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samba-mirror/source3/rpc_client/cli_netlogon.c

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/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
NT Domain Authentication SMB / MSRPC client
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-2000
Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 1998.
Largely re-written by Jeremy Allison (C) 2005.
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
*/
#include "includes.h"
/* LSA Request Challenge. Sends our challenge to server, then gets
server response. These are used to generate the credentials.
The sent and received challenges are stored in the netlog pipe
private data. Only call this via rpccli_netlogon_setup_creds(). JRA.
*/
static NTSTATUS rpccli_net_req_chal(struct rpc_pipe_client *cli,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const char *server_name,
const char *clnt_name,
const DOM_CHAL *clnt_chal_in,
DOM_CHAL *srv_chal_out)
{
prs_struct qbuf, rbuf;
NET_Q_REQ_CHAL q;
NET_R_REQ_CHAL r;
NTSTATUS result = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
/* create and send a MSRPC command with api NET_REQCHAL */
DEBUG(4,("cli_net_req_chal: LSA Request Challenge from %s to %s\n",
clnt_name, server_name));
/* store the parameters */
init_q_req_chal(&q, server_name, clnt_name, clnt_chal_in);
/* Marshall data and send request */
CLI_DO_RPC(cli, mem_ctx, PI_NETLOGON, NET_REQCHAL,
q, r,
qbuf, rbuf,
net_io_q_req_chal,
net_io_r_req_chal,
NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL);
result = r.status;
/* Return result */
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
/* Store the returned server challenge. */
*srv_chal_out = r.srv_chal;
}
return result;
}
#if 0
/****************************************************************************
LSA Authenticate 2
Send the client credential, receive back a server credential.
Ensure that the server credential returned matches the session key
encrypt of the server challenge originally received. JRA.
****************************************************************************/
NTSTATUS rpccli_net_auth2(struct rpc_pipe_client *cli,
uint16 sec_chan,
uint32 *neg_flags, DOM_CHAL *srv_chal)
{
prs_struct qbuf, rbuf;
NET_Q_AUTH_2 q;
NET_R_AUTH_2 r;
NTSTATUS result = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
fstring machine_acct;
if ( sec_chan == SEC_CHAN_DOMAIN )
fstr_sprintf( machine_acct, "%s$", lp_workgroup() );
else
fstrcpy( machine_acct, cli->mach_acct );
/* create and send a MSRPC command with api NET_AUTH2 */
DEBUG(4,("cli_net_auth2: srv:%s acct:%s sc:%x mc: %s chal %s neg: %x\n",
cli->srv_name_slash, machine_acct, sec_chan, global_myname(),
credstr(cli->clnt_cred.challenge.data), *neg_flags));
/* store the parameters */
init_q_auth_2(&q, cli->srv_name_slash, machine_acct,
sec_chan, global_myname(), &cli->clnt_cred.challenge,
*neg_flags);
/* turn parameters into data stream */
CLI_DO_RPC(cli, mem_ctx, PI_NETLOGON, NET_AUTH2,
q, r,
qbuf, rbuf,
net_io_q_auth_2,
net_io_r_auth_2,
NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL);
result = r.status;
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
UTIME zerotime;
/*
* Check the returned value using the initial
* server received challenge.
*/
zerotime.time = 0;
if (cred_assert( &r.srv_chal, cli->sess_key, srv_chal, zerotime) == 0) {
/*
* Server replied with bad credential. Fail.
*/
DEBUG(0,("cli_net_auth2: server %s replied with bad credential (bad machine \
password ?).\n", cli->cli->desthost ));
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
*neg_flags = r.srv_flgs.neg_flags;
}
return result;
}
#endif
/****************************************************************************
LSA Authenticate 2
Send the client credential, receive back a server credential.
The caller *must* ensure that the server credential returned matches the session key
encrypt of the server challenge originally received. JRA.
