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samba-mirror/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c

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/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
raw dcerpc operations
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2003-2005
Copyright (C) Jelmer Vernooij 2004-2005
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "system/network.h"
#include <tevent.h>
#include "lib/tsocket/tsocket.h"
#include "lib/util/tevent_ntstatus.h"
#include "librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h"
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_dcerpc.h"
#include "rpc_common.h"
#include "lib/util/bitmap.h"
#include "auth/gensec/gensec.h"
/* we need to be able to get/set the fragment length without doing a full
decode */
void dcerpc_set_frag_length(DATA_BLOB *blob, uint16_t v)
{
if (CVAL(blob->data,DCERPC_DREP_OFFSET) & DCERPC_DREP_LE) {
SSVAL(blob->data, DCERPC_FRAG_LEN_OFFSET, v);
} else {
RSSVAL(blob->data, DCERPC_FRAG_LEN_OFFSET, v);
}
}
uint16_t dcerpc_get_frag_length(const DATA_BLOB *blob)
{
if (CVAL(blob->data,DCERPC_DREP_OFFSET) & DCERPC_DREP_LE) {
return SVAL(blob->data, DCERPC_FRAG_LEN_OFFSET);
} else {
return RSVAL(blob->data, DCERPC_FRAG_LEN_OFFSET);
}
}
void dcerpc_set_auth_length(DATA_BLOB *blob, uint16_t v)
{
if (CVAL(blob->data,DCERPC_DREP_OFFSET) & DCERPC_DREP_LE) {
SSVAL(blob->data, DCERPC_AUTH_LEN_OFFSET, v);
} else {
RSSVAL(blob->data, DCERPC_AUTH_LEN_OFFSET, v);
}
}
uint8_t dcerpc_get_endian_flag(DATA_BLOB *blob)
{
return blob->data[DCERPC_DREP_OFFSET];
}
/**
* @brief Decodes a ncacn_packet
*
* @param mem_ctx The memory context on which to allocate the packet
* elements
* @param blob The blob of data to decode
* @param r An empty ncacn_packet, must not be NULL
*
* @return a NTSTATUS error code
*/
NTSTATUS dcerpc_pull_ncacn_packet(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const DATA_BLOB *blob,
struct ncacn_packet *r)
{
enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
struct ndr_pull *ndr;
ndr = ndr_pull_init_blob(blob, mem_ctx);
if (!ndr) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
ndr_err = ndr_pull_ncacn_packet(ndr, NDR_SCALARS|NDR_BUFFERS, r);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
talloc_free(ndr);
return ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
}
talloc_free(ndr);
if (r->frag_length != blob->length) {
return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/**
* @brief Pull a dcerpc_auth structure, taking account of any auth
* padding in the blob. For request/response packets we pass
* the whole data blob, so auth_data_only must be set to false
* as the blob contains data+pad+auth and no just pad+auth.
*
* @param pkt - The ncacn_packet strcuture
* @param mem_ctx - The mem_ctx used to allocate dcerpc_auth elements
* @param pkt_trailer - The packet trailer data, usually the trailing
* auth_info blob, but in the request/response case
* this is the stub_and_verifier blob.
* @param auth - A preallocated dcerpc_auth *empty* structure
* @param auth_length - The length of the auth trail, sum of auth header
* lenght and pkt->auth_length
* @param auth_data_only - Whether the pkt_trailer includes only the auth_blob
* (+ padding) or also other data.
*
* @return - A NTSTATUS error code.
