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samba-mirror/source3/auth/auth_util.c

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/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
Authentication utility functions
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1998
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2001
Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 2000-2001
Copyright (C) Rafal Szczesniak 2002
Copyright (C) Volker Lendecke 2006
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "smbd/globals.h"
#include "../libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
#undef DBGC_CLASS
#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
/****************************************************************************
Ensure primary group SID is always at position 0 in a
auth_serversupplied_info struct.
****************************************************************************/
static void sort_sid_array_for_smbd(struct auth_serversupplied_info *result,
const DOM_SID *pgroup_sid)
{
unsigned int i;
if (!result->sids) {
return;
}
if (sid_compare(&result->sids[0], pgroup_sid)==0) {
return;
}
for (i = 1; i < result->num_sids; i++) {
if (sid_compare(pgroup_sid,
&result->sids[i]) == 0) {
sid_copy(&result->sids[i], &result->sids[0]);
sid_copy(&result->sids[0], pgroup_sid);
return;
}
}
}
/****************************************************************************
Create a UNIX user on demand.
****************************************************************************/
static int _smb_create_user(const char *domain, const char *unix_username, const char *homedir)
{
TALLOC_CTX *ctx = talloc_tos();
char *add_script;
int ret;
add_script = talloc_strdup(ctx, lp_adduser_script());
if (!add_script || !*add_script) {
return -1;
}
add_script = talloc_all_string_sub(ctx,
add_script,
"%u",
unix_username);
if (!add_script) {
return -1;
}
if (domain) {
add_script = talloc_all_string_sub(ctx,
add_script,
"%D",
domain);
if (!add_script) {
return -1;
}
}
if (homedir) {
add_script = talloc_all_string_sub(ctx,
add_script,
"%H",
homedir);
if (!add_script) {
return -1;
}
}
ret = smbrun(add_script,NULL);
flush_pwnam_cache();
DEBUG(ret ? 0 : 3,
("smb_create_user: Running the command `%s' gave %d\n",
add_script,ret));
return ret;
}
/****************************************************************************
Create an auth_usersupplied_data structure
****************************************************************************/
static NTSTATUS make_user_info(struct auth_usersupplied_info **user_info,
const char *smb_name,
const char *internal_username,
const char *client_domain,
const char *domain,
const char *wksta_name,
DATA_BLOB *lm_pwd, DATA_BLOB *nt_pwd,
DATA_BLOB *lm_interactive_pwd, DATA_BLOB *nt_interactive_pwd,
DATA_BLOB *plaintext,
bool encrypted)
{
DEBUG(5,("attempting to make a user_info for %s (%s)\n", internal_username, smb_name));
*user_info = SMB_MALLOC_P(struct auth_usersupplied_info);
if (*user_info == NULL) {
DEBUG(0,("malloc failed for user_info (size %lu)\n", (unsigned long)sizeof(*user_info)));
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
ZERO_STRUCTP(*user_info);
DEBUG(5,("making strings for %s's user_info struct\n", internal_username));
(*user_info)->smb_name = SMB_STRDUP(smb_name);
if ((*user_info)->smb_name == NULL) {
free_user_info(user_info);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
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(*user_info)->internal_username = SMB_STRDUP(internal_username);
if ((*user_info)->internal_username == NULL) {
free_user_info(user_info);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
(*user_info)->domain = SMB_STRDUP(domain);
if ((*user_info)->domain == NULL) {
free_user_info(user_info);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
(*user_info)->client_domain = SMB_STRDUP(client_domain);
if ((*user_info)->client_domain == NULL) {
free_user_info(user_info);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
(*user_info)->wksta_name = SMB_STRDUP(wksta_name);
if ((*user_info)->wksta_name == NULL) {
free_user_info(user_info);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
DEBUG(5,("making blobs for %s's user_info struct\n", internal_username));
if (lm_pwd)
(*user_info)->lm_resp = data_blob(lm_pwd->data, lm_pwd->length);
if (nt_pwd)
(*user_info)->nt_resp = data_blob(nt_pwd->data, nt_pwd->length);
if (lm_interactive_pwd)
(*user_info)->lm_interactive_pwd = data_blob(lm_interactive_pwd->data, lm_interactive_pwd->length);
if (nt_interactive_pwd)
(*user_info)->nt_interactive_pwd = data_blob(nt_interactive_pwd->data, nt_interactive_pwd->length);
if (plaintext)
(*user_info)->plaintext_password = data_blob(plaintext->data, plaintext->length);
(*user_info)->encrypted = encrypted;
(*user_info)->logon_parameters = 0;
DEBUG(10,("made an %sencrypted user_info for %s (%s)\n", encrypted ? "":"un" , internal_username, smb_name));
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/****************************************************************************
Create an auth_usersupplied_data structure after appropriate mapping.
****************************************************************************/
NTSTATUS make_user_info_map(struct auth_usersupplied_info **user_info,
const char *smb_name,
const char *client_domain,
const char *wksta_name,
DATA_BLOB *lm_pwd,
DATA_BLOB *nt_pwd,
DATA_BLOB *lm_interactive_pwd,
DATA_BLOB *nt_interactive_pwd,
DATA_BLOB *plaintext,
bool encrypted)
{
struct smbd_server_connection *sconn = smbd_server_conn;
const char *domain;
NTSTATUS result;
bool was_mapped;
fstring internal_username;
fstrcpy(internal_username, smb_name);
was_mapped = map_username(sconn, internal_username);
DEBUG(5, ("Mapping user [%s]\\[%s] from workstation [%s]\n",
client_domain, smb_name, wksta_name));
domain = client_domain;
/* If you connect to a Windows domain member using a bogus domain name,
* the Windows box will map the BOGUS\user to SAMNAME\user. Thus, if
* the Windows box is a DC the name will become DOMAIN\user and be
* authenticated against AD, if the Windows box is a member server but
* not a DC the name will become WORKSTATION\user. A standalone
* non-domain member box will also map to WORKSTATION\user.
* This also deals with the client passing in a "" domain */
if (!is_trusted_domain(domain) &&
s3: fix bug #6650, authentication at member servers when winbindd is not running Authentication of domain users on the member server fails when winbindd is not running. This is because the is_trusted_domain() check behaves differently when winbindd is running and when it isn't: Since wb_is_trusted_domain() calls wbcDomainInfo(), and this will also give a result for our own domain, this succeeds for the member server's own domain when winbindd is running. When winbindd is not running, is_trusted_domain() checks (and possibly updates) the trustdom cache, and this does the lsa_EnumTrustDom() rpc call to the DC which does not return its own domain. In case of winbindd not running, before 3.4, the domain part was _silently_ mapped to the workgroup in auth_util.c:make_user_info_map(), which effectively did nothing in the member case. But then the parameter "map untrusted to domain" was introduced and the mapping was made to the workstation name instead of the workgroup name by default unless "map untrusted to domain = yes". (Commits d8c54fddda2dba3cbc5fc13e93431b152813892e, 5cd4b7b7c03df6e896186d985b6858a06aa40b3f, and fbca26923915a70031f561b198cfe2cc0d9c3aa6) This was ok as long as winbindd was running, but with winbindd not running, these changes actually uncovered the above logic bug in the check. So the correct check is to treat the workgroup as trusted / or known in the member case. This is most easily achieved by not comparing the domain name against get_global_sam_name() which is the host name unless for a DC but against my_sam_name() which is the workgroup for a DC and for a member, too. (These names are not very intuitive...) I admit that this is a very long commit message for a one-liner, but this has needed some tracking down, and I think the change deserves some justification. Michael
2009-08-21 15:59:16 +04:00
!strequal(domain, my_sam_name()))
{
if (lp_map_untrusted_to_domain())
domain = my_sam_name();
else
domain = get_global_sam_name();
DEBUG(5, ("Mapped domain from [%s] to [%s] for user [%s] from "
"workstation [%s]\n",
client_domain, domain, smb_name, wksta_name));
}
/* We know that the given domain is trusted (and we are allowing them),
* it is our global SAM name, or for legacy behavior it is our
* primary domain name */
result = make_user_info(user_info, smb_name, internal_username,
client_domain, domain, wksta_name,
lm_pwd, nt_pwd,
lm_interactive_pwd, nt_interactive_pwd,
plaintext, encrypted);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
(*user_info)->was_mapped = was_mapped;
}
return result;
}
/****************************************************************************
Create an auth_usersupplied_data, making the DATA_BLOBs here.
Decrypt and encrypt the passwords.
****************************************************************************/
bool make_user_info_netlogon_network(struct auth_usersupplied_info **user_info,
const char *smb_name,
const char *client_domain,
const char *wksta_name,
uint32 logon_parameters,
const uchar *lm_network_pwd,
int lm_pwd_len,
const uchar *nt_network_pwd,
int nt_pwd_len)
{
bool ret;
NTSTATUS status;
DATA_BLOB lm_blob = data_blob(lm_network_pwd, lm_pwd_len);
DATA_BLOB nt_blob = data_blob(nt_network_pwd, nt_pwd_len);
status = make_user_info_map(user_info,
smb_name, client_domain,
wksta_name,
lm_pwd_len ? &lm_blob : NULL,
nt_pwd_len ? &nt_blob : NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL,
True);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
(*user_info)->logon_parameters = logon_parameters;
}
ret = NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status) ? True : False;
data_blob_free(&lm_blob);
data_blob_free(&nt_blob);
return ret;
}
/****************************************************************************
Create an auth_usersupplied_data, making the DATA_BLOBs here.
