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samba-mirror/source3/winbindd/winbindd_pam.c

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/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
Winbind daemon - pam auth functions
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2000
Copyright (C) Tim Potter 2001
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2001-2002
Copyright (C) Guenther Deschner 2005
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "ntdomain.h"
#include "winbindd.h"
#include "libsmb/namequery.h"
#include "../libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
#include "libcli/auth/pam_errors.h"
#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_samr_c.h"
#include "librpc/rpc/dcesrv_core.h"
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_winbind.h"
#include "rpc_client/cli_pipe.h"
#include "rpc_client/cli_samr.h"
#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_netlogon.h"
#include "rpc_client/cli_netlogon.h"
#include "smb_krb5.h"
#include "../libcli/security/security.h"
#include "ads.h"
#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/krb5pac.h"
#include "passdb/machine_sid.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "../lib/tsocket/tsocket.h"
#include "auth/kerberos/pac_utils.h"
#include "auth/gensec/gensec.h"
#include "librpc/crypto/gse_krb5.h"
#include "lib/afs/afs_funcs.h"
#include "libsmb/samlogon_cache.h"
#include "rpc_client/util_netlogon.h"
#include "param/param.h"
#include "messaging/messaging.h"
#include "lib/util/string_wrappers.h"
#include "lib/crypto/gnutls_helpers.h"
#include "lib/crypto/gnutls_helpers.h"
#include <gnutls/crypto.h>
#include "lib/global_contexts.h"
#undef DBGC_CLASS
#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_WINBIND
#define LOGON_KRB5_FAIL_CLOCK_SKEW 0x02000000
static NTSTATUS append_info3_as_txt(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct winbindd_response *resp,
uint16_t validation_level,
union netr_Validation *validation)
{
struct netr_SamInfo3 *info3 = NULL;
char *ex = NULL;
uint32_t i;
NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
status = map_validation_to_info3(frame,
validation_level,
validation,
&info3);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
goto out;
}
resp->data.auth.info3.logon_time =
nt_time_to_unix(info3->base.logon_time);
resp->data.auth.info3.logoff_time =
nt_time_to_unix(info3->base.logoff_time);
resp->data.auth.info3.kickoff_time =
nt_time_to_unix(info3->base.kickoff_time);
resp->data.auth.info3.pass_last_set_time =
nt_time_to_unix(info3->base.last_password_change);
resp->data.auth.info3.pass_can_change_time =
nt_time_to_unix(info3->base.allow_password_change);
resp->data.auth.info3.pass_must_change_time =
nt_time_to_unix(info3->base.force_password_change);
resp->data.auth.info3.logon_count = info3->base.logon_count;
resp->data.auth.info3.bad_pw_count = info3->base.bad_password_count;
resp->data.auth.info3.user_rid = info3->base.rid;
resp->data.auth.info3.group_rid = info3->base.primary_gid;
sid_to_fstring(resp->data.auth.info3.dom_sid, info3->base.domain_sid);
resp->data.auth.info3.num_groups = info3->base.groups.count;
resp->data.auth.info3.user_flgs = info3->base.user_flags;
resp->data.auth.info3.acct_flags = info3->base.acct_flags;
resp->data.auth.info3.num_other_sids = info3->sidcount;
fstrcpy(resp->data.auth.info3.user_name,
info3->base.account_name.string);
fstrcpy(resp->data.auth.info3.full_name,
info3->base.full_name.string);
fstrcpy(resp->data.auth.info3.logon_script,
info3->base.logon_script.string);
fstrcpy(resp->data.auth.info3.profile_path,
info3->base.profile_path.string);
fstrcpy(resp->data.auth.info3.home_dir,
info3->base.home_directory.string);
fstrcpy(resp->data.auth.info3.dir_drive,
info3->base.home_drive.string);
fstrcpy(resp->data.auth.info3.logon_srv,
info3->base.logon_server.string);
fstrcpy(resp->data.auth.info3.logon_dom,
info3->base.logon_domain.string);
resp->data.auth.validation_level = validation_level;
if (validation_level == 6) {
fstrcpy(resp->data.auth.info6.dns_domainname,
validation->sam6->dns_domainname.string);
fstrcpy(resp->data.auth.info6.principal_name,
validation->sam6->principal_name.string);
}
ex = talloc_strdup(frame, "");
if (ex == NULL) {
status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto out;
}
for (i=0; i < info3->base.groups.count; i++) {
ex = talloc_asprintf_append_buffer(ex, "0x%08X:0x%08X\n",
info3->base.groups.rids[i].rid,
info3->base.groups.rids[i].attributes);
if (ex == NULL) {
status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto out;
}
}
for (i=0; i < info3->sidcount; i++) {
struct dom_sid_buf sidbuf;
ex = talloc_asprintf_append_buffer(
ex,
"%s:0x%08X\n",
dom_sid_str_buf(info3->sids[i].sid, &sidbuf),
info3->sids[i].attributes);
if (ex == NULL) {
status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto out;
}
}
resp->length += talloc_get_size(ex);
resp->extra_data.data = talloc_move(mem_ctx, &ex);
status = NT_STATUS_OK;
out:
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return status;
}
static NTSTATUS append_info3_as_ndr(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct winbindd_response *resp,
struct netr_SamInfo3 *info3)
{
DATA_BLOB blob;
enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
2010-05-10 02:42:06 +04:00
ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, info3,
(ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_netr_SamInfo3);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
DEBUG(0,("append_info3_as_ndr: failed to append\n"));
return ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
}
resp->extra_data.data = blob.data;
resp->length += blob.length;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
static NTSTATUS append_unix_username(uint16_t validation_level,
union netr_Validation *validation,
const char *name_domain,
const char *name_user,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
char **_unix_username)
{
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = NULL;
const char *nt_username = NULL;
const char *nt_domain = NULL;
char *unix_username = NULL;
struct netr_SamBaseInfo *base_info = NULL;
NTSTATUS status;
tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
/* We've been asked to return the unix username, per
'winbind use default domain' settings and the like */
switch (validation_level) {
case 3:
base_info = &validation->sam3->base;
break;
case 6:
base_info = &validation->sam6->base;
break;
default:
DBG_ERR("Invalid validation level %d\n", validation_level);
status = NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
nt_domain = talloc_strdup(tmp_ctx, base_info->logon_domain.string);
if (!nt_domain) {
/* If the server didn't give us one, just use the one
* we sent them */
nt_domain = name_domain;
}
nt_username = talloc_strdup(tmp_ctx, base_info->account_name.string);
if (!nt_username) {
/* If the server didn't give us one, just use the one
* we sent them */
nt_username = name_user;
}
unix_username = fill_domain_username_talloc(tmp_ctx,
nt_domain,
nt_username,
true);
if (unix_username == NULL) {
status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto out;
}
DBG_INFO("Setting unix username to [%s]\n", unix_username);
*_unix_username = talloc_move(mem_ctx, &unix_username);
status = NT_STATUS_OK;
out:
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return status;
}
static NTSTATUS append_afs_token(uint16_t validation_level,
union netr_Validation *validation,
const char *name_domain,
const char *name_user,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
DATA_BLOB *_blob)
{
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = NULL;
char *afsname = NULL;
char *cell;
char *token;
struct netr_SamBaseInfo *base_info = NULL;
NTSTATUS status;
tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
switch (validation_level) {
case 3:
base_info = &validation->sam3->base;
break;
case 6:
base_info = &validation->sam6->base;
break;
default:
DBG_ERR("Invalid validation level %d\n", validation_level);
status = NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
afsname = talloc_strdup(tmp_ctx, lp_afs_username_map());
if (afsname == NULL) {
status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto out;
}
afsname = talloc_string_sub(tmp_ctx,
lp_afs_username_map(),
"%D", name_domain);
afsname = talloc_string_sub(tmp_ctx, afsname,
"%u", name_user);
afsname = talloc_string_sub(tmp_ctx, afsname,
"%U", name_user);
{
struct dom_sid user_sid;
struct dom_sid_buf sidstr;
sid_compose(&user_sid, base_info->domain_sid, base_info->rid);
afsname = talloc_string_sub(
tmp_ctx,
afsname,
"%s",
dom_sid_str_buf(&user_sid, &sidstr));
}
if (afsname == NULL) {
status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto out;
}
if (!strlower_m(afsname)) {
status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
goto out;
}
DEBUG(10, ("Generating token for user %s\n", afsname));
cell = strchr(afsname, '@');
if (cell == NULL) {
status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto out;
}
*cell = '\0';
cell += 1;
token = afs_createtoken_str(afsname, cell);
if (token == NULL) {
status = NT_STATUS_OK;
goto out;
}
talloc_steal(mem_ctx, token);
*_blob = data_blob_string_const_null(token);
status = NT_STATUS_OK;
out:
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return status;
}
NTSTATUS extra_data_to_sid_array(const char *group_sid,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct wbint_SidArray **_sid_array)
{
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = NULL;
struct wbint_SidArray *sid_array = NULL;
struct dom_sid *require_membership_of_sid = NULL;
uint32_t num_require_membership_of_sid = 0;
char *req_sid = NULL;
const char *p = NULL;
NTSTATUS status;
if (_sid_array == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
*_sid_array = NULL;
tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
sid_array = talloc_zero(tmp_ctx, struct wbint_SidArray);
if (sid_array == NULL) {
status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto fail;
}
if (!group_sid || !group_sid[0]) {
/* NO sid supplied, all users may access */
status = NT_STATUS_OK;
/*
* Always return an allocated wbint_SidArray,
* even if the array is empty.
*/
goto out;
}
num_require_membership_of_sid = 0;
require_membership_of_sid = NULL;
p = group_sid;
while (next_token_talloc(tmp_ctx, &p, &req_sid, ",")) {
struct dom_sid sid;
if (!string_to_sid(&sid, req_sid)) {
DBG_ERR("check_info3_in_group: could not parse %s "
"as a SID!\n", req_sid);
status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
goto fail;
}
status = add_sid_to_array(tmp_ctx, &sid,
&require_membership_of_sid,
&num_require_membership_of_sid);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DBG_ERR("add_sid_to_array failed\n");
goto fail;
}
}
sid_array->num_sids = num_require_membership_of_sid;
sid_array->sids = talloc_move(sid_array, &require_membership_of_sid);
status = NT_STATUS_OK;
out:
*_sid_array = talloc_move(mem_ctx, &sid_array);
fail:
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return status;
}
2010-03-31 22:57:01 +04:00
static NTSTATUS check_info3_in_group(struct netr_SamInfo3 *info3,
struct wbint_SidArray *sid_array)
/**
* Check whether a user belongs to a group or list of groups.
*
* @param mem_ctx talloc memory context.
* @param info3 user information, including group membership info.
* @param group_sid One or more groups , separated by commas.
*
* @return NT_STATUS_OK on success,
* NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE if the user does not belong,
* or other NT_STATUS_IS_ERR(status) for other kinds of failure.
*/
{
size_t i;
struct security_token *token;
NTSTATUS status;
/* Parse the 'required group' SID */
if (sid_array == NULL || sid_array->num_sids == 0) {
/* NO sid supplied, all users may access */
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/*
* This is a limited-use security_token for the purpose of
* checking the SID list below, so no claims need to be added
* and se_access_check() will never run.
*/
token = security_token_initialise(talloc_tos(),
CLAIMS_EVALUATION_INVALID_STATE);
if (token == NULL) {
DEBUG(0, ("talloc failed\n"));
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
status = sid_array_from_info3(token, info3,
&token->sids,
&token->num_sids,
true);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
return status;
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status = add_aliases(get_global_sam_sid(),
token))
|| !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status = add_aliases(&global_sid_Builtin,
token))) {
DEBUG(3, ("could not add aliases: %s\n",
nt_errstr(status)));
return status;
}
security_token_debug(DBGC_CLASS, 10, token);
for (i=0; i<sid_array->num_sids; i++) {
struct dom_sid_buf buf;
DEBUG(10, ("Checking SID %s\n",
dom_sid_str_buf(&sid_array->sids[i],
&buf)));
if (nt_token_check_sid(&sid_array->sids[i],
token)) {
DEBUG(10, ("Access ok\n"));
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
}
/* Do not distinguish this error from a wrong username/pw */
return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
}
struct winbindd_domain *find_auth_domain(uint8_t flags,
const char *domain_name)
{
struct winbindd_domain *domain;
if (IS_DC) {
domain = find_domain_from_name_noinit(domain_name);
if (domain == NULL) {
DEBUG(3, ("Authentication for domain [%s] refused "
"as it is not a trusted domain\n",
domain_name));
return NULL;
}
if (domain->secure_channel_type != SEC_CHAN_NULL) {
return domain;
}
return domain->routing_domain;
}
2010-04-11 17:27:49 +04:00
if (strequal(domain_name, get_global_sam_name())) {
return find_domain_from_name_noinit(domain_name);
}
if (lp_winbind_use_krb5_enterprise_principals()) {
/*
* If we use enterprise principals
* we always go through our primary domain
* and follow the WRONG_REALM replies.