*/
NTSTATUS dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(const struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const DATA_BLOB *pkt_trailer,
struct dcerpc_auth *auth,
uint32_t *_auth_length,
bool auth_data_only)
{
struct ndr_pull *ndr;
enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
uint16_t data_and_pad;
uint16_t auth_length;
uint32_t tmp_length;
uint32_t max_pad_len = 0;
ZERO_STRUCTP(auth);
if (_auth_length != NULL) {
*_auth_length = 0;
if (auth_data_only) {
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
} else {
if (!auth_data_only) {
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
}
/* Paranoia checks for auth_length. The caller should check this... */
if (pkt->auth_length == 0) {
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
/* Paranoia checks for auth_length. The caller should check this... */
if (pkt->auth_length > pkt->frag_length) {
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
tmp_length = DCERPC_NCACN_PAYLOAD_OFFSET;
tmp_length += DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH;
tmp_length += pkt->auth_length;
if (tmp_length > pkt->frag_length) {
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (pkt_trailer->length > UINT16_MAX) {
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
auth_length = DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH + pkt->auth_length;
if (pkt_trailer->length < auth_length) {
return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
data_and_pad = pkt_trailer->length - auth_length;
ndr = ndr_pull_init_blob(pkt_trailer, mem_ctx);
if (!ndr) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!(pkt->drep[0] & DCERPC_DREP_LE)) {
ndr->flags |= LIBNDR_FLAG_BIGENDIAN;
}
ndr_err = ndr_pull_advance(ndr, data_and_pad);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
talloc_free(ndr);
return ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
}
ndr_err = ndr_pull_dcerpc_auth(ndr, NDR_SCALARS|NDR_BUFFERS, auth);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
talloc_free(ndr);
ZERO_STRUCTP(auth);
return ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
}
/*
* Make sure the padding would not exceed
* the frag_length.
*
* Here we assume at least 24 bytes for the
* payload specific header the value of
* DCERPC_{REQUEST,RESPONSE}_LENGTH.
*
* We use this also for BIND_*, ALTER_* and AUTH3 pdus.
*
* We need this check before we ignore possible
* invalid values. See also bug #11982.
*
* This check is mainly used to generate the correct
* error for BIND_*, ALTER_* and AUTH3 pdus.
*
* We always have the 'if (data_and_pad < auth->auth_pad_length)'
* protection for REQUEST and RESPONSE pdus, where the
* auth_pad_length field is actually used by the caller.
*/
tmp_length = DCERPC_REQUEST_LENGTH;
tmp_length += DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH;
tmp_length += pkt->auth_length;
if (tmp_length < pkt->frag_length) {
max_pad_len = pkt->frag_length - tmp_length;
}
if (max_pad_len < auth->auth_pad_length) {
DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": ERROR: pad length to large. "
"max %u got %u\n",
(unsigned)max_pad_len,
(unsigned)auth->auth_pad_length));
talloc_free(ndr);
ZERO_STRUCTP(auth);
return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
/*
* This is a workarround for a bug in old
* Samba releases. For BIND_ACK <= 3.5.x
* and for ALTER_RESP <= 4.2.x (see bug #11061)
*
* See also bug #11982.
*/
if (auth_data_only && data_and_pad == 0 &&
auth->auth_pad_length > 0) {
/*
* we need to ignore invalid auth_pad_length
* values for BIND_*, ALTER_* and AUTH3 pdus.
*/
auth->auth_pad_length = 0;
}
if (data_and_pad < auth->auth_pad_length) {
DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": ERROR: pad length mismatch. "
"Calculated %u got %u\n",
(unsigned)data_and_pad,
(unsigned)auth->auth_pad_length));
talloc_free(ndr);
ZERO_STRUCTP(auth);
return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
if (auth_data_only && data_and_pad != auth->auth_pad_length) {
DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": ERROR: pad length mismatch. "
"Calculated %u got %u\n",
(unsigned)data_and_pad,
(unsigned)auth->auth_pad_length));
talloc_free(ndr);
ZERO_STRUCTP(auth);
return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
DEBUG(6,(__location__ ": auth_pad_length %u\n",
(unsigned)auth->auth_pad_length));
talloc_steal(mem_ctx, auth->credentials.data);
talloc_free(ndr);
if (_auth_length != NULL) {
*_auth_length = auth_length;
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/**
* @brief Verify the fields in ncacn_packet header.
*
* @param pkt - The ncacn_packet strcuture
* @param ptype - The expected PDU type
* @param max_auth_info - The maximum size of a possible auth trailer
* @param required_flags - The required flags for the pdu.
* @param optional_flags - The possible optional flags for the pdu.
*
* @return - A NTSTATUS error code.
