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/*
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* Unix SMB / CIFS implementation .
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* RPC Pipe client / server routines
* Copyright ( C ) Andrew Tridgell 1992 - 1997 ,
* Copyright ( C ) Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton 1996 - 1997 ,
* Copyright ( C ) Paul Ashton 1997.
* Copyright ( C ) Jeremy Allison 1998 - 2001.
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* Copyright ( C ) Andrew Bartlett 2001.
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*
* This program is free software ; you can redistribute it and / or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation ; either version 2 of the License , or
* ( at your option ) any later version .
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful ,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY ; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE . See the
* GNU General Public License for more details .
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program ; if not , write to the Free Software
* Foundation , Inc . , 675 Mass Ave , Cambridge , MA 0213 9 , USA .
*/
/* This is the implementation of the netlogon pipe. */
# include "includes.h"
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extern userdom_struct current_user_info ;
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# undef DBGC_CLASS
# define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_RPC_SRV
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/*************************************************************************
init_net_r_req_chal :
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
static void init_net_r_req_chal ( NET_R_REQ_CHAL * r_c ,
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DOM_CHAL * srv_chal , NTSTATUS status )
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{
DEBUG ( 6 , ( " init_net_r_req_chal: %d \n " , __LINE__ ) ) ;
memcpy ( r_c - > srv_chal . data , srv_chal - > data , sizeof ( srv_chal - > data ) ) ;
r_c - > status = status ;
}
/*************************************************************************
error messages cropping up when using nltest . exe . . .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
# define ERROR_NO_SUCH_DOMAIN 0x54b
# define ERROR_NO_LOGON_SERVERS 0x51f
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# define NO_ERROR 0x0
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/*************************************************************************
net_reply_logon_ctrl :
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
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NTSTATUS _net_logon_ctrl ( pipes_struct * p , NET_Q_LOGON_CTRL * q_u ,
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NET_R_LOGON_CTRL * r_u )
{
uint32 flags = 0x0 ;
uint32 pdc_connection_status = 0x00 ; /* Maybe a win32 error code? */
/* Setup the Logon Control response */
init_net_r_logon_ctrl ( r_u , q_u - > query_level , flags ,
pdc_connection_status ) ;
return r_u - > status ;
}
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/****************************************************************************
Send a message to smbd to do a sam synchronisation
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
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static void send_sync_message ( void )
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{
TDB_CONTEXT * tdb ;
tdb = tdb_open_log ( lock_path ( " connections.tdb " ) , 0 ,
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TDB_DEFAULT , O_RDONLY , 0 ) ;
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if ( ! tdb ) {
DEBUG ( 3 , ( " send_sync_message(): failed to open connections "
" database \n " ) ) ;
return ;
}
DEBUG ( 3 , ( " sending sam synchronisation message \n " ) ) ;
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message_send_all ( tdb , MSG_SMB_SAM_SYNC , NULL , 0 , False , NULL ) ;
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tdb_close ( tdb ) ;
}
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/*************************************************************************
net_reply_logon_ctrl2 :
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
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NTSTATUS _net_logon_ctrl2 ( pipes_struct * p , NET_Q_LOGON_CTRL2 * q_u , NET_R_LOGON_CTRL2 * r_u )
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{
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uint32 flags = 0x0 ;
uint32 pdc_connection_status = 0x0 ;
uint32 logon_attempts = 0x0 ;
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uint32 tc_status ;
fstring servername , domain , dc_name , dc_name2 ;
struct in_addr dc_ip ;
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/* this should be \\global_myname() */
unistr2_to_ascii ( servername , & q_u - > uni_server_name , sizeof ( servername ) ) ;
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r_u - > status = NT_STATUS_OK ;
tc_status = ERROR_NO_SUCH_DOMAIN ;
fstrcpy ( dc_name , " " ) ;
switch ( q_u - > function_code ) {
case NETLOGON_CONTROL_TC_QUERY :
unistr2_to_ascii ( domain , & q_u - > info . info6 . domain , sizeof ( domain ) ) ;
if ( ! is_trusted_domain ( domain ) )
break ;
if ( ! get_dc_name ( domain , NULL , dc_name2 , & dc_ip ) ) {
tc_status = ERROR_NO_LOGON_SERVERS ;
break ;
}
fstr_sprintf ( dc_name , " \\ \\ %s " , dc_name2 ) ;
tc_status = NO_ERROR ;
break ;
case NETLOGON_CONTROL_REDISCOVER :
unistr2_to_ascii ( domain , & q_u - > info . info6 . domain , sizeof ( domain ) ) ;
if ( ! is_trusted_domain ( domain ) )
break ;
if ( ! get_dc_name ( domain , NULL , dc_name2 , & dc_ip ) ) {
tc_status = ERROR_NO_LOGON_SERVERS ;
break ;
}
fstr_sprintf ( dc_name , " \\ \\ %s " , dc_name2 ) ;
tc_status = NO_ERROR ;
break ;
default :
/* no idea what this should be */
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " _net_logon_ctrl2: unimplemented function level [%d] \n " ,
q_u - > function_code ) ) ;
}
/* prepare the response */
init_net_r_logon_ctrl2 ( r_u , q_u - > query_level , flags ,
pdc_connection_status , logon_attempts , tc_status , dc_name ) ;
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if ( lp_server_role ( ) = = ROLE_DOMAIN_BDC )
send_sync_message ( ) ;
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return r_u - > status ;
}
/*************************************************************************
net_reply_trust_dom_list :
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
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NTSTATUS _net_trust_dom_list ( pipes_struct * p , NET_Q_TRUST_DOM_LIST * q_u , NET_R_TRUST_DOM_LIST * r_u )
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{
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const char * trusted_domain = " test_domain " ;
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uint32 num_trust_domains = 1 ;
DEBUG ( 6 , ( " _net_trust_dom_list: %d \n " , __LINE__ ) ) ;
/* set up the Trusted Domain List response */
init_r_trust_dom ( r_u , num_trust_domains , trusted_domain ) ;
DEBUG ( 6 , ( " _net_trust_dom_list: %d \n " , __LINE__ ) ) ;
return r_u - > status ;
}
/***********************************************************************************
init_net_r_srv_pwset :
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
static void init_net_r_srv_pwset ( NET_R_SRV_PWSET * r_s ,
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DOM_CRED * srv_cred , NTSTATUS status )
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{
DEBUG ( 5 , ( " init_net_r_srv_pwset: %d \n " , __LINE__ ) ) ;
memcpy ( & r_s - > srv_cred , srv_cred , sizeof ( r_s - > srv_cred ) ) ;
r_s - > status = status ;
DEBUG ( 5 , ( " init_net_r_srv_pwset: %d \n " , __LINE__ ) ) ;
}
/******************************************************************
gets a machine password entry . checks access rights of the host .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
static BOOL get_md4pw ( char * md4pw , char * mach_acct )
{
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SAM_ACCOUNT * sampass = NULL ;
This commit is number 4 of 4.
In particular this commit focuses on:
Actually adding the 'const' to the passdb interface, and the flow-on changes.