*/
flags &= ~WBFLAG_PAM_CONTACT_TRUSTDOM;
}
/* we can auth against trusted domains */
if (flags & WBFLAG_PAM_CONTACT_TRUSTDOM) {
domain = find_domain_from_name_noinit(domain_name);
if (domain == NULL) {
DEBUG(3, ("Authentication for domain [%s] skipped "
"as it is not a trusted domain\n",
domain_name));
} else {
return domain;
}
}
return find_our_domain();
}
static NTSTATUS get_password_policy(struct winbindd_domain *domain,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct samr_DomInfo1 **_policy)
{
NTSTATUS status;
struct samr_DomInfo1 *policy = NULL;
if ( !winbindd_can_contact_domain( domain ) ) {
DBG_INFO("No inbound trust to contact domain %s\n",
domain->name);
return NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
policy = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samr_DomInfo1);
if (policy == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
status = wb_cache_password_policy(domain, mem_ctx, policy);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_ERR(status)) {
TALLOC_FREE(policy);
return status;
}
*_policy = talloc_move(mem_ctx, &policy);
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
static NTSTATUS get_max_bad_attempts_from_lockout_policy(struct winbindd_domain *domain,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
uint16_t *lockout_threshold)
{
NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
struct samr_DomInfo12 lockout_policy;
*lockout_threshold = 0;
status = wb_cache_lockout_policy(domain, mem_ctx, &lockout_policy);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_ERR(status)) {
return status;
}
*lockout_threshold = lockout_policy.lockout_threshold;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
static NTSTATUS get_pwd_properties(struct winbindd_domain *domain,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
uint32_t *password_properties)
{
NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
struct samr_DomInfo1 password_policy;
*password_properties = 0;
status = wb_cache_password_policy(domain, mem_ctx, &password_policy);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_ERR(status)) {
return status;
}
*password_properties = password_policy.password_properties;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
static bool generate_krb5_ccache(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const char *type,
uid_t uid,
const char **user_ccache_file)
{
/* accept FILE and WRFILE as krb5_cc_type from the client and then
* build the full ccname string based on the user's uid here -
* Guenther*/
const char *gen_cc = NULL;
if (uid != -1) {
if (strequal(type, "FILE")) {
gen_cc = talloc_asprintf(
mem_ctx, "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d", uid);
if (gen_cc == NULL) {
return false;
}
}
if (strequal(type, "WRFILE")) {
gen_cc = talloc_asprintf(
mem_ctx, "WRFILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d", uid);
if (gen_cc == NULL) {
return false;
}
}
if (strequal(type, "KEYRING")) {
gen_cc = talloc_asprintf(
mem_ctx, "KEYRING:persistent:%d", uid);
if (gen_cc == NULL) {
return false;
}
}
if (strequal(type, "KCM")) {
gen_cc = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx,
"KCM:%d",
uid);
if (gen_cc == NULL) {
return false;
}
}
if (strnequal(type, "FILE:/", 6) ||
strnequal(type, "WRFILE:/", 8) ||
strnequal(type, "DIR:/", 5)) {
/* we allow only one "%u" substitution */
char *p;
p = strchr(type, '%');
if (p != NULL) {
p++;
if (p != NULL && *p == 'u' && strchr(p, '%') == NULL) {
char uid_str[sizeof("18446744073709551615")];
snprintf(uid_str, sizeof(uid_str), "%u", uid);
gen_cc = talloc_string_sub2(mem_ctx,
type,
"%u",
uid_str,
/* remove_unsafe_characters */
false,
/* replace_once */
true,
/* allow_trailing_dollar */
false);
if (gen_cc == NULL) {
return false;
}
}
}
}
}
*user_ccache_file = gen_cc;
DBG_DEBUG("using ccache: %s\n", gen_cc != NULL ? gen_cc : "(internal)");
return true;
}
#endif
uid_t get_uid_from_request(struct winbindd_request *request)
{
uid_t uid;
uid = request->data.auth.uid;
if (uid == (uid_t)-1) {
DEBUG(1,("invalid uid: '%u'\n", (unsigned int)uid));
return -1;
}
return uid;
}
/**********************************************************************
Authenticate a user with a clear text password using Kerberos and fill up
ccache if required
**********************************************************************/
static NTSTATUS winbindd_raw_kerberos_login(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct winbindd_domain *domain,
const char *user,
const char *pass,
const char *krb5_cc_type,
uid_t uid,
struct netr_SamInfo6 **info6,
const char **_krb5ccname)
{
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
NTSTATUS result = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
const char *cc = NULL;
const char *principal_s = NULL;
char *realm = NULL;
char *name_namespace = NULL;
char *name_domain = NULL;
char *name_user = NULL;
time_t ticket_lifetime = 0;
time_t renewal_until = 0;
time_t time_offset = 0;
const char *user_ccache_file;
struct PAC_LOGON_INFO *logon_info = NULL;
struct PAC_UPN_DNS_INFO *upn_dns_info = NULL;
struct PAC_DATA *pac_data = NULL;
struct PAC_DATA_CTR *pac_data_ctr = NULL;
const char *local_service;
uint32_t i;
struct netr_SamInfo6 *info6_copy = NULL;
char *canon_principal = NULL;
char *canon_realm = NULL;
bool ok;
*info6 = NULL;
if (domain->alt_name == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
if (_krb5ccname != NULL) {
*_krb5ccname = NULL;
}
/* 1st step:
* prepare a krb5_cc_cache string for the user */
if (uid == -1) {
DEBUG(0,("no valid uid\n"));
}
ok = generate_krb5_ccache(mem_ctx,
krb5_cc_type,
uid,
&user_ccache_file);
if (!ok) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
cc = user_ccache_file;
/* 2nd step:
* get kerberos properties */
if (domain->backend_data.ads_conn != NULL) {
time_offset = domain->backend_data.ads_conn->auth.time_offset;
}
/* 3rd step:
* do kerberos auth and setup ccache as the user */
ok = parse_domain_user(mem_ctx,
user,
&name_namespace,
&name_domain,
&name_user);
if (!ok) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
realm = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, domain->alt_name);
if (realm == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!strupper_m(realm)) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
if (lp_winbind_use_krb5_enterprise_principals() &&
name_namespace[0] != '\0')
{
principal_s = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx,
"%s@%s@%s",
name_user,
name_namespace,
realm);
} else {
principal_s = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx,
"%s@%s",
name_user,
realm);
}
if (principal_s == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
local_service = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s$@%s",
lp_netbios_name(), lp_realm());
if (local_service == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
/* if this is a user ccache, we need to act as the user to let the krb5
* library handle the chown, etc. */
/************************ ENTERING NON-ROOT **********************/
if (user_ccache_file != NULL) {
set_effective_uid(uid);
DEBUG(10,("winbindd_raw_kerberos_login: uid is %d\n", uid));
}
/*
* Note cc can be NULL, it means
* kerberos_return_pac() will use
* a temporary krb5 ccache internally.
*/
result = kerberos_return_pac(mem_ctx,
principal_s,
pass,
time_offset,
&ticket_lifetime,
&renewal_until,
cc,
true,
true,
WINBINDD_PAM_AUTH_KRB5_RENEW_TIME,
NULL,
local_service,
&canon_principal,
&canon_realm,
&pac_data_ctr);
if (user_ccache_file != NULL) {
gain_root_privilege();
}
/************************ RETURNED TO ROOT **********************/
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
goto failed;
}
if (pac_data_ctr == NULL) {
goto failed;
}
pac_data = pac_data_ctr->pac_data;
if (pac_data == NULL) {
goto failed;
}
for (i=0; i < pac_data->num_buffers; i++) {
if (pac_data->buffers[i].type == PAC_TYPE_LOGON_INFO) {
logon_info = pac_data->buffers[i].info->logon_info.info;
continue;
}
if (pac_data->buffers[i].type == PAC_TYPE_UPN_DNS_INFO) {
upn_dns_info = &pac_data->buffers[i].info->upn_dns_info;
continue;
}
}
if (logon_info == NULL) {
DEBUG(10,("Missing logon_info in ticket of %s\n",
principal_s));
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
DEBUG(10,("winbindd_raw_kerberos_login: winbindd validated ticket of %s\n",
principal_s));
result = create_info6_from_pac(mem_ctx, logon_info,
upn_dns_info, &info6_copy);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
goto failed;
}
/* if we had a user's ccache then return that string for the pam
* environment */
if (user_ccache_file != NULL) {
if (_krb5ccname != NULL) {
*_krb5ccname = talloc_steal(mem_ctx, user_ccache_file);
}
result = add_ccache_to_list(principal_s,
cc,
user,
pass,
realm,
uid,
time(NULL),
ticket_lifetime,
renewal_until,
false,
canon_principal,
canon_realm);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
DEBUG(10,("winbindd_raw_kerberos_login: failed to add ccache to list: %s\n",
nt_errstr(result)));
}
}
*info6 = info6_copy;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
failed:
/*
* Do not delete an existing valid credential cache, if the user
* e.g. enters a wrong password
*/
if ((strequal(krb5_cc_type, "FILE") || strequal(krb5_cc_type, "WRFILE"))
&& user_ccache_file != NULL) {
return result;
}
/* we could have created a new credential cache with a valid tgt in it
* but we weren't able to get or verify the service ticket for this
* local host and therefore didn't get the PAC, we need to remove that
* cache entirely now */
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(remove_ccache(user))) {
DEBUG(3,("winbindd_raw_kerberos_login: "
"could not remove ccache for user %s\n",
user));
}
return result;
#else
return NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED;
#endif /* HAVE_KRB5 */
}
/****************************************************************
****************************************************************/
bool check_request_flags(uint32_t flags)
{
uint32_t flags_edata = WBFLAG_PAM_AFS_TOKEN |
WBFLAG_PAM_INFO3_TEXT |
WBFLAG_PAM_INFO3_NDR;
if ( ( (flags & flags_edata) == WBFLAG_PAM_AFS_TOKEN) ||
( (flags & flags_edata) == WBFLAG_PAM_INFO3_NDR) ||
( (flags & flags_edata) == WBFLAG_PAM_INFO3_TEXT)||
!(flags & flags_edata) ) {
return true;
}
DEBUG(1, ("check_request_flags: invalid request flags[0x%08X]\n",
flags));
return false;
}
/****************************************************************
****************************************************************/
NTSTATUS append_auth_data(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct winbindd_response *resp,
uint32_t request_flags,
uint16_t validation_level,
union netr_Validation *validation,
const char *name_domain,
const char *name_user)
{
struct netr_SamInfo3 *info3 = NULL;
NTSTATUS result = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
result = map_validation_to_info3(talloc_tos(),
validation_level,
validation,
&info3);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
goto out;
}
if (request_flags & WBFLAG_PAM_USER_SESSION_KEY) {
memcpy(resp->data.auth.user_session_key,
info3->base.key.key,
sizeof(resp->data.auth.user_session_key)
/* 16 */);
}
if (request_flags & WBFLAG_PAM_LMKEY) {
memcpy(resp->data.auth.first_8_lm_hash,
info3->base.LMSessKey.key,
sizeof(resp->data.auth.first_8_lm_hash)
/* 8 */);
}
if (request_flags & WBFLAG_PAM_UNIX_NAME) {
char *unix_username = NULL;
result = append_unix_username(validation_level,
validation,
name_domain,
name_user,
mem_ctx,
&unix_username);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
DEBUG(10,("Failed to append Unix Username: %s\n",
nt_errstr(result)));
goto out;
}
fstrcpy(resp->data.auth.unix_username, unix_username);
TALLOC_FREE(unix_username);
}
/* currently, anything from here on potentially overwrites extra_data. */
if (request_flags & WBFLAG_PAM_INFO3_NDR) {
result = append_info3_as_ndr(mem_ctx, resp, info3);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
DEBUG(10,("Failed to append INFO3 (NDR): %s\n",
nt_errstr(result)));
goto out;
}
}
if (request_flags & WBFLAG_PAM_INFO3_TEXT) {
result = append_info3_as_txt(mem_ctx, resp,
validation_level,
validation);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
DEBUG(10,("Failed to append INFO3 (TXT): %s\n",
nt_errstr(result)));
goto out;
}
}
if (request_flags & WBFLAG_PAM_AFS_TOKEN) {
DATA_BLOB blob = data_blob_null;
result = append_afs_token(validation_level,
validation,
name_domain,
name_user,
mem_ctx,
&blob);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
DEBUG(10,("Failed to append AFS token: %s\n",
nt_errstr(result)));
goto out;
}
resp->extra_data.data = blob.data;
resp->length += blob.length;
}
result = NT_STATUS_OK;
out:
TALLOC_FREE(info3);
return result;
}
static NTSTATUS winbindd_dual_pam_auth_cached(struct winbindd_domain *domain,
bool krb5_auth,
const char *user,
const char *pass,
const char *krb5_cc_type,
uid_t uid,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
uint16_t *_validation_level,
union netr_Validation **_validation,
const char **_krb5ccname)
{
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = NULL;
NTSTATUS result = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
uint16_t max_allowed_bad_attempts;
char *name_namespace = NULL;
char *name_domain = NULL;
char *name_user = NULL;
struct dom_sid sid;
enum lsa_SidType type;
uchar new_nt_pass[NT_HASH_LEN];
const uint8_t *cached_nt_pass;
const uint8_t *cached_salt;
struct netr_SamInfo3 *my_info3;
time_t kickoff_time, must_change_time;
bool password_good = false;
bool ok;
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
struct winbindd_tdc_domain *tdc_domain = NULL;
#endif
if (_validation == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
*_validation = NULL;
if (_krb5ccname != NULL) {
*_krb5ccname = NULL;
}
DEBUG(10,("winbindd_dual_pam_auth_cached\n"));
tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
/* Parse domain and username */
ok = parse_domain_user(tmp_ctx,
user,
&name_namespace,
&name_domain,
&name_user);
if (!ok) {
DBG_DEBUG("parse_domain_user failed\n");
result = NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
goto out;
}
if (!lookup_cached_name(name_namespace,
name_domain,
name_user,
&sid,
&type)) {
DEBUG(10,("winbindd_dual_pam_auth_cached: no such user in the cache\n"));
result = NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
goto out;
}
if (type != SID_NAME_USER) {
DEBUG(10,("winbindd_dual_pam_auth_cached: not a user (%s)\n", sid_type_lookup(type)));
result = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
goto out;
}
result = winbindd_get_creds(domain,
tmp_ctx,
&sid,
&my_info3,
&cached_nt_pass,
&cached_salt);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
DEBUG(10,("winbindd_dual_pam_auth_cached: failed to get creds: %s\n", nt_errstr(result)));
goto out;
}
E_md4hash(pass, new_nt_pass);
dump_data_pw("new_nt_pass", new_nt_pass, NT_HASH_LEN);
dump_data_pw("cached_nt_pass", cached_nt_pass, NT_HASH_LEN);
if (cached_salt) {
dump_data_pw("cached_salt", cached_salt, NT_HASH_LEN);
}
if (cached_salt) {
/* In this case we didn't store the nt_hash itself,
but the MD5 combination of salt + nt_hash. */
uchar salted_hash[NT_HASH_LEN];
gnutls_hash_hd_t hash_hnd = NULL;