*/
NTSTATUS dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header(const struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
enum dcerpc_pkt_type ptype,
size_t max_auth_info,
uint8_t required_flags,
uint8_t optional_flags)
{
if (pkt->rpc_vers != 5) {
return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
if (pkt->rpc_vers_minor != 0) {
return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
if (pkt->auth_length > pkt->frag_length) {
return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
if (pkt->ptype != ptype) {
return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
if (max_auth_info > UINT16_MAX) {
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (pkt->auth_length > 0) {
size_t max_auth_length;
if (max_auth_info <= DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH) {
return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
max_auth_length = max_auth_info - DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH;
if (pkt->auth_length > max_auth_length) {
return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
}
if ((pkt->pfc_flags & required_flags) != required_flags) {
return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
if (pkt->pfc_flags & ~(optional_flags|required_flags)) {
return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
if (pkt->drep[0] & ~DCERPC_DREP_LE) {
return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
if (pkt->drep[1] != 0) {
return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
if (pkt->drep[2] != 0) {
return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
if (pkt->drep[3] != 0) {
return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
NTSTATUS dcerpc_ncacn_pull_pkt_auth(const struct dcerpc_auth *auth_state,
struct gensec_security *gensec,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
enum dcerpc_pkt_type ptype,
uint8_t required_flags,
uint8_t optional_flags,
uint8_t payload_offset,
DATA_BLOB *payload_and_verifier,
DATA_BLOB *raw_packet,
const struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
{
NTSTATUS status;
struct dcerpc_auth auth;
uint32_t auth_length;
if (auth_state == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
status = dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header(pkt, ptype,
payload_and_verifier->length,
required_flags, optional_flags);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
return status;
}
switch (auth_state->auth_level) {
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY:
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY:
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PACKET:
break;
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT:
if (pkt->auth_length != 0) {
break;
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE:
if (pkt->auth_length != 0) {
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
default:
return NT_STATUS_RPC_UNSUPPORTED_AUTHN_LEVEL;
}
if (pkt->auth_length == 0) {
return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
if (gensec == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
status = dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(pkt, mem_ctx,
payload_and_verifier,
&auth, &auth_length, false);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
return status;
}
if (payload_and_verifier->length < auth_length) {
/*
* should be checked in dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer()
*/
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
payload_and_verifier->length -= auth_length;
if (payload_and_verifier->length < auth.auth_pad_length) {
/*
* should be checked in dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer()
*/
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (auth.auth_type != auth_state->auth_type) {
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
if (auth.auth_level != auth_state->auth_level) {
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
if (auth.auth_context_id != auth_state->auth_context_id) {
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
/* check signature or unseal the packet */
switch (auth_state->auth_level) {
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY:
status = gensec_unseal_packet(gensec,
raw_packet->data + payload_offset,
payload_and_verifier->length,
raw_packet->data,
raw_packet->length -
auth.credentials.length,
&auth.credentials);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
return NT_STATUS_RPC_SEC_PKG_ERROR;
}
memcpy(payload_and_verifier->data,
raw_packet->data + payload_offset,
payload_and_verifier->length);
break;
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY:
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PACKET:
status = gensec_check_packet(gensec,
payload_and_verifier->data,
payload_and_verifier->length,
raw_packet->data,
raw_packet->length -
auth.credentials.length,
&auth.credentials);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
return NT_STATUS_RPC_SEC_PKG_ERROR;
}
break;
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT:
/* for now we ignore possible signatures here */
break;
default:
return NT_STATUS_RPC_UNSUPPORTED_AUTHN_LEVEL;
}
/*
* remove the indicated amount of padding
*
* A possible overflow is checked above.
*/
payload_and_verifier->length -= auth.auth_pad_length;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
NTSTATUS dcerpc_ncacn_push_pkt_auth(const struct dcerpc_auth *auth_state,
struct gensec_security *gensec,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
DATA_BLOB *raw_packet,
size_t sig_size,
uint8_t payload_offset,
const DATA_BLOB *payload,
const struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
{
TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
NTSTATUS status;
enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
struct ndr_push *ndr = NULL;
uint32_t payload_length;
uint32_t whole_length;
DATA_BLOB blob = data_blob_null;
DATA_BLOB sig = data_blob_null;
struct dcerpc_auth _out_auth_info;
struct dcerpc_auth *out_auth_info = NULL;
*raw_packet = data_blob_null;
if (auth_state == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
switch (auth_state->auth_level) {
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY:
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY:
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PACKET:
if (sig_size == 0) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (gensec == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
_out_auth_info = (struct dcerpc_auth) {
.auth_type = auth_state->auth_type,
.auth_level = auth_state->auth_level,
.auth_context_id = auth_state->auth_context_id,
};
out_auth_info = &_out_auth_info;
break;
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT:
/*
* TODO: let the gensec mech decide if it wants to generate a
* signature that might be needed for schannel...