Also kill off the 'disp_info' stuff, as its no longer used.
While these changes have been mildly tested, and are pretty small, any
assistance in this is appreciated.
----
These changes introduces a large dose of 'const' to the Samba tree.
There are a number of good reasons to do this:
- I want to allow the SAM_ACCOUNT structure to move from wasteful
pstrings and fstrings to allocated strings. We can't do that if
people are modifying these outputs, as they may well make
assumptions about getting pstrings and fstrings
- I want --with-pam_smbpass to compile with a slightly sane
volume of warnings, currently its pretty bad, even in 2.2
where is compiles at all.
- Tridge assures me that he no longer opposes 'const religion'
based on the ability to #define const the problem away.
- Changed Get_Pwnam(x,y) into two variants (so that the const
parameter can work correctly): - Get_Pwnam(const x) and
Get_Pwnam_Modify(x).
- Reworked smbd/chgpasswd.c to work with these mods, passing
around a 'struct passwd' rather than the modified username
---
This finishes this line of commits off, your tree should now compile again :-)
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit c95f5aeb9327347674589ae313b75bee3bf8e317)
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const uint8 * pass ;
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BOOL ret ;
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uint32 acct_ctrl ;
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#if 0
/*
* Currently this code is redundent as we already have a filter
* by hostname list . What this code really needs to do is to
* get a hosts allowed / hosts denied list from the SAM database
* on a per user basis , and make the access decision there .
* I will leave this code here for now as a reminder to implement
* this at a later date . JRA .
*/
if ( ! allow_access ( lp_domain_hostsdeny ( ) , lp_domain_hostsallow ( ) ,
client_name ( ) , client_addr ( ) ) )
{
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " get_md4pw: Workstation %s denied access to domain \n " , mach_acct ) ) ;
return False ;
}
# endif /* 0 */
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if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( pdb_init_sam ( & sampass ) ) )
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return False ;
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/* JRA. This is ok as it is only used for generating the challenge. */
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become_root ( ) ;
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ret = pdb_getsampwnam ( sampass , mach_acct ) ;
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unbecome_root ( ) ;
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if ( ret = = False ) {
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " get_md4pw: Workstation %s: no account in domain \n " , mach_acct ) ) ;
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pdb_free_sam ( & sampass ) ;
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return False ;
}
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acct_ctrl = pdb_get_acct_ctrl ( sampass ) ;
if ( ! ( acct_ctrl & ACB_DISABLED ) & &
( ( acct_ctrl & ACB_DOMTRUST ) | |
( acct_ctrl & ACB_WSTRUST ) | |
( acct_ctrl & ACB_SVRTRUST ) ) & &
( ( pass = pdb_get_nt_passwd ( sampass ) ) ! = NULL ) ) {
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memcpy ( md4pw , pass , 16 ) ;
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dump_data ( 5 , md4pw , 16 ) ;
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pdb_free_sam ( & sampass ) ;
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return True ;
}
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DEBUG ( 0 , ( " get_md4pw: Workstation %s: no account in domain \n " , mach_acct ) ) ;
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pdb_free_sam ( & sampass ) ;
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return False ;
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}
/*************************************************************************
_net_req_chal
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
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NTSTATUS _net_req_chal ( pipes_struct * p , NET_Q_REQ_CHAL * q_u , NET_R_REQ_CHAL * r_u )
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{
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if ( ! p - > dc ) {
p - > dc = TALLOC_ZERO_P ( p - > pipe_state_mem_ctx , struct dcinfo ) ;
if ( ! p - > dc ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
} else {
DEBUG ( 10 , ( " _net_req_chal: new challenge requested. Clearing old state. \n " ) ) ;
ZERO_STRUCTP ( p - > dc ) ;
}
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rpcstr_pull ( p - > dc - > remote_machine ,
q_u - > uni_logon_clnt . buffer ,
sizeof ( fstring ) , q_u - > uni_logon_clnt . uni_str_len * 2 , 0 ) ;
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/* Save the client challenge to the server. */
memcpy ( p - > dc - > clnt_chal . data , q_u - > clnt_chal . data , sizeof ( q_u - > clnt_chal . data ) ) ;
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/* Create a server challenge for the client */
/* Set this to a random value. */
generate_random_buffer ( p - > dc - > srv_chal . data , 8 ) ;
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/* set up the LSA REQUEST CHALLENGE response */
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init_net_r_req_chal ( r_u , & p - > dc - > srv_chal , NT_STATUS_OK ) ;
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p - > dc - > challenge_sent = True ;
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
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}
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/*************************************************************************
init_net_r_auth :
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
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static void init_net_r_auth ( NET_R_AUTH * r_a , DOM_CHAL * resp_cred , NTSTATUS status )
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{
memcpy ( r_a - > srv_chal . data , resp_cred - > data , sizeof ( resp_cred - > data ) ) ;
r_a - > status = status ;
}
/*************************************************************************
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_net_auth . Create the initial credentials .