Decrypt and encrypt the passwords.
****************************************************************************/
bool make_user_info_netlogon_interactive(struct auth_usersupplied_info **user_info,
const char *smb_name,
const char *client_domain,
const char *wksta_name,
uint32 logon_parameters,
const uchar chal[8],
const uchar lm_interactive_pwd[16],
const uchar nt_interactive_pwd[16],
const uchar *dc_sess_key)
{
unsigned char lm_pwd[16];
unsigned char nt_pwd[16];
unsigned char local_lm_response[24];
unsigned char local_nt_response[24];
unsigned char key[16];
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
memcpy(key, dc_sess_key, 16);
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
if (lm_interactive_pwd)
memcpy(lm_pwd, lm_interactive_pwd, sizeof(lm_pwd));
if (nt_interactive_pwd)
memcpy(nt_pwd, nt_interactive_pwd, sizeof(nt_pwd));
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(100,("key:"));
dump_data(100, key, sizeof(key));
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DEBUG(100,("lm owf password:"));
dump_data(100, lm_pwd, sizeof(lm_pwd));
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
DEBUG(100,("nt owf password:"));
dump_data(100, nt_pwd, sizeof(nt_pwd));
#endif
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
if (lm_interactive_pwd)
arcfour_crypt(lm_pwd, key, sizeof(lm_pwd));
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
if (nt_interactive_pwd)
arcfour_crypt(nt_pwd, key, sizeof(nt_pwd));
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(100,("decrypt of lm owf password:"));
dump_data(100, lm_pwd, sizeof(lm_pwd));
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
DEBUG(100,("decrypt of nt owf password:"));
dump_data(100, nt_pwd, sizeof(nt_pwd));
#endif
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
if (lm_interactive_pwd)
SMBOWFencrypt(lm_pwd, chal,
local_lm_response);
if (nt_interactive_pwd)
SMBOWFencrypt(nt_pwd, chal,
local_nt_response);
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
/* Password info paranoia */
ZERO_STRUCT(key);
{
bool ret;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
DATA_BLOB local_lm_blob;
DATA_BLOB local_nt_blob;
DATA_BLOB lm_interactive_blob;
DATA_BLOB nt_interactive_blob;
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
if (lm_interactive_pwd) {
local_lm_blob = data_blob(local_lm_response,
sizeof(local_lm_response));
lm_interactive_blob = data_blob(lm_pwd,
sizeof(lm_pwd));
ZERO_STRUCT(lm_pwd);
}
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
if (nt_interactive_pwd) {
local_nt_blob = data_blob(local_nt_response,
sizeof(local_nt_response));
nt_interactive_blob = data_blob(nt_pwd,
sizeof(nt_pwd));
ZERO_STRUCT(nt_pwd);
}
nt_status = make_user_info_map(
user_info,
smb_name, client_domain, wksta_name,
lm_interactive_pwd ? &local_lm_blob : NULL,
nt_interactive_pwd ? &local_nt_blob : NULL,
lm_interactive_pwd ? &lm_interactive_blob : NULL,
nt_interactive_pwd ? &nt_interactive_blob : NULL,
NULL, True);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
(*user_info)->logon_parameters = logon_parameters;
}
ret = NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status) ? True : False;
data_blob_free(&local_lm_blob);
data_blob_free(&local_nt_blob);
data_blob_free(&lm_interactive_blob);
data_blob_free(&nt_interactive_blob);
return ret;
}
}
/****************************************************************************
Create an auth_usersupplied_data structure
****************************************************************************/
bool make_user_info_for_reply(struct auth_usersupplied_info **user_info,
const char *smb_name,
const char *client_domain,
const uint8 chal[8],
This is another rather major change to the samba authenticaion subystem. The particular aim is to modularized the interface - so that we can have arbitrary password back-ends. This code adds one such back-end, a 'winbind' module to authenticate against the winbind_auth_crap functionality. While fully-functional this code is mainly useful as a demonstration, because we don't get back the info3 as we would for direct ntdomain authentication. This commit introduced the new 'auth methods' parameter, in the spirit of the 'auth order' discussed on the lists. It is renamed because not all the methods may be consulted, even if previous methods fail - they may not have a suitable challenge for example. Also, we have a 'local' authentication method, for old-style 'unix if plaintext, sam if encrypted' authentication and a 'guest' module to handle guest logins in a single place. While this current design is not ideal, I feel that it does provide a better infrastructure than the current design, and can be built upon. The following parameters have changed: - use rhosts = This has been replaced by the 'rhosts' authentication method, and can be specified like 'auth methods = guest rhosts' - hosts equiv = This needs both this parameter and an 'auth methods' entry to be effective. (auth methods = guest hostsequiv ....) - plaintext to smbpasswd = This is replaced by specifying 'sam' rather than 'local' in the auth methods. The security = parameter is unchanged, and now provides defaults for the 'auth methods' parameter. The available auth methods are: guest rhosts hostsequiv sam (passdb direct hash access) unix (PAM, crypt() etc) local (the combination of the above, based on encryption) smbserver (old security=server) ntdomain (old security=domain) winbind (use winbind to cache DC connections) Assistance in testing, or the production of new and interesting authentication modules is always appreciated. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 8d31eae52a9757739711dbb82035a4dfe6b40c99)
2001-11-24 15:12:38 +03:00
DATA_BLOB plaintext_password)
{
DATA_BLOB local_lm_blob;
DATA_BLOB local_nt_blob;
NTSTATUS ret = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
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/*
* Not encrypted - do so.
*/
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DEBUG(5,("make_user_info_for_reply: User passwords not in encrypted "
"format.\n"));
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if (plaintext_password.data && plaintext_password.length) {
unsigned char local_lm_response[24];
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
This is another rather major change to the samba authenticaion subystem. The particular aim is to modularized the interface - so that we can have arbitrary password back-ends. This code adds one such back-end, a 'winbind' module to authenticate against the winbind_auth_crap functionality. While fully-functional this code is mainly useful as a demonstration, because we don't get back the info3 as we would for direct ntdomain authentication. This commit introduced the new 'auth methods' parameter, in the spirit of the 'auth order' discussed on the lists. It is renamed because not all the methods may be consulted, even if previous methods fail - they may not have a suitable challenge for example. Also, we have a 'local' authentication method, for old-style 'unix if plaintext, sam if encrypted' authentication and a 'guest' module to handle guest logins in a single place. While this current design is not ideal, I feel that it does provide a better infrastructure than the current design, and can be built upon. The following parameters have changed: - use rhosts = This has been replaced by the 'rhosts' authentication method, and can be specified like 'auth methods = guest rhosts' - hosts equiv = This needs both this parameter and an 'auth methods' entry to be effective. (auth methods = guest hostsequiv ....) - plaintext to smbpasswd = This is replaced by specifying 'sam' rather than 'local' in the auth methods. The security = parameter is unchanged, and now provides defaults for the 'auth methods' parameter. The available auth methods are: guest rhosts hostsequiv sam (passdb direct hash access) unix (PAM, crypt() etc) local (the combination of the above, based on encryption) smbserver (old security=server) ntdomain (old security=domain) winbind (use winbind to cache DC connections) Assistance in testing, or the production of new and interesting authentication modules is always appreciated. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 8d31eae52a9757739711dbb82035a4dfe6b40c99)
2001-11-24 15:12:38 +03:00
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(10,("Unencrypted password (len %d):\n",
(int)plaintext_password.length));
dump_data(100, plaintext_password.data,
plaintext_password.length);
This is another rather major change to the samba authenticaion subystem. The particular aim is to modularized the interface - so that we can have arbitrary password back-ends. This code adds one such back-end, a 'winbind' module to authenticate against the winbind_auth_crap functionality. While fully-functional this code is mainly useful as a demonstration, because we don't get back the info3 as we would for direct ntdomain authentication. This commit introduced the new 'auth methods' parameter, in the spirit of the 'auth order' discussed on the lists. It is renamed because not all the methods may be consulted, even if previous methods fail - they may not have a suitable challenge for example. Also, we have a 'local' authentication method, for old-style 'unix if plaintext, sam if encrypted' authentication and a 'guest' module to handle guest logins in a single place. While this current design is not ideal, I feel that it does provide a better infrastructure than the current design, and can be built upon. The following parameters have changed: - use rhosts = This has been replaced by the 'rhosts' authentication method, and can be specified like 'auth methods = guest rhosts' - hosts equiv = This needs both this parameter and an 'auth methods' entry to be effective. (auth methods = guest hostsequiv ....) - plaintext to smbpasswd = This is replaced by specifying 'sam' rather than 'local' in the auth methods. The security = parameter is unchanged, and now provides defaults for the 'auth methods' parameter. The available auth methods are: guest rhosts hostsequiv sam (passdb direct hash access) unix (PAM, crypt() etc) local (the combination of the above, based on encryption) smbserver (old security=server) ntdomain (old security=domain) winbind (use winbind to cache DC connections) Assistance in testing, or the production of new and interesting authentication modules is always appreciated. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 8d31eae52a9757739711dbb82035a4dfe6b40c99)
2001-11-24 15:12:38 +03:00
#endif
SMBencrypt( (const char *)plaintext_password.data,
(const uchar*)chal, local_lm_response);
local_lm_blob = data_blob(local_lm_response, 24);
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
/* We can't do an NT hash here, as the password needs to be
case insensitive */
local_nt_blob = data_blob_null;
} else {
local_lm_blob = data_blob_null;
