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samba-mirror/source3/utils/ntlm_auth.c

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/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
Winbind status program.
Copyright (C) Tim Potter 2000-2003
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2003-2004
Copyright (C) Francesco Chemolli <kinkie@kame.usr.dsi.unimi.it> 2000
Copyright (C) Robert O'Callahan 2006 (added cached credential code).
Copyright (C) Kai Blin <kai@samba.org> 2008
Copyright (C) Simo Sorce 2010
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "lib/param/param.h"
#include "popt_common.h"
#include "libcli/security/security.h"
#include "utils/ntlm_auth.h"
#include "../libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
#include "auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp.h"
#include "auth/gensec/gensec.h"
#include "auth/gensec/gensec_internal.h"
#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
#include "librpc/crypto/gse.h"
#include "smb_krb5.h"
#include "lib/util/tiniparser.h"
#include "../lib/crypto/arcfour.h"
#include "nsswitch/winbind_client.h"
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/krb5pac.h"
#include "../lib/util/asn1.h"
#include "auth/common_auth.h"
#include "source3/include/auth.h"
#include "source3/auth/proto.h"
#include "nsswitch/libwbclient/wbclient.h"
#include "lib/param/loadparm.h"
#include "lib/util/base64.h"
#include "lib/util/xfile.h"
#if HAVE_KRB5
#include "auth/kerberos/pac_utils.h"
#endif
#ifndef PAM_WINBIND_CONFIG_FILE
#define PAM_WINBIND_CONFIG_FILE "/etc/security/pam_winbind.conf"
#endif
#define WINBIND_KRB5_AUTH 0x00000080
#undef DBGC_CLASS
#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_WINBIND
#define INITIAL_BUFFER_SIZE 300
#define MAX_BUFFER_SIZE 630000
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
enum stdio_helper_mode {
SQUID_2_4_BASIC,
SQUID_2_5_BASIC,
SQUID_2_5_NTLMSSP,
NTLMSSP_CLIENT_1,
GSS_SPNEGO_SERVER,
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
GSS_SPNEGO_CLIENT,
NTLM_SERVER_1,
NTLM_CHANGE_PASSWORD_1,
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
NUM_HELPER_MODES
};
enum ntlm_auth_cli_state {
CLIENT_INITIAL = 0,
CLIENT_RESPONSE,
CLIENT_FINISHED,
CLIENT_ERROR
};
struct ntlm_auth_state {
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
enum stdio_helper_mode helper_mode;
enum ntlm_auth_cli_state cli_state;
struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state;
uint32_t neg_flags;
char *want_feature_list;
bool have_session_key;
DATA_BLOB session_key;
DATA_BLOB initial_message;
void *gensec_private_1;
};
typedef void (*stdio_helper_function)(enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mode,
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
struct ntlm_auth_state *state, char *buf,
int length, void **private2);
static void manage_gensec_request(enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mode,
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
char *buf, int length, void **private1);
static void manage_squid_request(enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mode,
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
struct ntlm_auth_state *state,
stdio_helper_function fn, void **private2);
static void manage_squid_basic_request (enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mode,
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
struct ntlm_auth_state *state,
char *buf, int length, void **private2);
static void manage_squid_ntlmssp_request (enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mode,
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
struct ntlm_auth_state *state,
char *buf, int length, void **private2);
static void manage_client_ntlmssp_request (enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mode,
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
struct ntlm_auth_state *state,
char *buf, int length, void **private2);
static void manage_gss_spnego_request (enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mode,
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
struct ntlm_auth_state *state,
char *buf, int length, void **private2);
static void manage_gss_spnego_client_request (enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mode,
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
struct ntlm_auth_state *state,
char *buf, int length, void **private2);
static void manage_ntlm_server_1_request (enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mode,
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
struct ntlm_auth_state *state,
char *buf, int length, void **private2);
static void manage_ntlm_change_password_1_request(enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mode,
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
struct ntlm_auth_state *state,
char *buf, int length, void **private2);
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
static const struct {
enum stdio_helper_mode mode;
const char *name;
stdio_helper_function fn;
} stdio_helper_protocols[] = {
{ SQUID_2_4_BASIC, "squid-2.4-basic", manage_squid_basic_request},
{ SQUID_2_5_BASIC, "squid-2.5-basic", manage_squid_basic_request},
{ SQUID_2_5_NTLMSSP, "squid-2.5-ntlmssp", manage_squid_ntlmssp_request},
{ NTLMSSP_CLIENT_1, "ntlmssp-client-1", manage_client_ntlmssp_request},
{ GSS_SPNEGO_SERVER, "gss-spnego", manage_gss_spnego_request},
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
{ GSS_SPNEGO_CLIENT, "gss-spnego-client", manage_gss_spnego_client_request},
{ NTLM_SERVER_1, "ntlm-server-1", manage_ntlm_server_1_request},
{ NTLM_CHANGE_PASSWORD_1, "ntlm-change-password-1", manage_ntlm_change_password_1_request},
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
{ NUM_HELPER_MODES, NULL, NULL}
};
const char *opt_username;
const char *opt_domain;
const char *opt_workstation;
const char *opt_password;
static DATA_BLOB opt_challenge;
static DATA_BLOB opt_lm_response;
static DATA_BLOB opt_nt_response;
2003-03-24 12:54:13 +03:00
static int request_lm_key;
static int request_user_session_key;
static int use_cached_creds;
static int offline_logon;
Added MSV1_0_ALLOW_MSVCHAPV2 flag to ntlm_auth An implementation of https://lists.samba.org/archive/samba/2012-March/166497.html (which has been discussed in 2012, but was never implemented). It has been tested on a Debian Jessie system with this patch added to the Debian package (which is currently 4.1.17). Even though this is Samba 4, the ntlm_auth installed is the one from Samba 3 (yes, it surprised me too). The backend was a machine with Windows 2012R2. It was first tested with the local security policy 'Network Security: LAN Manager authentication level' setting changed to 'Send NTLMv2 Response Only' (allow ntlm v1). This way we are able to authenticate with and without the MSV1_0_ALLOW_MSVCHAPV2 flag (as expected). After the basic step has been verified, the local security policy 'Network Security: LAN Manager authentication level' setting was changed to 'Send NTLMv2 Response Only. Refuse LM & NTLM' (only allow ntlm v2). The behaviour now changed according to the MSV1_0_ALLOW_MSVCHAPV2 flag (again: as expected). $ ntlm_auth --request-nt-key --username=XXXXXXXXXXXXX --challenge=XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX --nt-response=XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX --domain= Logon failure (0xc000006d) $ ntlm_auth --request-nt-key --username=XXXXXXXXXXXXX --challenge=XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX --nt-response=XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX --domain= --allow-mschapv2 NT_KEY: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX The changes in `wbclient.h` are intended for programs that use libwinbind directly instead of authenticating via `ntlm_auth`. I intend to use that within FreeRADIUS (see https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11149). BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11694 Signed-off-by: Herwin Weststrate <herwin@quarantainenet.nl> Reviewed-by: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2015-12-09 20:47:47 +03:00
static int opt_allow_mschapv2;
static const char *require_membership_of;
static const char *require_membership_of_sid;
static const char *opt_pam_winbind_conf;
const char *opt_target_service;
const char *opt_target_hostname;
/* This is a bit hairy, but the basic idea is to do a password callback
to the calling application. The callback comes from within gensec */
static void manage_gensec_get_pw_request(enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mode,
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
struct ntlm_auth_state *state, char *buf, int length,
void **password)
{
DATA_BLOB in;
if (strlen(buf) < 2) {
DEBUG(1, ("query [%s] invalid", buf));
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "BH Query invalid\n");
return;
}
if (strlen(buf) > 3) {
in = base64_decode_data_blob(buf + 3);
} else {
in = data_blob(NULL, 0);
}
if (strncmp(buf, "PW ", 3) == 0) {
*password = talloc_strndup(NULL,
(const char *)in.data, in.length);
if (*password == NULL) {
DEBUG(1, ("Out of memory\n"));
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "BH Out of memory\n");
data_blob_free(&in);
return;
}
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "OK\n");
data_blob_free(&in);
return;
}
DEBUG(1, ("Asked for (and expected) a password\n"));
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "BH Expected a password\n");
data_blob_free(&in);
}
/**
* Callback for password credentials. This is not async, and when
* GENSEC and the credentials code is made async, it will look rather
* different.