int rc;
rc = gnutls_hash_init(&hash_hnd, GNUTLS_DIG_MD5);
if (rc < 0) {
result = gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(
rc, NT_STATUS_HASH_NOT_SUPPORTED);
goto out;
}
rc = gnutls_hash(hash_hnd, cached_salt, 16);
if (rc < 0) {
gnutls_hash_deinit(hash_hnd, NULL);
result = gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(
rc, NT_STATUS_HASH_NOT_SUPPORTED);
goto out;
}
rc = gnutls_hash(hash_hnd, new_nt_pass, 16);
if (rc < 0) {
gnutls_hash_deinit(hash_hnd, NULL);
result = gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(
rc, NT_STATUS_HASH_NOT_SUPPORTED);
goto out;
}
gnutls_hash_deinit(hash_hnd, salted_hash);
password_good = mem_equal_const_time(cached_nt_pass, salted_hash,
NT_HASH_LEN);
} else {
/* Old cached cred - direct store of nt_hash (bad bad bad !). */
password_good = mem_equal_const_time(cached_nt_pass, new_nt_pass,
NT_HASH_LEN);
}
if (password_good) {
/* User *DOES* know the password, update logon_time and reset
* bad_pw_count */
my_info3->base.user_flags |= NETLOGON_CACHED_ACCOUNT;
if (my_info3->base.acct_flags & ACB_AUTOLOCK) {
result = NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT;
goto out;
}
if (my_info3->base.acct_flags & ACB_DISABLED) {
result = NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_DISABLED;
goto out;
}
if (my_info3->base.acct_flags & ACB_WSTRUST) {
result = NT_STATUS_NOLOGON_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT;
goto out;
}
if (my_info3->base.acct_flags & ACB_SVRTRUST) {
result = NT_STATUS_NOLOGON_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT;
goto out;
}
if (my_info3->base.acct_flags & ACB_DOMTRUST) {
result = NT_STATUS_NOLOGON_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT;
goto out;
}
if (!(my_info3->base.acct_flags & ACB_NORMAL)) {
DEBUG(0,("winbindd_dual_pam_auth_cached: what's wrong with that one?: 0x%08x\n",
my_info3->base.acct_flags));
result = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
goto out;
}
kickoff_time = nt_time_to_unix(my_info3->base.kickoff_time);
if (kickoff_time != 0 && time(NULL) > kickoff_time) {
result = NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_EXPIRED;
goto out;
}
must_change_time = nt_time_to_unix(my_info3->base.force_password_change);
if (must_change_time != 0 && must_change_time < time(NULL)) {
/* we allow grace logons when the password has expired */
my_info3->base.user_flags |= NETLOGON_GRACE_LOGON;
/* return NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_EXPIRED; */
goto success;
}
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
if ((krb5_auth) &&
((tdc_domain = wcache_tdc_fetch_domain(tmp_ctx, name_domain)) != NULL) &&
((tdc_domain->trust_type & LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL) ||
/* used to cope with the case winbindd starting without network. */
!strequal(tdc_domain->domain_name, tdc_domain->dns_name))) {
const char *cc = NULL;
char *realm = NULL;
const char *principal_s = NULL;
const char *user_ccache_file;
if (domain->alt_name == NULL) {
result = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
goto out;
}
if (uid == -1) {
DEBUG(0,("winbindd_dual_pam_auth_cached: invalid uid\n"));
result = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
goto out;
}
ok = generate_krb5_ccache(tmp_ctx,
krb5_cc_type,
uid,
&user_ccache_file);
if (!ok) {
result = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto out;
}
cc = user_ccache_file;
realm = talloc_strdup(tmp_ctx, domain->alt_name);
if (realm == NULL) {
result = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto out;
}
if (!strupper_m(realm)) {
result = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
goto out;
}
principal_s = talloc_asprintf(tmp_ctx, "%s@%s", name_user, realm);
if (principal_s == NULL) {
result = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto out;
}
if (user_ccache_file != NULL) {
if (_krb5ccname != NULL) {
*_krb5ccname = talloc_move(mem_ctx,
&user_ccache_file);
}
result = add_ccache_to_list(principal_s,
cc,
user,
pass,
realm,
uid,
time(NULL),
time(NULL) + lp_winbind_cache_time(),
time(NULL) + WINBINDD_PAM_AUTH_KRB5_RENEW_TIME,
true,
principal_s,
realm);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
DEBUG(10,("winbindd_dual_pam_auth_cached: failed "
"to add ccache to list: %s\n",
nt_errstr(result)));
}
}
}
#endif /* HAVE_KRB5 */
success:
/* FIXME: we possibly should handle logon hours as well (does xp when
* offline?) see auth/auth_sam.c:sam_account_ok for details */
unix_to_nt_time(&my_info3->base.logon_time, time(NULL));
my_info3->base.bad_password_count = 0;
result = winbindd_update_creds_by_info3(domain,
user,
pass,
my_info3);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
DEBUG(1,("winbindd_dual_pam_auth_cached: failed to update creds: %s\n",
nt_errstr(result)));
goto out;
}
result = map_info3_to_validation(mem_ctx,
my_info3,
_validation_level,
_validation);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
DBG_ERR("map_info3_to_validation failed: %s\n",
nt_errstr(result));
goto out;
}
result = NT_STATUS_OK;
goto out;
}
/* User does *NOT* know the correct password, modify info3 accordingly, but only if online */
if (domain->online == false) {
goto failed;
}
/* failure of this is not critical */
result = get_max_bad_attempts_from_lockout_policy(domain, tmp_ctx, &max_allowed_bad_attempts);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
DEBUG(10,("winbindd_dual_pam_auth_cached: failed to get max_allowed_bad_attempts. "
"Won't be able to honour account lockout policies\n"));
}
/* increase counter */
my_info3->base.bad_password_count++;
if (max_allowed_bad_attempts == 0) {
goto failed;
}
/* lockout user */
if (my_info3->base.bad_password_count >= max_allowed_bad_attempts) {
uint32_t password_properties;
result = get_pwd_properties(domain, tmp_ctx, &password_properties);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
DEBUG(10,("winbindd_dual_pam_auth_cached: failed to get password properties.\n"));
}
if ((my_info3->base.rid != DOMAIN_RID_ADMINISTRATOR) ||
(password_properties & DOMAIN_PASSWORD_LOCKOUT_ADMINS)) {
my_info3->base.acct_flags |= ACB_AUTOLOCK;
}
}
failed:
result = winbindd_update_creds_by_info3(domain, user, NULL, my_info3);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
DEBUG(0,("winbindd_dual_pam_auth_cached: failed to update creds %s\n",
nt_errstr(result)));
}
result = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
out:
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return result;
}
static NTSTATUS winbindd_dual_pam_auth_kerberos(struct winbindd_domain *domain,
const char *user,
const char *pass,
const char *krb5_cc_type,
uid_t uid,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
uint16_t *_validation_level,
union netr_Validation **_validation,
const char **_krb5ccname)
{
struct netr_SamInfo6 *info6 = NULL;
struct winbindd_domain *contact_domain;
char *name_namespace = NULL;
char *name_domain = NULL;
char *name_user = NULL;
NTSTATUS result;
bool ok;
DEBUG(10,("winbindd_dual_pam_auth_kerberos\n"));
/* Parse domain and username */
ok = parse_domain_user(mem_ctx,
user,
&name_namespace,
&name_domain,
&name_user);
if (!ok) {
result = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
goto done;
}
/* what domain should we contact? */
if (lp_winbind_use_krb5_enterprise_principals()) {
contact_domain = find_auth_domain(0, name_namespace);
} else {
contact_domain = find_domain_from_name(name_namespace);
}
if (contact_domain == NULL) {
DEBUG(3, ("Authentication for domain for [%s] -> [%s]\\[%s] failed as %s is not a trusted domain\n",
user, name_domain, name_user, name_namespace));
result = NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
goto done;
}
if (contact_domain->initialized &&
contact_domain->active_directory) {
goto try_login;
}
if (!contact_domain->initialized) {
init_dc_connection(contact_domain, false);
}
if (!contact_domain->active_directory) {
DEBUG(3,("krb5 auth requested but domain (%s) is not Active Directory\n",
contact_domain->name));
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_LOGON_TYPE;
}
try_login:
result = winbindd_raw_kerberos_login(
mem_ctx,
contact_domain,
user,
pass,
krb5_cc_type,
uid,
&info6,
_krb5ccname);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
goto done;
}
result = map_info6_to_validation(mem_ctx,
info6,
_validation_level,
_validation);
TALLOC_FREE(info6);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
DBG_ERR("map_info6_to_validation failed: %s\n",
nt_errstr(result));
}
done:
return result;
}
2010-04-11 17:27:49 +04:00
static NTSTATUS winbindd_dual_auth_passdb(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
uint32_t logon_parameters,
const char *domain,
const char *user,
const uint64_t logon_id,
const char *client_name,
const int client_pid,
2010-04-11 17:27:49 +04:00
const DATA_BLOB *challenge,
const DATA_BLOB *lm_resp,
const DATA_BLOB *nt_resp,
const struct tsocket_address *remote,
const struct tsocket_address *local,
bool interactive,
uint8_t *pauthoritative,
2010-04-11 17:27:49 +04:00
struct netr_SamInfo3 **pinfo3)
{
struct auth_context *auth_context;
struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info;
2010-04-11 17:27:49 +04:00
struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info = NULL;
struct netr_SamInfo3 *info3;
2010-04-11 17:27:49 +04:00
NTSTATUS status;
bool ok;
TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
/*
* We are authoritative by default
*/
*pauthoritative = 1;
status = make_user_info(frame, &user_info, user, user, domain, domain,
lp_netbios_name(), remote, local,
"winbind",
lm_resp, nt_resp, NULL, NULL,
NULL, AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE);
2010-04-11 17:27:49 +04:00
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(10, ("make_user_info failed: %s\n", nt_errstr(status)));
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
2010-04-11 17:27:49 +04:00
return status;
}
user_info->logon_parameters = logon_parameters;
user_info->logon_id = logon_id;
user_info->auth_description = talloc_asprintf(
frame, "PASSDB, %s, %d", client_name, client_pid);
if (user_info->auth_description == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
2010-04-11 17:27:49 +04:00
/* We don't want to come back to winbindd or to do PAM account checks */
user_info->flags |= USER_INFO_INFO3_AND_NO_AUTHZ;
if (interactive) {
user_info->flags |= USER_INFO_INTERACTIVE_LOGON;
}
status = make_auth3_context_for_winbind(frame, &auth_context);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DBG_ERR("make_auth3_context_for_winbind failed: %s\n",
nt_errstr(status));
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return status;
}
ok = auth3_context_set_challenge(auth_context,
challenge->data, "fixed");
if (!ok) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
status = auth_check_ntlm_password(mem_ctx,
auth_context,
user_info,
&server_info,
pauthoritative);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return status;
}
info3 = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct netr_SamInfo3);
if (info3 == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
status = serverinfo_to_SamInfo3(server_info, info3);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
TALLOC_FREE(info3);
DEBUG(0, ("serverinfo_to_SamInfo3 failed: %s\n",
nt_errstr(status)));
return status;
}
*pinfo3 = info3;
DBG_DEBUG("Authenticating user %s\\%s returned %s\n",
domain,
user,
nt_errstr(status));
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return status;
2010-04-11 17:27:49 +04:00
}
static NTSTATUS winbind_samlogon_retry_loop(struct winbindd_domain *domain,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
uint32_t logon_parameters,
const char *username,
const char *password,
const char *domainname,
const char *workstation,
const uint64_t logon_id,
bool plaintext_given,
DATA_BLOB chal,
DATA_BLOB lm_response,
DATA_BLOB nt_response,
bool interactive,
uint8_t *authoritative,
uint32_t *flags,
uint16_t *_validation_level,
union netr_Validation **_validation)
{
int attempts = 0;
int netr_attempts = 0;
bool retry = false;
bool valid_result = false;
NTSTATUS result;
enum netr_LogonInfoClass logon_type_i;
enum netr_LogonInfoClass logon_type_n;
uint16_t validation_level = UINT16_MAX;
union netr_Validation *validation = NULL;
winbindd_pam: add NT4 DC handling into winbind_samlogon_retry_loop() Handle the case where a NT4 DC does not fill in the acct_flags in the samlogon reply info3. Yes, in 2021, there are still admins arround with real NT4 DCs. NT4 DCs reject authentication with workstation accounts with NT_STATUS_NOLOGON_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT, even if MSV1_0_ALLOW_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT is specified. We no longer call dcerpc_samr_QueryUserInfo(level=16) to get the acct_flags, as we only ever got ACB_NORMAL back (maybe with ACB_PWNOEXP in addition), which is easy to calculate on our own. This was removed in commit (for 4.15.0rc1): commit 73528f26eea24033a7093e5591b8f89ad2b8644e Author: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> AuthorDate: Mon Jan 11 14:59:46 2021 +0100 Commit: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> CommitDate: Thu Jan 21 22:56:20 2021 +0000 winbind: remove legacy flags fallback Some very old NT4 DCs might have not returned the account flags filled in. This shouldn't be a problem anymore. Additionally, on a typical domain member server, this request is (and can only be) send to the primary domain, so this will not work with accounts from trusted domains. Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Jan 21 22:56:20 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184 It means one more caller of the problematic cm_connect_sam() function is removed! SAMR connections may not be allowed for machine accounts with modern AD DCs. For network logons NT4 DCs also skip the account_name, so we have to fallback to the one given by the client. We have code to cope with that deeply hidden inside of netsamlogon_cache_store(). Up to Samba 4.7 netsamlogon_cache_store() operated on the info3 structure that was passed to the caller of winbind_dual_SamLogon() and pass propagated up to auth_winbind in smbd. But for Samba 4.8 the following commit: commit f153c95176b7759e10996b24b66d9917945372ed Author: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> Date: Mon Dec 11 16:25:35 2017 +0100 winbindd: let winbind_dual_SamLogon return validation Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> actually changed the situation and only a temporary info3 structure was passed into netsamlogon_cache_store(), which means account_name was NULL and get propagated as "" into auth_winbind in smbd, where getpwnam() is no longer possible and every smb access gets NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14772 Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Aug 3 11:10:27 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
2021-08-02 15:17:47 +03:00
TALLOC_CTX *base_ctx = NULL;
struct netr_SamBaseInfo *base_info = NULL;
do {
struct rpc_pipe_client *netlogon_pipe;
struct netlogon_creds_cli_context *netlogon_creds_ctx = NULL;
/*
* We should always reset authoritative to 1
* before calling a server again.
