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/*
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Unix SMB / CIFS implementation .
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service ( connection ) opening and closing
Copyright ( C ) Andrew Tridgell 1992 - 1998
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This program is free software ; you can redistribute it and / or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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the Free Software Foundation ; either version 3 of the License , or
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( at your option ) any later version .
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This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful ,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY ; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE . See the
GNU General Public License for more details .
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You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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along with this program . If not , see < http : //www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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*/
# include "includes.h"
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# include "system/filesys.h"
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# include "system/passwd.h" /* uid_wrapper */
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# include "../lib/tsocket/tsocket.h"
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# include "smbd/smbd.h"
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# include "smbd/globals.h"
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# include "../librpc/gen_ndr/netlogon.h"
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# include "../libcli/security/security.h"
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# include "printing/pcap.h"
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# include "passdb/lookup_sid.h"
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# include "auth.h"
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# include "../auth/auth_util.h"
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# include "lib/param/loadparm.h"
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# include "messages.h"
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# include "lib/afs/afs_funcs.h"
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# include "lib/util_path.h"
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# include "lib/util/string_wrappers.h"
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# include "source3/lib/substitute.h"
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bool canonicalize_connect_path ( connection_struct * conn )
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{
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bool ret ;
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struct smb_filename con_fname = { . base_name = conn - > connectpath } ;
struct smb_filename * resolved_fname = SMB_VFS_REALPATH ( conn , talloc_tos ( ) ,
& con_fname ) ;
if ( resolved_fname = = NULL ) {
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return false ;
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}
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ret = set_conn_connectpath ( conn , resolved_fname - > base_name ) ;
TALLOC_FREE ( resolved_fname ) ;
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return ret ;
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}
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/****************************************************************************
Ensure when setting connectpath it is a canonicalized ( no . / // or ../)
absolute path stating in / and not ending in / .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
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bool set_conn_connectpath ( connection_struct * conn , const char * connectpath )
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{
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char * destname ;
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if ( connectpath = = NULL | | connectpath [ 0 ] = = ' \0 ' ) {
return false ;
}
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destname = canonicalize_absolute_path ( conn , connectpath ) ;
if ( destname = = NULL ) {
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return false ;
}
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DBG_DEBUG ( " service %s, connectpath = %s \n " ,
lp_const_servicename ( SNUM ( conn ) ) , destname ) ;
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talloc_free ( conn - > connectpath ) ;
conn - > connectpath = destname ;
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/*
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* Ensure conn - > cwd_fsp - > fsp_name is initialized .
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* start as conn - > connectpath .
*/
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TALLOC_FREE ( conn - > cwd_fsp - > fsp_name ) ;
conn - > cwd_fsp - > fsp_name = synthetic_smb_fname ( conn ,
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conn - > connectpath ,
NULL ,
NULL ,
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0 ,
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0 ) ;
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if ( conn - > cwd_fsp - > fsp_name = = NULL ) {
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return false ;
}
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return true ;
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}
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bool chdir_current_service ( connection_struct * conn )
{
const struct smb_filename connectpath_fname = {
. base_name = conn - > connectpath ,
} ;
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int saved_errno = 0 ;
char * utok_str = NULL ;
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int ret ;
conn - > lastused_count + + ;
ret = vfs_ChDir ( conn , & connectpath_fname ) ;
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if ( ret = = 0 ) {
return true ;
}
saved_errno = errno ;
utok_str = utok_string ( talloc_tos ( ) ,
conn - > session_info - > unix_token ) ;
if ( utok_str = = NULL ) {
errno = saved_errno ;
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return false ;
}
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DBG_ERR ( " vfs_ChDir(%s) failed: %s. Current token: %s \n " ,
conn - > connectpath ,
strerror ( saved_errno ) ,
utok_str ) ;
if ( saved_errno ! = 0 ) {
errno = saved_errno ;
}
return false ;
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}
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/****************************************************************************
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do some basic sainity checks on the share .
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This function modifies dev , ecode .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
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static NTSTATUS share_sanity_checks ( const struct tsocket_address * local_address ,
const struct tsocket_address * remote_address ,
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const char * rhost ,
int snum ,
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fstring dev )
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{
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char * raddr ;
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if ( ! lp_allow_local_address ( snum , local_address ) ) {
char * laddr = NULL ;
laddr = tsocket_address_inet_addr_string (
local_address , talloc_tos ( ) ) ;
if ( laddr = = NULL ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
raddr = tsocket_address_inet_addr_string (
remote_address , laddr ) ;
if ( raddr = = NULL ) {
TALLOC_FREE ( laddr ) ;
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
DBG_ERR ( " Denied connection from %s (%s) to \\ \\ %s \\ %s \n " ,
rhost , raddr , laddr , lp_const_servicename ( snum ) ) ;
TALLOC_FREE ( laddr ) ;
return NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME ;
}
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raddr = tsocket_address_inet_addr_string ( remote_address ,
talloc_tos ( ) ) ;
if ( raddr = = NULL ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
if ( ! lp_snum_ok ( snum ) | |
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! allow_access ( lp_hosts_deny ( snum ) , lp_hosts_allow ( snum ) ,
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rhost , raddr ) ) {
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return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
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}
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if ( dev [ 0 ] = = ' ? ' | | ! dev [ 0 ] ) {
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if ( lp_printable ( snum ) ) {
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fstrcpy ( dev , " LPT1: " ) ;
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} else if ( strequal ( lp_fstype ( snum ) , " IPC " ) ) {
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fstrcpy ( dev , " IPC " ) ;
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} else {
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fstrcpy ( dev , " A: " ) ;
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}
}
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if ( ! strupper_m ( dev ) ) {
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DBG_WARNING ( " strupper_m %s failed \n " , dev ) ;
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return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER ;
}
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if ( lp_printable ( snum ) ) {
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if ( ! strequal ( dev , " LPT1: " ) ) {
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return NT_STATUS_BAD_DEVICE_TYPE ;
}
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} else if ( strequal ( lp_fstype ( snum ) , " IPC " ) ) {
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if ( ! strequal ( dev , " IPC " ) ) {
return NT_STATUS_BAD_DEVICE_TYPE ;
}
} else if ( ! strequal ( dev , " A: " ) ) {
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return NT_STATUS_BAD_DEVICE_TYPE ;
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}
/* Behave as a printer if we are supposed to */
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if ( lp_printable ( snum ) & & ( strcmp ( dev , " A: " ) = = 0 ) ) {
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fstrcpy ( dev , " LPT1: " ) ;
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}
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return NT_STATUS_OK ;
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}
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/*
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* Go through lookup_name etc to find the force ' d group .