local_nt_blob = data_blob_null;
}
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
ret = make_user_info_map(
user_info, smb_name, client_domain,
get_remote_machine_name(),
local_lm_blob.data ? &local_lm_blob : NULL,
local_nt_blob.data ? &local_nt_blob : NULL,
NULL, NULL,
plaintext_password.data && plaintext_password.length ? &plaintext_password : NULL,
False);
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
data_blob_free(&local_lm_blob);
return NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret) ? True : False;
}
This is another rather major change to the samba authenticaion subystem. The particular aim is to modularized the interface - so that we can have arbitrary password back-ends. This code adds one such back-end, a 'winbind' module to authenticate against the winbind_auth_crap functionality. While fully-functional this code is mainly useful as a demonstration, because we don't get back the info3 as we would for direct ntdomain authentication. This commit introduced the new 'auth methods' parameter, in the spirit of the 'auth order' discussed on the lists. It is renamed because not all the methods may be consulted, even if previous methods fail - they may not have a suitable challenge for example. Also, we have a 'local' authentication method, for old-style 'unix if plaintext, sam if encrypted' authentication and a 'guest' module to handle guest logins in a single place. While this current design is not ideal, I feel that it does provide a better infrastructure than the current design, and can be built upon. The following parameters have changed: - use rhosts = This has been replaced by the 'rhosts' authentication method, and can be specified like 'auth methods = guest rhosts' - hosts equiv = This needs both this parameter and an 'auth methods' entry to be effective. (auth methods = guest hostsequiv ....) - plaintext to smbpasswd = This is replaced by specifying 'sam' rather than 'local' in the auth methods. The security = parameter is unchanged, and now provides defaults for the 'auth methods' parameter. The available auth methods are: guest rhosts hostsequiv sam (passdb direct hash access) unix (PAM, crypt() etc) local (the combination of the above, based on encryption) smbserver (old security=server) ntdomain (old security=domain) winbind (use winbind to cache DC connections) Assistance in testing, or the production of new and interesting authentication modules is always appreciated. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 8d31eae52a9757739711dbb82035a4dfe6b40c99)
2001-11-24 15:12:38 +03:00
/****************************************************************************
Create an auth_usersupplied_data structure
****************************************************************************/
NTSTATUS make_user_info_for_reply_enc(struct auth_usersupplied_info **user_info,
const char *smb_name,
const char *client_domain,
DATA_BLOB lm_resp, DATA_BLOB nt_resp)
This is another rather major change to the samba authenticaion subystem. The particular aim is to modularized the interface - so that we can have arbitrary password back-ends. This code adds one such back-end, a 'winbind' module to authenticate against the winbind_auth_crap functionality. While fully-functional this code is mainly useful as a demonstration, because we don't get back the info3 as we would for direct ntdomain authentication. This commit introduced the new 'auth methods' parameter, in the spirit of the 'auth order' discussed on the lists. It is renamed because not all the methods may be consulted, even if previous methods fail - they may not have a suitable challenge for example. Also, we have a 'local' authentication method, for old-style 'unix if plaintext, sam if encrypted' authentication and a 'guest' module to handle guest logins in a single place. While this current design is not ideal, I feel that it does provide a better infrastructure than the current design, and can be built upon. The following parameters have changed: - use rhosts = This has been replaced by the 'rhosts' authentication method, and can be specified like 'auth methods = guest rhosts' - hosts equiv = This needs both this parameter and an 'auth methods' entry to be effective. (auth methods = guest hostsequiv ....) - plaintext to smbpasswd = This is replaced by specifying 'sam' rather than 'local' in the auth methods. The security = parameter is unchanged, and now provides defaults for the 'auth methods' parameter. The available auth methods are: guest rhosts hostsequiv sam (passdb direct hash access) unix (PAM, crypt() etc) local (the combination of the above, based on encryption) smbserver (old security=server) ntdomain (old security=domain) winbind (use winbind to cache DC connections) Assistance in testing, or the production of new and interesting authentication modules is always appreciated. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 8d31eae52a9757739711dbb82035a4dfe6b40c99)
2001-11-24 15:12:38 +03:00
{
return make_user_info_map(user_info, smb_name,
client_domain,
get_remote_machine_name(),
lm_resp.data ? &lm_resp : NULL,
nt_resp.data ? &nt_resp : NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL,
True);
This is another rather major change to the samba authenticaion subystem. The particular aim is to modularized the interface - so that we can have arbitrary password back-ends. This code adds one such back-end, a 'winbind' module to authenticate against the winbind_auth_crap functionality. While fully-functional this code is mainly useful as a demonstration, because we don't get back the info3 as we would for direct ntdomain authentication. This commit introduced the new 'auth methods' parameter, in the spirit of the 'auth order' discussed on the lists. It is renamed because not all the methods may be consulted, even if previous methods fail - they may not have a suitable challenge for example. Also, we have a 'local' authentication method, for old-style 'unix if plaintext, sam if encrypted' authentication and a 'guest' module to handle guest logins in a single place. While this current design is not ideal, I feel that it does provide a better infrastructure than the current design, and can be built upon. The following parameters have changed: - use rhosts = This has been replaced by the 'rhosts' authentication method, and can be specified like 'auth methods = guest rhosts' - hosts equiv = This needs both this parameter and an 'auth methods' entry to be effective. (auth methods = guest hostsequiv ....) - plaintext to smbpasswd = This is replaced by specifying 'sam' rather than 'local' in the auth methods. The security = parameter is unchanged, and now provides defaults for the 'auth methods' parameter. The available auth methods are: guest rhosts hostsequiv sam (passdb direct hash access) unix (PAM, crypt() etc) local (the combination of the above, based on encryption) smbserver (old security=server) ntdomain (old security=domain) winbind (use winbind to cache DC connections) Assistance in testing, or the production of new and interesting authentication modules is always appreciated. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 8d31eae52a9757739711dbb82035a4dfe6b40c99)
2001-11-24 15:12:38 +03:00
}
/****************************************************************************
Create a guest user_info blob, for anonymous authenticaion.
****************************************************************************/
bool make_user_info_guest(struct auth_usersupplied_info **user_info)
{
NTSTATUS nt_status;
nt_status = make_user_info(user_info,
"","",
"","",
"",
NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL,
NULL,
True);
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status) ? True : False;
}
static int server_info_dtor(struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info)
{
TALLOC_FREE(server_info->sam_account);
ZERO_STRUCTP(server_info);
return 0;
}
/***************************************************************************
Make a server_info struct. Free with TALLOC_FREE().
***************************************************************************/
static struct auth_serversupplied_info *make_server_info(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx)
{
struct auth_serversupplied_info *result;
result = TALLOC_ZERO_P(mem_ctx, struct auth_serversupplied_info);
if (result == NULL) {
DEBUG(0, ("talloc failed\n"));
return NULL;
}
talloc_set_destructor(result, server_info_dtor);
/* Initialise the uid and gid values to something non-zero
which may save us from giving away root access if there
is a bug in allocating these fields. */
result->utok.uid = -1;
result->utok.gid = -1;
return result;
}
static char *sanitize_username(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const char *username)
{
fstring tmp;
alpha_strcpy(tmp, username, ". _-$", sizeof(tmp));
return talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, tmp);
}
/***************************************************************************
Is the incoming username our own machine account ?
If so, the connection is almost certainly from winbindd.
***************************************************************************/
static bool is_our_machine_account(const char *username)
{
bool ret;
char *truncname = NULL;
size_t ulen = strlen(username);
if (ulen == 0 || username[ulen-1] != '$') {
return false;
}
truncname = SMB_STRDUP(username);
if (!truncname) {
return false;
}
truncname[ulen-1] = '\0';
ret = strequal(truncname, global_myname());
SAFE_FREE(truncname);
return ret;
}
/***************************************************************************
Make (and fill) a user_info struct from a struct samu
***************************************************************************/
NTSTATUS make_server_info_sam(struct auth_serversupplied_info **server_info,
struct samu *sampass)
{
struct passwd *pwd;
gid_t *gids;
struct auth_serversupplied_info *result;
const char *username = pdb_get_username(sampass);
NTSTATUS status;
if ( !(result = make_server_info(NULL)) ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if ( !(pwd = getpwnam_alloc(result, username)) ) {
DEBUG(1, ("User %s in passdb, but getpwnam() fails!\n",
pdb_get_username(sampass)));
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
}
result->sam_account = sampass;
result->unix_name = pwd->pw_name;
/* Ensure that we keep pwd->pw_name, because we will free pwd below */
talloc_steal(result, pwd->pw_name);
result->utok.gid = pwd->pw_gid;
result->utok.uid = pwd->pw_uid;
TALLOC_FREE(pwd);
result->sanitized_username = sanitize_username(result,
result->unix_name);
if (result->sanitized_username == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (IS_DC && is_our_machine_account(username)) {
/*
* Ensure for a connection from our own
* machine account (from winbindd on a DC)
* there are no supplementary groups.