*
* Otherwise we could treat a local problem as
* non-authoritative.
*/
*authoritative = 1;
retry = false;
D_DEBUG("Creating a DCERPC netlogon connection for SAM logon. "
"netlogon attempt: %d, samlogon attempt: %d.\n",
netr_attempts,
attempts);
result = cm_connect_netlogon_secure(domain, &netlogon_pipe,
&netlogon_creds_ctx);
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result,
NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO)) {
/*
* This means we don't have a trust account.
*/
*authoritative = 0;
result = NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
break;
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
DEBUG(3,("Could not open handle to NETLOGON pipe "
"(error: %s, attempts: %d)\n",
nt_errstr(result), netr_attempts));
reset_cm_connection_on_error(domain, NULL, result);
/* After the first retry always close the connection */
if (netr_attempts > 0) {
DEBUG(3, ("This is again a problem for this "
"particular call, forcing the close "
"of this connection\n"));
invalidate_cm_connection(domain);
}
/* After the second retry failover to the next DC */
if (netr_attempts > 1) {
/*
* If the netlogon server is not reachable then
* it is possible that the DC is rebuilding
* sysvol and shutdown netlogon for that time.
* We should failover to the next dc.
*/
DEBUG(3, ("This is the third problem for this "
"particular call, adding DC to the "
"negative cache list: %s %s\n", domain->name, domain->dcname));
add_failed_connection_entry(domain->name,
domain->dcname,
result);
saf_delete(domain->name);
}
/* Only allow 3 retries */
if (netr_attempts < 3) {
DEBUG(3, ("The connection to netlogon "
"failed, retrying\n"));
netr_attempts++;
retry = true;
continue;
}
return result;
}
logon_type_i = NetlogonInteractiveInformation;
logon_type_n = NetlogonNetworkInformation;
if (domain->domain_trust_attribs & LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST) {
logon_type_i = NetlogonInteractiveTransitiveInformation;
logon_type_n = NetlogonNetworkTransitiveInformation;
}
if (domain->domain_trust_attribs & LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_FOREST_TRANSITIVE) {
logon_type_i = NetlogonInteractiveTransitiveInformation;
logon_type_n = NetlogonNetworkTransitiveInformation;
}
if (domain->domain_trust_attribs & LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_NON_TRANSITIVE) {
logon_type_i = NetlogonInteractiveInformation;
logon_type_n = NetlogonNetworkInformation;
}
if (domain->domain_trust_attribs & LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_QUARANTINED_DOMAIN) {
logon_type_i = NetlogonInteractiveInformation;
logon_type_n = NetlogonNetworkInformation;
}
netr_attempts = 0;
if (plaintext_given) {
result = rpccli_netlogon_password_logon(
netlogon_creds_ctx,
netlogon_pipe->binding_handle,
mem_ctx,
logon_parameters,
domainname,
username,
password,
workstation,
logon_id,
logon_type_i,
authoritative,
flags,
&validation_level,
&validation);
} else if (interactive) {
result = rpccli_netlogon_interactive_logon(
netlogon_creds_ctx,
netlogon_pipe->binding_handle,
mem_ctx,
logon_parameters,
username,
domainname,
workstation,
logon_id,
lm_response,
nt_response,
logon_type_i,
authoritative,
flags,
&validation_level,
&validation);
} else {
result = rpccli_netlogon_network_logon(
netlogon_creds_ctx,
netlogon_pipe->binding_handle,
mem_ctx,
logon_parameters,
username,
domainname,
workstation,
logon_id,
chal,
lm_response,
nt_response,
logon_type_n,
authoritative,
flags,
&validation_level,
&validation);
}
/*
* we increment this after the "feature negotiation"
* for can_do_samlogon_ex and can_do_validation6
*/
attempts += 1;
/* We have to try a second time as cm_connect_netlogon
might not yet have noticed that the DC has killed
our connection. */
retry = reset_cm_connection_on_error(domain,
netlogon_pipe->binding_handle,
result);
if (retry) {
DBG_PREFIX(attempts > 1 ? DBGLVL_NOTICE : DBGLVL_INFO, (
"This is problem %d for this "
"particular call,"
"DOMAIN[%s] DC[%s] - %s\n",
attempts,
domain->name,
domain->dcname,
nt_errstr(result)));
continue;
}
valid_result = true;
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_RPC_PROCNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE)) {
/*
* Got DCERPC_FAULT_OP_RNG_ERROR for SamLogon
* (no Ex). This happens against old Samba
* DCs, if LogonSamLogonEx() fails with an error
* e.g. NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER or NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD.
*
* The server will log something like this:
* api_net_sam_logon_ex: Failed to marshall NET_R_SAM_LOGON_EX.
*
* This sets the whole connection into a fault_state mode
* and all following request get NT_STATUS_RPC_PROCNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE.
*
* This also happens to our retry with LogonSamLogonWithFlags()
* and LogonSamLogon().
*
* In order to recover from this situation, we need to
* drop the connection.
*/
invalidate_cm_connection(domain);
result = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
break;
}
} while ( (attempts < 3) && retry );
if (!valid_result) {
/*
* This matches what windows does. In a chain of transitive
* trusts the ACCESS_DENIED/authoritative=0 is not propagated
* instead of NT_STATUS_NO_LOGON_SERVERS/authoritative=1 is
* passed along the chain if there's no other DC is available.
*/
DBG_WARNING("Mapping %s/authoritative=%u to "
"NT_STATUS_NO_LOGON_SERVERS/authoritative=1 for"
"USERNAME[%s] USERDOMAIN[%s] REMOTE-DOMAIN[%s] \n",
nt_errstr(result),
*authoritative,
username,
domainname,
domain->name);
*authoritative = 1;
return NT_STATUS_NO_LOGON_SERVERS;
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
return result;
}
winbindd_pam: add NT4 DC handling into winbind_samlogon_retry_loop() Handle the case where a NT4 DC does not fill in the acct_flags in the samlogon reply info3. Yes, in 2021, there are still admins arround with real NT4 DCs. NT4 DCs reject authentication with workstation accounts with NT_STATUS_NOLOGON_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT, even if MSV1_0_ALLOW_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT is specified. We no longer call dcerpc_samr_QueryUserInfo(level=16) to get the acct_flags, as we only ever got ACB_NORMAL back (maybe with ACB_PWNOEXP in addition), which is easy to calculate on our own. This was removed in commit (for 4.15.0rc1): commit 73528f26eea24033a7093e5591b8f89ad2b8644e Author: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> AuthorDate: Mon Jan 11 14:59:46 2021 +0100 Commit: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> CommitDate: Thu Jan 21 22:56:20 2021 +0000 winbind: remove legacy flags fallback Some very old NT4 DCs might have not returned the account flags filled in. This shouldn't be a problem anymore. Additionally, on a typical domain member server, this request is (and can only be) send to the primary domain, so this will not work with accounts from trusted domains. Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Jan 21 22:56:20 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184 It means one more caller of the problematic cm_connect_sam() function is removed! SAMR connections may not be allowed for machine accounts with modern AD DCs. For network logons NT4 DCs also skip the account_name, so we have to fallback to the one given by the client. We have code to cope with that deeply hidden inside of netsamlogon_cache_store(). Up to Samba 4.7 netsamlogon_cache_store() operated on the info3 structure that was passed to the caller of winbind_dual_SamLogon() and pass propagated up to auth_winbind in smbd. But for Samba 4.8 the following commit: commit f153c95176b7759e10996b24b66d9917945372ed Author: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> Date: Mon Dec 11 16:25:35 2017 +0100 winbindd: let winbind_dual_SamLogon return validation Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> actually changed the situation and only a temporary info3 structure was passed into netsamlogon_cache_store(), which means account_name was NULL and get propagated as "" into auth_winbind in smbd, where getpwnam() is no longer possible and every smb access gets NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14772 Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Aug 3 11:10:27 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
2021-08-02 15:17:47 +03:00
switch (validation_level) {
case 3:
base_ctx = validation->sam3;
base_info = &validation->sam3->base;
break;
case 6:
base_ctx = validation->sam6;
base_info = &validation->sam6->base;
break;
default:
smb_panic(__location__);
}
if (base_info->acct_flags == 0 || base_info->account_name.string == NULL) {
struct dom_sid user_sid;
struct dom_sid_buf sid_buf;
const char *acct_flags_src = "server";
const char *acct_name_src = "server";
/*
* Handle the case where a NT4 DC does not fill in the acct_flags in
* the samlogon reply info3. Yes, in 2021, there are still admins
* around with real NT4 DCs.
winbindd_pam: add NT4 DC handling into winbind_samlogon_retry_loop() Handle the case where a NT4 DC does not fill in the acct_flags in the samlogon reply info3. Yes, in 2021, there are still admins arround with real NT4 DCs. NT4 DCs reject authentication with workstation accounts with NT_STATUS_NOLOGON_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT, even if MSV1_0_ALLOW_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT is specified. We no longer call dcerpc_samr_QueryUserInfo(level=16) to get the acct_flags, as we only ever got ACB_NORMAL back (maybe with ACB_PWNOEXP in addition), which is easy to calculate on our own. This was removed in commit (for 4.15.0rc1): commit 73528f26eea24033a7093e5591b8f89ad2b8644e Author: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> AuthorDate: Mon Jan 11 14:59:46 2021 +0100 Commit: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> CommitDate: Thu Jan 21 22:56:20 2021 +0000 winbind: remove legacy flags fallback Some very old NT4 DCs might have not returned the account flags filled in. This shouldn't be a problem anymore. Additionally, on a typical domain member server, this request is (and can only be) send to the primary domain, so this will not work with accounts from trusted domains. Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Jan 21 22:56:20 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184 It means one more caller of the problematic cm_connect_sam() function is removed! SAMR connections may not be allowed for machine accounts with modern AD DCs. For network logons NT4 DCs also skip the account_name, so we have to fallback to the one given by the client. We have code to cope with that deeply hidden inside of netsamlogon_cache_store(). Up to Samba 4.7 netsamlogon_cache_store() operated on the info3 structure that was passed to the caller of winbind_dual_SamLogon() and pass propagated up to auth_winbind in smbd. But for Samba 4.8 the following commit: commit f153c95176b7759e10996b24b66d9917945372ed Author: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> Date: Mon Dec 11 16:25:35 2017 +0100 winbindd: let winbind_dual_SamLogon return validation Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> actually changed the situation and only a temporary info3 structure was passed into netsamlogon_cache_store(), which means account_name was NULL and get propagated as "" into auth_winbind in smbd, where getpwnam() is no longer possible and every smb access gets NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14772 Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Aug 3 11:10:27 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
2021-08-02 15:17:47 +03:00
*
* We used to call dcerpc_samr_QueryUserInfo(level=16) to fetch
* acct_flags, but as NT4 DCs reject authentication with workstation
* accounts with NT_STATUS_NOLOGON_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT, even if
* MSV1_0_ALLOW_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT is specified, we only ever got
* ACB_NORMAL back (maybe with ACB_PWNOEXP in addition).