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
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NTSTATUS _net_auth ( pipes_struct * p , NET_Q_AUTH * q_u , NET_R_AUTH * r_u )
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{
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fstring mach_acct ;
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fstring remote_machine ;
DOM_CHAL srv_chal_out ;
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if ( ! p - > dc | | ! p - > dc - > challenge_sent ) {
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
}
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rpcstr_pull ( mach_acct , q_u - > clnt_id . uni_acct_name . buffer , sizeof ( fstring ) ,
q_u - > clnt_id . uni_acct_name . uni_str_len * 2 , 0 ) ;
rpcstr_pull ( remote_machine , q_u - > clnt_id . uni_comp_name . buffer , sizeof ( fstring ) ,
q_u - > clnt_id . uni_comp_name . uni_str_len * 2 , 0 ) ;
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if ( ! get_md4pw ( ( char * ) p - > dc - > mach_pw , mach_acct ) ) {
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " _net_auth: creds_server_check failed. Failed to "
" get pasword for machine account %s "
" from client %s \n " ,
mach_acct , remote_machine ) ) ;
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
}
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/* From the client / server challenges and md4 password, generate sess key */
creds_server_init ( p - > dc ,
& p - > dc - > clnt_chal , /* Stored client chal. */
& p - > dc - > srv_chal , /* Stored server chal. */
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( const char * ) p - > dc - > mach_pw ,
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& srv_chal_out ) ;
/* Check client credentials are valid. */
if ( ! creds_server_check ( p - > dc , & q_u - > clnt_chal ) ) {
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " _net_auth: creds_server_check failed. Rejecting auth "
" request from client %s machine account %s \n " ,
remote_machine , mach_acct ) ) ;
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
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}
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fstrcpy ( p - > dc - > mach_acct , mach_acct ) ;
fstrcpy ( p - > dc - > remote_machine , remote_machine ) ;
p - > dc - > authenticated = True ;
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/* set up the LSA AUTH response */
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/* Return the server credentials. */
init_net_r_auth ( r_u , & srv_chal_out , NT_STATUS_OK ) ;
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return r_u - > status ;
}
/*************************************************************************
init_net_r_auth_2 :
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
static void init_net_r_auth_2 ( NET_R_AUTH_2 * r_a ,
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DOM_CHAL * resp_cred , NEG_FLAGS * flgs , NTSTATUS status )
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{
memcpy ( r_a - > srv_chal . data , resp_cred - > data , sizeof ( resp_cred - > data ) ) ;
memcpy ( & r_a - > srv_flgs , flgs , sizeof ( r_a - > srv_flgs ) ) ;
r_a - > status = status ;
}
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/*************************************************************************
_net_auth_2
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
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NTSTATUS _net_auth_2 ( pipes_struct * p , NET_Q_AUTH_2 * q_u , NET_R_AUTH_2 * r_u )
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{
NEG_FLAGS srv_flgs ;
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fstring mach_acct ;
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fstring remote_machine ;
DOM_CHAL srv_chal_out ;
rpcstr_pull ( mach_acct , q_u - > clnt_id . uni_acct_name . buffer , sizeof ( fstring ) ,
q_u - > clnt_id . uni_acct_name . uni_str_len * 2 , 0 ) ;
rpcstr_pull ( remote_machine , q_u - > clnt_id . uni_comp_name . buffer , sizeof ( fstring ) ,
q_u - > clnt_id . uni_comp_name . uni_str_len * 2 , 0 ) ;
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if ( ! p - > dc | | ! p - > dc - > challenge_sent ) {
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " _net_auth2: no challenge sent to client %s \n " ,
remote_machine ) ) ;
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
}
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if ( ( lp_server_schannel ( ) = = True ) & &
( ( q_u - > clnt_flgs . neg_flags & NETLOGON_NEG_SCHANNEL ) = = 0 ) ) {
/* schannel must be used, but client did not offer it. */
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DEBUG ( 0 , ( " _net_auth2: schannel required but client failed "
" to offer it. Client was %s \n " ,
mach_acct ) ) ;
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
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}
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if ( ! get_md4pw ( ( char * ) p - > dc - > mach_pw , mach_acct ) ) {
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " _net_auth2: failed to get machine password for "
" account %s \n " ,
mach_acct ) ) ;
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
}
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/* From the client / server challenges and md4 password, generate sess key */
creds_server_init ( p - > dc ,
& p - > dc - > clnt_chal , /* Stored client chal. */
& p - > dc - > srv_chal , /* Stored server chal. */
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( const char * ) p - > dc - > mach_pw ,
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& srv_chal_out ) ;
/* Check client credentials are valid. */
if ( ! creds_server_check ( p - > dc , & q_u - > clnt_chal ) ) {
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " _net_auth2: creds_server_check failed. Rejecting auth "
" request from client %s machine account %s \n " ,
remote_machine , mach_acct ) ) ;
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
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}
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2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
srv_flgs . neg_flags = 0x000001ff ;
2003-04-06 11:04:09 +04:00
if ( lp_server_schannel ( ) ! = False ) {
srv_flgs . neg_flags | = NETLOGON_NEG_SCHANNEL ;
}
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
/* set up the LSA AUTH 2 response */
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
init_net_r_auth_2 ( r_u , & srv_chal_out , & srv_flgs , NT_STATUS_OK ) ;
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
2005-10-05 05:47:52 +04:00
fstrcpy ( p - > dc - > mach_acct , mach_acct ) ;
fstrcpy ( p - > dc - > remote_machine , remote_machine ) ;
2005-10-07 05:46:19 +04:00
fstrcpy ( p - > dc - > domain , lp_workgroup ( ) ) ;
2005-10-05 05:47:52 +04:00
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
p - > dc - > authenticated = True ;
2005-10-07 05:46:19 +04:00
/* Store off the state so we can continue after client disconnect. */
become_root ( ) ;
secrets_store_schannel_session_info ( p - > mem_ctx , p - > dc ) ;
unbecome_root ( ) ;
2003-04-06 11:04:09 +04:00
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
return r_u - > status ;
}
/*************************************************************************
_net_srv_pwset
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
2001-08-27 23:46:22 +04:00
NTSTATUS _net_srv_pwset ( pipes_struct * p , NET_Q_SRV_PWSET * q_u , NET_R_SRV_PWSET * r_u )
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
{
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
fstring workstation ;
2001-05-04 19:44:27 +04:00
SAM_ACCOUNT * sampass = NULL ;
2001-03-11 03:32:10 +03:00
BOOL ret = False ;
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
unsigned char pwd [ 16 ] ;
int i ;
2002-03-03 06:56:53 +03:00
uint32 acct_ctrl ;
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
DOM_CRED cred_out ;
2004-08-31 23:56:16 +04:00
const uchar * old_pw ;
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
if ( ! p - > dc | | ! p - > dc - > authenticated ) {
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE ;
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
}
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
/* Step the creds chain forward. */
if ( ! creds_server_step ( p - > dc , & q_u - > clnt_id . cred , & cred_out ) ) {
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " _net_srv_pwset: creds_server_step failed. Rejecting auth "
" request from client %s machine account %s \n " ,
p - > dc - > remote_machine , p - > dc - > mach_acct ) ) ;
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
}
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
DEBUG ( 5 , ( " _net_srv_pwset: %d \n " , __LINE__ ) ) ;
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
rpcstr_pull ( workstation , q_u - > clnt_id . login . uni_comp_name . buffer ,
sizeof ( workstation ) , q_u - > clnt_id . login . uni_comp_name . uni_str_len * 2 , 0 ) ;
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
DEBUG ( 3 , ( " _net_srv_pwset: Server Password Set by Wksta:[%s] on account [%s] \n " ,
workstation , p - > dc - > mach_acct ) ) ;
2001-05-04 19:44:27 +04:00
pdb_init_sam ( & sampass ) ;
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
become_root ( ) ;
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
ret = pdb_getsampwnam ( sampass , p - > dc - > mach_acct ) ;
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
unbecome_root ( ) ;
2001-03-12 01:26:28 +03:00
/* Ensure the account exists and is a machine account. */
2002-03-03 06:56:53 +03:00
acct_ctrl = pdb_get_acct_ctrl ( sampass ) ;
2001-03-12 01:26:28 +03:00
2002-03-03 06:56:53 +03:00
if ( ! ( ret
& & ( acct_ctrl & ACB_WSTRUST | |
acct_ctrl & ACB_SVRTRUST | |
acct_ctrl & ACB_DOMTRUST ) ) ) {
2001-09-29 17:08:26 +04:00
pdb_free_sam ( & sampass ) ;
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER ;
2001-05-04 19:44:27 +04:00
}
2001-03-12 01:26:28 +03:00
2002-01-21 02:05:23 +03:00
if ( pdb_get_acct_ctrl ( sampass ) & ACB_DISABLED ) {
This is another *BIG* change...
Samba now features a pluggable passdb interface, along the same lines as the
one in use in the auth subsystem. In this case, only one backend may be active
at a time by the 'normal' interface, and only one backend per passdb_context is
permitted outside that.