*/
if (sig_size != 0) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (gensec == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
break;
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE:
if (sig_size != 0) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
break;
default:
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
ndr = ndr_push_init_ctx(frame);
if (ndr == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
ndr_err = ndr_push_ncacn_packet(ndr, NDR_SCALARS|NDR_BUFFERS, pkt);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
}
if (out_auth_info != NULL) {
/*
* pad to 16 byte multiple in the payload portion of the
* packet. This matches what w2k3 does. Note that we can't use
* ndr_push_align() as that is relative to the start of the
* whole packet, whereas w2k8 wants it relative to the start
* of the stub.
*/
out_auth_info->auth_pad_length =
DCERPC_AUTH_PAD_LENGTH(payload->length);
ndr_err = ndr_push_zero(ndr, out_auth_info->auth_pad_length);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
}
payload_length = payload->length +
out_auth_info->auth_pad_length;
ndr_err = ndr_push_dcerpc_auth(ndr, NDR_SCALARS|NDR_BUFFERS,
out_auth_info);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
}
whole_length = ndr->offset;
ndr_err = ndr_push_zero(ndr, sig_size);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
}
} else {
payload_length = payload->length;
whole_length = ndr->offset;
}
/* extract the whole packet as a blob */
blob = ndr_push_blob(ndr);
/*
* Setup the frag and auth length in the packet buffer.
* This is needed if the GENSEC mech does AEAD signing
* of the packet headers. The signature itself will be
* appended later.
*/
dcerpc_set_frag_length(&blob, blob.length);
dcerpc_set_auth_length(&blob, sig_size);
/* sign or seal the packet */
switch (auth_state->auth_level) {
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY:
status = gensec_seal_packet(gensec,
frame,
blob.data + payload_offset,
payload_length,
blob.data,
whole_length,
&sig);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return status;
}
break;
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY:
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PACKET:
status = gensec_sign_packet(gensec,
frame,
blob.data + payload_offset,
payload_length,
blob.data,
whole_length,
&sig);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return status;
}
break;
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT:
case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE:
break;
default:
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (sig.length != sig_size) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return NT_STATUS_RPC_SEC_PKG_ERROR;
}
if (sig_size != 0) {
memcpy(blob.data + whole_length, sig.data, sig_size);
}
*raw_packet = blob;
talloc_steal(mem_ctx, raw_packet->data);
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
struct dcerpc_read_ncacn_packet_state {
#if 0
struct {
} caller;
#endif
DATA_BLOB buffer;
struct ncacn_packet *pkt;
};
static int dcerpc_read_ncacn_packet_next_vector(struct tstream_context *stream,
void *private_data,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct iovec **_vector,
size_t *_count);
static void dcerpc_read_ncacn_packet_done(struct tevent_req *subreq);
struct tevent_req *dcerpc_read_ncacn_packet_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct tevent_context *ev,
struct tstream_context *stream)
{
struct tevent_req *req;
struct dcerpc_read_ncacn_packet_state *state;
struct tevent_req *subreq;
req = tevent_req_create(mem_ctx, &state,
struct dcerpc_read_ncacn_packet_state);
if (req == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
state->pkt = talloc_zero(state, struct ncacn_packet);
if (tevent_req_nomem(state->pkt, req)) {
goto post;
}
subreq = tstream_readv_pdu_send(state, ev,
stream,
dcerpc_read_ncacn_packet_next_vector,
state);
if (tevent_req_nomem(subreq, req)) {
goto post;
}
tevent_req_set_callback(subreq, dcerpc_read_ncacn_packet_done, req);
return req;
post:
tevent_req_post(req, ev);
return req;
}
static int dcerpc_read_ncacn_packet_next_vector(struct tstream_context *stream,
void *private_data,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct iovec **_vector,
size_t *_count)
{
struct dcerpc_read_ncacn_packet_state *state =
talloc_get_type_abort(private_data,
struct dcerpc_read_ncacn_packet_state);
struct iovec *vector;
off_t ofs = 0;
if (state->buffer.length == 0) {
/*
* first get enough to read the fragment length
*
* We read the full fixed ncacn_packet header
* in order to make wireshark happy with
* pcap files from socket_wrapper.