*/
static const char *get_password(struct cli_credentials *credentials)
{
TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
char *password = NULL;
struct ntlm_auth_state *state;
state = talloc_zero(frame, struct ntlm_auth_state);
if (state == NULL) {
DEBUG(0, ("squid_stream: Failed to talloc ntlm_auth_state\n"));
x_fprintf(x_stderr, "ERR\n");
exit(1);
}
state->mem_ctx = state;
/* Ask for a password */
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "PW\n");
manage_squid_request(NUM_HELPER_MODES /* bogus */, NULL, state, manage_gensec_get_pw_request, (void **)&password);
talloc_steal(credentials, password);
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return password;
}
/**
* A limited set of features are defined with text strings as needed
* by ntlm_auth
*
*/
static void gensec_want_feature_list(struct gensec_security *state, char* feature_list)
{
if (in_list("NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SESSION_KEY", feature_list, true)) {
DEBUG(10, ("want GENSEC_FEATURE_SESSION_KEY\n"));
gensec_want_feature(state, GENSEC_FEATURE_SESSION_KEY);
}
if (in_list("NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SIGN", feature_list, true)) {
DEBUG(10, ("want GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN\n"));
gensec_want_feature(state, GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN);
}
if (in_list("NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SEAL", feature_list, true)) {
DEBUG(10, ("want GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL\n"));
gensec_want_feature(state, GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL);
}
if (in_list("NTLMSSP_FEATURE_CCACHE", feature_list, true)) {
DEBUG(10, ("want GENSEC_FEATURE_NTLM_CCACHE\n"));
gensec_want_feature(state, GENSEC_FEATURE_NTLM_CCACHE);
}
}
static char winbind_separator(void)
{
struct winbindd_response response;
static bool got_sep;
static char sep;
if (got_sep)
return sep;
ZERO_STRUCT(response);
/* Send off request */
if (winbindd_request_response(NULL, WINBINDD_INFO, NULL, &response) !=
NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
d_fprintf(stderr, "could not obtain winbind separator!\n");
return *lp_winbind_separator();
}
sep = response.data.info.winbind_separator;
got_sep = True;
if (!sep) {
d_fprintf(stderr, "winbind separator was NULL!\n");
return *lp_winbind_separator();
}
return sep;
}
const char *get_winbind_domain(void)
{
struct winbindd_response response;
static fstring winbind_domain;
if (*winbind_domain) {
return winbind_domain;
}
ZERO_STRUCT(response);
/* Send off request */
if (winbindd_request_response(NULL, WINBINDD_DOMAIN_NAME, NULL, &response) !=
NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(1, ("could not obtain winbind domain name!\n"));
return lp_workgroup();
}
fstrcpy(winbind_domain, response.data.domain_name);
return winbind_domain;
}
const char *get_winbind_netbios_name(void)
{
struct winbindd_response response;
static fstring winbind_netbios_name;
if (*winbind_netbios_name) {
return winbind_netbios_name;
}
ZERO_STRUCT(response);
/* Send off request */
if (winbindd_request_response(NULL, WINBINDD_NETBIOS_NAME, NULL, &response) !=
NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(1, ("could not obtain winbind netbios name!\n"));
return lp_netbios_name();
}
fstrcpy(winbind_netbios_name, response.data.netbios_name);
return winbind_netbios_name;
}
DATA_BLOB get_challenge(void)
{
static DATA_BLOB chal;
if (opt_challenge.length)
return opt_challenge;
2010-01-09 22:26:46 +03:00
chal = data_blob(NULL, 8);
generate_random_buffer(chal.data, chal.length);
return chal;
}
/* Copy of parse_domain_user from winbindd_util.c. Parse a string of the
form DOMAIN/user into a domain and a user */
static bool parse_ntlm_auth_domain_user(const char *domuser, fstring domain,
fstring user)
{
char *p = strchr(domuser,winbind_separator());
if (!p) {
return False;
}
2010-01-09 22:26:46 +03:00
fstrcpy(user, p+1);
fstrcpy(domain, domuser);
domain[PTR_DIFF(p, domuser)] = 0;
return strupper_m(domain);
}
static bool get_require_membership_sid(void) {
struct winbindd_request request;
struct winbindd_response response;
if (!require_membership_of) {
return True;
}
if (require_membership_of_sid) {
return True;
}
/* Otherwise, ask winbindd for the name->sid request */
ZERO_STRUCT(request);
ZERO_STRUCT(response);
if (!parse_ntlm_auth_domain_user(require_membership_of,
request.data.name.dom_name,
request.data.name.name)) {
DEBUG(0, ("Could not parse %s into separate domain/name parts!\n",
require_membership_of));
return False;
}
if (winbindd_request_response(NULL, WINBINDD_LOOKUPNAME, &request, &response) !=
NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(0, ("Winbindd lookupname failed to resolve %s into a SID!\n",
require_membership_of));
return False;
}
require_membership_of_sid = SMB_STRDUP(response.data.sid.sid);
if (require_membership_of_sid)
return True;
return False;
}
/*
* Get some configuration from pam_winbind.conf to see if we
* need to contact trusted domain
*/
int get_pam_winbind_config()
{
int ctrl = 0;
struct tiniparser_dictionary *d = NULL;
2010-01-09 22:26:46 +03:00
if (!opt_pam_winbind_conf || !*opt_pam_winbind_conf) {
opt_pam_winbind_conf = PAM_WINBIND_CONFIG_FILE;
}
d = tiniparser_load(opt_pam_winbind_conf);
2010-01-09 22:26:46 +03:00
if (!d) {
return 0;
}
2010-01-09 22:26:46 +03:00
if (tiniparser_getboolean(d, "global:krb5_auth", false)) {
ctrl |= WINBIND_KRB5_AUTH;
}
tiniparser_freedict(d);
2010-01-09 22:26:46 +03:00
return ctrl;
}
/* Authenticate a user with a plaintext password */
static bool check_plaintext_auth(const char *user, const char *pass,
bool stdout_diagnostics)
{
struct winbindd_request request;
struct winbindd_response response;
NSS_STATUS result;
if (!get_require_membership_sid()) {
return False;
}
/* Send off request */
ZERO_STRUCT(request);
ZERO_STRUCT(response);
fstrcpy(request.data.auth.user, user);
fstrcpy(request.data.auth.pass, pass);
if (require_membership_of_sid) {
strlcpy(request.data.auth.require_membership_of_sid,
require_membership_of_sid,
sizeof(request.data.auth.require_membership_of_sid));
}
if (offline_logon) {
request.flags |= WBFLAG_PAM_CACHED_LOGIN;
}
result = winbindd_request_response(NULL, WINBINDD_PAM_AUTH, &request, &response);
/* Display response */
if (stdout_diagnostics) {
if ((result != NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS) && (response.data.auth.nt_status == 0)) {
d_fprintf(stderr, "Reading winbind reply failed! (0x01)\n");
}
d_printf("%s: %s (0x%x)\n",
response.data.auth.nt_status_string,
response.data.auth.error_string,
response.data.auth.nt_status);
} else {
if ((result != NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS) && (response.data.auth.nt_status == 0)) {
DEBUG(1, ("Reading winbind reply failed! (0x01)\n"));
}
DEBUG(3, ("%s: %s (0x%x)\n",
response.data.auth.nt_status_string,
response.data.auth.error_string,
response.data.auth.nt_status));
}
return (result == NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS);
}
/* authenticate a user with an encrypted username/password */
NTSTATUS contact_winbind_auth_crap(const char *username,
const char *domain,
const char *workstation,
const DATA_BLOB *challenge,
const DATA_BLOB *lm_response,
const DATA_BLOB *nt_response,
uint32_t flags,
uint32_t extra_logon_parameters,
uint8_t lm_key[8],
uint8_t user_session_key[16],
char **error_string,
char **unix_name)
{
NTSTATUS nt_status;
NSS_STATUS result;
struct winbindd_request request;
struct winbindd_response response;
if (!get_require_membership_sid()) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
ZERO_STRUCT(request);
ZERO_STRUCT(response);
request.flags = flags;
request.data.auth_crap.logon_parameters = extra_logon_parameters
| MSV1_0_ALLOW_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT | MSV1_0_ALLOW_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT;
Added MSV1_0_ALLOW_MSVCHAPV2 flag to ntlm_auth An implementation of https://lists.samba.org/archive/samba/2012-March/166497.html (which has been discussed in 2012, but was never implemented). It has been tested on a Debian Jessie system with this patch added to the Debian package (which is currently 4.1.17). Even though this is Samba 4, the ntlm_auth installed is the one from Samba 3 (yes, it surprised me too). The backend was a machine with Windows 2012R2. It was first tested with the local security policy 'Network Security: LAN Manager authentication level' setting changed to 'Send NTLMv2 Response Only' (allow ntlm v1). This way we are able to authenticate with and without the MSV1_0_ALLOW_MSVCHAPV2 flag (as expected). After the basic step has been verified, the local security policy 'Network Security: LAN Manager authentication level' setting was changed to 'Send NTLMv2 Response Only. Refuse LM & NTLM' (only allow ntlm v2). The behaviour now changed according to the MSV1_0_ALLOW_MSVCHAPV2 flag (again: as expected). $ ntlm_auth --request-nt-key --username=XXXXXXXXXXXXX --challenge=XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX --nt-response=XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX --domain= Logon failure (0xc000006d) $ ntlm_auth --request-nt-key --username=XXXXXXXXXXXXX --challenge=XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX --nt-response=XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX --domain= --allow-mschapv2 NT_KEY: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX The changes in `wbclient.h` are intended for programs that use libwinbind directly instead of authenticating via `ntlm_auth`. I intend to use that within FreeRADIUS (see https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11149). BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11694 Signed-off-by: Herwin Weststrate <herwin@quarantainenet.nl> Reviewed-by: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2015-12-09 20:47:47 +03:00
if (opt_allow_mschapv2) {
request.data.auth_crap.logon_parameters |= MSV1_0_ALLOW_MSVCHAPV2;
}
if (require_membership_of_sid)
fstrcpy(request.data.auth_crap.require_membership_of_sid, require_membership_of_sid);
fstrcpy(request.data.auth_crap.user, username);
fstrcpy(request.data.auth_crap.domain, domain);
fstrcpy(request.data.auth_crap.workstation,
workstation);
memcpy(request.data.auth_crap.chal, challenge->data, MIN(challenge->length, 8));
if (lm_response && lm_response->length) {
memcpy(request.data.auth_crap.lm_resp,
lm_response->data,
MIN(lm_response->length, sizeof(request.data.auth_crap.lm_resp)));
request.data.auth_crap.lm_resp_len = lm_response->length;
}
if (nt_response && nt_response->length) {
if (nt_response->length > sizeof(request.data.auth_crap.nt_resp)) {
request.flags = request.flags | WBFLAG_BIG_NTLMV2_BLOB;
request.extra_len = nt_response->length;
request.extra_data.data = SMB_MALLOC_ARRAY(char, request.extra_len);
if (request.extra_data.data == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