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*
* Create a new token from src_token , replacing the primary group sid with the
* one found .
*/
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static NTSTATUS find_forced_group ( bool force_user ,
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int snum , const char * username ,
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struct dom_sid * pgroup_sid ,
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gid_t * pgid )
{
NTSTATUS result = NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_GROUP ;
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TALLOC_CTX * frame = talloc_stackframe ( ) ;
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const struct loadparm_substitution * lp_sub =
loadparm_s3_global_substitution ( ) ;
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struct dom_sid group_sid ;
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enum lsa_SidType type ;
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char * groupname ;
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bool user_must_be_member = False ;
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gid_t gid ;
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groupname = lp_force_group ( talloc_tos ( ) , lp_sub , snum ) ;
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if ( groupname = = NULL ) {
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DBG_WARNING ( " talloc_strdup failed \n " ) ;
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result = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
goto done ;
}
if ( groupname [ 0 ] = = ' + ' ) {
user_must_be_member = True ;
groupname + = 1 ;
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}
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groupname = talloc_string_sub ( talloc_tos ( ) , groupname ,
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" %S " , lp_const_servicename ( snum ) ) ;
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if ( groupname = = NULL ) {
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DBG_WARNING ( " talloc_string_sub failed \n " ) ;
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result = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
goto done ;
}
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if ( ! lookup_name_smbconf ( talloc_tos ( ) , groupname ,
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LOOKUP_NAME_ALL | LOOKUP_NAME_GROUP ,
NULL , NULL , & group_sid , & type ) ) {
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DBG_DEBUG ( " lookup_name_smbconf(%s) failed \n " ,
groupname ) ;
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goto done ;
}
if ( ( type ! = SID_NAME_DOM_GRP ) & & ( type ! = SID_NAME_ALIAS ) & &
( type ! = SID_NAME_WKN_GRP ) ) {
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DBG_DEBUG ( " %s is a %s, not a group \n " , groupname ,
sid_type_lookup ( type ) ) ;
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goto done ;
}
if ( ! sid_to_gid ( & group_sid , & gid ) ) {
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struct dom_sid_buf buf ;
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DBG_DEBUG ( " sid_to_gid(%s) for %s failed \n " ,
dom_sid_str_buf ( & group_sid , & buf ) , groupname ) ;
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goto done ;
}
/*
* If the user has been forced and the forced group starts with a ' + ' ,
* then we only set the group to be the forced group if the forced
* user is a member of that group . Otherwise , the meaning of the ' + '
* would be ignored .
*/
if ( force_user & & user_must_be_member ) {
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if ( user_in_group_sid ( username , & group_sid ) ) {
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sid_copy ( pgroup_sid , & group_sid ) ;
* pgid = gid ;
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DBG_INFO ( " Forced group %s for member %s \n " ,
groupname , username ) ;
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} else {
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DBG_ERR ( " find_forced_group: forced user %s is not a member "
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" of forced group %s. Disallowing access. \n " ,
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username , groupname ) ;
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result = NT_STATUS_MEMBER_NOT_IN_GROUP ;
goto done ;
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}
} else {
sid_copy ( pgroup_sid , & group_sid ) ;
* pgid = gid ;
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DBG_INFO ( " Forced group %s \n " , groupname ) ;
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}
result = NT_STATUS_OK ;
done :
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TALLOC_FREE ( frame ) ;
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return result ;
}
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/****************************************************************************
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Create an auth_session_info structure for a connection_struct
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
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static NTSTATUS create_connection_session_info ( struct smbd_server_connection * sconn ,
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TALLOC_CTX * mem_ctx , int snum ,
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struct auth_session_info * session_info ,
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struct auth_session_info * * presult )
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{
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struct auth_session_info * result ;
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if ( lp_guest_only ( snum ) ) {
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return make_session_info_guest ( mem_ctx , presult ) ;
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}
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/*
* This is the normal security ! = share case where we have a
* valid vuid from the session setup . */
if ( security_session_user_level ( session_info , NULL ) < SECURITY_USER ) {
if ( ! lp_guest_ok ( snum ) ) {
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DBG_WARNING ( " guest user (from session setup) "
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" not permitted to access this share "
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" (%s) \n " , lp_const_servicename ( snum ) ) ;
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return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
}
} else {
if ( ! user_ok_token ( session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ,
session_info - > info - > domain_name ,
session_info - > security_token , snum ) ) {
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DBG_WARNING ( " user '%s' (from session setup) not "
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" permitted to access this share "
" (%s) \n " ,
session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ,
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lp_const_servicename ( snum ) ) ;
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return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
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}
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}
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2012-03-05 00:47:50 +04:00
result = copy_session_info ( mem_ctx , session_info ) ;
if ( result = = NULL ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
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2012-03-05 00:47:50 +04:00
* presult = result ;
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
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}
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/****************************************************************************
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Set relevant user and group settings corresponding to force user / group
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configuration for the given snum .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
NTSTATUS set_conn_force_user_group ( connection_struct * conn , int snum )
{
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const struct loadparm_substitution * lp_sub =
loadparm_s3_global_substitution ( ) ;
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NTSTATUS status ;
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if ( * lp_force_user ( talloc_tos ( ) , lp_sub , snum ) ) {
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/*
* Replace conn - > session_info with a completely faked up one
* from the username we are forced into : - )
*/
char * fuser ;
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char * sanitized_username ;
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struct auth_session_info * forced_serverinfo ;
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bool guest ;
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2019-10-31 20:40:53 +03:00
fuser = talloc_string_sub ( conn , lp_force_user ( talloc_tos ( ) , lp_sub , snum ) , " %S " ,
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lp_const_servicename ( snum ) ) ;
if ( fuser = = NULL ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
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guest = security_session_user_level ( conn - > session_info , NULL ) < SECURITY_USER ;
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status = make_session_info_from_username (
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conn , fuser ,
guest ,
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& forced_serverinfo ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
return status ;
}
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/* We don't want to replace the original sanitized_username
as it is the original user given in the connect attempt .