* Prevents loops in calling gid_to_sid().
*/
result->sids = NULL;
gids = NULL;
result->num_sids = 0;
/*
* This is a hack of monstrous proportions.
* If we know it's winbindd talking to us,
* we know we must never recurse into it,
* so turn off contacting winbindd for this
* entire process. This will get fixed when
* winbindd doesn't need to talk to smbd on
* a PDC. JRA.
*/
(void)winbind_off();
DEBUG(10, ("make_server_info_sam: our machine account %s "
"setting supplementary group list empty and "
"turning off winbindd requests.\n",
username));
} else {
status = pdb_enum_group_memberships(result, sampass,
&result->sids, &gids,
&result->num_sids);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(10, ("pdb_enum_group_memberships failed: %s\n",
nt_errstr(status)));
result->sam_account = NULL; /* Don't free on error exit. */
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return status;
}
}
/* For now we throw away the gids and convert via sid_to_gid
* later. This needs fixing, but I'd like to get the code straight and
* simple first. */
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
TALLOC_FREE(gids);
DEBUG(5,("make_server_info_sam: made server info for user %s -> %s\n",
pdb_get_username(sampass), result->unix_name));
*server_info = result;
/* Ensure that the sampass will be freed with the result */
talloc_steal(result, sampass);
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
static NTSTATUS log_nt_token(NT_USER_TOKEN *token)
{
TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
char *command;
char *group_sidstr;
size_t i;
if ((lp_log_nt_token_command() == NULL) ||
(strlen(lp_log_nt_token_command()) == 0)) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
group_sidstr = talloc_strdup(frame, "");
for (i=1; i<token->num_sids; i++) {
group_sidstr = talloc_asprintf(
frame, "%s %s", group_sidstr,
sid_string_talloc(frame, &token->user_sids[i]));
}
command = talloc_string_sub(
frame, lp_log_nt_token_command(),
"%s", sid_string_talloc(frame, &token->user_sids[0]));
command = talloc_string_sub(frame, command, "%t", group_sidstr);
if (command == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
DEBUG(8, ("running command: [%s]\n", command));
if (smbrun(command, NULL) != 0) {
DEBUG(0, ("Could not log NT token\n"));
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/*
* Create the token to use from server_info->sam_account and
* server_info->sids (the info3/sam groups). Find the unix gids.
*/
NTSTATUS create_local_token(struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info)
{
NTSTATUS status;
size_t i;
struct dom_sid tmp_sid;
/*
* If winbind is not around, we can not make much use of the SIDs the
* domain controller provided us with. Likewise if the user name was
* mapped to some local unix user.
*/
if (((lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_MEMBER) && !winbind_ping()) ||
(server_info->nss_token)) {
status = create_token_from_username(server_info,
server_info->unix_name,
server_info->guest,
&server_info->utok.uid,
&server_info->utok.gid,
&server_info->unix_name,
&server_info->ptok);
} else {
server_info->ptok = create_local_nt_token(
server_info,
pdb_get_user_sid(server_info->sam_account),
server_info->guest,
server_info->num_sids, server_info->sids);
status = server_info->ptok ?
NT_STATUS_OK : NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
return status;
}
/* Convert the SIDs to gids. */
server_info->utok.ngroups = 0;
server_info->utok.groups = NULL;
/* Start at index 1, where the groups start. */
for (i=1; i<server_info->ptok->num_sids; i++) {
gid_t gid;
DOM_SID *sid = &server_info->ptok->user_sids[i];
if (!sid_to_gid(sid, &gid)) {
DEBUG(10, ("Could not convert SID %s to gid, "
"ignoring it\n", sid_string_dbg(sid)));
continue;
}
add_gid_to_array_unique(server_info, gid,
&server_info->utok.groups,
&server_info->utok.ngroups);
}
/*
* Add the "Unix Group" SID for each gid to catch mapped groups
* and their Unix equivalent. This is to solve the backwards
* compatibility problem of 'valid users = +ntadmin' where
* ntadmin has been paired with "Domain Admins" in the group
* mapping table. Otherwise smb.conf would need to be changed
* to 'valid user = "Domain Admins"'. --jerry
*
* For consistency we also add the "Unix User" SID,
* so that the complete unix token is represented within
* the nt token.
*/
if (!uid_to_unix_users_sid(server_info->utok.uid, &tmp_sid)) {
DEBUG(1,("create_local_token: Failed to create SID "
"for uid %u!\n", (unsigned int)server_info->utok.uid));
}
add_sid_to_array_unique(server_info->ptok, &tmp_sid,
&server_info->ptok->user_sids,
&server_info->ptok->num_sids);
for ( i=0; i<server_info->utok.ngroups; i++ ) {
if (!gid_to_unix_groups_sid( server_info->utok.groups[i], &tmp_sid ) ) {
DEBUG(1,("create_local_token: Failed to create SID "
"for gid %u!\n", (unsigned int)server_info->utok.groups[i]));
continue;
}
add_sid_to_array_unique(server_info->ptok, &tmp_sid,
&server_info->ptok->user_sids,
&server_info->ptok->num_sids);
}
debug_nt_user_token(DBGC_AUTH, 10, server_info->ptok);
debug_unix_user_token(DBGC_AUTH, 10,
server_info->utok.uid,
server_info->utok.gid,
server_info->utok.ngroups,
server_info->utok.groups);
status = log_nt_token(server_info->ptok);
return status;
}
/*
* Create an artificial NT token given just a username. (Initially intended
* for force user)
*
* We go through lookup_name() to avoid problems we had with 'winbind use
* default domain'.
*
* We have 3 cases:
*
* unmapped unix users: Go directly to nss to find the user's group.
*
* A passdb user: The list of groups is provided by pdb_enum_group_memberships.
*
* If the user is provided by winbind, the primary gid is set to "domain
* users" of the user's domain. For an explanation why this is necessary, see
* the thread starting at
* http://lists.samba.org/archive/samba-technical/2006-January/044803.html.
*/
NTSTATUS create_token_from_username(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const char *username,
bool is_guest,
uid_t *uid, gid_t *gid,
char **found_username,
struct nt_user_token **token)
{
NTSTATUS result = NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
DOM_SID user_sid;
enum lsa_SidType type;
gid_t *gids;
DOM_SID *group_sids;
DOM_SID unix_group_sid;
size_t num_group_sids;
size_t num_gids;
size_t i;
tmp_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
DEBUG(0, ("talloc_new failed\n"));
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!lookup_name_smbconf(tmp_ctx, username, LOOKUP_NAME_ALL,
NULL, NULL, &user_sid, &type)) {
DEBUG(1, ("lookup_name_smbconf for %s failed\n", username));
goto done;
}
if (type != SID_NAME_USER) {
DEBUG(1, ("%s is a %s, not a user\n", username,
sid_type_lookup(type)));
goto done;
}
if (sid_check_is_in_our_domain(&user_sid)) {
bool ret;
/* This is a passdb user, so ask passdb */
struct samu *sam_acct = NULL;
if ( !(sam_acct = samu_new( tmp_ctx )) ) {
result = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto done;
}
become_root();
ret = pdb_getsampwsid(sam_acct, &user_sid);
unbecome_root();
if (!ret) {
DEBUG(1, ("pdb_getsampwsid(%s) for user %s failed\n",
sid_string_dbg(&user_sid), username));
DEBUGADD(1, ("Fall back to unix user %s\n", username));
goto unix_user;
}
result = pdb_enum_group_memberships(tmp_ctx, sam_acct,
&group_sids, &gids,
&num_group_sids);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
DEBUG(1, ("enum_group_memberships failed for %s (%s): "
"%s\n", username, sid_string_dbg(&user_sid),
nt_errstr(result)));
DEBUGADD(1, ("Fall back to unix user %s\n", username));
goto unix_user;
}
/* see the smb_panic() in pdb_default_enum_group_memberships */
SMB_ASSERT(num_group_sids > 0);
*gid = gids[0];
/* Ensure we're returning the found_username on the right context. */
*found_username = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx,
pdb_get_username(sam_acct));
/*
* If the SID from lookup_name() was the guest sid, passdb knows
* about the mapping of guest sid to lp_guestaccount()
* username and will return the unix_pw info for a guest
* user. Use it if it's there, else lookup the *uid details
* using getpwnam_alloc(). See bug #6291 for details. JRA.