*
* For network logons NT4 DCs also skip the
* account_name, so we have to fallback to the
* one given by the client.
*/
if (base_info->acct_flags == 0) {
base_info->acct_flags = ACB_NORMAL;
if (base_info->force_password_change == NTTIME_MAX) {
base_info->acct_flags |= ACB_PWNOEXP;
}
acct_flags_src = "calculated";
}
if (base_info->account_name.string == NULL) {
base_info->account_name.string = talloc_strdup(base_ctx,
username);
if (base_info->account_name.string == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(validation);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
acct_name_src = "client";
}
sid_compose(&user_sid, base_info->domain_sid, base_info->rid);
DBG_DEBUG("Fallback to %s_acct_flags[0x%x] %s_acct_name[%s] for %s\n",
acct_flags_src,
base_info->acct_flags,
acct_name_src,
base_info->account_name.string,
dom_sid_str_buf(&user_sid, &sid_buf));
}
*_validation_level = validation_level;
*_validation = validation;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
static NTSTATUS nt_dual_auth_passdb(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
fstring name_user,
fstring name_domain,
const char *pass,
uint64_t logon_id,
const char *client_name,
const int client_pid,
const struct tsocket_address *remote,
const struct tsocket_address *local,
uint8_t *authoritative,
struct netr_SamInfo3 **info3)
{
unsigned char local_nt_response[24];
uchar chal[8];
DATA_BLOB chal_blob;
DATA_BLOB lm_resp;
DATA_BLOB nt_resp;
/* do password magic */
generate_random_buffer(chal, sizeof(chal));
chal_blob = data_blob_const(chal, sizeof(chal));
if (lp_client_ntlmv2_auth()) {
DATA_BLOB server_chal;
DATA_BLOB names_blob;
server_chal = data_blob_const(chal, 8);
/* note that the 'workgroup' here is for the local
machine. The 'server name' must match the
'workstation' passed to the actual SamLogon call.
*/
names_blob = NTLMv2_generate_names_blob(mem_ctx,
lp_netbios_name(),
lp_workgroup());
if (!SMBNTLMv2encrypt(mem_ctx, name_user, name_domain,
pass, &server_chal, &names_blob,
&lm_resp, &nt_resp, NULL, NULL)) {
data_blob_free(&names_blob);
DEBUG(0, ("SMBNTLMv2encrypt() failed!\n"));
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
data_blob_free(&names_blob);
} else {
int rc;
lm_resp = data_blob_null;
rc = SMBNTencrypt(pass, chal, local_nt_response);
if (rc != 0) {
DEBUG(0, ("SMBNTencrypt() failed!\n"));
return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc,
NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DISABLED_BY_POLICY_OTHER);
}
nt_resp = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, local_nt_response,
sizeof(local_nt_response));
}
return winbindd_dual_auth_passdb(talloc_tos(), 0, name_domain,
name_user, logon_id, client_name,
client_pid, &chal_blob, &lm_resp,
&nt_resp, remote, local,
true, /* interactive */
authoritative, info3);
}
static NTSTATUS winbindd_dual_pam_auth_samlogon(
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct winbindd_domain *domain,
const char *user,
const char *pass,
uint64_t logon_id,
const char *client_name,
const int client_pid,
uint32_t request_flags,
const struct tsocket_address *remote,
const struct tsocket_address *local,
uint16_t *_validation_level,
union netr_Validation **_validation)
{
char *name_namespace = NULL;
char *name_domain = NULL;
char *name_user = NULL;
NTSTATUS result;
uint8_t authoritative = 1;
uint32_t flags = 0;
uint16_t validation_level = 0;
union netr_Validation *validation = NULL;
bool ok;
DEBUG(10,("winbindd_dual_pam_auth_samlogon\n"));
/* Parse domain and username */
ok = parse_domain_user(mem_ctx,
user,
&name_namespace,
&name_domain,
&name_user);
if (!ok) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
/*
* We check against domain->name instead of
* name_domain, as find_auth_domain() ->
* find_domain_from_name_noinit() already decided
* that we are in a child for the correct domain.
*
* name_domain can also be lp_realm()
* we need to check against domain->name.
*/
if (strequal(domain->name, get_global_sam_name())) {
struct netr_SamInfo3 *info3 = NULL;
result = nt_dual_auth_passdb(mem_ctx, name_user, name_domain,
pass, logon_id, client_name,
client_pid, remote, local,
&authoritative, &info3);
/*
* We need to try the remote NETLOGON server if this is
* not authoritative (for example on the RODC).
*/
if (authoritative != 0) {
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
return result;
}
result = map_info3_to_validation(mem_ctx,
info3,
&validation_level,
&validation);
TALLOC_FREE(info3);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
return result;
}
goto done;
}
2010-04-11 17:27:49 +04:00
}
/* check authentication loop */
result = winbind_samlogon_retry_loop(domain,
mem_ctx,
0,
name_user,
pass,
name_domain,
lp_netbios_name(),
logon_id,
true, /* plaintext_given */
data_blob_null,
data_blob_null, data_blob_null,
true, /* interactive */
&authoritative,
&flags,
&validation_level,
&validation);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
return result;
}
done:
*_validation_level = validation_level;
*_validation = validation;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/*
* @brief generate an authentication message in the logs.
*
*/
static void log_authentication(
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const struct winbindd_domain *domain,
const char *client_name,
pid_t client_pid,
uint16_t validation_level,
union netr_Validation *validation,
const struct timeval start_time,
const uint64_t logon_id,
const char *command,
const char *user_name,
const char *domain_name,
const char *workstation,
const DATA_BLOB lm_resp,
const DATA_BLOB nt_resp,
const struct tsocket_address *remote,
const struct tsocket_address *local,
NTSTATUS result)
{
struct auth_usersupplied_info *ui = NULL;
struct dom_sid *sid = NULL;
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = NULL;
struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx = NULL;
struct netr_SamBaseInfo *base_info = NULL;
if (validation != NULL) {
switch (validation_level) {
case 3:
base_info = &validation->sam3->base;
break;
case 6:
base_info = &validation->sam6->base;
break;
default:
DBG_WARNING("Unexpected validation level '%d'\n",
validation_level);
break;
}
}
ui = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct auth_usersupplied_info);
ui->logon_id = logon_id;
ui->service_description = "winbind";
ui->password.response.nt.length = nt_resp.length;
ui->password.response.nt.data = nt_resp.data;
ui->password.response.lanman.length = lm_resp.length;
ui->password.response.lanman.data = lm_resp.data;
if (nt_resp.length == 0 && lm_resp.length == 0) {
ui->password_state = AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN;
} else {
ui->password_state = AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE;
}
/*
* In the event of a failure ui->auth_description will be null,
* the logging code handles this correctly so it can be ignored.
*/
ui->auth_description = talloc_asprintf(
ui,
"%s, %s, %d",
command,
client_name,
client_pid);
if (ui->auth_description == NULL) {
DBG_ERR("OOM Unable to create auth_description\n");
}
ui->client.account_name = user_name;
ui->client.domain_name = domain_name;
ui->workstation_name = workstation;
ui->remote_host = remote;
ui->local_host = local;
if (base_info != NULL) {
sid = dom_sid_dup(ui, base_info->domain_sid);
if (sid != NULL) {
sid_append_rid(sid, base_info->rid);
}
}
if (lp_auth_event_notification()) {
lp_ctx = loadparm_init_s3(ui, loadparm_s3_helpers());
msg_ctx = imessaging_client_init(
ui, lp_ctx, global_event_context());
}
log_authentication_event(
msg_ctx,
lp_ctx,
&start_time,
ui,
result,
base_info != NULL ? base_info->logon_domain.string : "",
base_info != NULL ? base_info->account_name.string : "",
sid,
NULL /* client_audit_info */,
NULL /* server_audit_info */);
TALLOC_FREE(ui);
}
NTSTATUS _wbint_PamAuth(struct pipes_struct *p,
struct wbint_PamAuth *r)
{
struct winbindd_domain *domain = wb_child_domain();
NTSTATUS result = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
NTSTATUS krb5_result = NT_STATUS_OK;
char *name_namespace = NULL;
char *name_domain = NULL;
char *name_user = NULL;
char *mapped_user = NULL;
const char *domain_user = NULL;
uint16_t validation_level = UINT16_MAX;
union netr_Validation *validation = NULL;
struct netr_SamBaseInfo *base_info = NULL;
NTSTATUS name_map_status = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
bool ok;
uint64_t logon_id = 0;
const struct timeval start_time = timeval_current();
const struct tsocket_address *remote = NULL;
const struct tsocket_address *local = NULL;
const char *krb5ccname = NULL;
uid_t uid;
pid_t client_pid;
if (domain == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_REQUEST_NOT_ACCEPTED;
}
/* Cut client_pid to 32bit */
client_pid = r->in.client_pid;
if ((uint64_t)client_pid != r->in.client_pid) {
DBG_DEBUG("pid out of range\n");
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
/* Cut uid to 32bit */
uid = r->in.info->uid;
if ((uint64_t)uid != r->in.info->uid) {
DBG_DEBUG("uid out of range\n");
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
/*
* Generate a logon_id for this session.