This is used in ' % U ' substitutions . */
sanitized_username = discard_const_p ( char ,
forced_serverinfo - > unix_info - > sanitized_username ) ;
TALLOC_FREE ( sanitized_username ) ;
forced_serverinfo - > unix_info - > sanitized_username =
talloc_move ( forced_serverinfo - > unix_info ,
& conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > sanitized_username ) ;
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TALLOC_FREE ( conn - > session_info ) ;
conn - > session_info = forced_serverinfo ;
conn - > force_user = true ;
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DBG_INFO ( " Forced user %s \n " , fuser ) ;
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}
/*
* If force group is true , then override
* any groupid stored for the connecting user .
*/
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if ( * lp_force_group ( talloc_tos ( ) , lp_sub , snum ) ) {
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status = find_forced_group (
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conn - > force_user , snum , conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ,
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& conn - > session_info - > security_token - > sids [ 1 ] ,
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& conn - > session_info - > unix_token - > gid ) ;
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if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
return status ;
}
/*
* We need to cache this gid , to use within
* change_to_user ( ) separately from the conn - > session_info
* struct . We only use conn - > session_info directly if
* " force_user " was set .
*/
2011-07-15 08:59:14 +04:00
conn - > force_group_gid = conn - > session_info - > unix_token - > gid ;
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}
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
}
2008-05-06 19:48:22 +04:00
2016-06-23 13:53:47 +03:00
static NTSTATUS notify_init_sconn ( struct smbd_server_connection * sconn )
{
NTSTATUS status ;
if ( sconn - > notify_ctx ! = NULL ) {
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
}
2018-05-24 08:18:10 +03:00
sconn - > notify_ctx = notify_init ( sconn , sconn - > msg_ctx ,
2016-06-14 15:54:32 +03:00
sconn , notify_callback ) ;
2016-06-23 13:53:47 +03:00
if ( sconn - > notify_ctx = = NULL ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
status = messaging_register ( sconn - > msg_ctx , sconn ,
MSG_SMB_NOTIFY_CANCEL_DELETED ,
smbd_notify_cancel_deleted ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
DBG_DEBUG ( " messaging_register failed: %s \n " ,
nt_errstr ( status ) ) ;
TALLOC_FREE ( sconn - > notify_ctx ) ;
return status ;
}
2016-06-21 17:23:19 +03:00
status = messaging_register ( sconn - > msg_ctx , sconn ,
MSG_SMB_NOTIFY_STARTED ,
smbd_notifyd_restarted ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
DBG_DEBUG ( " messaging_register failed: %s \n " ,
nt_errstr ( status ) ) ;
messaging_deregister ( sconn - > msg_ctx ,
MSG_SMB_NOTIFY_CANCEL_DELETED , sconn ) ;
TALLOC_FREE ( sconn - > notify_ctx ) ;
return status ;
}
2016-06-23 13:53:47 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
}
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
/****************************************************************************
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
Make a connection , given the snum to connect to , and the vuser of the
connecting user if appropriate .