****************************************************************************/
static NTSTATUS rpccli_net_auth2(struct rpc_pipe_client *cli,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const char *server_name,
const char *account_name,
uint16 sec_chan_type,
const char *computer_name,
uint32 *neg_flags_inout,
const DOM_CHAL *clnt_chal_in,
DOM_CHAL *srv_chal_out)
{
prs_struct qbuf, rbuf;
NET_Q_AUTH_2 q;
NET_R_AUTH_2 r;
NTSTATUS result = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
/* create and send a MSRPC command with api NET_AUTH2 */
DEBUG(4,("cli_net_auth2: srv:%s acct:%s sc:%x mc: %s neg: %x\n",
server_name, account_name, sec_chan_type, computer_name,
*neg_flags_inout));
/* store the parameters */
init_q_auth_2(&q, server_name, account_name, sec_chan_type,
computer_name, clnt_chal_in, *neg_flags_inout);
/* turn parameters into data stream */
CLI_DO_RPC(cli, mem_ctx, PI_NETLOGON, NET_AUTH2,
q, r,
qbuf, rbuf,
net_io_q_auth_2,
net_io_r_auth_2,
NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL);
result = r.status;
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
*srv_chal_out = r.srv_chal;
*neg_flags_inout = r.srv_flgs.neg_flags;
}
return result;
}
#if 0 /* not currebntly used */
/****************************************************************************
LSA Authenticate 3
Send the client credential, receive back a server credential.
The caller *must* ensure that the server credential returned matches the session key
encrypt of the server challenge originally received. JRA.
****************************************************************************/
static NTSTATUS rpccli_net_auth3(struct rpc_pipe_client *cli,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const char *server_name,
const char *account_name,
uint16 sec_chan_type,
const char *computer_name,
uint32 *neg_flags_inout,
const DOM_CHAL *clnt_chal_in,
DOM_CHAL *srv_chal_out)
{
prs_struct qbuf, rbuf;
NET_Q_AUTH_3 q;
NET_R_AUTH_3 r;
NTSTATUS result = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
/* create and send a MSRPC command with api NET_AUTH2 */
DEBUG(4,("cli_net_auth3: srv:%s acct:%s sc:%x mc: %s chal %s neg: %x\n",
server_name, account_name, sec_chan_type, computer_name,
credstr(clnt_chal_in->data), *neg_flags_inout));
/* store the parameters */
init_q_auth_3(&q, server_name, account_name, sec_chan_type,
computer_name, clnt_chal_in, *neg_flags_inout);
/* turn parameters into data stream */
CLI_DO_RPC(cli, mem_ctx, PI_NETLOGON, NET_AUTH3,
q, r,
qbuf, rbuf,
net_io_q_auth_3,
net_io_r_auth_3,
NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
*srv_chal_out = r.srv_chal;
*neg_flags_inout = r.srv_flgs.neg_flags;
}
return result;
}
#endif /* not currebntly used */
/****************************************************************************
Wrapper function that uses the auth and auth2 calls to set up a NETLOGON
credentials chain. Stores the credentials in the struct dcinfo in the
netlogon pipe struct.
****************************************************************************/
NTSTATUS rpccli_netlogon_setup_creds(struct rpc_pipe_client *cli,
const char *server_name,
const char *domain,
const char *machine_account,
const char machine_pwd[16],
uint32 sec_chan_type,
uint32 *neg_flags_inout)
{
NTSTATUS result;
DOM_CHAL clnt_chal_send;
DOM_CHAL srv_chal_recv;
struct dcinfo *dc;
SMB_ASSERT(cli->pipe_idx == PI_NETLOGON);
dc = cli->dc;
if (!dc) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
/* Ensure we don't reuse any of this state. */
ZERO_STRUCTP(dc);
/* Store the machine account password we're going to use. */
memcpy(dc->mach_pw, machine_pwd, 16);
fstrcpy(dc->remote_machine, "\\\\");
fstrcat(dc->remote_machine, server_name);
fstrcpy(dc->domain, domain);
fstr_sprintf( dc->mach_acct, "%s$", machine_account);
/* Create the client challenge. */
generate_random_buffer(clnt_chal_send.data, 8);
/* Get the server challenge. */
result = rpccli_net_req_chal(cli,
cli->mem_ctx,
dc->remote_machine,
machine_account,
&clnt_chal_send,
&srv_chal_recv);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
return result;
}
/* Calculate the session key and client credentials */
creds_client_init(dc,
&clnt_chal_send,
&srv_chal_recv,
machine_pwd,
&clnt_chal_send);
/*
* Send client auth-2 challenge and receive server repy.
*/
result = rpccli_net_auth2(cli,
cli->mem_ctx,
dc->remote_machine,
dc->mach_acct,
sec_chan_type,
machine_account,
neg_flags_inout,
&clnt_chal_send, /* input. */
&srv_chal_recv); /* output */
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
return result;
}
/*
* Check the returned value using the initial
* server received challenge.