*/
logon_id = generate_random_u64();
remote = dcesrv_connection_get_remote_address(p->dce_call->conn);
local = dcesrv_connection_get_local_address(p->dce_call->conn);
DEBUG(3, ("[%"PRIu32"]: dual pam auth %s\n", client_pid,
r->in.info->username));
/* Parse domain and username */
name_map_status = normalize_name_unmap(p->mem_ctx,
r->in.info->username,
&mapped_user);
/* If the name normalization didn't actually do anything,
just use the original name */
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(name_map_status) &&
!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(name_map_status, NT_STATUS_FILE_RENAMED))
{
mapped_user = discard_const(r->in.info->username);
}
ok = parse_domain_user(p->mem_ctx,
mapped_user,
&name_namespace,
&name_domain,
&name_user);
if (!ok) {
result = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
goto done;
}
if (mapped_user != r->in.info->username) {
domain_user = talloc_asprintf(talloc_tos(),
"%s%c%s",
name_domain,
*lp_winbind_separator(),
name_user);
if (domain_user == NULL) {
result = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto done;
}
r->in.info->username = domain_user;
}
2010-09-08 17:29:32 +04:00
if (!domain->online) {
result = NT_STATUS_DOMAIN_CONTROLLER_NOT_FOUND;
if (domain->startup) {
/* Logons are very important to users. If we're offline and
we get a request within the first 30 seconds of startup,
try very hard to find a DC and go online. */
DEBUG(10,("winbindd_dual_pam_auth: domain: %s offline and auth "
"request in startup mode.\n", domain->name ));
winbindd_flush_negative_conn_cache(domain);
result = init_dc_connection(domain, false);
}
}
DEBUG(10,("winbindd_dual_pam_auth: domain: %s last was %s\n", domain->name, domain->online ? "online":"offline"));
/* Check for Kerberos authentication */
if (domain->online && (r->in.flags & WBFLAG_PAM_KRB5)) {
result = winbindd_dual_pam_auth_kerberos(
domain,
r->in.info->username,
r->in.info->password,
r->in.info->krb5_cc_type,
uid,
p->mem_ctx,
&validation_level,
&validation,
&krb5ccname);
/* save for later */
krb5_result = result;
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
DEBUG(10,("winbindd_dual_pam_auth_kerberos succeeded\n"));
goto process_result;
}
DBG_DEBUG("winbindd_dual_pam_auth_kerberos failed: %s\n",
nt_errstr(result));
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_NO_LOGON_SERVERS) ||
NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_IO_TIMEOUT) ||
NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_DOMAIN_CONTROLLER_NOT_FOUND)) {
DEBUG(10,("winbindd_dual_pam_auth_kerberos setting domain to offline\n"));
set_domain_offline( domain );
goto cached_logon;
}
/* there are quite some NT_STATUS errors where there is no
* point in retrying with a samlogon, we explicitly have to take
* care not to increase the bad logon counter on the DC */
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_DISABLED) ||
NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_EXPIRED) ||
NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT) ||
NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_INVALID_LOGON_HOURS) ||
NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_INVALID_WORKSTATION) ||
NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE) ||
NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER) ||
NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_EXPIRED) ||
NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_MUST_CHANGE) ||
NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD)) {
goto done;
}
if (r->in.flags & WBFLAG_PAM_FALLBACK_AFTER_KRB5) {
DEBUG(3,("falling back to samlogon\n"));
goto sam_logon;
} else {
goto cached_logon;
}
}
sam_logon:
/* Check for Samlogon authentication */
if (domain->online) {
result = winbindd_dual_pam_auth_samlogon(
p->mem_ctx,
domain,
r->in.info->username,
r->in.info->password,
logon_id,
r->in.client_name,
client_pid,
r->in.flags,
remote,
local,
&validation_level,
&validation);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
DEBUG(10,("winbindd_dual_pam_auth_samlogon succeeded\n"));
switch (validation_level) {
case 3:
base_info = &validation->sam3->base;
break;
case 6:
base_info = &validation->sam6->base;
break;
default:
DBG_ERR("Bad validation level %d\n",
validation_level);
result = NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto done;
}
/* add the Krb5 err if we have one */
if ( NT_STATUS_EQUAL(krb5_result, NT_STATUS_TIME_DIFFERENCE_AT_DC ) ) {
base_info->user_flags |= LOGON_KRB5_FAIL_CLOCK_SKEW;
}
goto process_result;
}
DEBUG(10,("winbindd_dual_pam_auth_samlogon failed: %s\n",
nt_errstr(result)));
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_NO_LOGON_SERVERS) ||
NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_IO_TIMEOUT) ||
NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_DOMAIN_CONTROLLER_NOT_FOUND))
{
DEBUG(10,("winbindd_dual_pam_auth_samlogon setting domain to offline\n"));
set_domain_offline( domain );
goto cached_logon;
}
if (domain->online) {
/* We're still online - fail. */
goto done;
}
}
cached_logon:
/* Check for Cached logons */
if (!domain->online && (r->in.flags & WBFLAG_PAM_CACHED_LOGIN) &&
lp_winbind_offline_logon()) {
result = winbindd_dual_pam_auth_cached(domain,
(r->in.flags & WBFLAG_PAM_KRB5),
r->in.info->username,
r->in.info->password,
r->in.info->krb5_cc_type,
uid,
p->mem_ctx,
&validation_level,
&validation,
&krb5ccname);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
DEBUG(10,("winbindd_dual_pam_auth_cached failed: %s\n", nt_errstr(result)));
goto done;
}
DEBUG(10,("winbindd_dual_pam_auth_cached succeeded\n"));
}
process_result:
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
struct dom_sid user_sid;
TALLOC_CTX *base_ctx = NULL;
struct netr_SamInfo3 *info3 = NULL;
switch (validation_level) {
case 3:
base_ctx = validation->sam3;
base_info = &validation->sam3->base;
break;
case 6:
base_ctx = validation->sam6;
base_info = &validation->sam6->base;
break;
default:
DBG_ERR("Bad validation level %d\n", validation_level);
result = NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto done;
}
sid_compose(&user_sid, base_info->domain_sid, base_info->rid);
if (base_info->full_name.string == NULL) {
struct netr_SamInfo3 *cached_info3;
cached_info3 = netsamlogon_cache_get(p->mem_ctx,
&user_sid);
if (cached_info3 != NULL &&
cached_info3->base.full_name.string != NULL) {
base_info->full_name.string = talloc_strdup(
base_ctx,
cached_info3->base.full_name.string);
if (base_info->full_name.string == NULL) {
result = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto done;
}
} else {
/* this might fail so we don't check the return code */
wcache_query_user_fullname(domain,
base_ctx,
&user_sid,
&base_info->full_name.string);
}
}
result = map_validation_to_info3(talloc_tos(),
validation_level,
validation,
&info3);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
goto done;
}
wcache_invalidate_samlogon(find_domain_from_name(name_domain),
&user_sid);
netsamlogon_cache_store(name_user, info3);
/* save name_to_sid info as early as possible (only if
this is our primary domain so we don't invalidate
the cache entry by storing the seq_num for the wrong
domain). */
if ( domain->primary ) {
cache_name2sid(domain, name_domain, name_user,
SID_NAME_USER, &user_sid);
}
/* Check if the user is in the right group */
result = check_info3_in_group(info3,
r->in.require_membership_of_sid);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
char *s = NDR_PRINT_STRUCT_STRING(p->mem_ctx,
wbint_SidArray,
r->in.require_membership_of_sid);
DBG_NOTICE("User %s is not in the required groups:\n",
r->in.info->username);
DEBUGADD(DBGLVL_NOTICE, ("%s", s));
DEBUGADD(DBGLVL_NOTICE,
("Plaintext authentication is rejected\n"));
goto done;
}
if (!is_allowed_domain(info3->base.logon_domain.string)) {
DBG_NOTICE("Authentication failed for user [%s] "
"from firewalled domain [%s]\n",
info3->base.account_name.string,
info3->base.logon_domain.string);
result = NT_STATUS_AUTHENTICATION_FIREWALL_FAILED;
goto done;
}
r->out.validation = talloc_zero(p->mem_ctx,
struct wbint_Validation);
if (r->out.validation == NULL) {
result = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto done;
}
r->out.validation->level = validation_level;
r->out.validation->validation = talloc_steal(r->out.validation,
validation);
r->out.validation->krb5ccname = talloc_steal(r->out.validation,
krb5ccname);
if ((r->in.flags & WBFLAG_PAM_CACHED_LOGIN)
2010-09-09 06:01:11 +04:00
&& lp_winbind_offline_logon()) {
2010-09-09 06:01:11 +04:00
result = winbindd_store_creds(domain,
r->in.info->username,
r->in.info->password,
info3);
}
result = NT_STATUS_OK;
}
done:
/* give us a more useful (more correct?) error code */
if ((NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_DOMAIN_CONTROLLER_NOT_FOUND) ||
(NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL)))) {
result = NT_STATUS_NO_LOGON_SERVERS;
}
DBG_PREFIX(NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result) ? 5 : 2,
("Plain-text authentication for user %s returned %s"
" (PAM: %d)\n",
r->in.info->username,
nt_errstr(result),
nt_status_to_pam(result)));
/*
* Log the winbind pam authentication, the logon_id will tie this to
* any of the logons invoked from this request.
*/
log_authentication(
p->mem_ctx,
domain,
r->in.client_name,
client_pid,
validation_level,
validation,
start_time,
logon_id,
"PAM_AUTH",
name_user,
name_domain,
NULL,
data_blob_null,
data_blob_null,
remote,
local,
result);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
gpupdate_user_init(r->in.info->username);
}
return result;
}
NTSTATUS winbind_dual_SamLogon(struct winbindd_domain *domain,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
bool interactive,
uint32_t logon_parameters,
const char *name_user,
const char *name_domain,
const char *workstation,
const uint64_t logon_id,
const char* client_name,
const int client_pid,
DATA_BLOB chal_blob,
DATA_BLOB lm_response,
DATA_BLOB nt_response,
const struct tsocket_address *remote,
const struct tsocket_address *local,
uint8_t *authoritative,
bool skip_sam,
uint32_t *flags,
uint16_t *_validation_level,
union netr_Validation **_validation)
{
uint16_t validation_level = 0;
union netr_Validation *validation = NULL;
NTSTATUS result;
/*
* We check against domain->name instead of
* name_domain, as find_auth_domain() ->
* find_domain_from_name_noinit() already decided
* that we are in a child for the correct domain.
*
* name_domain can also be lp_realm()
* we need to check against domain->name.
*/
if (!skip_sam && strequal(domain->name, get_global_sam_name())) {
struct netr_SamInfo3 *info3 = NULL;
result = winbindd_dual_auth_passdb(
talloc_tos(),
logon_parameters,
name_domain, name_user,
logon_id,
client_name,
client_pid,
&chal_blob, &lm_response, &nt_response,
remote,
local,
interactive,
authoritative,
&info3);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
result = map_info3_to_validation(mem_ctx,
info3,
&validation_level,
&validation);
TALLOC_FREE(info3);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
goto done;
}
}
/*
* We need to try the remote NETLOGON server if this is
* not authoritative.
*/
if (*authoritative != 0) {
*flags = 0;
goto process_result;
}
}
result = winbind_samlogon_retry_loop(domain,
mem_ctx,
logon_parameters,
name_user,
NULL, /* password */
name_domain,
/* Bug #3248 - found by Stefan Burkei. */
workstation, /* We carefully set this above so use it... */
logon_id,
false, /* plaintext_given */
chal_blob,
lm_response,
nt_response,
interactive,
authoritative,
flags,
&validation_level,
&validation);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
goto done;
}
process_result:
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
struct dom_sid user_sid;
TALLOC_CTX *base_ctx = NULL;
struct netr_SamBaseInfo *base_info = NULL;
struct netr_SamInfo3 *info3 = NULL;
switch (validation_level) {
case 3:
base_ctx = validation->sam3;
base_info = &validation->sam3->base;
break;
case 6:
base_ctx = validation->sam6;
base_info = &validation->sam6->base;
break;
default:
result = NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto done;
}
sid_compose(&user_sid, base_info->domain_sid, base_info->rid);
if (base_info->full_name.string == NULL) {
struct netr_SamInfo3 *cached_info3;
cached_info3 = netsamlogon_cache_get(mem_ctx,
&user_sid);
if (cached_info3 != NULL &&
cached_info3->base.full_name.string != NULL)
{
base_info->full_name.string = talloc_strdup(
base_ctx,
cached_info3->base.full_name.string);
} else {
/* this might fail so we don't check the return code */
wcache_query_user_fullname(domain,
base_ctx,
&user_sid,
&base_info->full_name.string);
}
}
result = map_validation_to_info3(talloc_tos(),
validation_level,
validation,
&info3);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
goto done;
}
wcache_invalidate_samlogon(find_domain_from_name(name_domain),
&user_sid);
netsamlogon_cache_store(name_user, info3);
TALLOC_FREE(info3);
}
done:
/* give us a more useful (more correct?) error code */
if ((NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_DOMAIN_CONTROLLER_NOT_FOUND) ||
(NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL)))) {
result = NT_STATUS_NO_LOGON_SERVERS;
}
DEBUG(NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result) ? 5 : 2,
("NTLM CRAP authentication for user [%s]\\[%s] returned %s\n",
name_domain,
name_user,
nt_errstr(result)));
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
return result;
}
*_validation_level = validation_level;
*_validation = validation;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
NTSTATUS _wbint_PamAuthCrap(struct pipes_struct *p, struct wbint_PamAuthCrap *r)
{
struct winbindd_domain *domain = wb_child_domain();
NTSTATUS result;
uint64_t logon_id = 0;
uint8_t authoritative = 1;
uint32_t flags = 0;
s3:winbind: Fix uninitialized validation_level variable Found by oss-fuzz: ../../source3/winbindd/winbindd_pam.c:2879:7: error: variable 'validation_level' is used uninitialized whenever 'if' condition is true [-Werror,-Wsometimes-uninitialized] if (!(state->request->flags & WBFLAG_BIG_NTLMV2_BLOB) || ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ../../source3/winbindd/winbindd_pam.c:3003:6: note: uninitialized use occurs here validation_level, ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ../../source3/winbindd/winbindd_pam.c:2879:3: note: remove the 'if' if its condition is always false if (!(state->request->flags & WBFLAG_BIG_NTLMV2_BLOB) || ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ../../source3/winbindd/winbindd_pam.c:2879:7: error: variable 'validation_level' is used uninitialized whenever '||' condition is true [-Werror,-Wsometimes-uninitialized] if (!(state->request->flags & WBFLAG_BIG_NTLMV2_BLOB) || ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ../../source3/winbindd/winbindd_pam.c:3003:6: note: uninitialized use occurs here validation_level, ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ../../source3/winbindd/winbindd_pam.c:2879:7: note: remove the '||' if its condition is always false if (!(state->request->flags & WBFLAG_BIG_NTLMV2_BLOB) || ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ../../source3/winbindd/winbindd_pam.c:2853:27: note: initialize the variable 'validation_level' to silence this warning uint16_t validation_level; ^ = 0 1 warning and 2 errors generated. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15044 Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Apr 12 18:54:50 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
2022-04-12 12:48:28 +03:00
uint16_t validation_level = UINT16_MAX;
union netr_Validation *validation = NULL;
const struct timeval start_time = timeval_current();
const struct tsocket_address *remote = NULL;
const struct tsocket_address *local = NULL;
struct netr_SamInfo3 *info3 = NULL;
pid_t client_pid;
if (domain == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_REQUEST_NOT_ACCEPTED;
}
2003-03-24 12:54:13 +03:00
/* Cut client_pid to 32bit */
client_pid = r->in.client_pid;
if ((uint64_t)client_pid != r->in.client_pid) {
DBG_DEBUG("pid out of range\n");
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
logon_id = generate_random_u64();
remote = dcesrv_connection_get_remote_address(p->dce_call->conn);
local = dcesrv_connection_get_local_address(p->dce_call->conn);
DBG_NOTICE("[%"PRIu32"]: pam auth crap domain: %s user: %s\n",
client_pid, r->in.domain, r->in.user);
result = winbind_dual_SamLogon(domain,
p->mem_ctx,
false, /* interactive */
r->in.logon_parameters,
r->in.user,
r->in.domain,
r->in.workstation,
logon_id,
r->in.client_name,
client_pid,
r->in.chal,
r->in.lm_resp,
r->in.nt_resp,
remote,
local,
&authoritative,
false,
&flags,
&validation_level,
&validation);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
goto done;
}
result = map_validation_to_info3(p->mem_ctx,
validation_level,
validation,
&info3);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
goto done;
}
/* Check if the user is in the right group */
result = check_info3_in_group(info3, r->in.require_membership_of_sid);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
char *s = NDR_PRINT_STRUCT_STRING(p->mem_ctx,
wbint_SidArray,
r->in.require_membership_of_sid);
DBG_NOTICE("User %s is not in the required groups:\n",
r->in.user);
DEBUGADD(DBGLVL_NOTICE, ("%s", s));
DEBUGADD(DBGLVL_NOTICE,
("CRAP authentication is rejected\n"));
goto done;
}
if (!is_allowed_domain(info3->base.logon_domain.string)) {
DBG_NOTICE("Authentication failed for user [%s] "
"from firewalled domain [%s]\n",
info3->base.account_name.string,
info3->base.logon_domain.string);
result = NT_STATUS_AUTHENTICATION_FIREWALL_FAILED;
goto done;
}
r->out.validation = talloc_zero(p->mem_ctx,
struct wbint_PamAuthCrapValidation);
if (r->out.validation == NULL) {
result = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto done;
}
r->out.validation->level = validation_level;
r->out.validation->validation = talloc_move(r->out.validation,
&validation);
done:
if (r->in.flags & WBFLAG_PAM_NT_STATUS_SQUASH) {
result = nt_status_squash(result);
}
*r->out.authoritative = authoritative;
/*
* Log the winbind pam authentication, the logon_id will tie this to
* any of the logons invoked from this request.