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
2022-03-17 22:32:30 +03:00
NTSTATUS make_connection_snum ( struct smbXsrv_connection * xconn ,
connection_struct * conn ,
int snum ,
struct smbXsrv_session * session ,
const char * pdev )
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
{
2014-09-16 03:03:31 +04:00
struct smbd_server_connection * sconn = xconn - > client - > sconn ;
2019-10-15 17:54:45 +03:00
const struct loadparm_substitution * lp_sub =
loadparm_s3_global_substitution ( ) ;
2009-06-23 02:26:56 +04:00
struct smb_filename * smb_fname_cpath = NULL ;
2003-03-19 02:49:03 +03:00
fstring dev ;
2005-10-03 22:14:09 +04:00
int ret ;
2007-11-11 01:43:39 +03:00
bool on_err_call_dis_hook = false ;
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
uid_t effuid ;
gid_t effgid ;
2008-05-06 23:50:08 +04:00
NTSTATUS status ;
2020-04-07 03:36:44 +03:00
bool ok ;
2003-03-19 02:49:03 +03:00
fstrcpy ( dev , pdev ) ;
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
2022-10-21 17:58:36 +03:00
status = share_sanity_checks ( sconn - > local_address ,
sconn - > remote_address ,
2011-06-16 17:49:41 +04:00
sconn - > remote_hostname ,
snum ,
dev ) ;
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
if ( NT_STATUS_IS_ERR ( status ) ) {
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
goto err_root_exit ;
}
2000-07-25 10:10:59 +04:00
2006-12-10 08:23:47 +03:00
conn - > params - > service = snum ;
2006-05-14 19:24:14 +04:00
2011-02-21 12:25:52 +03:00
status = create_connection_session_info ( sconn ,
2019-12-30 12:26:26 +03:00
conn , snum , session - > global - > auth_session_info ,
2011-02-21 12:25:52 +03:00
& conn - > session_info ) ;
2008-05-07 14:20:18 +04:00
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
2023-06-07 03:18:21 +03:00
DBG_WARNING ( " create_connection_session_info failed: %s \n " ,
nt_errstr ( status ) ) ;
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
goto err_root_exit ;
2008-05-07 14:20:18 +04:00
}
2012-02-03 11:03:10 +04:00
if ( lp_guest_only ( snum ) ) {
2008-05-07 14:20:18 +04:00
conn - > force_user = true ;
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
}
conn - > num_files_open = 0 ;
2006-04-15 08:07:10 +04:00
conn - > lastused = conn - > lastused_count = time ( NULL ) ;
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
conn - > printer = ( strncmp ( dev , " LPT " , 3 ) = = 0 ) ;
2005-12-17 20:13:45 +03:00
conn - > ipc = ( ( strncmp ( dev , " IPC " , 3 ) = = 0 ) | |
( lp_enable_asu_support ( ) & & strequal ( dev , " ADMIN$ " ) ) ) ;
2004-05-07 22:37:47 +04:00
/* Case options for the share. */
2021-01-12 22:39:51 +03:00
conn_setup_case_options ( conn ) ;
2004-05-07 22:37:47 +04:00
2019-10-10 15:18:23 +03:00
conn - > encrypt_level = lp_server_smb_encrypt ( snum ) ;
2020-05-26 10:34:54 +03:00
if ( conn - > encrypt_level > SMB_ENCRYPTION_OFF ) {
if ( lp_server_smb_encrypt ( - 1 ) = = SMB_ENCRYPTION_OFF ) {
if ( conn - > encrypt_level = = SMB_ENCRYPTION_REQUIRED ) {
2017-01-18 18:19:15 +03:00
DBG_ERR ( " Service [%s] requires encryption, but "
" it is disabled globally! \n " ,
2018-06-25 02:59:33 +03:00
lp_const_servicename ( snum ) ) ;
2017-01-18 18:19:15 +03:00
status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
goto err_root_exit ;
}
2020-05-26 10:34:54 +03:00
conn - > encrypt_level = SMB_ENCRYPTION_OFF ;
2017-01-18 18:19:15 +03:00
}
}
2007-12-28 10:51:03 +03:00
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
conn - > veto_list = NULL ;
conn - > hide_list = NULL ;
conn - > veto_oplock_list = NULL ;
2007-10-11 00:34:30 +04:00
conn - > aio_write_behind_list = NULL ;
2004-02-13 22:05:25 +03:00
2014-02-02 17:37:34 +04:00
conn - > read_only = lp_read_only ( SNUM ( conn ) ) ;
2001-08-17 12:12:33 +04:00
2011-03-02 16:34:28 +03:00
status = set_conn_force_user_group ( conn , snum ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
goto err_root_exit ;
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
}
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
2019-12-29 16:33:00 +03:00
conn - > vuid = session - > global - > session_wire_id ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
{
2019-10-31 14:45:44 +03:00
char * s = talloc_sub_full ( talloc_tos ( ) ,
2018-06-25 02:59:33 +03:00
lp_const_servicename ( SNUM ( conn ) ) ,
2011-07-15 09:55:31 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ,
2008-05-08 17:53:55 +04:00
conn - > connectpath ,
2011-07-15 08:59:14 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_token - > gid ,
2011-07-15 09:55:31 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > sanitized_username ,
2011-07-18 06:58:25 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > info - > domain_name ,
2019-10-31 21:14:02 +03:00
lp_path ( talloc_tos ( ) , lp_sub , snum ) ) ;
2007-11-11 01:43:39 +03:00
if ( ! s ) {
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
goto err_root_exit ;
2007-11-11 01:43:39 +03:00
}
if ( ! set_conn_connectpath ( conn , s ) ) {
TALLOC_FREE ( s ) ;
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
goto err_root_exit ;
2007-11-11 01:43:39 +03:00
}
2018-06-25 02:59:33 +03:00
DBG_NOTICE ( " Connect path is '%s' for service [%s] \n " , s ,
lp_const_servicename ( snum ) ) ;
2007-11-11 01:43:39 +03:00
TALLOC_FREE ( s ) ;
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
}
2001-04-12 01:19:25 +04:00
/*
2014-03-18 01:35:00 +04:00
* Set up the share security descriptor .
* NOTE - we use the * INCOMING USER * session_info
* here , as does ( indirectly ) change_to_user ( ) ,
* which can be called on any incoming packet .