This pluggable interface is designed to allow any number of passdb backends to
be compiled in, with the selection at runtime. The 'passdb backend' paramater
has been created (and documented!) to support this.
As such, configure has been modfied to allow (for example) --with-ldap and the
old smbpasswd to be selected at the same time.
This patch also introduces two new backends: smbpasswd_nua and tdbsam_nua.
These two backends accept 'non unix accounts', where the user does *not* exist
in /etc/passwd. These accounts' don't have UIDs in the unix sense, but to
avoid conflicts in the algroitmic mapping of RIDs, they use the values
specified in the 'non unix account range' paramter - in the same way as the
winbind ranges are specifed.
While I was at it, I cleaned up some of the code in pdb_tdb (code copied
directly from smbpasswd and not really considered properly). Most of this was
to do with % macro expansion on stored data. It isn't easy to get the macros
into the tdb, and the first password change will 'expand' them. tdbsam needs
to use a similar system to pdb_ldap in this regard.
This patch only makes minor adjustments to pdb_nisplus and pdb_ldap, becouse I
don't have the test facilities for these. I plan to incoroprate at least
pdb_ldap into this scheme after consultation with Jerry.
Each (converted) passdb module now no longer has any 'static' variables, and
only exports 1 init function outside its .c file.
The non-unix-account support in this patch has been proven! It is now possible
to join a win2k machine to a Samba PDC without an account in /etc/passwd!
Other changes:
Minor interface adjustments:
pdb_delete_sam_account() now takes a SAM_ACCOUNT, not a char*.
pdb_update_sam_account() no longer takes the 'override' argument that was being
ignored so often (every other passdb backend). Extra checks have been added in
some places.
Minor code changes:
smbpasswd no longer attempts to initialise the passdb at startup, this is
now done on first use.
pdbedit has lost some of its 'machine account' logic, as this behaviour is now
controlled by the passdb subsystem directly.
The samr subsystem no longer calls 'local password change', but does the pdb
interactions directly. This allow the ACB_ flags specifed to be transferred
direct to the backend, without interference.
Doco:
I've updated the doco to reflect some of the changes, and removed some paramters
no longer applicable to HEAD.
(This used to be commit ff354c99c585068af6dc1ff35a1f109a806b326b)
2002-01-20 17:30:58 +03:00
pdb_free_sam ( & sampass ) ;
return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_DISABLED ;
}
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
/* Woah - what does this to to the credential chain ? JRA */
cred_hash3 ( pwd , q_u - > pwd , p - > dc - > sess_key , 0 ) ;
2004-08-31 23:56:16 +04:00
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
DEBUG ( 100 , ( " Server password set : new given value was : \n " ) ) ;
2004-10-01 07:14:57 +04:00
for ( i = 0 ; i < sizeof ( pwd ) ; i + + )
DEBUG ( 100 , ( " %02X " , pwd [ i ] ) ) ;
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
DEBUG ( 100 , ( " \n " ) ) ;
2004-08-31 23:56:16 +04:00
old_pw = pdb_get_nt_passwd ( sampass ) ;
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
2004-08-31 23:56:16 +04:00
if ( old_pw & & memcmp ( pwd , old_pw , 16 ) = = 0 ) {
/* Avoid backend modificiations and other fun if the
client changed the password to the * same thing * */
2001-09-29 17:08:26 +04:00
2004-08-31 23:56:16 +04:00
ret = True ;
} else {
2001-09-29 17:08:26 +04:00
2004-08-31 23:56:16 +04:00
/* LM password should be NULL for machines */
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
if ( ! pdb_set_lanman_passwd ( sampass , NULL , PDB_CHANGED ) ) {
2004-08-31 23:56:16 +04:00
pdb_free_sam ( & sampass ) ;
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
if ( ! pdb_set_nt_passwd ( sampass , pwd , PDB_CHANGED ) ) {
2004-08-31 23:56:16 +04:00
pdb_free_sam ( & sampass ) ;
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
if ( ! pdb_set_pass_changed_now ( sampass ) ) {
2004-08-31 23:56:16 +04:00
pdb_free_sam ( & sampass ) ;
/* Not quite sure what this one qualifies as, but this will do */
return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL ;
}
become_root ( ) ;
ret = pdb_update_sam_account ( sampass ) ;
unbecome_root ( ) ;
2001-10-29 10:15:51 +03:00
}
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
if ( ret ) {
2001-08-27 23:46:22 +04:00
status = NT_STATUS_OK ;
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
}
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
/* set up the LSA Server Password Set response */
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
init_net_r_srv_pwset ( r_u , & cred_out , status ) ;
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
2001-09-29 17:08:26 +04:00
pdb_free_sam ( & sampass ) ;
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
return r_u - > status ;
}
/*************************************************************************
_net_sam_logoff :
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
2001-08-27 23:46:22 +04:00
NTSTATUS _net_sam_logoff ( pipes_struct * p , NET_Q_SAM_LOGOFF * q_u , NET_R_SAM_LOGOFF * r_u )
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
{
2001-03-12 01:26:28 +03:00
if ( ! get_valid_user_struct ( p - > vuid ) )
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER ;
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
if ( ! p - > dc | | ! p - > dc - > authenticated ) {
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE ;
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
}
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
r_u - > buffer_creds = 1 ; /* yes, we have valid server credentials */
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
/* checks and updates credentials. creates reply credentials */
if ( ! creds_server_step ( p - > dc , & q_u - > sam_id . client . cred , & r_u - > srv_creds ) ) {
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " _net_sam_logoff: creds_server_step failed. Rejecting auth "
" request from client %s machine account %s \n " ,
p - > dc - > remote_machine , p - > dc - > mach_acct ) ) ;
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
}
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
r_u - > status = NT_STATUS_OK ;
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
return r_u - > status ;
}
This is my 'Authentication Rewrite' version 1.01, mostly as submitted to
samba-technical a few weeks ago.
The idea here is to standardize the checking of user names and passwords,
thereby ensuring that all authtentications pass the same standards. The
interface currently implemented in as
nt_status = check_password(user_info, server_info)
where user_info contains (mostly) the authentication data, and server_info
contains things like the user-id they got, and their resolved user name.
The current ugliness with the way the structures are created will be killed
the next revision, when they will be created and malloced by creator functions.
This patch also includes the first implementation of NTLMv2 in HEAD, but which
needs some more testing. We also add a hack to allow plaintext passwords to be
compared with smbpasswd, not the system password database.
Finally, this patch probably reintroduces the PAM accounts bug we had in
2.2.0, I'll fix that once this hits the tree. (I've just finished testing
it on a wide variety of platforms, so I want to get this patch in).
