > connectpath to the preexec
* scripts as a parameter , so attempt to canonicalize
* it here before calling the preexec scripts .
* We ignore errors here , as it is possible that
* the conn - > connectpath doesn ' t exist yet and
* the preexec scripts will create them .
*/
( void ) canonicalize_connect_path ( conn ) ;
2005-12-17 20:13:45 +03:00
/* Preexecs are done here as they might make the dir we are to ChDir
* to below */
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
/* execute any "root preexec = " line */
2012-07-18 09:37:23 +04:00
if ( * lp_rootpreexec ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) ) {
2007-11-11 01:43:39 +03:00
char * cmd = talloc_sub_advanced ( talloc_tos ( ) ,
2012-07-18 09:37:23 +04:00
lp_servicename ( talloc_tos ( ) , SNUM ( conn ) ) ,
2011-07-15 09:55:31 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ,
2008-05-08 17:53:55 +04:00
conn - > connectpath ,
2011-07-15 08:59:14 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_token - > gid ,
2011-07-15 09:55:31 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > sanitized_username ,
2011-07-18 06:58:25 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > info - > domain_name ,
2012-07-18 09:37:23 +04:00
lp_rootpreexec ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) ) ;
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
DEBUG ( 5 , ( " cmd=%s \n " , cmd ) ) ;
2001-04-13 23:12:06 +04:00
ret = smbrun ( cmd , NULL ) ;
2007-11-11 01:43:39 +03:00
TALLOC_FREE ( cmd ) ;
2005-04-27 03:52:21 +04:00
if ( ret ! = 0 & & lp_rootpreexec_close ( snum ) ) {
2005-12-17 20:13:45 +03:00
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " root preexec gave %d - failing "
" connection \n " , ret ) ) ;
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
goto err_root_exit ;
1999-12-13 16:27:58 +03:00
}
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
}
2001-09-20 11:09:28 +04:00
/* USER Activites: */
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
if ( ! change_to_user ( conn , conn - > vuid ) ) {
/* No point continuing if they fail the basic checks */
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " Can't become connected user! \n " ) ) ;
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
status = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE ;
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
goto err_root_exit ;
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
}
2002-11-18 09:12:47 +03:00
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
effuid = geteuid ( ) ;
effgid = getegid ( ) ;
2005-12-17 20:13:45 +03:00
/* Remember that a different vuid can connect later without these
* checks . . . */
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
2005-12-17 20:13:45 +03:00
/* Preexecs are done here as they might make the dir we are to ChDir
* to below */
2001-09-20 11:09:28 +04:00
/* execute any "preexec = " line */
2012-07-18 09:37:23 +04:00
if ( * lp_preexec ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) ) {
2007-11-11 01:43:39 +03:00
char * cmd = talloc_sub_advanced ( talloc_tos ( ) ,
2012-07-18 09:37:23 +04:00
lp_servicename ( talloc_tos ( ) , SNUM ( conn ) ) ,
2011-07-15 09:55:31 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ,
2008-05-08 17:53:55 +04:00
conn - > connectpath ,
2011-07-15 08:59:14 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_token - > gid ,
2011-07-15 09:55:31 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > sanitized_username ,
2011-07-18 06:58:25 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > info - > domain_name ,
2012-07-18 09:37:23 +04:00
lp_preexec ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) ) ;
2001-09-20 11:09:28 +04:00
ret = smbrun ( cmd , NULL ) ;
2007-11-11 01:43:39 +03:00
TALLOC_FREE ( cmd ) ;
2005-04-27 03:52:21 +04:00
if ( ret ! = 0 & & lp_preexec_close ( snum ) ) {
2005-12-17 20:13:45 +03:00
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " preexec gave %d - failing connection \n " ,
ret ) ) ;
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
2007-11-11 01:43:39 +03:00
goto err_root_exit ;
2001-09-20 11:09:28 +04:00
}
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
}
2003-09-07 20:36:13 +04:00
2010-02-17 22:13:35 +03:00
# ifdef WITH_FAKE_KASERVER
if ( lp_afs_share ( snum ) ) {
afs_login ( conn ) ;
}
# endif
/*
* we ' ve finished with the user stuff - go back to root
* so the SMB_VFS_STAT call will only fail on path errors ,
* not permission problems .