memcpy(request.extra_data.data, nt_response->data,
nt_response->length);
} else {
memcpy(request.data.auth_crap.nt_resp,
nt_response->data, nt_response->length);
}
request.data.auth_crap.nt_resp_len = nt_response->length;
}
2010-01-09 22:26:46 +03:00
result = winbindd_request_response(NULL, WINBINDD_PAM_AUTH_CRAP, &request, &response);
SAFE_FREE(request.extra_data.data);
/* Display response */
if ((result != NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS) && (response.data.auth.nt_status == 0)) {
nt_status = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
if (error_string)
*error_string = smb_xstrdup("Reading winbind reply failed!");
winbindd_free_response(&response);
return nt_status;
}
2010-01-09 22:26:46 +03:00
nt_status = (NT_STATUS(response.data.auth.nt_status));
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
if (error_string)
*error_string = smb_xstrdup(response.data.auth.error_string);
winbindd_free_response(&response);
return nt_status;
}
if ((flags & WBFLAG_PAM_LMKEY) && lm_key) {
memcpy(lm_key, response.data.auth.first_8_lm_hash,
sizeof(response.data.auth.first_8_lm_hash));
}
if ((flags & WBFLAG_PAM_USER_SESSION_KEY) && user_session_key) {
memcpy(user_session_key, response.data.auth.user_session_key,
sizeof(response.data.auth.user_session_key));
}
if (flags & WBFLAG_PAM_UNIX_NAME) {
*unix_name = SMB_STRDUP(response.data.auth.unix_username);
if (!*unix_name) {
winbindd_free_response(&response);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
}
winbindd_free_response(&response);
return nt_status;
}
/* contact server to change user password using auth crap */
static NTSTATUS contact_winbind_change_pswd_auth_crap(const char *username,
const char *domain,
const DATA_BLOB new_nt_pswd,
const DATA_BLOB old_nt_hash_enc,
const DATA_BLOB new_lm_pswd,
const DATA_BLOB old_lm_hash_enc,
char **error_string)
{
NTSTATUS nt_status;
NSS_STATUS result;
struct winbindd_request request;
struct winbindd_response response;
if (!get_require_membership_sid())
{
if(error_string)
*error_string = smb_xstrdup("Can't get membership sid.");
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
ZERO_STRUCT(request);
ZERO_STRUCT(response);
if(username != NULL)
fstrcpy(request.data.chng_pswd_auth_crap.user, username);
if(domain != NULL)
fstrcpy(request.data.chng_pswd_auth_crap.domain,domain);
if(new_nt_pswd.length)
{
memcpy(request.data.chng_pswd_auth_crap.new_nt_pswd, new_nt_pswd.data, sizeof(request.data.chng_pswd_auth_crap.new_nt_pswd));
request.data.chng_pswd_auth_crap.new_nt_pswd_len = new_nt_pswd.length;
}
if(old_nt_hash_enc.length)
{
memcpy(request.data.chng_pswd_auth_crap.old_nt_hash_enc, old_nt_hash_enc.data, sizeof(request.data.chng_pswd_auth_crap.old_nt_hash_enc));
request.data.chng_pswd_auth_crap.old_nt_hash_enc_len = old_nt_hash_enc.length;
}
if(new_lm_pswd.length)
{
memcpy(request.data.chng_pswd_auth_crap.new_lm_pswd, new_lm_pswd.data, sizeof(request.data.chng_pswd_auth_crap.new_lm_pswd));
request.data.chng_pswd_auth_crap.new_lm_pswd_len = new_lm_pswd.length;
}
if(old_lm_hash_enc.length)
{
memcpy(request.data.chng_pswd_auth_crap.old_lm_hash_enc, old_lm_hash_enc.data, sizeof(request.data.chng_pswd_auth_crap.old_lm_hash_enc));
request.data.chng_pswd_auth_crap.old_lm_hash_enc_len = old_lm_hash_enc.length;
}
2010-01-09 22:26:46 +03:00
result = winbindd_request_response(NULL, WINBINDD_PAM_CHNG_PSWD_AUTH_CRAP, &request, &response);
/* Display response */
if ((result != NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS) && (response.data.auth.nt_status == 0))
{
nt_status = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
if (error_string)
*error_string = smb_xstrdup("Reading winbind reply failed!");
winbindd_free_response(&response);
return nt_status;
}
2010-01-09 22:26:46 +03:00
nt_status = (NT_STATUS(response.data.auth.nt_status));
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status))
{
if (error_string)
*error_string = smb_xstrdup(response.data.auth.error_string);
winbindd_free_response(&response);
return nt_status;
}
winbindd_free_response(&response);
2010-01-09 22:26:46 +03:00
return nt_status;
}
static NTSTATUS ntlm_auth_generate_session_info(struct auth4_context *auth_context,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
void *server_returned_info,
const char *original_user_name,
uint32_t session_info_flags,
struct auth_session_info **session_info_out)
{
const char *unix_username = (const char *)server_returned_info;
bool ok;
struct dom_sid *sids = NULL;
struct auth_session_info *session_info = NULL;
session_info = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct auth_session_info);
if (session_info == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
session_info->unix_info = talloc_zero(session_info, struct auth_user_info_unix);
if (session_info->unix_info == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(session_info);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
session_info->unix_info->unix_name = talloc_strdup(session_info->unix_info,
unix_username);
if (session_info->unix_info->unix_name == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(session_info);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
session_info->security_token = talloc_zero(session_info, struct security_token);
if (session_info->security_token == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(session_info);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
sids = talloc_zero_array(session_info->security_token,
struct dom_sid, 3);
if (sids == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(session_info);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
ok = dom_sid_parse(SID_WORLD, &sids[0]);
if (!ok) {
TALLOC_FREE(session_info);
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
ok = dom_sid_parse(SID_NT_NETWORK, &sids[1]);
if (!ok) {
TALLOC_FREE(session_info);
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
ok = dom_sid_parse(SID_NT_AUTHENTICATED_USERS, &sids[2]);
if (!ok) {
TALLOC_FREE(session_info);
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
session_info->security_token->num_sids = talloc_array_length(sids);
session_info->security_token->sids = sids;
*session_info_out = session_info;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
static NTSTATUS ntlm_auth_generate_session_info_pac(struct auth4_context *auth_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context,
DATA_BLOB *pac_blob,
const char *princ_name,
const struct tsocket_address *remote_address,
uint32_t session_info_flags,
struct auth_session_info **session_info)
{
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
struct PAC_LOGON_INFO *logon_info = NULL;
char *unixuser;
NTSTATUS status;
char *domain = NULL;
char *realm = NULL;
char *user = NULL;
char *p;
tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
if (!tmp_ctx) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (pac_blob) {
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
status = kerberos_pac_logon_info(tmp_ctx, *pac_blob, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0, &logon_info);
#else
status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
#endif
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
goto done;
}
}
DEBUG(3, ("Kerberos ticket principal name is [%s]\n", princ_name));
p = strchr_m(princ_name, '@');
if (!p) {
DEBUG(3, ("[%s] Doesn't look like a valid principal\n",
princ_name));
return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
}
user = talloc_strndup(mem_ctx, princ_name, p - princ_name);
if (!user) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
realm = talloc_strdup(talloc_tos(), p + 1);
if (!realm) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!strequal(realm, lp_realm())) {
DEBUG(3, ("Ticket for foreign realm %s@%s\n", user, realm));
if (!lp_allow_trusted_domains()) {
return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
}
}
if (logon_info && logon_info->info3.base.logon_domain.string) {
domain = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx,
logon_info->info3.base.logon_domain.string);
if (!domain) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
DEBUG(10, ("Domain is [%s] (using PAC)\n", domain));
} else {
/* If we have winbind running, we can (and must) shorten the
username by using the short netbios name. Otherwise we will
have inconsistent user names. With Kerberos, we get the
fully qualified realm, with ntlmssp we get the short
name. And even w2k3 does use ntlmssp if you for example
connect to an ip address. */
wbcErr wbc_status;
struct wbcDomainInfo *info = NULL;
DEBUG(10, ("Mapping [%s] to short name using winbindd\n",
realm));
wbc_status = wbcDomainInfo(realm, &info);
if (WBC_ERROR_IS_OK(wbc_status)) {
domain = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx,
info->short_name);
wbcFreeMemory(info);
} else {
DEBUG(3, ("Could not find short name: %s\n",
wbcErrorString(wbc_status)));
domain = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, realm);
}
if (!domain) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
DEBUG(10, ("Domain is [%s] (using Winbind)\n", domain));
}
unixuser = talloc_asprintf(tmp_ctx, "%s%c%s", domain, winbind_separator(), user);
if (!unixuser) {
status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto done;
}
status = ntlm_auth_generate_session_info(auth_ctx, mem_ctx, unixuser, NULL, session_info_flags, session_info);
done:
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return status;
}
/**
* Return the challenge as determined by the authentication subsystem
* @return an 8 byte random challenge
*/
static NTSTATUS ntlm_auth_get_challenge(struct auth4_context *auth_ctx,
uint8_t chal[8])
{
if (auth_ctx->challenge.data.length == 8) {
DEBUG(5, ("auth_get_challenge: returning previous challenge by module %s (normal)\n",
auth_ctx->challenge.set_by));
memcpy(chal, auth_ctx->challenge.data.data, 8);
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
if (!auth_ctx->challenge.set_by) {
generate_random_buffer(chal, 8);
auth_ctx->challenge.data = data_blob_talloc(auth_ctx, chal, 8);
NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(auth_ctx->challenge.data.data);
auth_ctx->challenge.set_by = "random";
}
DEBUG(10,("auth_get_challenge: challenge set by %s\n",
auth_ctx->challenge.set_by));
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/**
* NTLM2 authentication modifies the effective challenge,
* @param challenge The new challenge value
*/
static NTSTATUS ntlm_auth_set_challenge(struct auth4_context *auth_ctx, const uint8_t chal[8], const char *set_by)
{
auth_ctx->challenge.set_by = talloc_strdup(auth_ctx, set_by);
NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(auth_ctx->challenge.set_by);
auth_ctx->challenge.data = data_blob_talloc(auth_ctx, chal, 8);
NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(auth_ctx->challenge.data.data);
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/**
* Check the password on an NTLMSSP login.