(This used to be commit b30b6202f31d339b48d51c0d38174cafd1cfcd42)
2001-08-03 17:09:23 +04:00
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
/*************************************************************************
_net_sam_logon
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
2001-08-27 23:46:22 +04:00
NTSTATUS _net_sam_logon ( pipes_struct * p , NET_Q_SAM_LOGON * q_u , NET_R_SAM_LOGON * r_u )
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
{
2001-08-27 23:46:22 +04:00
NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK ;
2001-05-04 19:44:27 +04:00
NET_USER_INFO_3 * usr_info = NULL ;
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
NET_ID_INFO_CTR * ctr = q_u - > sam_id . ctr ;
2001-05-04 19:44:27 +04:00
UNISTR2 * uni_samlogon_user = NULL ;
This is my 'Authentication Rewrite' version 1.01, mostly as submitted to
samba-technical a few weeks ago.
The idea here is to standardize the checking of user names and passwords,
thereby ensuring that all authtentications pass the same standards. The
interface currently implemented in as
nt_status = check_password(user_info, server_info)
where user_info contains (mostly) the authentication data, and server_info
contains things like the user-id they got, and their resolved user name.
The current ugliness with the way the structures are created will be killed
the next revision, when they will be created and malloced by creator functions.
This patch also includes the first implementation of NTLMv2 in HEAD, but which
needs some more testing. We also add a hack to allow plaintext passwords to be
compared with smbpasswd, not the system password database.
Finally, this patch probably reintroduces the PAM accounts bug we had in
2.2.0, I'll fix that once this hits the tree. (I've just finished testing
it on a wide variety of platforms, so I want to get this patch in).
(This used to be commit b30b6202f31d339b48d51c0d38174cafd1cfcd42)
2001-08-03 17:09:23 +04:00
UNISTR2 * uni_samlogon_domain = NULL ;
2001-09-06 09:24:37 +04:00
UNISTR2 * uni_samlogon_workstation = NULL ;
fstring nt_username , nt_domain , nt_workstation ;
2001-10-31 15:07:59 +03:00
auth_usersupplied_info * user_info = NULL ;
auth_serversupplied_info * server_info = NULL ;
2002-01-26 08:52:20 +03:00
SAM_ACCOUNT * sampw ;
2003-07-01 00:45:14 +04:00
struct auth_context * auth_context = NULL ;
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
2004-12-07 21:25:53 +03:00
usr_info = TALLOC_P ( p - > mem_ctx , NET_USER_INFO_3 ) ;
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
if ( ! usr_info )
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
2001-05-04 19:44:27 +04:00
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
ZERO_STRUCTP ( usr_info ) ;
2002-03-27 20:39:01 +03:00
/* store the user information, if there is any. */
r_u - > user = usr_info ;
r_u - > switch_value = 0 ; /* indicates no info */
r_u - > auth_resp = 1 ; /* authoritative response */
r_u - > switch_value = 3 ; /* indicates type of validation user info */
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
r_u - > buffer_creds = 1 ; /* Ensure we always return server creds. */
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
2001-05-04 19:44:27 +04:00
if ( ! get_valid_user_struct ( p - > vuid ) )
return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER ;
2003-04-06 11:04:09 +04:00
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
if ( ! p - > dc | | ! p - > dc - > authenticated ) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE ;
}
2003-04-06 11:04:09 +04:00
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
if ( ( lp_server_schannel ( ) = = True ) & & ( p - > auth . auth_type ! = PIPE_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL ) ) {
2003-04-06 11:04:09 +04:00
/* 'server schannel = yes' should enforce use of
schannel , the client did offer it in auth2 , but
obviously did not use it . */
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " _net_sam_logoff: client %s not using schannel for netlogon \n " ,
p - > dc - > remote_machine ) ) ;
2003-04-06 11:04:09 +04:00
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
}
2001-05-04 19:44:27 +04:00
/* checks and updates credentials. creates reply credentials */
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
if ( ! creds_server_step ( p - > dc , & q_u - > sam_id . client . cred , & r_u - > srv_creds ) ) {
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " _net_sam_logoff: creds_server_step failed. Rejecting auth "
" request from client %s machine account %s \n " ,
p - > dc - > remote_machine , p - > dc - > mach_acct ) ) ;
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
}
2005-08-11 23:45:53 +04:00
2001-05-04 19:44:27 +04:00
/* find the username */
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
switch ( q_u - > sam_id . logon_level ) {
case INTERACTIVE_LOGON_TYPE :
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
uni_samlogon_user = & ctr - > auth . id1 . uni_user_name ;
uni_samlogon_domain = & ctr - > auth . id1 . uni_domain_name ;
uni_samlogon_workstation = & ctr - > auth . id1 . uni_wksta_name ;
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
DEBUG ( 3 , ( " SAM Logon (Interactive). Domain:[%s]. " , lp_workgroup ( ) ) ) ;
break ;
case NET_LOGON_TYPE :
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
uni_samlogon_user = & ctr - > auth . id2 . uni_user_name ;
uni_samlogon_domain = & ctr - > auth . id2 . uni_domain_name ;
uni_samlogon_workstation = & ctr - > auth . id2 . uni_wksta_name ;
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
DEBUG ( 3 , ( " SAM Logon (Network). Domain:[%s]. " , lp_workgroup ( ) ) ) ;
break ;
default :
DEBUG ( 2 , ( " SAM Logon: unsupported switch value \n " ) ) ;
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_INFO_CLASS ;
} /* end switch */
2001-07-04 11:15:53 +04:00
rpcstr_pull ( nt_username , uni_samlogon_user - > buffer , sizeof ( nt_username ) , uni_samlogon_user - > uni_str_len * 2 , 0 ) ;
This is my 'Authentication Rewrite' version 1.01, mostly as submitted to
samba-technical a few weeks ago.
The idea here is to standardize the checking of user names and passwords,
thereby ensuring that all authtentications pass the same standards. The
interface currently implemented in as
nt_status = check_password(user_info, server_info)
where user_info contains (mostly) the authentication data, and server_info
contains things like the user-id they got, and their resolved user name.
The current ugliness with the way the structures are created will be killed
the next revision, when they will be created and malloced by creator functions.
This patch also includes the first implementation of NTLMv2 in HEAD, but which
needs some more testing. We also add a hack to allow plaintext passwords to be
compared with smbpasswd, not the system password database.
Finally, this patch probably reintroduces the PAM accounts bug we had in
2.2.0, I'll fix that once this hits the tree. (I've just finished testing
it on a wide variety of platforms, so I want to get this patch in).
(This used to be commit b30b6202f31d339b48d51c0d38174cafd1cfcd42)
2001-08-03 17:09:23 +04:00
rpcstr_pull ( nt_domain , uni_samlogon_domain - > buffer , sizeof ( nt_domain ) , uni_samlogon_domain - > uni_str_len * 2 , 0 ) ;
2001-09-06 09:24:37 +04:00
rpcstr_pull ( nt_workstation , uni_samlogon_workstation - > buffer , sizeof ( nt_workstation ) , uni_samlogon_workstation - > uni_str_len * 2 , 0 ) ;
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
2001-09-06 09:24:37 +04:00
DEBUG ( 3 , ( " User:[%s@%s] Requested Domain:[%s] \n " , nt_username ,
nt_workstation , nt_domain ) ) ;
2001-12-09 02:56:58 +03:00
2003-01-04 09:15:24 +03:00
fstrcpy ( current_user_info . smb_name , nt_username ) ;
2002-11-20 03:53:24 +03:00
sub_set_smb_name ( nt_username ) ;
2001-12-09 02:56:58 +03:00
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
DEBUG ( 5 , ( " Attempting validation level %d for unmapped username %s. \n " , q_u - > sam_id . ctr - > switch_value , nt_username ) ) ;
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
2003-07-01 00:45:14 +04:00
status = NT_STATUS_OK ;
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
switch ( ctr - > switch_value ) {
case NET_LOGON_TYPE :
This is another rather major change to the samba authenticaion
subystem.