*/
change_to_root_user ( ) ;
/* ROOT Activites: */
2010-02-11 22:00:45 +03:00
/*
* If widelinks are disallowed we need to canonicalise the connect
* path here to ensure we don ' t have any symlinks in the
* connectpath . We will be checking all paths on this connection are
* below this directory . We must do this after the VFS init as we
* depend on the realpath ( ) pointer in the vfs table . JRA .
*/
2010-02-12 02:16:23 +03:00
if ( ! lp_widelinks ( snum ) ) {
2010-02-11 22:00:45 +03:00
if ( ! canonicalize_connect_path ( conn ) ) {
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " canonicalize_connect_path failed "
" for service %s, path %s \n " ,
2012-07-18 09:37:23 +04:00
lp_servicename ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) ,
2010-02-11 22:00:45 +03:00
conn - > connectpath ) ) ;
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
status = NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME ;
2010-02-11 22:00:45 +03:00
goto err_root_exit ;
}
}
2005-06-27 21:14:15 +04:00
/* Add veto/hide lists */
if ( ! IS_IPC ( conn ) & & ! IS_PRINT ( conn ) ) {
2012-07-18 09:37:23 +04:00
set_namearray ( & conn - > veto_list ,
lp_veto_files ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) ) ;
set_namearray ( & conn - > hide_list ,
lp_hide_files ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) ) ;
set_namearray ( & conn - > veto_oplock_list ,
lp_veto_oplocks ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) ) ;
2008-05-27 08:13:05 +04:00
set_namearray ( & conn - > aio_write_behind_list ,
2012-07-18 09:37:23 +04:00
lp_aio_write_behind ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) ) ;
2005-06-27 21:14:15 +04:00
}
2013-04-15 13:10:28 +04:00
smb_fname_cpath = synthetic_smb_fname ( talloc_tos ( ) , conn - > connectpath ,
NULL , NULL ) ;
if ( smb_fname_cpath = = NULL ) {
status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
2009-06-23 02:26:56 +04:00
goto err_root_exit ;
}
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
/* win2000 does not check the permissions on the directory
during the tree connect , instead relying on permission
check during individual operations . To match this behaviour
I have disabled this chdir check ( tridge ) */
/* the alternative is just to check the directory exists */
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
2010-02-13 05:17:32 +03:00
if ( ( ret = SMB_VFS_STAT ( conn , smb_fname_cpath ) ) ! = 0 | |
! S_ISDIR ( smb_fname_cpath - > st . st_ex_mode ) ) {
if ( ret = = 0 & & ! S_ISDIR ( smb_fname_cpath - > st . st_ex_mode ) ) {
2005-12-17 20:13:45 +03:00
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " '%s' is not a directory, when connecting to "
" [%s] \n " , conn - > connectpath ,
2012-07-18 09:37:23 +04:00
lp_servicename ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) ) ) ;
2010-02-13 05:17:32 +03:00
} else {
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " '%s' does not exist or permission denied "
" when connecting to [%s] Error was %s \n " ,
2012-07-18 09:37:23 +04:00
conn - > connectpath ,
lp_servicename ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) ,
2005-12-17 20:13:45 +03:00
strerror ( errno ) ) ) ;
2005-10-03 22:14:09 +04:00
}
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
status = NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME ;
2010-02-13 05:17:32 +03:00
goto err_root_exit ;
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
}
2010-05-20 22:36:47 +04:00
conn - > base_share_dev = smb_fname_cpath - > st . st_ex_dev ;
2007-09-13 01:48:20 +04:00
2012-07-23 09:21:34 +04:00
talloc_free ( conn - > origpath ) ;
conn - > origpath = talloc_strdup ( conn , conn - > connectpath ) ;
2007-09-13 01:48:20 +04:00
2007-12-23 01:01:25 +03:00
/* Figure out the characteristics of the underlying filesystem. This
* assumes that all the filesystem mounted withing a share path have
* the same characteristics , which is likely but not guaranteed .
*/
2009-08-25 07:57:37 +04:00
conn - > fs_capabilities = SMB_VFS_FS_CAPABILITIES ( conn , & conn - > ts_res ) ;
2007-12-23 01:01:25 +03:00
1999-12-13 16:27:58 +03:00
/*
* Print out the ' connected as ' stuff here as we need
2001-09-20 11:09:28 +04:00
* to know the effective uid and gid we will be using
* ( at least initially ) .