*
* Return the session keys used on the connection.
*/
static NTSTATUS winbind_pw_check(struct auth4_context *auth4_context,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info,
void **server_returned_info,
DATA_BLOB *session_key, DATA_BLOB *lm_session_key)
{
static const char zeros[16] = { 0, };
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
NTSTATUS nt_status;
char *error_string = NULL;
uint8_t lm_key[8];
uint8_t user_sess_key[16];
2009-02-10 00:25:59 +03:00
char *unix_name = NULL;
nt_status = contact_winbind_auth_crap(user_info->client.account_name, user_info->client.domain_name,
user_info->workstation_name,
&auth4_context->challenge.data,
&user_info->password.response.lanman,
&user_info->password.response.nt,
WBFLAG_PAM_LMKEY | WBFLAG_PAM_USER_SESSION_KEY | WBFLAG_PAM_UNIX_NAME,
0,
lm_key, user_sess_key,
&error_string, &unix_name);
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
if (memcmp(lm_key, zeros, 8) != 0) {
*lm_session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
memcpy(lm_session_key->data, lm_key, 8);
memset(lm_session_key->data+8, '\0', 8);
}
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if (memcmp(user_sess_key, zeros, 16) != 0) {
*session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, user_sess_key, 16);
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
}
*server_returned_info = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx,
unix_name);
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
} else {
DEBUG(NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED) ? 0 : 3,
("Login for user [%s]\\[%s]@[%s] failed due to [%s]\n",
user_info->client.domain_name, user_info->client.account_name,
user_info->workstation_name,
error_string ? error_string : "unknown error (NULL)"));
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
}
2009-02-10 00:25:59 +03:00
2009-02-13 12:06:14 +03:00
SAFE_FREE(error_string);
2009-02-10 00:25:59 +03:00
SAFE_FREE(unix_name);
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
return nt_status;
}
static NTSTATUS local_pw_check(struct auth4_context *auth4_context,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info,
void **server_returned_info,
DATA_BLOB *session_key, DATA_BLOB *lm_session_key)
{
NTSTATUS nt_status;
struct samr_Password lm_pw, nt_pw;
nt_lm_owf_gen (opt_password, nt_pw.hash, lm_pw.hash);
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nt_status = ntlm_password_check(mem_ctx,
true, true, 0,
&auth4_context->challenge.data,
&user_info->password.response.lanman,
&user_info->password.response.nt,
user_info->client.account_name,
user_info->client.account_name,
user_info->client.domain_name,
&lm_pw, &nt_pw, session_key, lm_session_key);
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if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
*server_returned_info = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx,
"%s%c%s", user_info->client.domain_name,
*lp_winbind_separator(),
user_info->client.account_name);
} else {
DEBUG(3, ("Login for user [%s]\\[%s]@[%s] failed due to [%s]\n",
user_info->client.domain_name, user_info->client.account_name,
user_info->workstation_name,
nt_errstr(nt_status)));
}
return nt_status;
}
static NTSTATUS ntlm_auth_prepare_gensec_client(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
struct gensec_security **gensec_security_out)
{
struct gensec_security *gensec_security = NULL;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
const struct gensec_security_ops **backends = NULL;
struct gensec_settings *gensec_settings = NULL;
size_t idx = 0;
tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(tmp_ctx);
gensec_settings = lpcfg_gensec_settings(tmp_ctx, lp_ctx);
if (gensec_settings == NULL) {
DEBUG(10, ("lpcfg_gensec_settings failed\n"));
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
backends = talloc_zero_array(gensec_settings,
const struct gensec_security_ops *, 4);
if (backends == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
gensec_settings->backends = backends;
gensec_init();
/* These need to be in priority order, krb5 before NTLMSSP */
#if defined(HAVE_KRB5)
backends[idx++] = &gensec_gse_krb5_security_ops;
#endif
backends[idx++] = gensec_security_by_oid(NULL, GENSEC_OID_NTLMSSP);
backends[idx++] = gensec_security_by_oid(NULL, GENSEC_OID_SPNEGO);
nt_status = gensec_client_start(NULL, &gensec_security,
gensec_settings);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return nt_status;
}
talloc_unlink(tmp_ctx, gensec_settings);
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if (opt_target_service != NULL) {
nt_status = gensec_set_target_service(gensec_security,
opt_target_service);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return nt_status;
}
}
if (opt_target_hostname != NULL) {
nt_status = gensec_set_target_hostname(gensec_security,
opt_target_hostname);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return nt_status;
}
}
*gensec_security_out = talloc_steal(mem_ctx, gensec_security);
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
static struct auth4_context *make_auth4_context_ntlm_auth(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, bool local_pw)
{
struct auth4_context *auth4_context = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct auth4_context);
if (auth4_context == NULL) {
DEBUG(10, ("failed to allocate auth4_context failed\n"));
return NULL;
}
auth4_context->generate_session_info = ntlm_auth_generate_session_info;
auth4_context->generate_session_info_pac = ntlm_auth_generate_session_info_pac;
auth4_context->get_ntlm_challenge = ntlm_auth_get_challenge;
auth4_context->set_ntlm_challenge = ntlm_auth_set_challenge;
if (local_pw) {
auth4_context->check_ntlm_password = local_pw_check;
} else {
auth4_context->check_ntlm_password = winbind_pw_check;
}
auth4_context->private_data = NULL;
return auth4_context;
}
static NTSTATUS ntlm_auth_prepare_gensec_server(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
struct gensec_security **gensec_security_out)
{
struct gensec_security *gensec_security;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
const struct gensec_security_ops **backends;
struct gensec_settings *gensec_settings;
size_t idx = 0;
struct cli_credentials *server_credentials;
struct auth4_context *auth4_context;
tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(tmp_ctx);
auth4_context = make_auth4_context_ntlm_auth(tmp_ctx, opt_password);
if (auth4_context == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
gensec_settings = lpcfg_gensec_settings(tmp_ctx, lp_ctx);
if (lp_ctx == NULL) {
DEBUG(10, ("lpcfg_gensec_settings failed\n"));
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
/*
* This should be a 'netbios domain -> DNS domain'
* mapping, and can currently validly return NULL on
* poorly configured systems.
*
* This is used for the NTLMSSP server
*
*/
if (opt_password) {
gensec_settings->server_netbios_name = lp_netbios_name();
gensec_settings->server_netbios_domain = lp_workgroup();
} else {
gensec_settings->server_netbios_name = get_winbind_netbios_name();
gensec_settings->server_netbios_domain = get_winbind_domain();
}
gensec_settings->server_dns_domain = strlower_talloc(gensec_settings,
get_mydnsdomname(talloc_tos()));
gensec_settings->server_dns_name = strlower_talloc(gensec_settings,
get_mydnsfullname());
backends = talloc_zero_array(gensec_settings,
const struct gensec_security_ops *, 4);
if (backends == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
gensec_settings->backends = backends;
gensec_init();
/* These need to be in priority order, krb5 before NTLMSSP */
#if defined(HAVE_KRB5)
backends[idx++] = &gensec_gse_krb5_security_ops;
#endif
backends[idx++] = gensec_security_by_oid(NULL, GENSEC_OID_NTLMSSP);
backends[idx++] = gensec_security_by_oid(NULL, GENSEC_OID_SPNEGO);
/*
* This is anonymous for now, because we just use it
* to set the kerberos state at the moment
*/
server_credentials = cli_credentials_init_anon(tmp_ctx);
if (!server_credentials) {
DEBUG(0, ("auth_generic_prepare: Failed to init server credentials\n"));
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
cli_credentials_set_conf(server_credentials, lp_ctx);
if (lp_server_role() == ROLE_ACTIVE_DIRECTORY_DC || lp_security() == SEC_ADS || USE_KERBEROS_KEYTAB) {
cli_credentials_set_kerberos_state(server_credentials, CRED_AUTO_USE_KERBEROS);
} else {
cli_credentials_set_kerberos_state(server_credentials, CRED_DONT_USE_KERBEROS);
}
nt_status = gensec_server_start(tmp_ctx, gensec_settings,
auth4_context, &gensec_security);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return nt_status;
}
gensec_set_credentials(gensec_security, server_credentials);
talloc_unlink(tmp_ctx, lp_ctx);
talloc_unlink(tmp_ctx, server_credentials);
talloc_unlink(tmp_ctx, gensec_settings);
talloc_unlink(tmp_ctx, auth4_context);
*gensec_security_out = talloc_steal(mem_ctx, gensec_security);
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
static void manage_client_ntlmssp_request(enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mode,
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
struct ntlm_auth_state *state,
char *buf, int length, void **private2)
{
manage_gensec_request(stdio_helper_mode, lp_ctx, buf, length, &state->gensec_private_1);
return;
}
static void manage_squid_basic_request(enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mode,
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
struct ntlm_auth_state *state,
char *buf, int length, void **private2)
{
char *user, *pass;
user=buf;
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pass=(char *)memchr(buf,' ',length);
if (!pass) {
DEBUG(2, ("Password not found. Denying access\n"));
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "ERR\n");
return;
}
*pass='\0';
pass++;
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if (state->helper_mode == SQUID_2_5_BASIC) {
rfc1738_unescape(user);
rfc1738_unescape(pass);
}
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if (check_plaintext_auth(user, pass, False)) {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "OK\n");
} else {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "ERR\n");
}
}
static void manage_gensec_request(enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mode,
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
char *buf, int length, void **private1)
{
DATA_BLOB in;
DATA_BLOB out = data_blob(NULL, 0);
char *out_base64 = NULL;
const char *reply_arg = NULL;
struct gensec_ntlm_state {
struct gensec_security *gensec_state;
const char *set_password;
};
struct gensec_ntlm_state *state;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
bool first = false;
const char *reply_code;
struct cli_credentials *creds;
static char *want_feature_list = NULL;
static DATA_BLOB session_key;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
if (*private1) {
state = (struct gensec_ntlm_state *)*private1;
} else {
state = talloc_zero(NULL, struct gensec_ntlm_state);
if (!state) {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "BH No Memory\n");
exit(1);
}
*private1 = state;
if (opt_password) {
state->set_password = opt_password;
}
}
if (strlen(buf) < 2) {
DEBUG(1, ("query [%s] invalid", buf));
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "BH Query invalid\n");
return;
}
if (strlen(buf) > 3) {
if(strncmp(buf, "SF ", 3) == 0) {
DEBUG(10, ("Setting flags to negotiate\n"));
talloc_free(want_feature_list);
want_feature_list = talloc_strndup(state, buf+3, strlen(buf)-3);
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "OK\n");
return;
}
in = base64_decode_data_blob(buf + 3);
} else {
in = data_blob(NULL, 0);
}
if (strncmp(buf, "YR", 2) == 0) {
if (state->gensec_state) {
talloc_free(state->gensec_state);
state->gensec_state = NULL;
}
} else if ( (strncmp(buf, "OK", 2) == 0)) {
/* Just return BH, like ntlm_auth from Samba 3 does. */
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "BH Command expected\n");
data_blob_free(&in);
return;
} else if ( (strncmp(buf, "TT ", 3) != 0) &&
(strncmp(buf, "KK ", 3) != 0) &&
(strncmp(buf, "AF ", 3) != 0) &&
(strncmp(buf, "NA ", 3) != 0) &&
(strncmp(buf, "UG", 2) != 0) &&
(strncmp(buf, "PW ", 3) != 0) &&
(strncmp(buf, "GK", 2) != 0) &&
(strncmp(buf, "GF", 2) != 0)) {
DEBUG(1, ("SPNEGO request [%s] invalid prefix\n", buf));
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "BH SPNEGO request invalid prefix\n");
data_blob_free(&in);
return;
}
mem_ctx = talloc_named(NULL, 0, "manage_gensec_request internal mem_ctx");
/* setup gensec */
if (!(state->gensec_state)) {
switch (stdio_helper_mode) {
case GSS_SPNEGO_CLIENT:
/*
* cached credentials are only supported by
* NTLMSSP_CLIENT_1 for now.