* This way we set up the share access based
* on the authenticated user , not the forced
* user . See bug :
*
* https : //bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9878
2001-04-12 01:19:25 +04:00
*/
2013-01-05 02:40:05 +04:00
status = check_user_share_access ( conn ,
2019-12-30 12:26:26 +03:00
session - > global - > auth_session_info ,
2013-01-05 02:40:05 +04:00
& conn - > share_access ,
& conn - > read_only ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
goto err_root_exit ;
2001-04-12 01:19:25 +04:00
}
2013-01-05 02:40:05 +04:00
2000-08-04 02:38:43 +04:00
/* Initialise VFS function pointers */
2001-10-18 04:27:20 +04:00
if ( ! smbd_vfs_init ( conn ) ) {
2018-06-25 02:59:33 +03:00
DBG_ERR ( " vfs_init failed for service %s \n " ,
lp_const_servicename ( snum ) ) ;
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
status = NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME ;
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
goto err_root_exit ;
2000-08-04 02:38:43 +04:00
}
2010-02-12 02:16:23 +03:00
/* ROOT Activities: */
/* explicitly check widelinks here so that we can correctly warn
2010-02-12 00:12:29 +03:00
* in the logs . */
2010-02-12 02:16:23 +03:00
widelinks_warning ( snum ) ;
2010-02-17 22:13:35 +03:00
/* Invoke VFS make connection hook - this must be the first
filesystem operation that we do . */
2018-06-25 02:59:33 +03:00
if ( SMB_VFS_CONNECT ( conn , lp_const_servicename ( snum ) ,
2011-07-15 09:55:31 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ) < 0 ) {
2015-06-25 19:44:44 +03:00
DBG_WARNING ( " SMB_VFS_CONNECT for service '%s' at '%s' failed: %s \n " ,
2018-06-25 02:59:33 +03:00
lp_const_servicename ( snum ) , conn - > connectpath ,
2015-06-25 19:44:44 +03:00
strerror ( errno ) ) ;
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
status = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL ;
2010-02-17 22:13:35 +03:00
goto err_root_exit ;
}
/* Any error exit after here needs to call the disconnect hook. */
on_err_call_dis_hook = true ;
2012-03-21 14:59:27 +04:00
if ( ( ! conn - > printer ) & & ( ! conn - > ipc ) & &
2014-11-21 17:53:53 +03:00
lp_change_notify ( ) ) {
2016-06-23 13:53:47 +03:00
status = notify_init_sconn ( sconn ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
goto err_root_exit ;
2012-03-22 17:58:24 +04:00
}
2010-02-17 22:13:35 +03:00
}
2012-03-30 18:00:15 +04:00
if ( lp_kernel_oplocks ( snum ) ) {
init_kernel_oplocks ( conn - > sconn ) ;
}
2010-02-12 01:45:53 +03:00
/*
* Fix compatibility issue pointed out by Volker .
* We pass the conn - > connectpath to the preexec
* scripts as a parameter , so attempt to canonicalize
* it here before calling the preexec scripts .
* We ignore errors here , as it is possible that
* the conn - > connectpath doesn ' t exist yet and
* the preexec scripts will create them .
*/
( void ) canonicalize_connect_path ( conn ) ;
2005-12-17 20:13:45 +03:00
/* Preexecs are done here as they might make the dir we are to ChDir
* to below */
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
/* execute any "root preexec = " line */
2019-11-04 14:20:21 +03:00
if ( * lp_root_preexec ( talloc_tos ( ) , lp_sub , snum ) ) {
2019-10-31 14:45:44 +03:00
char * cmd = talloc_sub_full ( talloc_tos ( ) ,
2018-06-25 02:59:33 +03:00
lp_const_servicename ( SNUM ( conn ) ) ,
2011-07-15 09:55:31 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ,
2008-05-08 17:53:55 +04:00
conn - > connectpath ,
2011-07-15 08:59:14 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_token - > gid ,
2011-07-15 09:55:31 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > sanitized_username ,
2011-07-18 06:58:25 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > info - > domain_name ,
2019-11-04 14:20:21 +03:00
lp_root_preexec ( talloc_tos ( ) , lp_sub , snum ) ) ;
2023-06-07 03:18:21 +03:00
DBG_INFO ( " cmd=%s \n " , cmd ) ;
2016-10-12 18:55:15 +03:00
ret = smbrun ( cmd , NULL , NULL ) ;
2007-11-11 01:43:39 +03:00
TALLOC_FREE ( cmd ) ;
2014-02-04 06:09:04 +04:00
if ( ret ! = 0 & & lp_root_preexec_close ( snum ) ) {
2023-06-07 03:18:21 +03:00
DBG_WARNING ( " root preexec gave %d - failing "
" connection \n " , ret ) ;
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
goto err_root_exit ;
1999-12-13 16:27:58 +03:00
}
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
}
2001-09-20 11:09:28 +04:00
2023-07-18 12:30:18 +03:00
/* USER Activities: */
2019-07-13 17:17:17 +03:00
if ( ! change_to_user_and_service ( conn , conn - > vuid ) ) {
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
/* No point continuing if they fail the basic checks */
2023-06-07 03:18:21 +03:00
DBG_ERR ( " Can't become connected user! \n " ) ;
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
status = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE ;
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
goto err_root_exit ;
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
}
2002-11-18 09:12:47 +03:00
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
effuid = geteuid ( ) ;
effgid = getegid ( ) ;
2005-12-17 20:13:45 +03:00
/* Remember that a different vuid can connect later without these
* checks . . . */
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
2005-12-17 20:13:45 +03:00
/* Preexecs are done here as they might make the dir we are to ChDir