The particular aim is to modularized the interface - so that we
can have arbitrary password back-ends.
This code adds one such back-end, a 'winbind' module to authenticate
against the winbind_auth_crap functionality. While fully-functional
this code is mainly useful as a demonstration, because we don't get
back the info3 as we would for direct ntdomain authentication.
This commit introduced the new 'auth methods' parameter, in the
spirit of the 'auth order' discussed on the lists. It is renamed
because not all the methods may be consulted, even if previous
methods fail - they may not have a suitable challenge for example.
Also, we have a 'local' authentication method, for old-style
'unix if plaintext, sam if encrypted' authentication and a
'guest' module to handle guest logins in a single place.
While this current design is not ideal, I feel that it does
provide a better infrastructure than the current design, and can
be built upon.
The following parameters have changed:
- use rhosts =
This has been replaced by the 'rhosts' authentication method,
and can be specified like 'auth methods = guest rhosts'
- hosts equiv =
This needs both this parameter and an 'auth methods' entry
to be effective. (auth methods = guest hostsequiv ....)
- plaintext to smbpasswd =
This is replaced by specifying 'sam' rather than 'local'
in the auth methods.
The security = parameter is unchanged, and now provides defaults
for the 'auth methods' parameter.
The available auth methods are:
guest
rhosts
hostsequiv
sam (passdb direct hash access)
unix (PAM, crypt() etc)
local (the combination of the above, based on encryption)
smbserver (old security=server)
ntdomain (old security=domain)
winbind (use winbind to cache DC connections)
Assistance in testing, or the production of new and interesting
authentication modules is always appreciated.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 8d31eae52a9757739711dbb82035a4dfe6b40c99)
2001-11-24 15:12:38 +03:00
{
2004-03-18 10:36:36 +03:00
const char * wksname = nt_workstation ;
2002-01-05 07:55:41 +03:00
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status = make_auth_context_fixed ( & auth_context , ctr - > auth . id2 . lm_chal ) ) ) {
return status ;
}
2004-03-18 10:36:36 +03:00
/* For a network logon, the workstation name comes in with two
* backslashes in the front . Strip them if they are there . */
if ( * wksname = = ' \\ ' ) wksname + + ;
if ( * wksname = = ' \\ ' ) wksname + + ;
2001-11-26 07:05:28 +03:00
/* Standard challenge/response authenticaion */
2002-01-05 07:55:41 +03:00
if ( ! make_user_info_netlogon_network ( & user_info ,
nt_username , nt_domain ,
2004-03-18 10:36:36 +03:00
wksname ,
2002-01-05 07:55:41 +03:00
ctr - > auth . id2 . lm_chal_resp . buffer ,
ctr - > auth . id2 . lm_chal_resp . str_str_len ,
ctr - > auth . id2 . nt_chal_resp . buffer ,
ctr - > auth . id2 . nt_chal_resp . str_str_len ) ) {
status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
2003-07-01 00:45:14 +04:00
}
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
break ;
This is another rather major change to the samba authenticaion
subystem.
The particular aim is to modularized the interface - so that we
can have arbitrary password back-ends.
This code adds one such back-end, a 'winbind' module to authenticate
against the winbind_auth_crap functionality. While fully-functional
this code is mainly useful as a demonstration, because we don't get
back the info3 as we would for direct ntdomain authentication.
This commit introduced the new 'auth methods' parameter, in the
spirit of the 'auth order' discussed on the lists. It is renamed
because not all the methods may be consulted, even if previous
methods fail - they may not have a suitable challenge for example.
Also, we have a 'local' authentication method, for old-style
'unix if plaintext, sam if encrypted' authentication and a
'guest' module to handle guest logins in a single place.
While this current design is not ideal, I feel that it does
provide a better infrastructure than the current design, and can
be built upon.
The following parameters have changed:
- use rhosts =
This has been replaced by the 'rhosts' authentication method,
and can be specified like 'auth methods = guest rhosts'
- hosts equiv =
This needs both this parameter and an 'auth methods' entry
to be effective. (auth methods = guest hostsequiv ....)
- plaintext to smbpasswd =
This is replaced by specifying 'sam' rather than 'local'
in the auth methods.
The security = parameter is unchanged, and now provides defaults
for the 'auth methods' parameter.
The available auth methods are:
guest
rhosts
hostsequiv
sam (passdb direct hash access)
unix (PAM, crypt() etc)
local (the combination of the above, based on encryption)
smbserver (old security=server)
ntdomain (old security=domain)
winbind (use winbind to cache DC connections)
Assistance in testing, or the production of new and interesting
authentication modules is always appreciated.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 8d31eae52a9757739711dbb82035a4dfe6b40c99)
2001-11-24 15:12:38 +03:00
}
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
case INTERACTIVE_LOGON_TYPE :
2001-11-26 07:05:28 +03:00
/* 'Interactive' autheticaion, supplies the password in its
MD4 form , encrypted with the session key . We will
convert this to chellange / responce for the auth
subsystem to chew on */
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
{
2002-01-05 07:55:41 +03:00
const uint8 * chal ;
2003-07-01 00:45:14 +04:00
2002-01-05 07:55:41 +03:00
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status = make_auth_context_subsystem ( & auth_context ) ) ) {
return status ;
This is another rather major change to the samba authenticaion
subystem.
The particular aim is to modularized the interface - so that we
can have arbitrary password back-ends.
This code adds one such back-end, a 'winbind' module to authenticate
against the winbind_auth_crap functionality. While fully-functional
this code is mainly useful as a demonstration, because we don't get
back the info3 as we would for direct ntdomain authentication.
This commit introduced the new 'auth methods' parameter, in the
spirit of the 'auth order' discussed on the lists. It is renamed
because not all the methods may be consulted, even if previous
methods fail - they may not have a suitable challenge for example.
Also, we have a 'local' authentication method, for old-style
'unix if plaintext, sam if encrypted' authentication and a
'guest' module to handle guest logins in a single place.
While this current design is not ideal, I feel that it does
provide a better infrastructure than the current design, and can
be built upon.
The following parameters have changed:
- use rhosts =
This has been replaced by the 'rhosts' authentication method,
and can be specified like 'auth methods = guest rhosts'
- hosts equiv =
This needs both this parameter and an 'auth methods' entry
to be effective. (auth methods = guest hostsequiv ....)
- plaintext to smbpasswd =
This is replaced by specifying 'sam' rather than 'local'
in the auth methods.