*/
use_cached_creds = false;
/* fall through */
case NTLMSSP_CLIENT_1:
/* setup the client side */
if (state->set_password != NULL) {
use_cached_creds = false;
}
if (use_cached_creds) {
struct wbcCredentialCacheParams params;
struct wbcCredentialCacheInfo *info = NULL;
struct wbcAuthErrorInfo *error = NULL;
wbcErr wbc_status;
params.account_name = opt_username;
params.domain_name = opt_domain;
params.level = WBC_CREDENTIAL_CACHE_LEVEL_NTLMSSP;
params.num_blobs = 0;
params.blobs = NULL;
wbc_status = wbcCredentialCache(&params, &info,
&error);
wbcFreeMemory(error);
if (!WBC_ERROR_IS_OK(wbc_status)) {
use_cached_creds = false;
}
wbcFreeMemory(info);
}
nt_status = ntlm_auth_prepare_gensec_client(state, lp_ctx,
&state->gensec_state);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "BH GENSEC mech failed to start: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status));
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return;
}
creds = cli_credentials_init(state->gensec_state);
cli_credentials_set_conf(creds, lp_ctx);
if (opt_username) {
cli_credentials_set_username(creds, opt_username, CRED_SPECIFIED);
}
if (opt_domain) {
cli_credentials_set_domain(creds, opt_domain, CRED_SPECIFIED);
}
if (use_cached_creds) {
gensec_want_feature(state->gensec_state,
GENSEC_FEATURE_NTLM_CCACHE);
} else if (state->set_password) {
cli_credentials_set_password(creds, state->set_password, CRED_SPECIFIED);
} else {
cli_credentials_set_password_callback(creds, get_password);
}
if (opt_workstation) {
cli_credentials_set_workstation(creds, opt_workstation, CRED_SPECIFIED);
}
gensec_set_credentials(state->gensec_state, creds);
break;
case GSS_SPNEGO_SERVER:
case SQUID_2_5_NTLMSSP:
{
nt_status = ntlm_auth_prepare_gensec_server(state, lp_ctx,
&state->gensec_state);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "BH GENSEC mech failed to start: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status));
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return;
}
break;
}
default:
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
abort();
}
gensec_want_feature_list(state->gensec_state, want_feature_list);
switch (stdio_helper_mode) {
case GSS_SPNEGO_CLIENT:
case GSS_SPNEGO_SERVER:
nt_status = gensec_start_mech_by_oid(state->gensec_state, GENSEC_OID_SPNEGO);
if (!in.length) {
first = true;
}
break;
case NTLMSSP_CLIENT_1:
if (!in.length) {
first = true;
}
/* fall through */
case SQUID_2_5_NTLMSSP:
nt_status = gensec_start_mech_by_oid(state->gensec_state, GENSEC_OID_NTLMSSP);
break;
default:
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
abort();
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
DEBUG(1, ("GENSEC mech failed to start: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "BH GENSEC mech failed to start\n");
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return;
}
}
/* update */
if (strncmp(buf, "PW ", 3) == 0) {
state->set_password = talloc_strndup(state,
(const char *)in.data,
in.length);
cli_credentials_set_password(gensec_get_credentials(state->gensec_state),
state->set_password,
CRED_SPECIFIED);
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "OK\n");
data_blob_free(&in);
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return;
}
if (strncmp(buf, "GK", 2) == 0) {
char *base64_key;
DEBUG(10, ("Requested session key\n"));
nt_status = gensec_session_key(state->gensec_state, mem_ctx, &session_key);
if(!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
DEBUG(1, ("gensec_session_key failed: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "BH No session key\n");
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return;
} else {
base64_key = base64_encode_data_blob(state, session_key);
SMB_ASSERT(base64_key != NULL);
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "GK %s\n", base64_key);
talloc_free(base64_key);
}
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return;
}
if (strncmp(buf, "GF", 2) == 0) {
uint32_t neg_flags;
DEBUG(10, ("Requested negotiated NTLMSSP feature flags\n"));
neg_flags = gensec_ntlmssp_neg_flags(state->gensec_state);
if (neg_flags == 0) {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "BH\n");
return;
}
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "GF 0x%08x\n", neg_flags);
return;
}
nt_status = gensec_update(state->gensec_state, mem_ctx, in, &out);
/* don't leak 'bad password'/'no such user' info to the network client */
nt_status = nt_status_squash(nt_status);
if (out.length) {
out_base64 = base64_encode_data_blob(mem_ctx, out);
SMB_ASSERT(out_base64 != NULL);
} else {
out_base64 = NULL;
}
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
reply_arg = "*";
if (first && state->gensec_state->gensec_role == GENSEC_CLIENT) {
reply_code = "YR";
} else if (state->gensec_state->gensec_role == GENSEC_CLIENT) {
reply_code = "KK";
} else if (state->gensec_state->gensec_role == GENSEC_SERVER) {
reply_code = "TT";
} else {
abort();
}
} else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED)) {
reply_code = "BH NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED";
reply_arg = nt_errstr(nt_status);
DEBUG(1, ("GENSEC login failed: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
} else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL)) {
reply_code = "BH NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL";
reply_arg = nt_errstr(nt_status);
DEBUG(1, ("GENSEC login failed: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
} else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
reply_code = "NA";
reply_arg = nt_errstr(nt_status);
DEBUG(1, ("GENSEC login failed: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
} else if /* OK */ (state->gensec_state->gensec_role == GENSEC_SERVER) {
struct auth_session_info *session_info;
nt_status = gensec_session_info(state->gensec_state, mem_ctx, &session_info);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
reply_code = "BH Failed to retrive session info";
reply_arg = nt_errstr(nt_status);
DEBUG(1, ("GENSEC failed to retrieve the session info: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
} else {
reply_code = "AF";
reply_arg = talloc_strdup(state->gensec_state, session_info->unix_info->unix_name);
if (reply_arg == NULL) {
reply_code = "BH out of memory";
reply_arg = nt_errstr(NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY);
}
talloc_free(session_info);
}
} else if (state->gensec_state->gensec_role == GENSEC_CLIENT) {
reply_code = "AF";
reply_arg = out_base64;
} else {
abort();
}
switch (stdio_helper_mode) {
case GSS_SPNEGO_SERVER:
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "%s %s %s\n", reply_code,
out_base64 ? out_base64 : "*",
reply_arg ? reply_arg : "*");
break;
default:
if (out_base64) {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "%s %s\n", reply_code, out_base64);
} else if (reply_arg) {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "%s %s\n", reply_code, reply_arg);
} else {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "%s\n", reply_code);
}
}
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return;
}
static void manage_gss_spnego_request(enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mode,
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
struct ntlm_auth_state *state,
char *buf, int length, void **private2)
{
manage_gensec_request(stdio_helper_mode, lp_ctx, buf, length, &state->gensec_private_1);
return;
}
static void manage_squid_ntlmssp_request(enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mode,
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
struct ntlm_auth_state *state,
char *buf, int length, void **private2)
{
manage_gensec_request(stdio_helper_mode, lp_ctx, buf, length, &state->gensec_private_1);
return;
}
static void manage_gss_spnego_client_request(enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mode,
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
struct ntlm_auth_state *state,
char *buf, int length, void **private2)
{
manage_gensec_request(stdio_helper_mode, lp_ctx, buf, length, &state->gensec_private_1);
return;
}