*/
ofs = 0;
state->buffer.length = DCERPC_NCACN_PAYLOAD_OFFSET;
state->buffer.data = talloc_array(state, uint8_t,
state->buffer.length);
if (!state->buffer.data) {
return -1;
}
} else if (state->buffer.length == DCERPC_NCACN_PAYLOAD_OFFSET) {
/* now read the fragment length and allocate the full buffer */
size_t frag_len = dcerpc_get_frag_length(&state->buffer);
ofs = state->buffer.length;
if (frag_len < ofs) {
/*
* something is wrong, let the caller deal with it
*/
*_vector = NULL;
*_count = 0;
return 0;
}
state->buffer.data = talloc_realloc(state,
state->buffer.data,
uint8_t, frag_len);
if (!state->buffer.data) {
return -1;
}
state->buffer.length = frag_len;
} else {
/* if we reach this we have a full fragment */
*_vector = NULL;
*_count = 0;
return 0;
}
/* now create the vector that we want to be filled */
vector = talloc_array(mem_ctx, struct iovec, 1);
if (!vector) {
return -1;
}
vector[0].iov_base = (void *) (state->buffer.data + ofs);
vector[0].iov_len = state->buffer.length - ofs;
*_vector = vector;
*_count = 1;
return 0;
}
static void dcerpc_read_ncacn_packet_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
{
struct tevent_req *req = tevent_req_callback_data(subreq,
struct tevent_req);
struct dcerpc_read_ncacn_packet_state *state = tevent_req_data(req,
struct dcerpc_read_ncacn_packet_state);
int ret;
int sys_errno;
NTSTATUS status;
ret = tstream_readv_pdu_recv(subreq, &sys_errno);
TALLOC_FREE(subreq);
if (ret == -1) {
status = map_nt_error_from_unix_common(sys_errno);
tevent_req_nterror(req, status);
return;
}
status = dcerpc_pull_ncacn_packet(state->pkt,
&state->buffer,
state->pkt);
if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) {
return;
}
tevent_req_done(req);
}
NTSTATUS dcerpc_read_ncacn_packet_recv(struct tevent_req *req,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct ncacn_packet **pkt,
DATA_BLOB *buffer)
{
struct dcerpc_read_ncacn_packet_state *state = tevent_req_data(req,
struct dcerpc_read_ncacn_packet_state);
NTSTATUS status;
if (tevent_req_is_nterror(req, &status)) {
tevent_req_received(req);
return status;
}
*pkt = talloc_move(mem_ctx, &state->pkt);
if (buffer) {
buffer->data = talloc_move(mem_ctx, &state->buffer.data);
buffer->length = state->buffer.length;
}
tevent_req_received(req);
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
const char *dcerpc_default_transport_endpoint(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
enum dcerpc_transport_t transport,
const struct ndr_interface_table *table)
{
NTSTATUS status;
const char *p = NULL;
const char *endpoint = NULL;
int i;
struct dcerpc_binding *default_binding = NULL;
TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
/* Find one of the default pipes for this interface */
for (i = 0; i < table->endpoints->count; i++) {
enum dcerpc_transport_t dtransport;
const char *dendpoint;
status = dcerpc_parse_binding(frame, table->endpoints->names[i],
&default_binding);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
continue;
}
dtransport = dcerpc_binding_get_transport(default_binding);
dendpoint = dcerpc_binding_get_string_option(default_binding,
"endpoint");
if (dendpoint == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(default_binding);
continue;
}
if (transport == NCA_UNKNOWN) {
transport = dtransport;
}
if (transport != dtransport) {
TALLOC_FREE(default_binding);
continue;
}
p = dendpoint;
break;
}