1999-12-13 16:27:58 +03:00
*/
2013-01-27 02:42:57 +04:00
if ( DEBUGLVL ( IS_IPC ( conn ) ? 3 : 2 ) ) {
2005-12-17 20:13:45 +03:00
dbgtext ( " %s (%s) " , get_remote_machine_name ( ) ,
2011-06-16 17:49:41 +04:00
tsocket_address_string ( conn - > sconn - > remote_address ,
talloc_tos ( ) ) ) ;
2010-06-12 13:39:03 +04:00
dbgtext ( " %s " , srv_is_signing_active ( sconn ) ? " signed " : " " ) ;
2012-07-18 09:37:23 +04:00
dbgtext ( " connect to service %s " ,
lp_servicename ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) ) ;
2008-05-08 18:06:42 +04:00
dbgtext ( " initially as user %s " ,
2011-07-15 09:55:31 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ) ;
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
dbgtext ( " (uid=%d, gid=%d) " , ( int ) effuid , ( int ) effgid ) ;
2012-03-24 23:17:08 +04:00
dbgtext ( " (pid %d) \n " , ( int ) getpid ( ) ) ;
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
}
2007-09-13 01:48:20 +04:00
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
return status ;
2007-11-11 01:43:39 +03:00
err_root_exit :
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
2009-06-23 02:26:56 +04:00
TALLOC_FREE ( smb_fname_cpath ) ;
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
/* We must exit this function as root. */
2010-02-13 10:18:53 +03:00
if ( geteuid ( ) ! = 0 ) {
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
change_to_root_user ( ) ;
}
2007-11-11 01:43:39 +03:00
if ( on_err_call_dis_hook ) {
/* Call VFS disconnect hook */
SMB_VFS_DISCONNECT ( conn ) ;
}
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
return status ;
2012-01-19 00:38:14 +04:00
}
/****************************************************************************
Make a connection to a service from SMB1 . Internal interface .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
static connection_struct * make_connection_smb1 ( struct smbd_server_connection * sconn ,
2012-11-01 16:53:27 +04:00
NTTIME now ,
2012-06-05 14:04:15 +04:00
int snum , struct user_struct * vuser ,
2012-01-19 00:38:14 +04:00
const char * pdev ,
NTSTATUS * pstatus )
{
2012-03-28 18:14:09 +04:00
struct smbXsrv_tcon * tcon ;
NTSTATUS status ;
struct connection_struct * conn ;
status = smb1srv_tcon_create ( sconn - > conn , now , & tcon ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " make_connection_smb1: Couldn't find free tcon %s. \n " ,
nt_errstr ( status ) ) ) ;
* pstatus = status ;
return NULL ;
}
conn = conn_new ( sconn ) ;
2012-01-19 00:38:14 +04:00
if ( ! conn ) {
2012-03-28 18:14:09 +04:00
TALLOC_FREE ( tcon ) ;
2012-01-19 00:38:14 +04:00
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " make_connection_smb1: Couldn't find free connection. \n " ) ) ;
* pstatus = NT_STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES ;
return NULL ;
}
2012-03-28 18:14:09 +04:00
conn - > cnum = tcon - > global - > tcon_wire_id ;
conn - > tcon = tcon ;
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
* pstatus = make_connection_snum ( sconn ,
2012-01-19 00:38:14 +04:00
conn ,
snum ,
vuser ,
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
pdev ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( * pstatus ) ) {
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
conn_free ( conn ) ;
2012-03-28 18:14:09 +04:00
TALLOC_FREE ( tcon ) ;
2012-01-19 00:38:14 +04:00
return NULL ;
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
}
2012-03-28 18:14:09 +04:00
2012-07-18 09:37:23 +04:00
tcon - > global - > share_name = lp_servicename ( tcon - > global , SNUM ( conn ) ) ;
2012-03-28 18:14:09 +04:00
if ( tcon - > global - > share_name = = NULL ) {
conn_free ( conn ) ;
TALLOC_FREE ( tcon ) ;
* pstatus = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
return NULL ;
}
2012-10-18 15:40:08 +04:00
tcon - > global - > session_global_id =
vuser - > session - > global - > session_global_id ;
2012-03-28 18:14:09 +04:00
tcon - > compat = talloc_move ( tcon , & conn ) ;
tcon - > status = NT_STATUS_OK ;
* pstatus = smbXsrv_tcon_update ( tcon ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( * pstatus ) ) {
TALLOC_FREE ( tcon ) ;
return NULL ;
}
return tcon - > compat ;
2012-01-19 00:38:14 +04:00
}
/****************************************************************************
Make a connection to a service from SMB2 . External SMB2 interface .