static void manage_ntlm_server_1_request(enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mode,
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
struct ntlm_auth_state *state,
char *buf, int length, void **private2)
{
char *request, *parameter;
static DATA_BLOB challenge;
static DATA_BLOB lm_response;
static DATA_BLOB nt_response;
static char *full_username;
static char *username;
static char *domain;
static char *plaintext_password;
static bool ntlm_server_1_user_session_key;
static bool ntlm_server_1_lm_session_key;
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if (strequal(buf, ".")) {
if (!full_username && !username) {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "Error: No username supplied!\n");
} else if (plaintext_password) {
/* handle this request as plaintext */
if (!full_username) {
if (asprintf(&full_username, "%s%c%s", domain, winbind_separator(), username) == -1) {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "Error: Out of memory in asprintf!\n.\n");
return;
}
}
if (check_plaintext_auth(full_username, plaintext_password, False)) {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "Authenticated: Yes\n");
} else {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "Authenticated: No\n");
}
} else if (!lm_response.data && !nt_response.data) {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "Error: No password supplied!\n");
} else if (!challenge.data) {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "Error: No lanman-challenge supplied!\n");
} else {
char *error_string = NULL;
uchar lm_key[8];
uchar user_session_key[16];
uint32_t flags = 0;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
if (full_username && !username) {
fstring fstr_user;
fstring fstr_domain;
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if (!parse_ntlm_auth_domain_user(full_username, fstr_user, fstr_domain)) {
/* username might be 'tainted', don't print into our new-line deleimianted stream */
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "Error: Could not parse into domain and username\n");
}
SAFE_FREE(username);
SAFE_FREE(domain);
username = smb_xstrdup(fstr_user);
domain = smb_xstrdup(fstr_domain);
}
if (opt_password) {
DATA_BLOB nt_session_key, lm_session_key;
struct samr_Password lm_pw, nt_pw;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
ZERO_STRUCT(user_session_key);
ZERO_STRUCT(lm_key);
nt_lm_owf_gen (opt_password, nt_pw.hash, lm_pw.hash);
nt_status = ntlm_password_check(mem_ctx,
true, true, 0,
&challenge,
&lm_response,
&nt_response,
username,
username,
domain,
&lm_pw, &nt_pw,
&nt_session_key,
&lm_session_key);
error_string = smb_xstrdup(get_friendly_nt_error_msg(nt_status));
if (ntlm_server_1_user_session_key) {
if (nt_session_key.length == sizeof(user_session_key)) {
memcpy(user_session_key,
nt_session_key.data,
sizeof(user_session_key));
}
}
if (ntlm_server_1_lm_session_key) {
if (lm_session_key.length == sizeof(lm_key)) {
memcpy(lm_key,
lm_session_key.data,
sizeof(lm_key));
}
}
TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx);
} else {
if (!domain) {
domain = smb_xstrdup(get_winbind_domain());
}
if (ntlm_server_1_lm_session_key)
flags |= WBFLAG_PAM_LMKEY;
if (ntlm_server_1_user_session_key)
flags |= WBFLAG_PAM_USER_SESSION_KEY;
nt_status = contact_winbind_auth_crap(username,
domain,
lp_netbios_name(),
&challenge,
&lm_response,
&nt_response,
flags, 0,
lm_key,
user_session_key,
&error_string,
NULL);
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "Authenticated: No\n");
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "Authentication-Error: %s\n.\n", error_string);
} else {
static char zeros[16];
char *hex_lm_key;
char *hex_user_session_key;
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "Authenticated: Yes\n");
if (ntlm_server_1_lm_session_key
&& (memcmp(zeros, lm_key,
sizeof(lm_key)) != 0)) {
hex_lm_key = hex_encode_talloc(NULL,
(const unsigned char *)lm_key,
sizeof(lm_key));
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "LANMAN-Session-Key: %s\n", hex_lm_key);
TALLOC_FREE(hex_lm_key);
}
if (ntlm_server_1_user_session_key
&& (memcmp(zeros, user_session_key,
sizeof(user_session_key)) != 0)) {
hex_user_session_key = hex_encode_talloc(NULL,
(const unsigned char *)user_session_key,
sizeof(user_session_key));
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "User-Session-Key: %s\n", hex_user_session_key);
TALLOC_FREE(hex_user_session_key);
}
}
SAFE_FREE(error_string);
}
/* clear out the state */
challenge = data_blob_null;
nt_response = data_blob_null;
lm_response = data_blob_null;
SAFE_FREE(full_username);
SAFE_FREE(username);
SAFE_FREE(domain);
SAFE_FREE(plaintext_password);
ntlm_server_1_user_session_key = False;
ntlm_server_1_lm_session_key = False;
x_fprintf(x_stdout, ".\n");
return;
}
request = buf;
/* Indicates a base64 encoded structure */
parameter = strstr_m(request, ":: ");
if (!parameter) {
parameter = strstr_m(request, ": ");
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if (!parameter) {
DEBUG(0, ("Parameter not found!\n"));
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "Error: Parameter not found!\n.\n");
return;
}
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parameter[0] ='\0';
parameter++;
parameter[0] ='\0';
parameter++;
} else {
parameter[0] ='\0';
parameter++;
parameter[0] ='\0';
parameter++;
parameter[0] ='\0';
parameter++;
base64_decode_inplace(parameter);
}
if (strequal(request, "LANMAN-Challenge")) {
challenge = strhex_to_data_blob(NULL, parameter);
if (challenge.length != 8) {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "Error: hex decode of %s failed! (got %d bytes, expected 8)\n.\n",
parameter,
(int)challenge.length);
challenge = data_blob_null;
}
} else if (strequal(request, "NT-Response")) {
nt_response = strhex_to_data_blob(NULL, parameter);
if (nt_response.length < 24) {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "Error: hex decode of %s failed! (only got %d bytes, needed at least 24)\n.\n",
parameter,
(int)nt_response.length);
nt_response = data_blob_null;
}
} else if (strequal(request, "LANMAN-Response")) {
lm_response = strhex_to_data_blob(NULL, parameter);
if (lm_response.length != 24) {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "Error: hex decode of %s failed! (got %d bytes, expected 24)\n.\n",
parameter,
(int)lm_response.length);
lm_response = data_blob_null;
}
} else if (strequal(request, "Password")) {
plaintext_password = smb_xstrdup(parameter);
} else if (strequal(request, "NT-Domain")) {
domain = smb_xstrdup(parameter);
} else if (strequal(request, "Username")) {
username = smb_xstrdup(parameter);
} else if (strequal(request, "Full-Username")) {
full_username = smb_xstrdup(parameter);
} else if (strequal(request, "Request-User-Session-Key")) {
ntlm_server_1_user_session_key = strequal(parameter, "Yes");
} else if (strequal(request, "Request-LanMan-Session-Key")) {
ntlm_server_1_lm_session_key = strequal(parameter, "Yes");
} else {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "Error: Unknown request %s\n.\n", request);
}
}
static void manage_ntlm_change_password_1_request(enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mode,
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
struct ntlm_auth_state *state,
char *buf, int length, void **private2)
{
char *request, *parameter;
static DATA_BLOB new_nt_pswd;
static DATA_BLOB old_nt_hash_enc;
static DATA_BLOB new_lm_pswd;
static DATA_BLOB old_lm_hash_enc;
static char *full_username = NULL;
static char *username = NULL;
static char *domain = NULL;
static char *newpswd = NULL;
static char *oldpswd = NULL;
if (strequal(buf, ".")) {
if(newpswd && oldpswd) {
uchar old_nt_hash[16];
uchar old_lm_hash[16];
uchar new_nt_hash[16];
uchar new_lm_hash[16];
new_nt_pswd = data_blob(NULL, 516);
old_nt_hash_enc = data_blob(NULL, 16);
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/* Calculate the MD4 hash (NT compatible) of the
* password */
E_md4hash(oldpswd, old_nt_hash);
E_md4hash(newpswd, new_nt_hash);
/* E_deshash returns false for 'long'
passwords (> 14 DOS chars).