*/
/* We must always assign the *uid. */
if (sam_acct->unix_pw == NULL) {
struct passwd *pwd = getpwnam_alloc(sam_acct, *found_username );
if (!pwd) {
DEBUG(10, ("getpwnam_alloc failed for %s\n",
*found_username));
result = NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
goto done;
}
result = samu_set_unix(sam_acct, pwd );
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
DEBUG(10, ("samu_set_unix failed for %s\n",
*found_username));
result = NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
goto done;
}
}
*uid = sam_acct->unix_pw->pw_uid;
} else if (sid_check_is_in_unix_users(&user_sid)) {
/* This is a unix user not in passdb. We need to ask nss
* directly, without consulting passdb */
struct passwd *pass;
/*
* This goto target is used as a fallback for the passdb
* case. The concrete bug report is when passdb gave us an
* unmapped gid.
*/
unix_user:
if (!sid_to_uid(&user_sid, uid)) {
DEBUG(1, ("unix_user case, sid_to_uid for %s (%s) failed\n",
username, sid_string_dbg(&user_sid)));
result = NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
goto done;
}
uid_to_unix_users_sid(*uid, &user_sid);
pass = getpwuid_alloc(tmp_ctx, *uid);
if (pass == NULL) {
DEBUG(1, ("getpwuid(%u) for user %s failed\n",
(unsigned int)*uid, username));
goto done;
}
if (!getgroups_unix_user(tmp_ctx, username, pass->pw_gid,
&gids, &num_group_sids)) {
DEBUG(1, ("getgroups_unix_user for user %s failed\n",
username));
goto done;
}
if (num_group_sids) {
group_sids = TALLOC_ARRAY(tmp_ctx, DOM_SID, num_group_sids);
if (group_sids == NULL) {
DEBUG(1, ("TALLOC_ARRAY failed\n"));
result = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto done;
}
} else {
group_sids = NULL;
}
for (i=0; i<num_group_sids; i++) {
gid_to_sid(&group_sids[i], gids[i]);
}
/* In getgroups_unix_user we always set the primary gid */
SMB_ASSERT(num_group_sids > 0);
*gid = gids[0];
/* Ensure we're returning the found_username on the right context. */
*found_username = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, pass->pw_name);
} else {
/* This user is from winbind, force the primary gid to the
* user's "domain users" group. Under certain circumstances
* (user comes from NT4), this might be a loss of
* information. But we can not rely on winbind getting the
* correct info. AD might prohibit winbind looking up that
* information. */
uint32 dummy;
/* We must always assign the *uid. */
if (!sid_to_uid(&user_sid, uid)) {
DEBUG(1, ("winbindd case, sid_to_uid for %s (%s) failed\n",
username, sid_string_dbg(&user_sid)));
result = NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
goto done;
}
num_group_sids = 1;
group_sids = TALLOC_ARRAY(tmp_ctx, DOM_SID, num_group_sids);
if (group_sids == NULL) {
DEBUG(1, ("TALLOC_ARRAY failed\n"));
result = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto done;
}
sid_copy(&group_sids[0], &user_sid);
sid_split_rid(&group_sids[0], &dummy);
sid_append_rid(&group_sids[0], DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_USERS);
if (!sid_to_gid(&group_sids[0], gid)) {
DEBUG(1, ("sid_to_gid(%s) failed\n",
sid_string_dbg(&group_sids[0])));
goto done;
}
gids = gid;
/* Ensure we're returning the found_username on the right context. */
*found_username = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, username);
}
/* Add the "Unix Group" SID for each gid to catch mapped groups
and their Unix equivalent. This is to solve the backwards
compatibility problem of 'valid users = +ntadmin' where
ntadmin has been paired with "Domain Admins" in the group
mapping table. Otherwise smb.conf would need to be changed
to 'valid user = "Domain Admins"'. --jerry */
num_gids = num_group_sids;
for ( i=0; i<num_gids; i++ ) {
gid_t high, low;
/* don't pickup anything managed by Winbind */
if ( lp_idmap_gid(&low, &high) && (gids[i] >= low) && (gids[i] <= high) )
continue;
if ( !gid_to_unix_groups_sid( gids[i], &unix_group_sid ) ) {
DEBUG(1,("create_token_from_username: Failed to create SID "
"for gid %u!\n", (unsigned int)gids[i]));
continue;
}
result = add_sid_to_array_unique(tmp_ctx, &unix_group_sid,
&group_sids, &num_group_sids);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
goto done;
}
}
/* Ensure we're creating the nt_token on the right context. */
*token = create_local_nt_token(mem_ctx, &user_sid,
is_guest, num_group_sids, group_sids);
if ((*token == NULL) || (*found_username == NULL)) {
result = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto done;
}
result = NT_STATUS_OK;
done:
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return result;
}
/***************************************************************************
Build upon create_token_from_username:
Expensive helper function to figure out whether a user given its name is
member of a particular group.
***************************************************************************/
bool user_in_group_sid(const char *username, const DOM_SID *group_sid)
{
NTSTATUS status;
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
char *found_username;
struct nt_user_token *token;
bool result;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
mem_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
if (mem_ctx == NULL) {
DEBUG(0, ("talloc_new failed\n"));
return False;
}
status = create_token_from_username(mem_ctx, username, False,
&uid, &gid, &found_username,
&token);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(10, ("could not create token for %s\n", username));
return False;
}
result = nt_token_check_sid(group_sid, token);
TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx);
return result;
}
bool user_in_group(const char *username, const char *groupname)
{
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
DOM_SID group_sid;
bool ret;
mem_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
if (mem_ctx == NULL) {
DEBUG(0, ("talloc_new failed\n"));
return False;
}
ret = lookup_name(mem_ctx, groupname, LOOKUP_NAME_ALL,
NULL, NULL, &group_sid, NULL);
TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx);
if (!ret) {
DEBUG(10, ("lookup_name for (%s) failed.\n", groupname));
return False;
}
return user_in_group_sid(username, &group_sid);
}
/***************************************************************************
Make (and fill) a server_info struct from a 'struct passwd' by conversion
to a struct samu
***************************************************************************/
NTSTATUS make_server_info_pw(struct auth_serversupplied_info **server_info,
char *unix_username,
struct passwd *pwd)
{
NTSTATUS status;
struct samu *sampass = NULL;
gid_t *gids;
char *qualified_name = NULL;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = NULL;
DOM_SID u_sid;
enum lsa_SidType type;
struct auth_serversupplied_info *result;
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
if ( !(sampass = samu_new( NULL )) ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
status = samu_set_unix( sampass, pwd );
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
return status;
}
result = make_server_info(NULL);
if (result == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
result->sam_account = sampass;
result->unix_name = talloc_strdup(result, unix_username);
result->sanitized_username = sanitize_username(result, unix_username);
if ((result->unix_name == NULL)
|| (result->sanitized_username == NULL)) {
TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
result->utok.uid = pwd->pw_uid;
result->utok.gid = pwd->pw_gid;
status = pdb_enum_group_memberships(result, sampass,
&result->sids, &gids,
&result->num_sids);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(10, ("pdb_enum_group_memberships failed: %s\n",
nt_errstr(status)));
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return status;
}
/*
* The SID returned in server_info->sam_account is based
* on our SAM sid even though for a pure UNIX account this should
* not be the case as it doesn't really exist in the SAM db.
* This causes lookups on "[in]valid users" to fail as they
* will lookup this name as a "Unix User" SID to check against
* the user token. Fix this by adding the "Unix User"\unix_username
* SID to the sid array. The correct fix should probably be
* changing the server_info->sam_account user SID to be a
* S-1-22 Unix SID, but this might break old configs where
* plaintext passwords were used with no SAM backend.
*/
mem_ctx = talloc_init("make_server_info_pw_tmp");
if (!mem_ctx) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
qualified_name = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s\\%s",
unix_users_domain_name(),
unix_username );
if (!qualified_name) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!lookup_name(mem_ctx, qualified_name, LOOKUP_NAME_ALL,
NULL, NULL,
&u_sid, &type)) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
}
TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx);
if (type != SID_NAME_USER) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
}
status = add_sid_to_array_unique(result, &u_sid,
&result->sids,
&result->num_sids);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return status;
}
/* For now we throw away the gids and convert via sid_to_gid
* later. This needs fixing, but I'd like to get the code straight and
* simple first. */
TALLOC_FREE(gids);
*server_info = result;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/***************************************************************************
Make (and fill) a user_info struct for a guest login.
This *must* succeed for smbd to start. If there is no mapping entry for
the guest gid, then create one.