The security = parameter is unchanged, and now provides defaults
for the 'auth methods' parameter.
The available auth methods are:
guest
rhosts
hostsequiv
sam (passdb direct hash access)
unix (PAM, crypt() etc)
local (the combination of the above, based on encryption)
smbserver (old security=server)
ntdomain (old security=domain)
winbind (use winbind to cache DC connections)
Assistance in testing, or the production of new and interesting
authentication modules is always appreciated.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 8d31eae52a9757739711dbb82035a4dfe6b40c99)
2001-11-24 15:12:38 +03:00
}
2002-01-05 07:55:41 +03:00
chal = auth_context - > get_ntlm_challenge ( auth_context ) ;
if ( ! make_user_info_netlogon_interactive ( & user_info ,
nt_username , nt_domain ,
nt_workstation , chal ,
ctr - > auth . id1 . lm_owf . data ,
ctr - > auth . id1 . nt_owf . data ,
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
p - > dc - > sess_key ) ) {
2002-01-05 07:55:41 +03:00
status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
break ;
}
default :
DEBUG ( 2 , ( " SAM Logon: unsupported switch value \n " ) ) ;
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_INFO_CLASS ;
} /* end switch */
2003-07-01 00:45:14 +04:00
if ( NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
status = auth_context - > check_ntlm_password ( auth_context ,
user_info , & server_info ) ;
}
( auth_context - > free ) ( & auth_context ) ;
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
free_user_info ( & user_info ) ;
2001-11-09 01:19:01 +03:00
DEBUG ( 5 , ( " _net_sam_logon: check_password returned status %s \n " ,
2002-03-17 07:36:35 +03:00
nt_errstr ( status ) ) ) ;
This is my 'Authentication Rewrite' version 1.01, mostly as submitted to
samba-technical a few weeks ago.
The idea here is to standardize the checking of user names and passwords,
thereby ensuring that all authtentications pass the same standards. The
interface currently implemented in as
nt_status = check_password(user_info, server_info)
where user_info contains (mostly) the authentication data, and server_info
contains things like the user-id they got, and their resolved user name.
The current ugliness with the way the structures are created will be killed
the next revision, when they will be created and malloced by creator functions.
This patch also includes the first implementation of NTLMv2 in HEAD, but which
needs some more testing. We also add a hack to allow plaintext passwords to be
compared with smbpasswd, not the system password database.
Finally, this patch probably reintroduces the PAM accounts bug we had in
2.2.0, I'll fix that once this hits the tree. (I've just finished testing
it on a wide variety of platforms, so I want to get this patch in).
(This used to be commit b30b6202f31d339b48d51c0d38174cafd1cfcd42)
2001-08-03 17:09:23 +04:00
/* Check account and password */
2001-11-25 05:30:30 +03:00
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
2005-08-12 19:28:19 +04:00
/* If we don't know what this domain is, we need to
indicate that we are not authoritative . This
allows the client to decide if it needs to try
a local user . Fix by jpjanosi @ us . ibm . com , # 2976 */
if ( NT_STATUS_EQUAL ( status , NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER )
& & ! strequal ( nt_domain , get_global_sam_name ( ) )
& & ! is_trusted_domain ( nt_domain ) )
r_u - > auth_resp = 0 ; /* We are not authoritative */
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
free_server_info ( & server_info ) ;
This is my 'Authentication Rewrite' version 1.01, mostly as submitted to
samba-technical a few weeks ago.
The idea here is to standardize the checking of user names and passwords,
thereby ensuring that all authtentications pass the same standards. The
interface currently implemented in as
nt_status = check_password(user_info, server_info)
where user_info contains (mostly) the authentication data, and server_info
contains things like the user-id they got, and their resolved user name.
The current ugliness with the way the structures are created will be killed
the next revision, when they will be created and malloced by creator functions.
This patch also includes the first implementation of NTLMv2 in HEAD, but which
needs some more testing. We also add a hack to allow plaintext passwords to be
compared with smbpasswd, not the system password database.
Finally, this patch probably reintroduces the PAM accounts bug we had in
2.2.0, I'll fix that once this hits the tree. (I've just finished testing
it on a wide variety of platforms, so I want to get this patch in).
(This used to be commit b30b6202f31d339b48d51c0d38174cafd1cfcd42)
2001-08-03 17:09:23 +04:00
return status ;
2001-05-04 19:44:27 +04:00
}
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
2001-11-09 01:19:01 +03:00
if ( server_info - > guest ) {
/* We don't like guest domain logons... */
DEBUG ( 5 , ( " _net_sam_logon: Attempted domain logon as GUEST denied. \n " ) ) ;
free_server_info ( & server_info ) ;
return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE ;
}
2001-09-06 09:24:37 +04:00
/* This is the point at which, if the login was successful, that
the SAM Local Security Authority should record that the user is
logged in to the domain . */
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
{
DOM_GID * gids = NULL ;
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
const DOM_SID * user_sid = NULL ;
const DOM_SID * group_sid = NULL ;
DOM_SID domain_sid ;
uint32 user_rid , group_rid ;
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
int num_gids = 0 ;
pstring my_name ;
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
fstring user_sid_string ;
fstring group_sid_string ;
2004-04-06 12:11:16 +04:00
uchar user_session_key [ 16 ] ;
Changes all over the shop, but all towards:
- NTLM2 support in the server
- KEY_EXCH support in the server
- variable length session keys.
In detail:
- NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing
domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade).
* This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' *
(This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may
well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password
changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of
NTLM2 on RPC pipes.)
This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we
must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm
being changed. This also needs to be turned off for
'security=server', which does not support this.
- KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key
actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being
the shared-secret directly or indirectly.
- As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem
needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the
backend.
- There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation.
- The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii.
Don't make an ascii version ever.
- The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We
have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded
to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes
long, when the krb5 login uses DES.
* This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. *
- Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of
misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This
should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues.
- Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when
passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate)
REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures...