* to below */
2001-09-20 11:09:28 +04:00
/* execute any "preexec = " line */
2019-11-04 13:30:22 +03:00
if ( * lp_preexec ( talloc_tos ( ) , lp_sub , snum ) ) {
2019-10-31 14:45:44 +03:00
char * cmd = talloc_sub_full ( talloc_tos ( ) ,
2018-06-25 02:59:33 +03:00
lp_const_servicename ( SNUM ( conn ) ) ,
2011-07-15 09:55:31 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ,
2008-05-08 17:53:55 +04:00
conn - > connectpath ,
2011-07-15 08:59:14 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_token - > gid ,
2011-07-15 09:55:31 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > sanitized_username ,
2011-07-18 06:58:25 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > info - > domain_name ,
2019-11-04 13:30:22 +03:00
lp_preexec ( talloc_tos ( ) , lp_sub , snum ) ) ;
2016-10-12 18:55:15 +03:00
ret = smbrun ( cmd , NULL , NULL ) ;
2007-11-11 01:43:39 +03:00
TALLOC_FREE ( cmd ) ;
2005-04-27 03:52:21 +04:00
if ( ret ! = 0 & & lp_preexec_close ( snum ) ) {
2023-06-07 03:18:21 +03:00
DBG_WARNING ( " preexec gave %d - failing connection \n " ,
ret ) ;
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
2007-11-11 01:43:39 +03:00
goto err_root_exit ;
2001-09-20 11:09:28 +04:00
}
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
}
2003-09-07 20:36:13 +04:00
2010-02-17 22:13:35 +03:00
# ifdef WITH_FAKE_KASERVER
if ( lp_afs_share ( snum ) ) {
afs_login ( conn ) ;
}
# endif
/*
* we ' ve finished with the user stuff - go back to root
* so the SMB_VFS_STAT call will only fail on path errors ,
* not permission problems .
*/
change_to_root_user ( ) ;
2023-07-18 12:30:18 +03:00
/* ROOT Activities: */
2010-02-17 22:13:35 +03:00
2010-02-11 22:00:45 +03:00
/*
2020-04-07 03:36:44 +03:00
* Canonicalise the connect
2010-02-11 22:00:45 +03:00
* path here to ensure we don ' t have any symlinks in the
* connectpath . We will be checking all paths on this connection are
* below this directory . We must do this after the VFS init as we
* depend on the realpath ( ) pointer in the vfs table . JRA .
*/
2020-04-07 03:36:44 +03:00
ok = canonicalize_connect_path ( conn ) ;
if ( ! ok ) {
DBG_ERR ( " canonicalize_connect_path failed "
" for service %s, path %s \n " ,
lp_const_servicename ( snum ) ,
conn - > connectpath ) ;
status = NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME ;
goto err_root_exit ;
2010-02-11 22:00:45 +03:00
}
2005-06-27 21:14:15 +04:00
/* Add veto/hide lists */
if ( ! IS_IPC ( conn ) & & ! IS_PRINT ( conn ) ) {
2012-07-18 09:37:23 +04:00
set_namearray ( & conn - > veto_list ,
2019-11-04 14:29:44 +03:00
lp_veto_files ( talloc_tos ( ) , lp_sub , snum ) ) ;
2012-07-18 09:37:23 +04:00
set_namearray ( & conn - > hide_list ,
2019-10-31 20:44:25 +03:00
lp_hide_files ( talloc_tos ( ) , lp_sub , snum ) ) ;
2012-07-18 09:37:23 +04:00
set_namearray ( & conn - > veto_oplock_list ,
2019-11-04 14:30:58 +03:00
lp_veto_oplock_files ( talloc_tos ( ) , lp_sub , snum ) ) ;
2008-05-27 08:13:05 +04:00
set_namearray ( & conn - > aio_write_behind_list ,
2019-10-15 17:54:45 +03:00
lp_aio_write_behind ( talloc_tos ( ) , lp_sub , snum ) ) ;
2005-06-27 21:14:15 +04:00
}
2016-03-19 07:19:38 +03:00
smb_fname_cpath = synthetic_smb_fname ( talloc_tos ( ) ,
conn - > connectpath ,
NULL ,
NULL ,
2020-04-30 12:48:32 +03:00
0 ,
2016-03-19 07:19:38 +03:00
0 ) ;
2013-04-15 13:10:28 +04:00
if ( smb_fname_cpath = = NULL ) {
status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
2009-06-23 02:26:56 +04:00
goto err_root_exit ;
}
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
/* win2000 does not check the permissions on the directory
during the tree connect , instead relying on permission
check during individual operations . To match this behaviour
I have disabled this chdir check ( tridge ) */
/* the alternative is just to check the directory exists */
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
2010-02-13 05:17:32 +03:00
if ( ( ret = SMB_VFS_STAT ( conn , smb_fname_cpath ) ) ! = 0 | |
! S_ISDIR ( smb_fname_cpath - > st . st_ex_mode ) ) {
if ( ret = = 0 & & ! S_ISDIR ( smb_fname_cpath - > st . st_ex_mode ) ) {
2018-06-25 02:59:33 +03:00
DBG_ERR ( " '%s' is not a directory, when connecting to "
2005-12-17 20:13:45 +03:00
" [%s] \n " , conn - > connectpath ,
2018-06-25 02:59:33 +03:00
lp_const_servicename ( snum ) ) ;
2010-02-13 05:17:32 +03:00
} else {
2018-06-25 02:59:33 +03:00
DBG_ERR ( " '%s' does not exist or permission denied "
2010-02-13 05:17:32 +03:00
" when connecting to [%s] Error was %s \n " ,
2012-07-18 09:37:23 +04:00
conn - > connectpath ,
2018-06-25 02:59:33 +03:00
lp_const_servicename ( snum ) ,
strerror ( errno ) ) ;
2005-10-03 22:14:09 +04:00
}
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
status = NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME ;
2010-02-13 05:17:32 +03:00
goto err_root_exit ;
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
}
2010-05-20 22:36:47 +04:00
conn - > base_share_dev = smb_fname_cpath - > st . st_ex_dev ;
2007-09-13 01:48:20 +04:00
2007-12-23 01:01:25 +03:00
/* Figure out the characteristics of the underlying filesystem. This
2019-08-29 23:39:12 +03:00
* assumes that all the filesystem mounted within a share path have
2007-12-23 01:01:25 +03:00
* the same characteristics , which is likely but not guaranteed .