***************************************************************************/
static NTSTATUS make_new_server_info_guest(struct auth_serversupplied_info **server_info)
{
NTSTATUS status;
struct samu *sampass = NULL;
DOM_SID guest_sid;
bool ret;
static const char zeros[16] = {0, };
fstring tmp;
if ( !(sampass = samu_new( NULL )) ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
sid_compose(&guest_sid, get_global_sam_sid(), DOMAIN_USER_RID_GUEST);
become_root();
ret = pdb_getsampwsid(sampass, &guest_sid);
unbecome_root();
if (!ret) {
TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
}
status = make_server_info_sam(server_info, sampass);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
return status;
}
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
(*server_info)->guest = True;
status = create_local_token(*server_info);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(10, ("create_local_token failed: %s\n",
nt_errstr(status)));
return status;
}
/* annoying, but the Guest really does have a session key, and it is
all zeros! */
(*server_info)->user_session_key = data_blob(zeros, sizeof(zeros));
(*server_info)->lm_session_key = data_blob(zeros, sizeof(zeros));
alpha_strcpy(tmp, pdb_get_username(sampass), ". _-$", sizeof(tmp));
(*server_info)->sanitized_username = talloc_strdup(*server_info, tmp);
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/****************************************************************************
Fake a auth_serversupplied_info just from a username
****************************************************************************/
NTSTATUS make_serverinfo_from_username(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const char *username,
bool is_guest,
struct auth_serversupplied_info **presult)
{
struct auth_serversupplied_info *result;
struct passwd *pwd;
NTSTATUS status;
pwd = getpwnam_alloc(talloc_tos(), username);
if (pwd == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
}
status = make_server_info_pw(&result, pwd->pw_name, pwd);
TALLOC_FREE(pwd);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
return status;
}
result->nss_token = true;
result->guest = is_guest;
status = create_local_token(result);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return status;
}
*presult = result;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
struct auth_serversupplied_info *copy_serverinfo(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const struct auth_serversupplied_info *src)
{
struct auth_serversupplied_info *dst;
dst = make_server_info(mem_ctx);
if (dst == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
dst->guest = src->guest;
dst->utok.uid = src->utok.uid;
dst->utok.gid = src->utok.gid;
dst->utok.ngroups = src->utok.ngroups;
if (src->utok.ngroups != 0) {
dst->utok.groups = (gid_t *)TALLOC_MEMDUP(
dst, src->utok.groups,
sizeof(gid_t)*dst->utok.ngroups);
} else {
dst->utok.groups = NULL;
}
if (src->ptok) {
dst->ptok = dup_nt_token(dst, src->ptok);
if (!dst->ptok) {
TALLOC_FREE(dst);
return NULL;
}
}
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
dst->user_session_key = data_blob_talloc( dst, src->user_session_key.data,
src->user_session_key.length);
dst->lm_session_key = data_blob_talloc(dst, src->lm_session_key.data,
src->lm_session_key.length);
dst->sam_account = samu_new(NULL);
if (!dst->sam_account) {
TALLOC_FREE(dst);
return NULL;
}
if (!pdb_copy_sam_account(dst->sam_account, src->sam_account)) {
TALLOC_FREE(dst);
return NULL;
}
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
dst->pam_handle = NULL;
dst->unix_name = talloc_strdup(dst, src->unix_name);
if (!dst->unix_name) {
TALLOC_FREE(dst);
return NULL;
}
dst->sanitized_username = talloc_strdup(dst, src->sanitized_username);
if (!dst->sanitized_username) {
TALLOC_FREE(dst);
return NULL;
}
return dst;
}
/*
* Set a new session key. Used in the rpc server where we have to override the
* SMB level session key with SystemLibraryDTC
*/
bool server_info_set_session_key(struct auth_serversupplied_info *info,
DATA_BLOB session_key)
{
TALLOC_FREE(info->user_session_key.data);
info->user_session_key = data_blob_talloc(
info, session_key.data, session_key.length);
return (info->user_session_key.data != NULL);
}
static struct auth_serversupplied_info *guest_info = NULL;
bool init_guest_info(void)
{
if (guest_info != NULL)
return True;
return NT_STATUS_IS_OK(make_new_server_info_guest(&guest_info));
}
NTSTATUS make_server_info_guest(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct auth_serversupplied_info **server_info)
{
*server_info = copy_serverinfo(mem_ctx, guest_info);
return (*server_info != NULL) ? NT_STATUS_OK : NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
bool copy_current_user(struct current_user *dst, struct current_user *src)
{
gid_t *groups;
NT_USER_TOKEN *nt_token;
groups = (gid_t *)memdup(src->ut.groups,
sizeof(gid_t) * src->ut.ngroups);
if ((src->ut.ngroups != 0) && (groups == NULL)) {
return False;
}
nt_token = dup_nt_token(NULL, src->nt_user_token);
if (nt_token == NULL) {
SAFE_FREE(groups);
return False;
}
dst->conn = src->conn;
dst->vuid = src->vuid;
dst->ut.uid = src->ut.uid;
dst->ut.gid = src->ut.gid;
dst->ut.ngroups = src->ut.ngroups;
dst->ut.groups = groups;
dst->nt_user_token = nt_token;
return True;
}
/***************************************************************************
Purely internal function for make_server_info_info3
Fill the sam account from getpwnam
***************************************************************************/
static NTSTATUS fill_sam_account(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const char *domain,
const char *username,
char **found_username,
uid_t *uid, gid_t *gid,
struct samu *account,
bool *username_was_mapped)
{
struct smbd_server_connection *sconn = smbd_server_conn;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
fstring dom_user, lower_username;
fstring real_username;
struct passwd *passwd;
fstrcpy( lower_username, username );
strlower_m( lower_username );
fstr_sprintf(dom_user, "%s%c%s", domain, *lp_winbind_separator(),
lower_username);
/* Get the passwd struct. Try to create the account is necessary. */
*username_was_mapped = map_username(sconn, dom_user);
if ( !(passwd = smb_getpwnam( NULL, dom_user, real_username, True )) )
return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
*uid = passwd->pw_uid;
*gid = passwd->pw_gid;
/* This is pointless -- there is no suport for differing
unix and windows names. Make sure to always store the
one we actually looked up and succeeded. Have I mentioned
why I hate the 'winbind use default domain' parameter?
--jerry */
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
*found_username = talloc_strdup( mem_ctx, real_username );
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
DEBUG(5,("fill_sam_account: located username was [%s]\n", *found_username));
nt_status = samu_set_unix( account, passwd );
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
TALLOC_FREE(passwd);
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
return nt_status;
}
/****************************************************************************
Wrapper to allow the getpwnam() call to strip the domain name and
try again in case a local UNIX user is already there. Also run through
the username if we fallback to the username only.
****************************************************************************/
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
struct passwd *smb_getpwnam( TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, char *domuser,
fstring save_username, bool create )
{
struct passwd *pw = NULL;
char *p;
fstring username;
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
/* we only save a copy of the username it has been mangled
by winbindd use default domain */
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
save_username[0] = '\0';
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
/* don't call map_username() here since it has to be done higher
up the stack so we don't call it mutliple times */
fstrcpy( username, domuser );
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
p = strchr_m( username, *lp_winbind_separator() );
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
/* code for a DOMAIN\user string */
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
if ( p ) {
fstring strip_username;
pw = Get_Pwnam_alloc( mem_ctx, domuser );
if ( pw ) {
/* make sure we get the case of the username correct */
/* work around 'winbind use default domain = yes' */
if ( !strchr_m( pw->pw_name, *lp_winbind_separator() ) ) {
char *domain;
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
/* split the domain and username into 2 strings */
*p = '\0';
domain = username;
fstr_sprintf(save_username, "%s%c%s", domain, *lp_winbind_separator(), pw->pw_name);
}
else
fstrcpy( save_username, pw->pw_name );
/* whew -- done! */
return pw;
}
/* setup for lookup of just the username */
/* remember that p and username are overlapping memory */
p++;
fstrcpy( strip_username, p );
fstrcpy( username, strip_username );
}
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
/* just lookup a plain username */
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
pw = Get_Pwnam_alloc(mem_ctx, username);
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
/* Create local user if requested but only if winbindd
is not running. We need to protect against cases
where winbindd is failing and then prematurely
creating users in /etc/passwd */
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
if ( !pw && create && !winbind_ping() ) {
/* Don't add a machine account. */
if (username[strlen(username)-1] == '$')
return NULL;
_smb_create_user(NULL, username, NULL);
pw = Get_Pwnam_alloc(mem_ctx, username);
}
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
/* one last check for a valid passwd struct */
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
if ( pw )
fstrcpy( save_username, pw->pw_name );
return pw;
}
/***************************************************************************
Make a server_info struct from the info3 returned by a domain logon
***************************************************************************/
NTSTATUS make_server_info_info3(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const char *sent_nt_username,
const char *domain,
struct auth_serversupplied_info **server_info,
struct netr_SamInfo3 *info3)
{
static const char zeros[16] = {0, };
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
NTSTATUS nt_status = NT_STATUS_OK;
char *found_username = NULL;
const char *nt_domain;
const char *nt_username;
struct samu *sam_account = NULL;
DOM_SID user_sid;
DOM_SID group_sid;
bool username_was_mapped;
uid_t uid = (uid_t)-1;
gid_t gid = (gid_t)-1;
struct auth_serversupplied_info *result;
/*
Here is where we should check the list of
trusted domains, and verify that the SID
matches.