(This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
uchar lm_session_key [ 16 ] ;
2003-02-02 08:22:37 +03:00
uchar netlogon_sess_key [ 16 ] ;
2003-02-24 05:35:54 +03:00
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
sampw = server_info - > sam_account ;
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
/* set up pointer indicating user/password failed to be found */
usr_info - > ptr_user_info = 0 ;
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
user_sid = pdb_get_user_sid ( sampw ) ;
group_sid = pdb_get_group_sid ( sampw ) ;
sid_copy ( & domain_sid , user_sid ) ;
sid_split_rid ( & domain_sid , & user_rid ) ;
if ( ! sid_peek_check_rid ( & domain_sid , group_sid , & group_rid ) ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " _net_sam_logon: user %s \\ %s has user sid %s \n but group sid %s. \n The conflicting domain portions are not supported for NETLOGON calls \n " ,
pdb_get_domain ( sampw ) , pdb_get_username ( sampw ) ,
sid_to_string ( user_sid_string , user_sid ) ,
sid_to_string ( group_sid_string , group_sid ) ) ) ;
return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL ;
}
2005-07-14 00:04:26 +04:00
if ( server_info - > login_server ) {
pstrcpy ( my_name , server_info - > login_server ) ;
} else {
pstrcpy ( my_name , global_myname ( ) ) ;
}
2003-01-04 11:54:43 +03:00
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status
= nt_token_to_group_list ( p - > mem_ctx ,
& domain_sid ,
server_info - > ptok ,
& num_gids ,
& gids ) ) ) {
return status ;
}
2002-01-26 08:52:20 +03:00
2003-02-02 08:22:37 +03:00
ZERO_STRUCT ( netlogon_sess_key ) ;
2005-09-30 21:13:37 +04:00
memcpy ( netlogon_sess_key , p - > dc - > sess_key , 8 ) ;
2004-04-06 12:11:16 +04:00
if ( server_info - > user_session_key . length ) {
memcpy ( user_session_key , server_info - > user_session_key . data ,
MIN ( sizeof ( user_session_key ) , server_info - > user_session_key . length ) ) ;
SamOEMhash ( user_session_key , netlogon_sess_key , 16 ) ;
Changes all over the shop, but all towards:
- NTLM2 support in the server
- KEY_EXCH support in the server
- variable length session keys.
In detail:
- NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing
domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade).
* This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' *
(This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may
well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password
changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of
NTLM2 on RPC pipes.)
This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we
must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm
being changed. This also needs to be turned off for
'security=server', which does not support this.
- KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key
actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being
the shared-secret directly or indirectly.
- As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem
needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the
backend.
- There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation.
- The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii.
Don't make an ascii version ever.
- The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We
have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded
to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes
long, when the krb5 login uses DES.
* This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. *
- Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of
misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This
should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues.
- Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when
passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate)
REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures...
(This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
}
if ( server_info - > lm_session_key . length ) {
memcpy ( lm_session_key , server_info - > lm_session_key . data ,
MIN ( sizeof ( lm_session_key ) , server_info - > lm_session_key . length ) ) ;
SamOEMhash ( lm_session_key , netlogon_sess_key , 16 ) ;
}
2003-02-02 08:22:37 +03:00
ZERO_STRUCT ( netlogon_sess_key ) ;
Changes all over the shop, but all towards:
- NTLM2 support in the server
- KEY_EXCH support in the server
- variable length session keys.
In detail:
- NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing
domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade).
* This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' *
(This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may
well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password
changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of
NTLM2 on RPC pipes.)
This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we
must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm
being changed. This also needs to be turned off for
'security=server', which does not support this.
- KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key
actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being
the shared-secret directly or indirectly.
- As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem
needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the
backend.
- There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation.
- The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii.
Don't make an ascii version ever.
- The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We
have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded
to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes
long, when the krb5 login uses DES.
* This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. *
- Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of
misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This
should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues.
- Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when
passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate)
REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures...
(This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
2002-01-26 08:52:20 +03:00
init_net_user_info3 ( p - > mem_ctx , usr_info ,
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
user_rid ,
2003-07-03 07:56:16 +04:00
group_rid ,
2002-01-26 08:52:20 +03:00
pdb_get_username ( sampw ) ,
pdb_get_fullname ( sampw ) ,
pdb_get_homedir ( sampw ) ,
2002-08-17 19:34:15 +04:00
pdb_get_dir_drive ( sampw ) ,
2002-01-26 08:52:20 +03:00
pdb_get_logon_script ( sampw ) ,
pdb_get_profile_path ( sampw ) ,
pdb_get_logon_time ( sampw ) ,
2002-09-25 19:19:00 +04:00
get_time_t_max ( ) ,
get_time_t_max ( ) ,
2002-01-26 08:52:20 +03:00
pdb_get_pass_last_set_time ( sampw ) ,
pdb_get_pass_can_change_time ( sampw ) ,
pdb_get_pass_must_change_time ( sampw ) ,
0 , /* logon_count */
0 , /* bad_pw_count */
num_gids , /* uint32 num_groups */
gids , /* DOM_GID *gids */
0x20 , /* uint32 user_flgs (?) */
2004-04-06 12:11:16 +04:00
server_info - > user_session_key . length ? user_session_key : NULL ,
Changes all over the shop, but all towards:
- NTLM2 support in the server
- KEY_EXCH support in the server
- variable length session keys.
In detail:
- NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing
domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade).
* This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' *
(This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may
well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password
changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of
NTLM2 on RPC pipes.)
This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we
must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm
being changed. This also needs to be turned off for
'security=server', which does not support this.
- KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key
actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being
the shared-secret directly or indirectly.
- As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem
needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the
backend.
- There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation.
- The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii.
Don't make an ascii version ever.
- The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We
have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded
to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes
long, when the krb5 login uses DES.
* This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. *
- Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of
misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This
should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues.
- Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when
passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate)
REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures...
(This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
server_info - > lm_session_key . length ? lm_session_key : NULL ,
2002-01-26 08:52:20 +03:00
my_name , /* char *logon_srv */
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
pdb_get_domain ( sampw ) ,
& domain_sid , /* DOM_SID *dom_sid */
/* Should be users domain sid, not servers - for trusted domains */
2002-01-26 08:52:20 +03:00
NULL ) ; /* char *other_sids */
2004-04-06 12:11:16 +04:00
ZERO_STRUCT ( user_session_key ) ;
Changes all over the shop, but all towards:
- NTLM2 support in the server
- KEY_EXCH support in the server
- variable length session keys.
In detail:
- NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing
domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade).
* This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' *
(This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may
well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password
changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of
NTLM2 on RPC pipes.)
This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we
must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm
being changed. This also needs to be turned off for
'security=server', which does not support this.
- KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key
actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being
the shared-secret directly or indirectly.
- As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem
needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the
backend.
- There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation.
- The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii.
Don't make an ascii version ever.
- The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We
have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded
to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes
long, when the krb5 login uses DES.
* This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. *
- Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of
misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This
should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues.
- Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when
passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate)
REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures...
(This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
ZERO_STRUCT ( lm_session_key ) ;
2001-05-04 19:44:27 +04:00
}
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
free_server_info ( & server_info ) ;
2001-05-04 19:44:27 +04:00
return status ;
2001-02-27 03:32:11 +03:00
}
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
2004-04-13 18:39:48 +04:00
/*************************************************************************
_ds_enum_dom_trusts
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
#if 0 /* JERRY -- not correct */
NTSTATUS _ds_enum_dom_trusts ( pipes_struct * p , DS_Q_ENUM_DOM_TRUSTS * q_u ,
DS_R_ENUM_DOM_TRUSTS * r_u )
{
NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK ;
2001-10-31 13:46:25 +03:00
2004-04-13 18:39:48 +04:00
/* TODO: According to MSDN, the can only be executed against a
DC or domain member running Windows 2000 or later . Need
to test against a standalone 2 k server and see what it
does . A windows 2000 DC includes its own domain in the
list . - - jerry */
return status ;
}
# endif /* JERRY */