*/
2022-05-26 08:06:04 +03:00
if ( ! IS_IPC ( conn ) ) {
conn - > fs_capabilities = SMB_VFS_FS_CAPABILITIES ( conn , & conn - > ts_res ) ;
}
1999-12-13 16:27:58 +03:00
/*
* Print out the ' connected as ' stuff here as we need
2001-09-20 11:09:28 +04:00
* to know the effective uid and gid we will be using
* ( at least initially ) .
1999-12-13 16:27:58 +03:00
*/
2023-06-07 03:18:21 +03:00
if ( DEBUGLVL ( IS_IPC ( conn ) ? DBGLVL_INFO : DBGLVL_NOTICE ) ) {
2022-03-08 06:06:34 +03:00
bool signing_active ;
2005-12-17 20:13:45 +03:00
dbgtext ( " %s (%s) " , get_remote_machine_name ( ) ,
2011-06-16 17:49:41 +04:00
tsocket_address_string ( conn - > sconn - > remote_address ,
talloc_tos ( ) ) ) ;
2022-03-17 22:21:32 +03:00
# if defined(WITH_SMB1SERVER)
2022-03-08 06:06:34 +03:00
if ( sconn - > using_smb2 ) {
2022-03-17 22:21:32 +03:00
# endif
2022-03-08 06:06:34 +03:00
signing_active = smb2_signing_key_valid (
session - > global - > encryption_key ) ;
2022-03-17 22:21:32 +03:00
# if defined(WITH_SMB1SERVER)
2022-03-08 06:06:34 +03:00
} else {
2022-03-08 06:51:06 +03:00
signing_active = smb1_srv_is_signing_active ( xconn ) ;
2022-03-08 06:06:34 +03:00
}
2022-03-17 22:21:32 +03:00
# endif
2022-03-08 06:06:34 +03:00
dbgtext ( " %s " , signing_active ? " signed " : " " ) ;
2012-07-18 09:37:23 +04:00
dbgtext ( " connect to service %s " ,
2018-06-25 02:59:33 +03:00
lp_const_servicename ( snum ) ) ;
2008-05-08 18:06:42 +04:00
dbgtext ( " initially as user %s " ,
2011-07-15 09:55:31 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ) ;
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
dbgtext ( " (uid=%d, gid=%d) " , ( int ) effuid , ( int ) effgid ) ;
2012-03-24 23:17:08 +04:00
dbgtext ( " (pid %d) \n " , ( int ) getpid ( ) ) ;
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
}
2007-09-13 01:48:20 +04:00
2018-06-14 08:27:43 +03:00
conn - > tcon_done = true ;
2018-06-14 08:26:14 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
2007-11-11 01:43:39 +03:00
err_root_exit :
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
2009-06-23 02:26:56 +04:00
TALLOC_FREE ( smb_fname_cpath ) ;
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
/* We must exit this function as root. */
2010-02-13 10:18:53 +03:00
if ( geteuid ( ) ! = 0 ) {
Simplify the logic in make_connection_snum(), and make it match Windows behavior.
Cause all exit paths to go through one place, where all cleanup is
done. change_to_root_user() for pathname operations that should succeed if
the path exists, even if the connecting user has no access.
For example, a share can now be defined with a path of /root/only/access
(where /root/only/access is a directory path with all components only
accessible to root e.g. root owned, permissions 700 on every component).
Non-root users will now correctly connect, but get ACCESS_DENIED on
all activities (which matches Windows behavior). Previously, non-root
users would get NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME on doing a TConX to this
share, even though it's a perfectly valid share path (just not accessible
to them).
This change was inspired by the research I did for bug #7126, which
was reported by bepi@adria.it.
As this is a change in a core function, I'm proposing to leave
this only in master for 3.6.0, not back-port to any existing releases.
This should give us enough time to decide if this is the way we want this to
behave (as Windows) or if we prefer the previous behavior.
Jeremy.
2010-02-13 09:45:37 +03:00
change_to_root_user ( ) ;
}
2007-11-11 01:43:39 +03:00
if ( on_err_call_dis_hook ) {
/* Call VFS disconnect hook */
SMB_VFS_DISCONNECT ( conn ) ;
}
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
return status ;
2012-01-19 00:38:14 +04:00
}
/****************************************************************************
Make a connection to a service from SMB2 . External SMB2 interface .