*/
if (!sid_compose(&user_sid, info3->base.domain_sid, info3->base.rid)) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
if (!sid_compose(&group_sid, info3->base.domain_sid,
info3->base.primary_gid)) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
nt_username = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, info3->base.account_name.string);
if (!nt_username) {
/* If the server didn't give us one, just use the one we sent
* them */
nt_username = sent_nt_username;
}
nt_domain = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, info3->base.domain.string);
if (!nt_domain) {
/* If the server didn't give us one, just use the one we sent
* them */
nt_domain = domain;
}
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
/* try to fill the SAM account.. If getpwnam() fails, then try the
add user script (2.2.x behavior).
We use the _unmapped_ username here in an attempt to provide
consistent username mapping behavior between kerberos and NTLM[SSP]
authentication in domain mode security. I.E. Username mapping
should be applied to the fully qualified username
(e.g. DOMAIN\user) and not just the login name. Yes this means we
called map_username() unnecessarily in make_user_info_map() but
that is how the current code is designed. Making the change here
is the least disruptive place. -- jerry */
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
if ( !(sam_account = samu_new( NULL )) ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
/* this call will try to create the user if necessary */
nt_status = fill_sam_account(mem_ctx, nt_domain, sent_nt_username,
&found_username, &uid, &gid, sam_account,
&username_was_mapped);
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
/* if we still don't have a valid unix account check for
'map to guest = bad uid' */
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
TALLOC_FREE( sam_account );
if ( lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_UID ) {
make_server_info_guest(NULL, server_info);
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
return nt_status;
}
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
if (!pdb_set_nt_username(sam_account, nt_username, PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(sam_account);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!pdb_set_username(sam_account, nt_username, PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(sam_account);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!pdb_set_domain(sam_account, nt_domain, PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(sam_account);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!pdb_set_user_sid(sam_account, &user_sid, PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(sam_account);
return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
}
if (!pdb_set_group_sid(sam_account, &group_sid, PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(sam_account);
return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
}
if (!pdb_set_fullname(sam_account,
info3->base.full_name.string,
PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(sam_account);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!pdb_set_logon_script(sam_account,
info3->base.logon_script.string,
PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(sam_account);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!pdb_set_profile_path(sam_account,
info3->base.profile_path.string,
PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(sam_account);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!pdb_set_homedir(sam_account,
info3->base.home_directory.string,
PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(sam_account);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!pdb_set_dir_drive(sam_account,
info3->base.home_drive.string,
PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(sam_account);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!pdb_set_acct_ctrl(sam_account, info3->base.acct_flags, PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(sam_account);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!pdb_set_pass_last_set_time(
sam_account,
nt_time_to_unix(info3->base.last_password_change),
PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(sam_account);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!pdb_set_pass_can_change_time(
sam_account,
nt_time_to_unix(info3->base.allow_password_change),
PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(sam_account);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!pdb_set_pass_must_change_time(
sam_account,
nt_time_to_unix(info3->base.force_password_change),
PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(sam_account);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
result = make_server_info(NULL);
if (result == NULL) {
DEBUG(4, ("make_server_info failed!\n"));
TALLOC_FREE(sam_account);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
Here's the code to make winbindd work on a Samba DC to handle domain trusts. Jeremy and I talked about this and it's going in as working code. It keeps winbind clean and solves the trust problem with minimal changes. To summarize, there are 2 basic cases where the deadlock would occur. (1) lookuping up secondary groups for a user, and (2) get[gr|pw]nam() calls that fall through the NSS layer because they don't exist anywhere. o To handle case #1, we bypass winbindd in sys_getgrouplist() unless the username includes the 'winbind separator'. o Case #2 is handled by adding checks in winbindd to return failure if we are a DC and the domain matches our own. This code has been tested using basic share connections, domain logons, and with pam_winbind (both with and without 'winbind use default domain'). The 'trustdomain' auth module should work as well if an admin wants to manually create UNIX users for acounts in the trusted domains. Other misc fixes: * we need to fix check_ntlm_password() to be able to determine if an auth module is authoritative over a user (NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD, etc...). I worked around my specific situation, but this needs to be fixed. the winbindd auth module was causing delays. * fix named server mutex deadlock between trust domain auth module and winbindd looking up a uid * make sure SAM_ACCOUNT gets stored in the server_info struct for the _net_sam_logon() reply. Configuration details: The recommended method for supporting trusts is to use winbind. The gets us around some of the server mutex issues as well. * set 'files winbind' for passwd: and group: in /etc/nsswitch.conf * create domain trusts like normal * join winbind on the pdc to the Samba domain using 'net rpc join' * add normal parameters to smb.conf for winbind * set 'auth method = guest sam winbind' * start smbd, nmbd, & winbindd Problems that remain: * join a Windows 2k/XP box to a Samba domain. * create a 2-way trust between the Samba domain and an NT domain * logon to the windows client as a user from theh trusted domain * try to browse server in the trusted domain (or other workstations). an NT client seems to work ok, but 2k and XP either prompt for passwords or fail with errors. apparanently this never got tested since no one has ever been able to logon as a trusted user to a Samba domain from a Windows client. (This used to be commit f804b590f9dbf1f0147c06a0a2f12e221ae6fc3b)
2003-06-29 07:39:50 +04:00
/* save this here to _net_sam_logon() doesn't fail (it assumes a
valid struct samu) */
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
result->sam_account = sam_account;
result->unix_name = talloc_strdup(result, found_username);
result->sanitized_username = sanitize_username(result,
result->unix_name);
if (result->sanitized_username == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
/* Fill in the unix info we found on the way */
result->utok.uid = uid;
result->utok.gid = gid;
/* Create a 'combined' list of all SIDs we might want in the SD */
result->num_sids = 0;
result->sids = NULL;
nt_status = sid_array_from_info3(result, info3,
&result->sids,
&result->num_sids,
false, false);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return nt_status;
}
/* Ensure the primary group sid is at position 0. */
sort_sid_array_for_smbd(result, &group_sid);
result->login_server = talloc_strdup(result,
info3->base.logon_server.string);
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
/* ensure we are never given NULL session keys */
if (memcmp(info3->base.key.key, zeros, sizeof(zeros)) == 0) {
result->user_session_key = data_blob_null;
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
} else {
result->user_session_key = data_blob_talloc(
result, info3->base.key.key,
sizeof(info3->base.key.key));
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
}
2003-03-24 12:54:13 +03:00
if (memcmp(info3->base.LMSessKey.key, zeros, 8) == 0) {
result->lm_session_key = data_blob_null;
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
} else {
result->lm_session_key = data_blob_talloc(
result, info3->base.LMSessKey.key,
sizeof(info3->base.LMSessKey.key));
}
result->nss_token |= username_was_mapped;
*server_info = result;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/*****************************************************************************
Make a server_info struct from the wbcAuthUserInfo returned by a domain logon
******************************************************************************/
NTSTATUS make_server_info_wbcAuthUserInfo(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const char *sent_nt_username,
const char *domain,
const struct wbcAuthUserInfo *info,
struct auth_serversupplied_info **server_info)
{
static const char zeros[16] = {0, };
NTSTATUS nt_status = NT_STATUS_OK;
char *found_username = NULL;
const char *nt_domain;
const char *nt_username;
struct samu *sam_account = NULL;
DOM_SID user_sid;
DOM_SID group_sid;
bool username_was_mapped;
uint32_t i;
uid_t uid = (uid_t)-1;
gid_t gid = (gid_t)-1;
struct auth_serversupplied_info *result;
result = make_server_info(NULL);
if (result == NULL) {
DEBUG(4, ("make_server_info failed!\n"));
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
/*
Here is where we should check the list of
trusted domains, and verify that the SID
matches.
*/
memcpy(&user_sid, &info->sids[0].sid, sizeof(user_sid));
memcpy(&group_sid, &info->sids[1].sid, sizeof(group_sid));
if (info->account_name) {
nt_username = talloc_strdup(result, info->account_name);
} else {
/* If the server didn't give us one, just use the one we sent
* them */
nt_username = talloc_strdup(result, sent_nt_username);
}
if (!nt_username) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (info->domain_name) {
nt_domain = talloc_strdup(result, info->domain_name);
} else {
/* If the server didn't give us one, just use the one we sent
* them */
nt_domain = talloc_strdup(result, domain);
}
if (!nt_domain) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
/* try to fill the SAM account.. If getpwnam() fails, then try the
add user script (2.2.x behavior).