We must set cnum before claiming connection .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
connection_struct * make_connection_smb2 ( struct smbd_server_connection * sconn ,
2012-03-27 13:09:05 +04:00
struct smbXsrv_tcon * tcon ,
int snum ,
2012-06-05 14:04:15 +04:00
struct user_struct * vuser ,
2012-01-19 00:38:14 +04:00
const char * pdev ,
NTSTATUS * pstatus )
{
connection_struct * conn = conn_new ( sconn ) ;
if ( ! conn ) {
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " make_connection_smb2: Couldn't find free connection. \n " ) ) ;
* pstatus = NT_STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES ;
return NULL ;
}
2012-03-27 13:09:05 +04:00
conn - > cnum = tcon - > global - > tcon_wire_id ;
conn - > tcon = tcon ;
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
* pstatus = make_connection_snum ( sconn ,
2012-01-19 00:38:14 +04:00
conn ,
2012-03-27 13:09:05 +04:00
snum ,
2012-01-19 00:38:14 +04:00
vuser ,
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
pdev ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( * pstatus ) ) {
2012-01-19 00:38:14 +04:00
conn_free ( conn ) ;
return NULL ;
}
return conn ;
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
}
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
/****************************************************************************
2012-01-19 00:38:14 +04:00
Make a connection to a service . External SMB1 interface .
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
*
* @ param service
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
2009-05-26 18:38:45 +04:00
connection_struct * make_connection ( struct smbd_server_connection * sconn ,
2012-11-01 16:53:27 +04:00
NTTIME now ,
2012-02-03 11:03:10 +04:00
const char * service_in ,
2012-06-05 17:56:46 +04:00
const char * pdev , uint64_t vuid ,
2005-12-17 20:13:45 +03:00
NTSTATUS * status )
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
{
uid_t euid ;
2012-06-05 14:04:15 +04:00
struct user_struct * vuser = NULL ;
2010-11-10 02:07:49 +03:00
char * service = NULL ;
2003-03-19 02:49:03 +03:00
fstring dev ;
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
int snum = - 1 ;
2003-04-14 07:48:26 +04:00
2003-03-19 02:49:03 +03:00
fstrcpy ( dev , pdev ) ;
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
2005-12-17 20:13:45 +03:00
/* This must ONLY BE CALLED AS ROOT. As it exits this function as
* root . */
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
if ( ! non_root_mode ( ) & & ( euid = geteuid ( ) ) ! = 0 ) {
2005-12-17 20:13:45 +03:00
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " make_connection: PANIC ERROR. Called as nonroot "
" (%u) \n " , ( unsigned int ) euid ) ) ;
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
smb_panic ( " make_connection: PANIC ERROR. Called as nonroot \n " ) ;
}
2009-05-27 13:15:44 +04:00
if ( conn_num_open ( sconn ) > 2047 ) {
2006-09-29 16:47:00 +04:00
* status = NT_STATUS_INSUFF_SERVER_RESOURCES ;
return NULL ;
}
2012-02-03 11:03:10 +04:00
vuser = get_valid_user_struct ( sconn , vuid ) ;
if ( ! vuser ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " make_connection: refusing to connect with "
" no session setup \n " ) ) ;
* status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
return NULL ;
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
}
2005-12-17 20:13:45 +03:00
/* Logic to try and connect to the correct [homes] share, preferably
without too many getpwnam ( ) lookups . This is particulary nasty for
winbind usernames , where the share name isn ' t the same as unix
username .
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The snum of the homes share is stored on the vuser at session setup
time .