2010-01-09 22:26:46 +03:00
Therefore, don't send a buffer
encrypted with the truncated hash
(it could allow an even easier
attack on the password)
Likewise, obey the admin's restriction
*/
if (lp_client_lanman_auth() &&
E_deshash(newpswd, new_lm_hash) &&
E_deshash(oldpswd, old_lm_hash)) {
new_lm_pswd = data_blob(NULL, 516);
old_lm_hash_enc = data_blob(NULL, 16);
encode_pw_buffer(new_lm_pswd.data, newpswd,
STR_UNICODE);
arcfour_crypt(new_lm_pswd.data, old_nt_hash, 516);
E_old_pw_hash(new_nt_hash, old_lm_hash,
old_lm_hash_enc.data);
} else {
new_lm_pswd.data = NULL;
new_lm_pswd.length = 0;
old_lm_hash_enc.data = NULL;
old_lm_hash_enc.length = 0;
}
encode_pw_buffer(new_nt_pswd.data, newpswd,
STR_UNICODE);
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arcfour_crypt(new_nt_pswd.data, old_nt_hash, 516);
E_old_pw_hash(new_nt_hash, old_nt_hash,
old_nt_hash_enc.data);
}
2010-01-09 22:26:46 +03:00
if (!full_username && !username) {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "Error: No username supplied!\n");
} else if ((!new_nt_pswd.data || !old_nt_hash_enc.data) &&
(!new_lm_pswd.data || old_lm_hash_enc.data) ) {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "Error: No NT or LM password "
"blobs supplied!\n");
} else {
char *error_string = NULL;
2010-01-09 22:26:46 +03:00
if (full_username && !username) {
fstring fstr_user;
fstring fstr_domain;
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if (!parse_ntlm_auth_domain_user(full_username,
fstr_user,
fstr_domain)) {
/* username might be 'tainted', don't
* print into our new-line
* deleimianted stream */
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "Error: Could not "
"parse into domain and "
"username\n");
SAFE_FREE(username);
username = smb_xstrdup(full_username);
} else {
SAFE_FREE(username);
SAFE_FREE(domain);
username = smb_xstrdup(fstr_user);
domain = smb_xstrdup(fstr_domain);
}
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}
if(!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(contact_winbind_change_pswd_auth_crap(
username, domain,
new_nt_pswd,
old_nt_hash_enc,
new_lm_pswd,
old_lm_hash_enc,
&error_string))) {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "Password-Change: No\n");
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "Password-Change-Error: "
"%s\n.\n", error_string);
} else {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "Password-Change: Yes\n");
}
SAFE_FREE(error_string);
}
/* clear out the state */
new_nt_pswd = data_blob_null;
old_nt_hash_enc = data_blob_null;
new_lm_pswd = data_blob_null;
old_nt_hash_enc = data_blob_null;
SAFE_FREE(full_username);
SAFE_FREE(username);
SAFE_FREE(domain);
SAFE_FREE(newpswd);
SAFE_FREE(oldpswd);
x_fprintf(x_stdout, ".\n");
return;
}
request = buf;
/* Indicates a base64 encoded structure */
parameter = strstr_m(request, ":: ");
if (!parameter) {
parameter = strstr_m(request, ": ");
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if (!parameter) {
DEBUG(0, ("Parameter not found!\n"));
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "Error: Parameter not found!\n.\n");
return;
}
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parameter[0] ='\0';
parameter++;
parameter[0] ='\0';
parameter++;
} else {
parameter[0] ='\0';
parameter++;
parameter[0] ='\0';
parameter++;
parameter[0] ='\0';
parameter++;
base64_decode_inplace(parameter);
}
if (strequal(request, "new-nt-password-blob")) {
new_nt_pswd = strhex_to_data_blob(NULL, parameter);
if (new_nt_pswd.length != 516) {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "Error: hex decode of %s failed! "
"(got %d bytes, expected 516)\n.\n",
parameter,
(int)new_nt_pswd.length);
new_nt_pswd = data_blob_null;
}
} else if (strequal(request, "old-nt-hash-blob")) {
old_nt_hash_enc = strhex_to_data_blob(NULL, parameter);
if (old_nt_hash_enc.length != 16) {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "Error: hex decode of %s failed! "
"(got %d bytes, expected 16)\n.\n",
parameter,
(int)old_nt_hash_enc.length);
old_nt_hash_enc = data_blob_null;
}
} else if (strequal(request, "new-lm-password-blob")) {
new_lm_pswd = strhex_to_data_blob(NULL, parameter);
if (new_lm_pswd.length != 516) {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "Error: hex decode of %s failed! "
"(got %d bytes, expected 516)\n.\n",
parameter,
(int)new_lm_pswd.length);
new_lm_pswd = data_blob_null;
}
}
else if (strequal(request, "old-lm-hash-blob")) {
old_lm_hash_enc = strhex_to_data_blob(NULL, parameter);
if (old_lm_hash_enc.length != 16)
{
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "Error: hex decode of %s failed! "
"(got %d bytes, expected 16)\n.\n",
parameter,
(int)old_lm_hash_enc.length);
old_lm_hash_enc = data_blob_null;
}
} else if (strequal(request, "nt-domain")) {
domain = smb_xstrdup(parameter);
} else if(strequal(request, "username")) {
username = smb_xstrdup(parameter);
} else if(strequal(request, "full-username")) {
username = smb_xstrdup(parameter);
} else if(strequal(request, "new-password")) {
newpswd = smb_xstrdup(parameter);
} else if (strequal(request, "old-password")) {
oldpswd = smb_xstrdup(parameter);
} else {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "Error: Unknown request %s\n.\n", request);
}
}
static void manage_squid_request(enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mode,
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
struct ntlm_auth_state *state,
stdio_helper_function fn, void **private2)
{
char *buf;
char tmp[INITIAL_BUFFER_SIZE+1];
int length, buf_size = 0;
char *c;
2003-03-24 12:54:13 +03:00
buf = talloc_strdup(state->mem_ctx, "");
if (!buf) {
DEBUG(0, ("Failed to allocate input buffer.\n"));
x_fprintf(x_stderr, "ERR\n");
exit(1);
}
do {
/* this is not a typo - x_fgets doesn't work too well under
* squid */
if (fgets(tmp, sizeof(tmp)-1, stdin) == NULL) {
if (ferror(stdin)) {
DEBUG(1, ("fgets() failed! dying..... errno=%d "
"(%s)\n", ferror(stdin),
strerror(ferror(stdin))));
exit(1);
}
exit(0);
}
buf = talloc_strdup_append_buffer(buf, tmp);
buf_size += INITIAL_BUFFER_SIZE;
if (buf_size > MAX_BUFFER_SIZE) {
DEBUG(2, ("Oversized message\n"));
x_fprintf(x_stderr, "ERR\n");
talloc_free(buf);
return;
}
c = strchr(buf, '\n');
} while (c == NULL);
*c = '\0';
length = c-buf;
DEBUG(10, ("Got '%s' from squid (length: %d).\n",buf,length));
if (buf[0] == '\0') {
DEBUG(2, ("Invalid Request\n"));
x_fprintf(x_stderr, "ERR\n");
talloc_free(buf);
return;
}
fn(stdio_helper_mode, lp_ctx, state, buf, length, private2);
talloc_free(buf);
}
static void squid_stream(enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_mode,
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
stdio_helper_function fn) {
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
struct ntlm_auth_state *state;
/* initialize FDescs */
x_setbuf(x_stdout, NULL);
x_setbuf(x_stderr, NULL);
mem_ctx = talloc_init("ntlm_auth");
if (!mem_ctx) {
DEBUG(0, ("squid_stream: Failed to create talloc context\n"));
x_fprintf(x_stderr, "ERR\n");
exit(1);
}
state = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct ntlm_auth_state);
if (!state) {
DEBUG(0, ("squid_stream: Failed to talloc ntlm_auth_state\n"));
x_fprintf(x_stderr, "ERR\n");
exit(1);
}
state->mem_ctx = mem_ctx;
state->helper_mode = stdio_mode;
while(1) {
TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
manage_squid_request(stdio_mode, lp_ctx, state, fn, NULL);
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
}
}
/* Authenticate a user with a challenge/response */
static bool check_auth_crap(void)
{
NTSTATUS nt_status;
uint32_t flags = 0;
char lm_key[8];
char user_session_key[16];
char *hex_lm_key;
char *hex_user_session_key;
char *error_string;
static uint8_t zeros[16];
2003-03-24 12:54:13 +03:00
x_setbuf(x_stdout, NULL);
2003-03-24 12:54:13 +03:00
if (request_lm_key)
flags |= WBFLAG_PAM_LMKEY;
2003-03-24 12:54:13 +03:00
if (request_user_session_key)
flags |= WBFLAG_PAM_USER_SESSION_KEY;
flags |= WBFLAG_PAM_NT_STATUS_SQUASH;
nt_status = contact_winbind_auth_crap(opt_username, opt_domain,
opt_workstation,
&opt_challenge,
&opt_lm_response,
&opt_nt_response,
flags, 0,
(unsigned char *)lm_key,
(unsigned char *)user_session_key,
&error_string, NULL);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "%s (0x%x)\n",
error_string,
NT_STATUS_V(nt_status));
SAFE_FREE(error_string);
return False;
}
2003-03-24 12:54:13 +03:00
if (request_lm_key
&& (memcmp(zeros, lm_key,
sizeof(lm_key)) != 0)) {
hex_lm_key = hex_encode_talloc(talloc_tos(), (const unsigned char *)lm_key,
sizeof(lm_key));
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "LM_KEY: %s\n", hex_lm_key);
TALLOC_FREE(hex_lm_key);
}
if (request_user_session_key
&& (memcmp(zeros, user_session_key,
sizeof(user_session_key)) != 0)) {
hex_user_session_key = hex_encode_talloc(talloc_tos(), (const unsigned char *)user_session_key,
sizeof(user_session_key));
x_fprintf(x_stdout, "NT_KEY: %s\n", hex_user_session_key);
TALLOC_FREE(hex_user_session_key);
}
return True;
}
/* Main program */
enum {
OPT_USERNAME = 1000,
OPT_DOMAIN,
OPT_WORKSTATION,
OPT_CHALLENGE,
OPT_RESPONSE,
OPT_LM,
OPT_NT,
2003-03-24 12:54:13 +03:00
OPT_PASSWORD,
OPT_LM_KEY,
OPT_USER_SESSION_KEY,
OPT_DIAGNOSTICS,
OPT_REQUIRE_MEMBERSHIP,
OPT_USE_CACHED_CREDS,
Added MSV1_0_ALLOW_MSVCHAPV2 flag to ntlm_auth An implementation of https://lists.samba.org/archive/samba/2012-March/166497.html (which has been discussed in 2012, but was never implemented). It has been tested on a Debian Jessie system with this patch added to the Debian package (which is currently 4.1.17). Even though this is Samba 4, the ntlm_auth installed is the one from Samba 3 (yes, it surprised me too). The backend was a machine with Windows 2012R2. It was first tested with the local security policy 'Network Security: LAN Manager authentication level' setting changed to 'Send NTLMv2 Response Only' (allow ntlm v1). This way we are able to authenticate with and without the MSV1_0_ALLOW_MSVCHAPV2 flag (as expected). After the basic step has been verified, the local security policy 'Network Security: LAN Manager authentication level' setting was changed to 'Send NTLMv2 Response Only. Refuse LM & NTLM' (only allow ntlm v2). The behaviour now changed according to the MSV1_0_ALLOW_MSVCHAPV2 flag (again: as expected). $ ntlm_auth --request-nt-key --username=XXXXXXXXXXXXX --challenge=XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX --nt-response=XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX --domain= Logon failure (0xc000006d) $ ntlm_auth --request-nt-key --username=XXXXXXXXXXXXX --challenge=XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX --nt-response=XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX --domain= --allow-mschapv2 NT_KEY: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX The changes in `wbclient.h` are intended for programs that use libwinbind directly instead of authenticating via `ntlm_auth`. I intend to use that within FreeRADIUS (see https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11149). BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11694 Signed-off-by: Herwin Weststrate <herwin@quarantainenet.nl> Reviewed-by: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2015-12-09 20:47:47 +03:00
OPT_ALLOW_MSCHAPV2,
OPT_PAM_WINBIND_CONF,
OPT_TARGET_SERVICE,
OPT_TARGET_HOSTNAME,
OPT_OFFLINE_LOGON
};
int main(int argc, const char **argv)
{
TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
int opt;
const char *helper_protocol = NULL;
int diagnostics = 0;
const char *hex_challenge = NULL;
const char *hex_lm_response = NULL;
const char *hex_nt_response = NULL;
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx;
poptContext pc;
/* NOTE: DO NOT change this interface without considering the implications!