*/
if (!creds_client_check(dc, &srv_chal_recv)) {
/*
* Server replied with bad credential. Fail.
*/
DEBUG(0,("rpccli_netlogon_setup_creds: server %s "
"replied with bad credential\n",
cli->cli->desthost ));
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
DEBUG(5,("rpccli_netlogon_setup_creds: server %s credential "
"chain established.\n",
cli->cli->desthost ));
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/* Logon Control 2 */
NTSTATUS rpccli_netlogon_logon_ctrl2(struct rpc_pipe_client *cli, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
uint32 query_level)
{
prs_struct qbuf, rbuf;
NET_Q_LOGON_CTRL2 q;
NET_R_LOGON_CTRL2 r;
NTSTATUS result = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
fstring server;
ZERO_STRUCT(q);
ZERO_STRUCT(r);
/* Initialise input parameters */
slprintf(server, sizeof(fstring)-1, "\\\\%s", cli->cli->desthost);
init_net_q_logon_ctrl2(&q, server, query_level);
/* Marshall data and send request */
CLI_DO_RPC(cli, mem_ctx, PI_NETLOGON, NET_LOGON_CTRL2,
q, r,
qbuf, rbuf,
net_io_q_logon_ctrl2,
net_io_r_logon_ctrl2,
NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL);
result = r.status;
return result;
}
/* GetDCName */
NTSTATUS rpccli_netlogon_getdcname(struct rpc_pipe_client *cli,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const char *mydcname,
const char *domainname, fstring newdcname)
{
prs_struct qbuf, rbuf;
NET_Q_GETDCNAME q;
NET_R_GETDCNAME r;
NTSTATUS result = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
ZERO_STRUCT(q);
ZERO_STRUCT(r);
/* Initialise input parameters */
init_net_q_getdcname(&q, mydcname, domainname);
/* Marshall data and send request */
CLI_DO_RPC(cli, mem_ctx, PI_NETLOGON, NET_GETDCNAME,
q, r,
qbuf, rbuf,
net_io_q_getdcname,
net_io_r_getdcname,
NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
rpcstr_pull_unistr2_fstring(newdcname, &r.uni_dcname);
}
return result;
}
/* Sam synchronisation */
NTSTATUS rpccli_netlogon_sam_sync(struct rpc_pipe_client *cli, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
uint32 database_id, uint32 next_rid, uint32 *num_deltas,
SAM_DELTA_HDR **hdr_deltas,
SAM_DELTA_CTR **deltas)
{
prs_struct qbuf, rbuf;
NET_Q_SAM_SYNC q;
NET_R_SAM_SYNC r;
NTSTATUS result = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
DOM_CRED clnt_creds;
DOM_CRED ret_creds;
ZERO_STRUCT(q);
ZERO_STRUCT(r);
ZERO_STRUCT(ret_creds);
/* Initialise input parameters */
creds_client_step(cli->dc, &clnt_creds);
prs_set_session_key(&qbuf, cli->dc->sess_key);
prs_set_session_key(&rbuf, cli->dc->sess_key);
init_net_q_sam_sync(&q, cli->dc->remote_machine, global_myname(),
&clnt_creds, &ret_creds, database_id, next_rid);
/* Marshall data and send request */
CLI_DO_RPC(cli, mem_ctx, PI_NETLOGON, NET_SAM_SYNC,
q, r,
qbuf, rbuf,
net_io_q_sam_sync,
net_io_r_sam_sync,
NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL);
/* Return results */
result = r.status;
*num_deltas = r.num_deltas2;
*hdr_deltas = r.hdr_deltas;
*deltas = r.deltas;
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_ERR(result)) {
/* Check returned credentials. */
if (!creds_client_check(cli->dc, &r.srv_creds.challenge)) {
DEBUG(0,("cli_netlogon_sam_sync: credentials chain check failed\n"));
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
}
return result;
}
/* Sam synchronisation */
NTSTATUS rpccli_netlogon_sam_deltas(struct rpc_pipe_client *cli, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
uint32 database_id, UINT64_S seqnum,
uint32 *num_deltas,