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*/
if ( strequal ( service_in , HOMES_NAME ) ) {
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if ( vuser - > homes_snum = = - 1 ) {
DEBUG ( 2 , ( " [homes] share not available for "
" this user because it was not found "
" or created at session setup "
" time \n " ) ) ;
* status = NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME ;
return NULL ;
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}
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DEBUG ( 5 , ( " making a connection to [homes] service "
" created at session setup time \n " ) ) ;
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return make_connection_smb1 ( sconn , now ,
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vuser - > homes_snum ,
vuser ,
dev , status ) ;
} else if ( ( vuser - > homes_snum ! = - 1 )
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& & strequal ( service_in ,
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lp_servicename ( talloc_tos ( ) , vuser - > homes_snum ) ) ) {
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DEBUG ( 5 , ( " making a connection to 'homes' service [%s] "
" created at session setup time \n " , service_in ) ) ;
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return make_connection_smb1 ( sconn , now ,
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vuser - > homes_snum ,
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vuser ,
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dev , status ) ;
}
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service = talloc_strdup ( talloc_tos ( ) , service_in ) ;
if ( ! service ) {
* status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
return NULL ;
}
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if ( ! strlower_m ( service ) ) {
DEBUG ( 2 , ( " strlower_m %s failed \n " , service ) ) ;
* status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER ;
return NULL ;
}
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snum = find_service ( talloc_tos ( ) , service , & service ) ;
if ( ! service ) {
* status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
return NULL ;
}
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if ( snum < 0 ) {
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if ( strequal ( service , " IPC$ " ) | |
( lp_enable_asu_support ( ) & & strequal ( service , " ADMIN$ " ) ) ) {
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DEBUG ( 3 , ( " refusing IPC connection to %s \n " , service ) ) ;
* status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
return NULL ;
}
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DEBUG ( 3 , ( " %s (%s) couldn't find service %s \n " ,
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get_remote_machine_name ( ) ,
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tsocket_address_string (
sconn - > remote_address , talloc_tos ( ) ) ,
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service ) ) ;
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* status = NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME ;
return NULL ;
}
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/* Handle non-Dfs clients attempting connections to msdfs proxy */
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if ( lp_host_msdfs ( ) & & ( * lp_msdfs_proxy ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) ! = ' \0 ' ) ) {
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DEBUG ( 3 , ( " refusing connection to dfs proxy share '%s' "
" (pointing to %s) \n " ,
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service , lp_msdfs_proxy ( talloc_tos ( ) , snum ) ) ) ;
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* status = NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME ;
return NULL ;
}
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DEBUG ( 5 , ( " making a connection to 'normal' service %s \n " , service ) ) ;
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return make_connection_smb1 ( sconn , now , snum , vuser ,
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dev , status ) ;
}
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/****************************************************************************
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Close a cnum .
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
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void close_cnum ( connection_struct * conn , uint64_t vuid )
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{
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file_close_conn ( conn ) ;
if ( ! IS_IPC ( conn ) ) {
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dptr_closecnum ( conn ) ;
}
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change_to_root_user ( ) ;
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DEBUG ( IS_IPC ( conn ) ? 3 : 1 , ( " %s (%s) closed connection to service %s \n " ,
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get_remote_machine_name ( ) ,
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tsocket_address_string ( conn - > sconn - > remote_address ,
talloc_tos ( ) ) ,
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lp_servicename ( talloc_tos ( ) , SNUM ( conn ) ) ) ) ;
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/* Call VFS disconnect hook */
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SMB_VFS_DISCONNECT ( conn ) ;
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/* make sure we leave the directory available for unmount */
vfs_ChDir ( conn , " / " ) ;
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/* execute any "postexec = " line */
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if ( * lp_postexec ( talloc_tos ( ) , SNUM ( conn ) ) & &
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change_to_user ( conn , vuid ) ) {
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char * cmd = talloc_sub_advanced ( talloc_tos ( ) ,
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lp_servicename ( talloc_tos ( ) , SNUM ( conn ) ) ,
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conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ,
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conn - > connectpath ,
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conn - > session_info - > unix_token - > gid ,
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conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > sanitized_username ,
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conn - > session_info - > info - > domain_name ,
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lp_postexec ( talloc_tos ( ) , SNUM ( conn ) ) ) ;
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smbrun ( cmd , NULL ) ;
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TALLOC_FREE ( cmd ) ;
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change_to_root_user ( ) ;
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}
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change_to_root_user ( ) ;
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/* execute any "root postexec = " line */
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if ( * lp_rootpostexec ( talloc_tos ( ) , SNUM ( conn ) ) ) {
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char * cmd = talloc_sub_advanced ( talloc_tos ( ) ,
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lp_servicename ( talloc_tos ( ) , SNUM ( conn ) ) ,
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conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ,
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conn - > connectpath ,
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conn - > session_info - > unix_token - > gid ,
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conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > sanitized_username ,
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conn - > session_info - > info - > domain_name ,
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lp_rootpostexec ( talloc_tos ( ) , SNUM ( conn ) ) ) ;
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smbrun ( cmd , NULL ) ;
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TALLOC_FREE ( cmd ) ;
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}
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conn_free ( conn ) ;
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}