This is an external interface, which other programs will use to interact
with this helper.
*/
/* We do not use single-letter command abbreviations, because they harm future
interface stability. */
struct poptOption long_options[] = {
POPT_AUTOHELP
{ "helper-protocol", 0, POPT_ARG_STRING, &helper_protocol, OPT_DOMAIN, "operate as a stdio-based helper", "helper protocol to use"},
{ "username", 0, POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_username, OPT_USERNAME, "username"},
{ "domain", 0, POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_domain, OPT_DOMAIN, "domain name"},
{ "workstation", 0, POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_workstation, OPT_WORKSTATION, "workstation"},
{ "challenge", 0, POPT_ARG_STRING, &hex_challenge, OPT_CHALLENGE, "challenge (HEX encoded)"},
{ "lm-response", 0, POPT_ARG_STRING, &hex_lm_response, OPT_LM, "LM Response to the challenge (HEX encoded)"},
{ "nt-response", 0, POPT_ARG_STRING, &hex_nt_response, OPT_NT, "NT or NTLMv2 Response to the challenge (HEX encoded)"},
{ "password", 0, POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_password, OPT_PASSWORD, "User's plaintext password"},
{ "request-lm-key", 0, POPT_ARG_NONE, &request_lm_key, OPT_LM_KEY, "Retrieve LM session key"},
{ "request-nt-key", 0, POPT_ARG_NONE, &request_user_session_key, OPT_USER_SESSION_KEY, "Retrieve User (NT) session key"},
{ "use-cached-creds", 0, POPT_ARG_NONE, &use_cached_creds, OPT_USE_CACHED_CREDS, "Use cached credentials if no password is given"},
Added MSV1_0_ALLOW_MSVCHAPV2 flag to ntlm_auth An implementation of https://lists.samba.org/archive/samba/2012-March/166497.html (which has been discussed in 2012, but was never implemented). It has been tested on a Debian Jessie system with this patch added to the Debian package (which is currently 4.1.17). Even though this is Samba 4, the ntlm_auth installed is the one from Samba 3 (yes, it surprised me too). The backend was a machine with Windows 2012R2. It was first tested with the local security policy 'Network Security: LAN Manager authentication level' setting changed to 'Send NTLMv2 Response Only' (allow ntlm v1). This way we are able to authenticate with and without the MSV1_0_ALLOW_MSVCHAPV2 flag (as expected). After the basic step has been verified, the local security policy 'Network Security: LAN Manager authentication level' setting was changed to 'Send NTLMv2 Response Only. Refuse LM & NTLM' (only allow ntlm v2). The behaviour now changed according to the MSV1_0_ALLOW_MSVCHAPV2 flag (again: as expected). $ ntlm_auth --request-nt-key --username=XXXXXXXXXXXXX --challenge=XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX --nt-response=XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX --domain= Logon failure (0xc000006d) $ ntlm_auth --request-nt-key --username=XXXXXXXXXXXXX --challenge=XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX --nt-response=XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX --domain= --allow-mschapv2 NT_KEY: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX The changes in `wbclient.h` are intended for programs that use libwinbind directly instead of authenticating via `ntlm_auth`. I intend to use that within FreeRADIUS (see https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11149). BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11694 Signed-off-by: Herwin Weststrate <herwin@quarantainenet.nl> Reviewed-by: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2015-12-09 20:47:47 +03:00
{ "allow-mschapv2", 0, POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_allow_mschapv2, OPT_ALLOW_MSCHAPV2, "Explicitly allow MSCHAPv2" },
{ "offline-logon", 0, POPT_ARG_NONE, &offline_logon,
OPT_OFFLINE_LOGON,
"Use cached passwords when DC is offline"},
{ "diagnostics", 0, POPT_ARG_NONE, &diagnostics,
OPT_DIAGNOSTICS,
"Perform diagnostics on the authentication chain"},
{ "require-membership-of", 0, POPT_ARG_STRING, &require_membership_of, OPT_REQUIRE_MEMBERSHIP, "Require that a user be a member of this group (either name or SID) for authentication to succeed" },
{ "pam-winbind-conf", 0, POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_pam_winbind_conf, OPT_PAM_WINBIND_CONF, "Require that request must set WBFLAG_PAM_CONTACT_TRUSTDOM when krb5 auth is required" },
{ "target-service", 0, POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_target_service, OPT_TARGET_SERVICE, "Target service (eg http)" },
{ "target-hostname", 0, POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_target_hostname, OPT_TARGET_HOSTNAME, "Target hostname" },
POPT_COMMON_CONFIGFILE
POPT_COMMON_VERSION
POPT_COMMON_OPTION
POPT_TABLEEND
};
/* Samba client initialisation */
smb_init_locale();
setup_logging("ntlm_auth", DEBUG_STDERR);
fault_setup();
/* Parse options */
pc = poptGetContext("ntlm_auth", argc, argv, long_options, 0);
/* Parse command line options */
if (argc == 1) {
poptPrintHelp(pc, stderr, 0);
return 1;
}
while((opt = poptGetNextOpt(pc)) != -1) {
/* Get generic config options like --configfile */
}
poptFreeContext(pc);
2011-07-28 12:19:36 +04:00
if (!lp_load_global(get_dyn_CONFIGFILE())) {
d_fprintf(stderr, "ntlm_auth: error opening config file %s. Error was %s\n",
get_dyn_CONFIGFILE(), strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
pc = poptGetContext(NULL, argc, (const char **)argv, long_options,
POPT_CONTEXT_KEEP_FIRST);
while((opt = poptGetNextOpt(pc)) != -1) {
switch (opt) {
case OPT_CHALLENGE:
opt_challenge = strhex_to_data_blob(NULL, hex_challenge);
if (opt_challenge.length != 8) {
x_fprintf(x_stderr, "hex decode of %s failed! (only got %d bytes)\n",
hex_challenge,
(int)opt_challenge.length);
exit(1);
}
break;
case OPT_LM:
opt_lm_response = strhex_to_data_blob(NULL, hex_lm_response);
if (opt_lm_response.length != 24) {
x_fprintf(x_stderr, "hex decode of %s failed! (only got %d bytes)\n",
hex_lm_response,
(int)opt_lm_response.length);
exit(1);
}
break;
2003-03-24 12:54:13 +03:00
case OPT_NT:
opt_nt_response = strhex_to_data_blob(NULL, hex_nt_response);
if (opt_nt_response.length < 24) {
x_fprintf(x_stderr, "hex decode of %s failed! (only got %d bytes)\n",
hex_nt_response,
(int)opt_nt_response.length);
exit(1);
}
break;
case OPT_REQUIRE_MEMBERSHIP:
if (strncasecmp_m("S-", require_membership_of, 2) == 0) {
require_membership_of_sid = require_membership_of;
}
break;
}
}
if (opt_username) {
char *domain = SMB_STRDUP(opt_username);
char *p = strchr_m(domain, *lp_winbind_separator());
if (p) {
opt_username = p+1;
*p = '\0';
if (opt_domain && !strequal(opt_domain, domain)) {
x_fprintf(x_stderr, "Domain specified in username (%s) "
"doesn't match specified domain (%s)!\n\n",
domain, opt_domain);
poptPrintHelp(pc, stderr, 0);
exit(1);
}
opt_domain = domain;
} else {
SAFE_FREE(domain);
}
}
/* Note: if opt_domain is "" then send no domain */
if (opt_domain == NULL) {
opt_domain = get_winbind_domain();
}
if (opt_workstation == NULL) {
opt_workstation = "";
}
lp_ctx = loadparm_init_s3(NULL, loadparm_s3_helpers());
if (lp_ctx == NULL) {
x_fprintf(x_stderr, "loadparm_init_s3() failed!\n");
exit(1);
}
if (helper_protocol) {
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
int i;
for (i=0; i<NUM_HELPER_MODES; i++) {
if (strcmp(helper_protocol, stdio_helper_protocols[i].name) == 0) {
squid_stream(stdio_helper_protocols[i].mode, lp_ctx, stdio_helper_protocols[i].fn);
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
exit(0);
}
}
x_fprintf(x_stderr, "unknown helper protocol [%s]\n\nValid helper protools:\n\n", helper_protocol);
for (i=0; i<NUM_HELPER_MODES; i++) {
x_fprintf(x_stderr, "%s\n", stdio_helper_protocols[i].name);
}
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
exit(1);
}
if (!opt_username || !*opt_username) {
x_fprintf(x_stderr, "username must be specified!\n\n");
poptPrintHelp(pc, stderr, 0);
exit(1);
}
if (opt_challenge.length) {
if (!check_auth_crap()) {
exit(1);
}
exit(0);
}
if (!opt_password) {
char pwd[256] = {0};
int rc;
rc = samba_getpass("Password: ", pwd, sizeof(pwd), false, false);
if (rc == 0) {
opt_password = SMB_STRDUP(pwd);
}
}
if (diagnostics) {
if (!diagnose_ntlm_auth()) {
return 1;
}
} else {
fstring user;
fstr_sprintf(user, "%s%c%s", opt_domain, winbind_separator(), opt_username);
if (!check_plaintext_auth(user, opt_password, True)) {
return 1;
}
}
/* Exit code */
poptFreeContext(pc);
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return 0;
}