*/
log_authentication(
p->mem_ctx,
domain,
r->in.client_name,
client_pid,
r->out.validation->level,
r->out.validation->validation,
start_time,
logon_id,
"NTLM_AUTH",
r->in.user,
r->in.domain,
r->in.workstation,
r->in.lm_resp,
r->in.nt_resp,
remote,
local,
result);
return result;
}
NTSTATUS _wbint_PamAuthChangePassword(struct pipes_struct *p,
struct wbint_PamAuthChangePassword *r)
{
struct winbindd_domain *contact_domain = wb_child_domain();
2009-03-19 00:49:41 +03:00
struct policy_handle dom_pol;
struct rpc_pipe_client *cli = NULL;
bool got_info = false;
struct samr_DomInfo1 *info = NULL;
struct userPwdChangeFailureInformation *reject = NULL;
NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
NTSTATUS result = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
char *namespace = NULL;
char *domain = NULL;
char *user = NULL;
struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = NULL;
bool ok;
pid_t client_pid;
ZERO_STRUCT(dom_pol);
if (contact_domain == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_REQUEST_NOT_ACCEPTED;
}
/* Cut client_pid to 32bit */
client_pid = r->in.client_pid;
if ((uint64_t)client_pid != r->in.client_pid) {
DBG_DEBUG("pid out of range\n");
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
DBG_NOTICE("[%"PRIu32"]: dual pam chauthtok %s\n",
client_pid, r->in.user);
ok = parse_domain_user(p->mem_ctx,
r->in.user,
&namespace,
&domain,
&user);
if (!ok) {
goto done;
}
if (!is_allowed_domain(domain)) {
DBG_NOTICE("Authentication failed for user [%s] "
"from firewalled domain [%s]\n",
user, domain);
result = NT_STATUS_AUTHENTICATION_FIREWALL_FAILED;
goto done;
}
/* Initialize reject reason */
*r->out.reject_reason = Undefined;
/* Get sam handle */
result = cm_connect_sam(contact_domain,
p->mem_ctx,
true,
&cli,
&dom_pol);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
DEBUG(1, ("could not get SAM handle on DC for %s\n", domain));
goto done;
}
b = cli->binding_handle;
status = dcerpc_samr_chgpasswd_user4(cli->binding_handle,
p->mem_ctx,
cli->srv_name_slash,
user,
r->in.old_password,
r->in.new_password,
&result);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status) && NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
/* Password successfully changed. */
goto done;
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_RPC_PROCNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE) ||
NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED) ||
NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED)) {
/* DO NOT FALLBACK TO RC4 */
if (lp_weak_crypto() == SAMBA_WEAK_CRYPTO_DISALLOWED) {
result = NT_STATUS_STRONG_CRYPTO_NOT_SUPPORTED;
goto process_result;
}
}
} else {
/* Password change was unsuccessful. */
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
goto done;
}
}
result = rpccli_samr_chgpasswd_user3(cli,
p->mem_ctx,
user,
r->in.new_password,
r->in.old_password,
&info,
&reject);
/* Windows 2003 returns NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_RESTRICTION */
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_RESTRICTION) ) {
*r->out.dominfo = talloc_steal(p->mem_ctx, info);
*r->out.reject_reason = reject->extendedFailureReason;
got_info = true;
}
/* atm the pidl generated rpccli_samr_ChangePasswordUser3 function will
* return with NT_STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL for w2k dcs as w2k just
* returns with 4byte error code (NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED) which is too
* short to comply with the samr_ChangePasswordUser3 idl - gd */
/* only fallback when the chgpasswd_user3 call is not supported */
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_RPC_PROCNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE) ||
NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED) ||
NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) ||
NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED)) {
DEBUG(10,("Password change with chgpasswd_user3 failed with: %s, retrying chgpasswd_user2\n",
nt_errstr(result)));
result = rpccli_samr_chgpasswd_user2(cli,
p->mem_ctx,
user,
r->in.new_password,
r->in.old_password);
/* Windows 2000 returns NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_RESTRICTION.
Map to the same status code as Windows 2003. */
if ( NT_STATUS_EQUAL(NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_RESTRICTION, result ) ) {
result = NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_RESTRICTION;
}
}
done:
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)
&& (r->in.flags & WBFLAG_PAM_CACHED_LOGIN)
&& lp_winbind_offline_logon()) {
result = winbindd_update_creds_by_name(contact_domain, user,
r->in.new_password);
/* Again, this happens when we login from gdm or xdm
* and the password expires, *BUT* cached credentials
* don't exist. winbindd_update_creds_by_name()
* returns NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER.
* This is not a failure.
* --- BoYang
* */
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
result = NT_STATUS_OK;
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
DEBUG(10, ("Failed to store creds: %s\n",
nt_errstr(result)));
goto process_result;
}
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result) && !got_info && contact_domain) {
NTSTATUS policy_ret;
policy_ret = get_password_policy(contact_domain,
p->mem_ctx,
&info);
/* failure of this is non critical, it will just provide no
* additional information to the client why the change has
* failed - Guenther */
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(policy_ret)) {
DEBUG(10,("Failed to get password policies: %s\n", nt_errstr(policy_ret)));
goto process_result;
}
*r->out.dominfo = talloc_steal(p->mem_ctx, info);
}
process_result:
if (strequal(contact_domain->name, get_global_sam_name())) {
/* FIXME: internal rpc pipe does not cache handles yet */
if (b) {
if (is_valid_policy_hnd(&dom_pol)) {
NTSTATUS _result;
dcerpc_samr_Close(b,
p->mem_ctx,
&dom_pol,
&_result);
}
TALLOC_FREE(cli);
}
}
DEBUG(NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result) ? 5 : 2,
("Password change for user [%s]\\[%s] returned %s (PAM: %d)\n",
domain,
user,
nt_errstr(result),
nt_status_to_pam(result)));
return result;
}
NTSTATUS _wbint_PamLogOff(struct pipes_struct *p, struct wbint_PamLogOff *r)
{
struct winbindd_domain *domain = wb_child_domain();
NTSTATUS result = NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED;
pid_t client_pid;
uid_t user_uid;
if (domain == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_REQUEST_NOT_ACCEPTED;
}
/* Cut client_pid to 32bit */
client_pid = r->in.client_pid;
if ((uint64_t)client_pid != r->in.client_pid) {
DBG_DEBUG("pid out of range\n");
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
/* Cut uid to 32bit */
user_uid = r->in.uid;
if ((uint64_t)user_uid != r->in.uid) {
DBG_DEBUG("uid out of range\n");
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
DBG_NOTICE("[%"PRIu32"]: pam dual logoff %s\n", client_pid, r->in.user);
if (!(r->in.flags & WBFLAG_PAM_KRB5)) {
result = NT_STATUS_OK;
goto process_result;
}
if ((r->in.krb5ccname == NULL) || (strlen(r->in.krb5ccname) == 0)) {
result = NT_STATUS_OK;
goto process_result;
}
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
if (user_uid == (uid_t)-1) {
DBG_DEBUG("Invalid uid for user '%s'\n", r->in.user);
goto process_result;
}
/* what we need here is to find the corresponding krb5 ccache name *we*
* created for a given username and destroy it */
if (!ccache_entry_exists(r->in.user)) {
result = NT_STATUS_OK;
DBG_DEBUG("No entry found for user '%s'.\n", r->in.user);
goto process_result;
}
if (!ccache_entry_identical(r->in.user, user_uid, r->in.krb5ccname)) {
DBG_DEBUG("Cached entry differs for user '%s'\n", r->in.user);
goto process_result;
}
result = remove_ccache(r->in.user);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
DBG_DEBUG("Failed to remove ccache for user '%s': %s\n",
r->in.user, nt_errstr(result));
goto process_result;
}
/*
* Remove any mlock'ed memory creds in the child
* we might be using for krb5 ticket renewal.