if (p == NULL) {
goto done;
}
/*
* extract the pipe name without \\pipe from for example
* ncacn_np:[\\pipe\\epmapper]
*/
if (transport == NCACN_NP) {
if (strncasecmp(p, "\\pipe\\", 6) == 0) {
p += 6;
}
if (strncmp(p, "\\", 1) == 0) {
p += 1;
}
}
endpoint = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, p);
done:
talloc_free(frame);
return endpoint;
}
struct dcerpc_sec_vt_header2 dcerpc_sec_vt_header2_from_ncacn_packet(const struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
{
struct dcerpc_sec_vt_header2 ret;
ZERO_STRUCT(ret);
ret.ptype = pkt->ptype;
memcpy(&ret.drep, pkt->drep, sizeof(ret.drep));
ret.call_id = pkt->call_id;
switch (pkt->ptype) {
case DCERPC_PKT_REQUEST:
ret.context_id = pkt->u.request.context_id;
ret.opnum = pkt->u.request.opnum;
break;
case DCERPC_PKT_RESPONSE:
ret.context_id = pkt->u.response.context_id;
break;
case DCERPC_PKT_FAULT:
ret.context_id = pkt->u.fault.context_id;
break;
default:
break;
}
return ret;
}
bool dcerpc_sec_vt_header2_equal(const struct dcerpc_sec_vt_header2 *v1,
const struct dcerpc_sec_vt_header2 *v2)
{
if (v1->ptype != v2->ptype) {
return false;
}
if (memcmp(v1->drep, v2->drep, sizeof(v1->drep)) != 0) {
return false;
}
if (v1->call_id != v2->call_id) {
return false;
}
if (v1->context_id != v2->context_id) {
return false;
}
if (v1->opnum != v2->opnum) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
static bool dcerpc_sec_vt_is_valid(const struct dcerpc_sec_verification_trailer *r)
{
bool ret = false;
TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
struct bitmap *commands_seen;
int i;
if (r->count.count == 0) {
ret = true;
goto done;
}
if (memcmp(r->magic, DCERPC_SEC_VT_MAGIC, sizeof(r->magic)) != 0) {
goto done;
}
commands_seen = bitmap_talloc(frame, DCERPC_SEC_VT_COMMAND_ENUM + 1);
if (commands_seen == NULL) {
goto done;
}
for (i=0; i < r->count.count; i++) {
enum dcerpc_sec_vt_command_enum cmd =
r->commands[i].command & DCERPC_SEC_VT_COMMAND_ENUM;
if (bitmap_query(commands_seen, cmd)) {
/* Each command must appear at most once. */
goto done;
}
bitmap_set(commands_seen, cmd);
switch (cmd) {
case DCERPC_SEC_VT_COMMAND_BITMASK1:
case DCERPC_SEC_VT_COMMAND_PCONTEXT:
case DCERPC_SEC_VT_COMMAND_HEADER2:
break;
default:
if ((r->commands[i].u._unknown.length % 4) != 0) {
goto done;
}
break;
}
}
ret = true;
done:
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return ret;
}
static bool dcerpc_sec_vt_bitmask_check(const uint32_t *bitmask1,
struct dcerpc_sec_vt *c)
{
if (bitmask1 == NULL) {
if (c->command & DCERPC_SEC_VT_MUST_PROCESS) {
DEBUG(10, ("SEC_VT check Bitmask1 must_process_command "
"failed\n"));
return false;
}
return true;
}
if ((c->u.bitmask1 & DCERPC_SEC_VT_CLIENT_SUPPORTS_HEADER_SIGNING)
&& (!(*bitmask1 & DCERPC_SEC_VT_CLIENT_SUPPORTS_HEADER_SIGNING))) {
DEBUG(10, ("SEC_VT check Bitmask1 client_header_signing "
"failed\n"));
return false;
}
return true;
}
static bool dcerpc_sec_vt_pctx_check(const struct dcerpc_sec_vt_pcontext *pcontext,
struct dcerpc_sec_vt *c)
{
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
bool ok;
if (pcontext == NULL) {
if (c->command & DCERPC_SEC_VT_MUST_PROCESS) {
DEBUG(10, ("SEC_VT check Pcontext must_process_command "
"failed\n"));
return false;
}
return true;
}
mem_ctx = talloc_stackframe();
ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(&pcontext->abstract_syntax,
&c->u.pcontext.abstract_syntax);