SAM_DELTA_HDR **hdr_deltas,
SAM_DELTA_CTR **deltas)
{
prs_struct qbuf, rbuf;
NET_Q_SAM_DELTAS q;
NET_R_SAM_DELTAS r;
NTSTATUS result = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
DOM_CRED clnt_creds;
ZERO_STRUCT(q);
ZERO_STRUCT(r);
/* Initialise input parameters */
creds_client_step(cli->dc, &clnt_creds);
init_net_q_sam_deltas(&q, cli->dc->remote_machine,
global_myname(), &clnt_creds,
database_id, seqnum);
/* Marshall data and send request */
CLI_DO_RPC(cli, mem_ctx, PI_NETLOGON, NET_SAM_DELTAS,
q, r,
qbuf, rbuf,
net_io_q_sam_deltas,
net_io_r_sam_deltas,
NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL);
/* Return results */
result = r.status;
*num_deltas = r.num_deltas2;
*hdr_deltas = r.hdr_deltas;
*deltas = r.deltas;
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_ERR(result)) {
/* Check returned credentials. */
if (!creds_client_check(cli->dc, &r.srv_creds.challenge)) {
DEBUG(0,("cli_netlogon_sam_sync: credentials chain check failed\n"));
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
}
return result;
}
/* Logon domain user */
NTSTATUS rpccli_netlogon_sam_logon(struct rpc_pipe_client *cli,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const char *domain,
const char *username,
const char *password,
int logon_type)
{
prs_struct qbuf, rbuf;
NET_Q_SAM_LOGON q;
NET_R_SAM_LOGON r;
NTSTATUS result = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
DOM_CRED clnt_creds;
DOM_CRED ret_creds;
NET_ID_INFO_CTR ctr;
NET_USER_INFO_3 user;
int validation_level = 3;
fstring clnt_name_slash;
ZERO_STRUCT(q);
ZERO_STRUCT(r);
ZERO_STRUCT(ret_creds);
fstr_sprintf( clnt_name_slash, "\\\\%s", global_myname() );
/* Initialise input parameters */
creds_client_step(cli->dc, &clnt_creds);
q.validation_level = validation_level;
ctr.switch_value = logon_type;
switch (logon_type) {
case INTERACTIVE_LOGON_TYPE: {
unsigned char lm_owf_user_pwd[16], nt_owf_user_pwd[16];
nt_lm_owf_gen(password, nt_owf_user_pwd, lm_owf_user_pwd);
init_id_info1(&ctr.auth.id1, domain,
0, /* param_ctrl */
0xdead, 0xbeef, /* LUID? */
username, clnt_name_slash,
cli->dc->sess_key, lm_owf_user_pwd,
nt_owf_user_pwd);
break;
}
case NET_LOGON_TYPE: {
uint8 chal[8];
unsigned char local_lm_response[24];
unsigned char local_nt_response[24];
generate_random_buffer(chal, 8);
SMBencrypt(password, chal, local_lm_response);
SMBNTencrypt(password, chal, local_nt_response);
init_id_info2(&ctr.auth.id2, domain,
0, /* param_ctrl */
0xdead, 0xbeef, /* LUID? */
username, clnt_name_slash, chal,
local_lm_response, 24, local_nt_response, 24);
break;
}
default:
DEBUG(0, ("switch value %d not supported\n",
ctr.switch_value));
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_INFO_CLASS;
}
r.user = &user;
init_sam_info(&q.sam_id, cli->dc->remote_machine, global_myname(),
&clnt_creds, &ret_creds, logon_type,
&ctr);
/* Marshall data and send request */
CLI_DO_RPC(cli, mem_ctx, PI_NETLOGON, NET_SAMLOGON,
q, r,
qbuf, rbuf,
net_io_q_sam_logon,
net_io_r_sam_logon,
NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL);
/* Return results */
result = r.status;
if (r.buffer_creds) {
/* Check returned credentials if present. */
if (!creds_client_check(cli->dc, &r.srv_creds.challenge)) {
DEBUG(0,("rpccli_netlogon_sam_logon: credentials chain check failed\n"));
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
}
return result;
}
/**
* Logon domain user with an 'network' SAM logon
*
* @param info3 Pointer to a NET_USER_INFO_3 already allocated by the caller.