*/
winbindd_delete_memory_creds(r->in.user);
#else
result = NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED;
#endif
process_result:
return result;
}
/* Change user password with auth crap*/
NTSTATUS _wbint_PamAuthCrapChangePassword(struct pipes_struct *p,
struct wbint_PamAuthCrapChangePassword *r)
{
NTSTATUS result;
char *namespace = NULL;
char *domain = NULL;
char *user = NULL;
2009-03-19 00:49:41 +03:00
struct policy_handle dom_pol;
struct winbindd_domain *contact_domain = wb_child_domain();
struct rpc_pipe_client *cli = NULL;
struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = NULL;
TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
pid_t client_pid;
ZERO_STRUCT(dom_pol);
if (contact_domain == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_REQUEST_NOT_ACCEPTED;
}
/* Cut client_pid to 32bit */
client_pid = r->in.client_pid;
if ((uint64_t)client_pid != r->in.client_pid) {
DBG_DEBUG("pid out of range\n");
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
DBG_NOTICE("[%"PRIu32"]: pam change pswd auth crap domain: %s "
"user: %s\n", client_pid, r->in.domain, r->in.user);
if (lp_winbind_offline_logon()) {
DEBUG(0,("Refusing password change as winbind offline logons are enabled. "));
DEBUGADD(0,("Changing passwords here would risk inconsistent logons\n"));
result = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
goto done;
}
if (r->in.domain != NULL && strlen(r->in.domain) > 0) {
user = talloc_strdup(frame, "");
namespace = talloc_strdup(frame, "");
domain = talloc_strdup(frame, r->in.domain);
if (domain == NULL || user == NULL || namespace == NULL) {
result = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto done;
}
} else {
bool ok;
ok = parse_domain_user(frame,
r->in.user,
&namespace,
&domain,
&user);
if (!ok) {
result = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
goto done;
}
if (strlen(domain) == 0) {
DBG_NOTICE("no domain specified with username (%s) - "
"failing auth\n", r->in.user);
result = NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
goto done;
}
}
if (!*domain && lp_winbind_use_default_domain()) {
TALLOC_FREE(domain);
domain = talloc_strdup(frame, lp_workgroup());
if (domain == NULL) {
result = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto done;
}
}
if (!is_allowed_domain(domain)) {
DBG_NOTICE("Authentication failed for user [%s] "
"from firewalled domain [%s]\n",
r->in.user,
domain);
result = NT_STATUS_AUTHENTICATION_FIREWALL_FAILED;
goto done;
}
if(!*user) {
TALLOC_FREE(user);
user = talloc_strdup(frame, r->in.user);
if (user == NULL) {
result = NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
goto done;
}
}
/* Get sam handle */
result = cm_connect_sam(contact_domain,
p->mem_ctx,
true,
&cli,
&dom_pol);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
DEBUG(1, ("could not get SAM handle on DC for %s\n", domain));
goto done;
}
b = cli->binding_handle;
result = rpccli_samr_chng_pswd_auth_crap(cli,
p->mem_ctx,
user,
r->in.new_nt_pswd,
r->in.old_nt_hash_enc,
r->in.new_lm_pswd,
r->in.old_lm_hash_enc);
done:
if (strequal(contact_domain->name, get_global_sam_name())) {
/* FIXME: internal rpc pipe does not cache handles yet */
if (b) {
if (is_valid_policy_hnd(&dom_pol)) {
NTSTATUS _result;
dcerpc_samr_Close(b,
p->mem_ctx,
&dom_pol,
&_result);
}
TALLOC_FREE(cli);
}
}
DEBUG(NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result) ? 5 : 2,
("Password change for user [%s]\\[%s] returned %s (PAM: %d)\n",
domain, user,
nt_errstr(result),
nt_status_to_pam(result)));
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return result;
}
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
static NTSTATUS extract_pac_vrfy_sigs(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB pac_blob,
struct PAC_DATA **p_pac_data)
{
krb5_context krbctx = NULL;
krb5_error_code k5ret;
krb5_keytab keytab;
krb5_kt_cursor cursor;
krb5_keytab_entry entry;
NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
ZERO_STRUCT(entry);
ZERO_STRUCT(cursor);
k5ret = smb_krb5_init_context_common(&krbctx);
if (k5ret) {
DBG_ERR("kerberos init context failed (%s)\n",
error_message(k5ret));
status = krb5_to_nt_status(k5ret);
goto out;
}
k5ret = gse_krb5_get_server_keytab(krbctx, &keytab);
if (k5ret) {
DEBUG(1, ("Failed to get keytab: %s\n",
error_message(k5ret)));
status = krb5_to_nt_status(k5ret);
goto out_free;
}
k5ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(krbctx, keytab, &cursor);
if (k5ret) {
DEBUG(1, ("Failed to start seq: %s\n",
error_message(k5ret)));
status = krb5_to_nt_status(k5ret);
goto out_keytab;
}
k5ret = krb5_kt_next_entry(krbctx, keytab, &entry, &cursor);
while (k5ret == 0) {
status = kerberos_decode_pac(mem_ctx,
pac_blob,
krbctx,
NULL, /* krbtgt_keyblock */
KRB5_KT_KEY(&entry), /* service_keyblock */
NULL, /* client_principal */
0, /* tgs_authtime */
p_pac_data);
s3: winbindd: winbindd_pam: fix leak in extract_pac_vrfy_sigs Add missing free for entry variable and its members : key and principal Found definite memory leaks via valgrind as shown below. Leak 1 : ==1686== 76,800 bytes in 2,400 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 432 of 433 ==1686== at 0x4C38185: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:431) ==1686== by 0x79CBFED: krb5int_c_copy_keyblock_contents (keyblocks.c:101) ==1686== by 0x621CFA3: krb5_mkt_get_next (kt_memory.c:500) ==1686== by 0x141186: extract_pac_vrfy_sigs (winbindd_pam.c:3384) ==1686== by 0x141186: winbindd_pam_auth_pac_verify (winbindd_pam.c:3434) ==1686== by 0x17ED21: winbindd_pam_auth_crap_send (winbindd_pam_auth_crap.c:68) ==1686== by 0x127F45: process_request_send (winbindd.c:502) ==1686== by 0x127F45: winbind_client_request_read (winbindd.c:749) ==1686== by 0x124AAF: wb_req_read_done (wb_reqtrans.c:126) ==1686== by 0x66D4706: tevent_common_invoke_fd_handler (tevent_fd.c:142) ==1686== by 0x66DAF4E: epoll_event_loop (tevent_epoll.c:737) ==1686== by 0x66DAF4E: epoll_event_loop_once (tevent_epoll.c:938) ==1686== by 0x66D8F5A: std_event_loop_once (tevent_standard.c:110) ==1686== by 0x66D39B4: _tevent_loop_once (tevent.c:823) ==1686== by 0x1232F3: main (winbindd.c:1718) Leak 2 : ==1686== at 0x4C38185: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:431) ==1686== by 0x62255E4: krb5_copy_principal (copy_princ.c:38) ==1686== by 0x621D003: krb5_mkt_get_next (kt_memory.c:503) ==1686== by 0x141186: extract_pac_vrfy_sigs (winbindd_pam.c:3384) ==1686== by 0x141186: winbindd_pam_auth_pac_verify (winbindd_pam.c:3434) ==1686== by 0x17ED21: winbindd_pam_auth_crap_send (winbindd_pam_auth_crap.c:68) ==1686== by 0x127F45: process_request_send (winbindd.c:502) ==1686== by 0x127F45: winbind_client_request_read (winbindd.c:749) ==1686== by 0x124AAF: wb_req_read_done (wb_reqtrans.c:126) ==1686== by 0x66D4706: tevent_common_invoke_fd_handler (tevent_fd.c:142) ==1686== by 0x66DAF4E: epoll_event_loop (tevent_epoll.c:737) ==1686== by 0x66DAF4E: epoll_event_loop_once (tevent_epoll.c:938) ==1686== by 0x66D8F5A: std_event_loop_once (tevent_standard.c:110) ==1686== by 0x66D39B4: _tevent_loop_once (tevent.c:823) ==1686== by 0x1232F3: main (winbindd.c:1718) Signed-off-by: Shaleen Bathla <shaleen.bathla@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org> Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org> Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Apr 16 10:22:51 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
2024-04-10 16:01:39 +03:00
(void)smb_krb5_kt_free_entry(krbctx, &entry);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
break;
}
k5ret = krb5_kt_next_entry(krbctx, keytab, &entry, &cursor);
}
s3: winbindd: winbindd_pam: fix leak in extract_pac_vrfy_sigs Add missing free for entry variable and its members : key and principal Found definite memory leaks via valgrind as shown below. Leak 1 : ==1686== 76,800 bytes in 2,400 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 432 of 433 ==1686== at 0x4C38185: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:431) ==1686== by 0x79CBFED: krb5int_c_copy_keyblock_contents (keyblocks.c:101) ==1686== by 0x621CFA3: krb5_mkt_get_next (kt_memory.c:500) ==1686== by 0x141186: extract_pac_vrfy_sigs (winbindd_pam.c:3384) ==1686== by 0x141186: winbindd_pam_auth_pac_verify (winbindd_pam.c:3434) ==1686== by 0x17ED21: winbindd_pam_auth_crap_send (winbindd_pam_auth_crap.c:68) ==1686== by 0x127F45: process_request_send (winbindd.c:502) ==1686== by 0x127F45: winbind_client_request_read (winbindd.c:749) ==1686== by 0x124AAF: wb_req_read_done (wb_reqtrans.c:126) ==1686== by 0x66D4706: tevent_common_invoke_fd_handler (tevent_fd.c:142) ==1686== by 0x66DAF4E: epoll_event_loop (tevent_epoll.c:737) ==1686== by 0x66DAF4E: epoll_event_loop_once (tevent_epoll.c:938) ==1686== by 0x66D8F5A: std_event_loop_once (tevent_standard.c:110) ==1686== by 0x66D39B4: _tevent_loop_once (tevent.c:823) ==1686== by 0x1232F3: main (winbindd.c:1718) Leak 2 : ==1686== at 0x4C38185: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:431) ==1686== by 0x62255E4: krb5_copy_principal (copy_princ.c:38) ==1686== by 0x621D003: krb5_mkt_get_next (kt_memory.c:503) ==1686== by 0x141186: extract_pac_vrfy_sigs (winbindd_pam.c:3384) ==1686== by 0x141186: winbindd_pam_auth_pac_verify (winbindd_pam.c:3434) ==1686== by 0x17ED21: winbindd_pam_auth_crap_send (winbindd_pam_auth_crap.c:68) ==1686== by 0x127F45: process_request_send (winbindd.c:502) ==1686== by 0x127F45: winbind_client_request_read (winbindd.c:749) ==1686== by 0x124AAF: wb_req_read_done (wb_reqtrans.c:126) ==1686== by 0x66D4706: tevent_common_invoke_fd_handler (tevent_fd.c:142) ==1686== by 0x66DAF4E: epoll_event_loop (tevent_epoll.c:737) ==1686== by 0x66DAF4E: epoll_event_loop_once (tevent_epoll.c:938) ==1686== by 0x66D8F5A: std_event_loop_once (tevent_standard.c:110) ==1686== by 0x66D39B4: _tevent_loop_once (tevent.c:823) ==1686== by 0x1232F3: main (winbindd.c:1718) Signed-off-by: Shaleen Bathla <shaleen.bathla@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org> Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org> Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Apr 16 10:22:51 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
2024-04-10 16:01:39 +03:00
if (k5ret != 0 && k5ret != KRB5_KT_END) {
DEBUG(1, ("Failed to get next entry: %s\n",
error_message(k5ret)));
(void)smb_krb5_kt_free_entry(krbctx, &entry);
}
k5ret = krb5_kt_end_seq_get(krbctx, keytab, &cursor);
if (k5ret) {
DEBUG(1, ("Failed to end seq: %s\n",
error_message(k5ret)));
}
out_keytab:
k5ret = krb5_kt_close(krbctx, keytab);
if (k5ret) {
DEBUG(1, ("Failed to close keytab: %s\n",
error_message(k5ret)));
}
out_free:
krb5_free_context(krbctx);
out:
return status;
}
NTSTATUS winbindd_pam_auth_pac_verify(struct winbindd_cli_state *state,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
bool *p_is_trusted,
uint16_t *p_validation_level,
union netr_Validation **p_validation)
{
struct winbindd_request *req = state->request;
DATA_BLOB pac_blob;
struct PAC_DATA *pac_data = NULL;
struct PAC_LOGON_INFO *logon_info = NULL;
struct PAC_UPN_DNS_INFO *upn_dns_info = NULL;
struct netr_SamInfo6 *info6 = NULL;
uint16_t validation_level = 0;
union netr_Validation *validation = NULL;
struct netr_SamInfo3 *info3_copy = NULL;
NTSTATUS result;
bool is_trusted = false;
uint32_t i;
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = NULL;
tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
*p_is_trusted = false;
*p_validation_level = 0;
*p_validation = NULL;
pac_blob = data_blob_const(req->extra_data.data, req->extra_len);
result = extract_pac_vrfy_sigs(tmp_ctx, pac_blob, &pac_data);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
is_trusted = true;
}
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(result, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED)) {
/* Try without signature verification */
result = kerberos_decode_pac(tmp_ctx,
pac_blob,
NULL, /* krb5_context */
NULL, /* krbtgt_keyblock */
NULL, /* service_keyblock */
NULL, /* client_principal */
0, /* tgs_authtime */
&pac_data);
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
DEBUG(1, ("Error during PAC signature verification: %s\n",
nt_errstr(result)));
goto out;
}
for (i=0; i < pac_data->num_buffers; i++) {
if (pac_data->buffers[i].type == PAC_TYPE_LOGON_INFO) {
logon_info = pac_data->buffers[i].info->logon_info.info;
continue;
}
if (pac_data->buffers[i].type == PAC_TYPE_UPN_DNS_INFO) {
upn_dns_info = &pac_data->buffers[i].info->upn_dns_info;
continue;
}
}
result = create_info6_from_pac(tmp_ctx,
logon_info,
upn_dns_info,
&info6);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
goto out;
}
if (!is_allowed_domain(info6->base.logon_domain.string)) {
DBG_NOTICE("Authentication failed for user [%s] "
"from firewalled domain [%s]\n",
info6->base.account_name.string,
info6->base.logon_domain.string);
result = NT_STATUS_AUTHENTICATION_FIREWALL_FAILED;
goto out;
}
result = map_info6_to_validation(tmp_ctx,
info6,
&validation_level,
&validation);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
goto out;
}
result = map_validation_to_info3(tmp_ctx,
validation_level,
validation,
&info3_copy);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
goto out;
}
if (is_trusted) {
/*
* Signature verification succeeded, we can
* trust the PAC and prime the netsamlogon
* and name2sid caches. DO NOT DO THIS
* in the signature verification failed
* code path.
*/
struct winbindd_domain *domain = NULL;
netsamlogon_cache_store(NULL, info3_copy);
/*
* We're in the parent here, so find the child
* pointer from the PAC domain name.
*/
domain = find_lookup_domain_from_name(
info3_copy->base.logon_domain.string);
if (domain && domain->primary ) {
struct dom_sid user_sid;
struct dom_sid_buf buf;
sid_compose(&user_sid,
info3_copy->base.domain_sid,
info3_copy->base.rid);
cache_name2sid_trusted(domain,
info3_copy->base.logon_domain.string,
info3_copy->base.account_name.string,
SID_NAME_USER,
&user_sid);
DBG_INFO("PAC for user %s\\%s SID %s primed cache\n",
info3_copy->base.logon_domain.string,
info3_copy->base.account_name.string,
dom_sid_str_buf(&user_sid, &buf));
}
}
*p_is_trusted = is_trusted;
*p_validation_level = validation_level;
*p_validation = talloc_move(mem_ctx, &validation);
result = NT_STATUS_OK;
out:
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return result;
}
#else /* HAVE_KRB5 */
NTSTATUS winbindd_pam_auth_pac_verify(struct winbindd_cli_state *state,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
bool *p_is_trusted,
uint16_t *p_validation_level,
union netr_Validation **p_validation);
{
*p_is_trusted = false;
*p_validation_level = 0;
*p_validation = NULL;
return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
}
#endif /* HAVE_KRB5 */