We must set cnum before claiming connection .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
2014-09-15 05:47:41 +04:00
connection_struct * make_connection_smb2 ( struct smbd_smb2_request * req ,
2012-03-27 13:09:05 +04:00
struct smbXsrv_tcon * tcon ,
int snum ,
2012-01-19 00:38:14 +04:00
const char * pdev ,
NTSTATUS * pstatus )
{
2014-09-15 05:47:41 +04:00
struct smbd_server_connection * sconn = req - > sconn ;
2012-01-19 00:38:14 +04:00
connection_struct * conn = conn_new ( sconn ) ;
if ( ! conn ) {
2023-06-07 03:18:21 +03:00
DBG_ERR ( " make_connection_smb2: Couldn't find free connection. \n " ) ;
2012-01-19 00:38:14 +04:00
* pstatus = NT_STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES ;
return NULL ;
}
2012-03-27 13:09:05 +04:00
conn - > cnum = tcon - > global - > tcon_wire_id ;
conn - > tcon = tcon ;
2014-09-15 05:47:41 +04:00
* pstatus = make_connection_snum ( req - > xconn ,
2012-01-19 00:38:14 +04:00
conn ,
2012-03-27 13:09:05 +04:00
snum ,
2019-12-29 16:34:42 +03:00
req - > session ,
2012-01-19 08:52:47 +04:00
pdev ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( * pstatus ) ) {
2012-01-19 00:38:14 +04:00
conn_free ( conn ) ;
return NULL ;
}
return conn ;
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
}
/****************************************************************************
2005-04-27 03:52:21 +04:00
Close a cnum .
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
2005-04-27 03:52:21 +04:00
2022-08-17 21:35:29 +03:00
void close_cnum ( connection_struct * conn ,
uint64_t vuid ,
enum file_close_type close_type )
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
{
2017-06-29 21:29:33 +03:00
char rootpath [ 2 ] = { ' / ' , ' \0 ' } ;
struct smb_filename root_fname = { . base_name = rootpath } ;
2019-11-04 13:23:18 +03:00
const struct loadparm_substitution * lp_sub =
loadparm_s3_global_substitution ( ) ;
2017-06-29 21:29:33 +03:00
2022-08-17 21:39:36 +03:00
file_close_conn ( conn , close_type ) ;
2008-10-13 01:09:18 +04:00
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
change_to_root_user ( ) ;
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
2023-06-07 03:18:21 +03:00
DEBUG ( IS_IPC ( conn ) ? DBGLVL_INFO : DBGLVL_NOTICE , ( " %s (%s) closed connection to service %s \n " ,
2005-12-17 20:13:45 +03:00
get_remote_machine_name ( ) ,
2011-06-16 17:49:41 +04:00
tsocket_address_string ( conn - > sconn - > remote_address ,
talloc_tos ( ) ) ,
2018-06-25 02:59:33 +03:00
lp_const_servicename ( SNUM ( conn ) ) ) ) ;
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
2003-10-03 19:11:24 +04:00
/* make sure we leave the directory available for unmount */
2017-06-29 21:29:33 +03:00
vfs_ChDir ( conn , & root_fname ) ;
2003-10-03 19:11:24 +04:00
2015-01-15 19:41:50 +03:00
/* Call VFS disconnect hook */
SMB_VFS_DISCONNECT ( conn ) ;
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
/* execute any "postexec = " line */
2019-11-04 13:23:18 +03:00
if ( * lp_postexec ( talloc_tos ( ) , lp_sub , SNUM ( conn ) ) & &
2019-07-13 17:17:17 +03:00
change_to_user_and_service ( conn , vuid ) ) {
2019-10-31 14:45:44 +03:00
char * cmd = talloc_sub_full ( talloc_tos ( ) ,
2018-06-25 02:59:33 +03:00
lp_const_servicename ( SNUM ( conn ) ) ,
2011-07-15 09:55:31 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ,
2008-05-08 17:53:55 +04:00
conn - > connectpath ,
2011-07-15 08:59:14 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_token - > gid ,
2011-07-15 09:55:31 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > sanitized_username ,
2011-07-18 06:58:25 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > info - > domain_name ,
2019-11-04 13:23:18 +03:00
lp_postexec ( talloc_tos ( ) , lp_sub , SNUM ( conn ) ) ) ;
2016-10-12 18:55:15 +03:00
smbrun ( cmd , NULL , NULL ) ;
2007-11-11 01:43:39 +03:00
TALLOC_FREE ( cmd ) ;
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
change_to_root_user ( ) ;
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
}
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
change_to_root_user ( ) ;
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
/* execute any "root postexec = " line */
2019-11-04 14:19:24 +03:00
if ( * lp_root_postexec ( talloc_tos ( ) , lp_sub , SNUM ( conn ) ) ) {
2019-10-31 14:45:44 +03:00
char * cmd = talloc_sub_full ( talloc_tos ( ) ,
2018-06-25 02:59:33 +03:00
lp_const_servicename ( SNUM ( conn ) ) ,
2011-07-15 09:55:31 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ,
2008-05-08 17:53:55 +04:00
conn - > connectpath ,
2011-07-15 08:59:14 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_token - > gid ,
2011-07-15 09:55:31 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_info - > sanitized_username ,
2011-07-18 06:58:25 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > info - > domain_name ,
2019-11-04 14:19:24 +03:00
lp_root_postexec ( talloc_tos ( ) , lp_sub , SNUM ( conn ) ) ) ;
2016-10-12 18:55:15 +03:00
smbrun ( cmd , NULL , NULL ) ;
2007-11-11 01:43:39 +03:00
TALLOC_FREE ( cmd ) ;
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
}
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
2009-08-06 15:22:33 +04:00
conn_free ( conn ) ;
1998-08-17 17:11:34 +04:00
}