**/
NTSTATUS rpccli_netlogon_sam_network_logon(struct rpc_pipe_client *cli,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const char *server,
const char *username,
const char *domain,
const char *workstation,
const uint8 chal[8],
DATA_BLOB lm_response,
DATA_BLOB nt_response,
NET_USER_INFO_3 *info3)
{
prs_struct qbuf, rbuf;
NET_Q_SAM_LOGON q;
NET_R_SAM_LOGON r;
NTSTATUS result = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
NET_ID_INFO_CTR ctr;
int validation_level = 3;
const char *workstation_name_slash;
const char *server_name_slash;
2003-03-24 12:54:13 +03:00
static uint8 zeros[16];
DOM_CRED clnt_creds;
DOM_CRED ret_creds;
int i;
ZERO_STRUCT(q);
ZERO_STRUCT(r);
ZERO_STRUCT(ret_creds);
creds_client_step(cli->dc, &clnt_creds);
if (server[0] != '\\' && server[1] != '\\') {
server_name_slash = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "\\\\%s", server);
} else {
server_name_slash = server;
}
if (workstation[0] != '\\' && workstation[1] != '\\') {
workstation_name_slash = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "\\\\%s", workstation);
} else {
workstation_name_slash = workstation;
}
if (!workstation_name_slash || !server_name_slash) {
DEBUG(0, ("talloc_asprintf failed!\n"));
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
/* Initialise input parameters */
q.validation_level = validation_level;
ctr.switch_value = NET_LOGON_TYPE;
init_id_info2(&ctr.auth.id2, domain,
0, /* param_ctrl */
0xdead, 0xbeef, /* LUID? */
username, workstation_name_slash, (const uchar*)chal,
lm_response.data, lm_response.length, nt_response.data, nt_response.length);
init_sam_info(&q.sam_id, server_name_slash, global_myname(),
&clnt_creds, &ret_creds, NET_LOGON_TYPE,
&ctr);
r.user = info3;
/* Marshall data and send request */
CLI_DO_RPC(cli, mem_ctx, PI_NETLOGON, NET_SAMLOGON,
q, r,
qbuf, rbuf,
net_io_q_sam_logon,
net_io_r_sam_logon,
NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL);
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
if (memcmp(zeros, info3->user_sess_key, 16) != 0) {
SamOEMhash(info3->user_sess_key, cli->dc->sess_key, 16);
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
} else {
memset(info3->user_sess_key, '\0', 16);
}
if (memcmp(zeros, info3->lm_sess_key, 8) != 0) {
SamOEMhash(info3->lm_sess_key, cli->dc->sess_key, 8);
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
} else {
memset(info3->lm_sess_key, '\0', 8);
}
memset(&info3->acct_flags, '\0', 4);
for (i=0; i < 7; i++) {
memset(&info3->unknown[i], '\0', 4);
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
}
2003-03-24 12:54:13 +03:00
/* Return results */
result = r.status;
if (r.buffer_creds) {
/* Check returned credentials if present. */
if (!creds_client_check(cli->dc, &r.srv_creds.challenge)) {
DEBUG(0,("rpccli_netlogon_sam_network_logon: credentials chain check failed\n"));
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
}
return result;
}
/***************************************************************************
LSA Server Password Set.
****************************************************************************/
NTSTATUS rpccli_net_srv_pwset(struct rpc_pipe_client *cli, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const char *machine_name, uint8 hashed_mach_pwd[16])
{
prs_struct rbuf;
prs_struct qbuf;
DOM_CRED clnt_creds;
NET_Q_SRV_PWSET q;
NET_R_SRV_PWSET r;
uint16 sec_chan_type = 2;
NTSTATUS result;
creds_client_step(cli->dc, &clnt_creds);
DEBUG(4,("cli_net_srv_pwset: srv:%s acct:%s sc: %d mc: %s\n",
cli->dc->remote_machine, cli->dc->mach_acct, sec_chan_type, machine_name));
/* store the parameters */
init_q_srv_pwset(&q, cli->dc->remote_machine, (const char *)cli->dc->sess_key,
cli->dc->mach_acct, sec_chan_type, machine_name,
&clnt_creds, hashed_mach_pwd);
CLI_DO_RPC(cli, mem_ctx, PI_NETLOGON, NET_SRVPWSET,
q, r,
qbuf, rbuf,
net_io_q_srv_pwset,
net_io_r_srv_pwset,
NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL);
result = r.status;
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
/* report error code */
DEBUG(0,("cli_net_srv_pwset: %s\n", nt_errstr(result)));
}
/* Always check returned credentials. */
if (!creds_client_check(cli->dc, &r.srv_cred.challenge)) {
DEBUG(0,("rpccli_net_srv_pwset: credentials chain check failed\n"));
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
return result;
}