if (!ok) {
DEBUG(10, ("SEC_VT check pcontext abstract_syntax failed: "
"%s vs. %s\n",
ndr_syntax_id_to_string(mem_ctx,
&pcontext->abstract_syntax),
ndr_syntax_id_to_string(mem_ctx,
&c->u.pcontext.abstract_syntax)));
goto err_ctx_free;
}
ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(&pcontext->transfer_syntax,
&c->u.pcontext.transfer_syntax);
if (!ok) {
DEBUG(10, ("SEC_VT check pcontext transfer_syntax failed: "
"%s vs. %s\n",
ndr_syntax_id_to_string(mem_ctx,
&pcontext->transfer_syntax),
ndr_syntax_id_to_string(mem_ctx,
&c->u.pcontext.transfer_syntax)));
goto err_ctx_free;
}
ok = true;
err_ctx_free:
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ok;
}
static bool dcerpc_sec_vt_hdr2_check(const struct dcerpc_sec_vt_header2 *header2,
struct dcerpc_sec_vt *c)
{
if (header2 == NULL) {
if (c->command & DCERPC_SEC_VT_MUST_PROCESS) {
DEBUG(10, ("SEC_VT check Header2 must_process_command failed\n"));
return false;
}
return true;
}
if (!dcerpc_sec_vt_header2_equal(header2, &c->u.header2)) {
DEBUG(10, ("SEC_VT check Header2 failed\n"));
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool dcerpc_sec_verification_trailer_check(
const struct dcerpc_sec_verification_trailer *vt,
const uint32_t *bitmask1,
const struct dcerpc_sec_vt_pcontext *pcontext,
const struct dcerpc_sec_vt_header2 *header2)
{
size_t i;
if (!dcerpc_sec_vt_is_valid(vt)) {
return false;
}
for (i=0; i < vt->count.count; i++) {
bool ok;
struct dcerpc_sec_vt *c = &vt->commands[i];
switch (c->command & DCERPC_SEC_VT_COMMAND_ENUM) {
case DCERPC_SEC_VT_COMMAND_BITMASK1:
ok = dcerpc_sec_vt_bitmask_check(bitmask1, c);
if (!ok) {
return false;
}
break;
case DCERPC_SEC_VT_COMMAND_PCONTEXT:
ok = dcerpc_sec_vt_pctx_check(pcontext, c);
if (!ok) {
return false;
}
break;
case DCERPC_SEC_VT_COMMAND_HEADER2: {
ok = dcerpc_sec_vt_hdr2_check(header2, c);
if (!ok) {
return false;
}
break;
}
default:
if (c->command & DCERPC_SEC_VT_MUST_PROCESS) {
DEBUG(10, ("SEC_VT check Unknown must_process_command failed\n"));
return false;
}
break;
}
}
return true;
}
static const struct ndr_syntax_id dcerpc_bind_time_features_prefix = {
.uuid = {
.time_low = 0x6cb71c2c,
.time_mid = 0x9812,
.time_hi_and_version = 0x4540,
.clock_seq = {0x00, 0x00},
.node = {0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}
},
.if_version = 1,
};
bool dcerpc_extract_bind_time_features(struct ndr_syntax_id s, uint64_t *_features)
{
uint8_t values[8];
uint64_t features = 0;
values[0] = s.uuid.clock_seq[0];
values[1] = s.uuid.clock_seq[1];
values[2] = s.uuid.node[0];
values[3] = s.uuid.node[1];
values[4] = s.uuid.node[2];
values[5] = s.uuid.node[3];
values[6] = s.uuid.node[4];
values[7] = s.uuid.node[5];
ZERO_STRUCT(s.uuid.clock_seq);
ZERO_STRUCT(s.uuid.node);
if (!ndr_syntax_id_equal(&s, &dcerpc_bind_time_features_prefix)) {
if (_features != NULL) {
*_features = 0;
}
return false;
}
features = BVAL(values, 0);
if (_features != NULL) {
*_features = features;
}
return true;
}
struct ndr_syntax_id dcerpc_construct_bind_time_features(uint64_t features)
{
struct ndr_syntax_id s = dcerpc_bind_time_features_prefix;
uint8_t values[8];
SBVAL(values, 0, features);
s.uuid.clock_seq[0] = values[0];
s.uuid.clock_seq[1] = values[1];
s.uuid.node[0] = values[2];
s.uuid.node[1] = values[3];
s.uuid.node[2] = values[4];
s.uuid.node[3] = values[5];
s.uuid.node[4] = values[6];
s.uuid.node[5] = values[7];
return s;
}