We use the _unmapped_ username here in an attempt to provide
consistent username mapping behavior between kerberos and NTLM[SSP]
authentication in domain mode security. I.E. Username mapping
should be applied to the fully qualified username
(e.g. DOMAIN\user) and not just the login name. Yes this means we
called map_username() unnecessarily in make_user_info_map() but
that is how the current code is designed. Making the change here
is the least disruptive place. -- jerry */
if ( !(sam_account = samu_new( result )) ) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
/* this call will try to create the user if necessary */
nt_status = fill_sam_account(result, nt_domain, sent_nt_username,
&found_username, &uid, &gid, sam_account,
&username_was_mapped);
/* if we still don't have a valid unix account check for
'map to guest = bad uid' */
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
TALLOC_FREE( result );
if ( lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_UID ) {
make_server_info_guest(NULL, server_info);
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
return nt_status;
}
if (!pdb_set_nt_username(sam_account, nt_username, PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!pdb_set_username(sam_account, nt_username, PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!pdb_set_domain(sam_account, nt_domain, PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!pdb_set_user_sid(sam_account, &user_sid, PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
}
if (!pdb_set_group_sid(sam_account, &group_sid, PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
}
if (!pdb_set_fullname(sam_account, info->full_name, PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!pdb_set_logon_script(sam_account, info->logon_script, PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!pdb_set_profile_path(sam_account, info->profile_path, PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!pdb_set_homedir(sam_account, info->home_directory, PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!pdb_set_dir_drive(sam_account, info->home_drive, PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!pdb_set_acct_ctrl(sam_account, info->acct_flags, PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!pdb_set_pass_last_set_time(
sam_account,
nt_time_to_unix(info->pass_last_set_time),
PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!pdb_set_pass_can_change_time(
sam_account,
nt_time_to_unix(info->pass_can_change_time),
PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!pdb_set_pass_must_change_time(
sam_account,
nt_time_to_unix(info->pass_must_change_time),
PDB_CHANGED)) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
/* save this here to _net_sam_logon() doesn't fail (it assumes a
valid struct samu) */
result->sam_account = sam_account;
result->unix_name = talloc_strdup(result, found_username);
result->sanitized_username = sanitize_username(result,
result->unix_name);
result->login_server = talloc_strdup(result, info->logon_server);
if ((result->unix_name == NULL)
|| (result->sanitized_username == NULL)
|| (result->login_server == NULL)) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
/* Fill in the unix info we found on the way */
result->utok.uid = uid;
result->utok.gid = gid;
/* Create a 'combined' list of all SIDs we might want in the SD */
result->num_sids = info->num_sids - 2;
result->sids = talloc_array(result, DOM_SID, result->num_sids);
if (result->sids == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(result);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
for (i=0; i < result->num_sids; i++) {
memcpy(&result->sids[i], &info->sids[i+2].sid, sizeof(result->sids[i]));
}
/* Ensure the primary group sid is at position 0. */
sort_sid_array_for_smbd(result, &group_sid);
/* ensure we are never given NULL session keys */
if (memcmp(info->user_session_key, zeros, sizeof(zeros)) == 0) {
result->user_session_key = data_blob_null;
} else {
result->user_session_key = data_blob_talloc(
result, info->user_session_key,
sizeof(info->user_session_key));
}
if (memcmp(info->lm_session_key, zeros, 8) == 0) {
result->lm_session_key = data_blob_null;
} else {
result->lm_session_key = data_blob_talloc(
result, info->lm_session_key,
sizeof(info->lm_session_key));
}
result->nss_token |= username_was_mapped;
*server_info = result;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/***************************************************************************
Free a user_info struct
***************************************************************************/
void free_user_info(struct auth_usersupplied_info **user_info)
{
DEBUG(5,("attempting to free (and zero) a user_info structure\n"));
if (*user_info != NULL) {
if ((*user_info)->smb_name) {
DEBUG(10,("structure was created for %s\n",
(*user_info)->smb_name));
}
SAFE_FREE((*user_info)->smb_name);
SAFE_FREE((*user_info)->internal_username);
SAFE_FREE((*user_info)->client_domain);
SAFE_FREE((*user_info)->domain);
SAFE_FREE((*user_info)->wksta_name);
data_blob_free(&(*user_info)->lm_resp);
data_blob_free(&(*user_info)->nt_resp);
data_blob_clear_free(&(*user_info)->lm_interactive_pwd);
data_blob_clear_free(&(*user_info)->nt_interactive_pwd);
data_blob_clear_free(&(*user_info)->plaintext_password);
ZERO_STRUCT(**user_info);
}
SAFE_FREE(*user_info);
}
This is another rather major change to the samba authenticaion subystem. The particular aim is to modularized the interface - so that we can have arbitrary password back-ends. This code adds one such back-end, a 'winbind' module to authenticate against the winbind_auth_crap functionality. While fully-functional this code is mainly useful as a demonstration, because we don't get back the info3 as we would for direct ntdomain authentication. This commit introduced the new 'auth methods' parameter, in the spirit of the 'auth order' discussed on the lists. It is renamed because not all the methods may be consulted, even if previous methods fail - they may not have a suitable challenge for example. Also, we have a 'local' authentication method, for old-style 'unix if plaintext, sam if encrypted' authentication and a 'guest' module to handle guest logins in a single place. While this current design is not ideal, I feel that it does provide a better infrastructure than the current design, and can be built upon. The following parameters have changed: - use rhosts = This has been replaced by the 'rhosts' authentication method, and can be specified like 'auth methods = guest rhosts' - hosts equiv = This needs both this parameter and an 'auth methods' entry to be effective. (auth methods = guest hostsequiv ....) - plaintext to smbpasswd = This is replaced by specifying 'sam' rather than 'local' in the auth methods. The security = parameter is unchanged, and now provides defaults for the 'auth methods' parameter. The available auth methods are: guest rhosts hostsequiv sam (passdb direct hash access) unix (PAM, crypt() etc) local (the combination of the above, based on encryption) smbserver (old security=server) ntdomain (old security=domain) winbind (use winbind to cache DC connections) Assistance in testing, or the production of new and interesting authentication modules is always appreciated. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 8d31eae52a9757739711dbb82035a4dfe6b40c99)
2001-11-24 15:12:38 +03:00
/***************************************************************************
Make an auth_methods struct
***************************************************************************/
bool make_auth_methods(struct auth_context *auth_context, auth_methods **auth_method)
This is another rather major change to the samba authenticaion subystem. The particular aim is to modularized the interface - so that we can have arbitrary password back-ends. This code adds one such back-end, a 'winbind' module to authenticate against the winbind_auth_crap functionality. While fully-functional this code is mainly useful as a demonstration, because we don't get back the info3 as we would for direct ntdomain authentication. This commit introduced the new 'auth methods' parameter, in the spirit of the 'auth order' discussed on the lists. It is renamed because not all the methods may be consulted, even if previous methods fail - they may not have a suitable challenge for example. Also, we have a 'local' authentication method, for old-style 'unix if plaintext, sam if encrypted' authentication and a 'guest' module to handle guest logins in a single place. While this current design is not ideal, I feel that it does provide a better infrastructure than the current design, and can be built upon. The following parameters have changed: - use rhosts = This has been replaced by the 'rhosts' authentication method, and can be specified like 'auth methods = guest rhosts' - hosts equiv = This needs both this parameter and an 'auth methods' entry to be effective. (auth methods = guest hostsequiv ....) - plaintext to smbpasswd = This is replaced by specifying 'sam' rather than 'local' in the auth methods. The security = parameter is unchanged, and now provides defaults for the 'auth methods' parameter. The available auth methods are: guest rhosts hostsequiv sam (passdb direct hash access) unix (PAM, crypt() etc) local (the combination of the above, based on encryption) smbserver (old security=server) ntdomain (old security=domain) winbind (use winbind to cache DC connections) Assistance in testing, or the production of new and interesting authentication modules is always appreciated. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 8d31eae52a9757739711dbb82035a4dfe6b40c99)
2001-11-24 15:12:38 +03:00
{
if (!auth_context) {
smb_panic("no auth_context supplied to "
"make_auth_methods()!\n");
}
if (!auth_method) {
smb_panic("make_auth_methods: pointer to auth_method pointer "
"is NULL!\n");
}
*auth_method = TALLOC_P(auth_context->mem_ctx, auth_methods);
This is another rather major change to the samba authenticaion subystem. The particular aim is to modularized the interface - so that we can have arbitrary password back-ends. This code adds one such back-end, a 'winbind' module to authenticate against the winbind_auth_crap functionality. While fully-functional this code is mainly useful as a demonstration, because we don't get back the info3 as we would for direct ntdomain authentication. This commit introduced the new 'auth methods' parameter, in the spirit of the 'auth order' discussed on the lists. It is renamed because not all the methods may be consulted, even if previous methods fail - they may not have a suitable challenge for example. Also, we have a 'local' authentication method, for old-style 'unix if plaintext, sam if encrypted' authentication and a 'guest' module to handle guest logins in a single place. While this current design is not ideal, I feel that it does provide a better infrastructure than the current design, and can be built upon. The following parameters have changed: - use rhosts = This has been replaced by the 'rhosts' authentication method, and can be specified like 'auth methods = guest rhosts' - hosts equiv = This needs both this parameter and an 'auth methods' entry to be effective. (auth methods = guest hostsequiv ....) - plaintext to smbpasswd = This is replaced by specifying 'sam' rather than 'local' in the auth methods. The security = parameter is unchanged, and now provides defaults for the 'auth methods' parameter. The available auth methods are: guest rhosts hostsequiv sam (passdb direct hash access) unix (PAM, crypt() etc) local (the combination of the above, based on encryption) smbserver (old security=server) ntdomain (old security=domain) winbind (use winbind to cache DC connections) Assistance in testing, or the production of new and interesting authentication modules is always appreciated. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 8d31eae52a9757739711dbb82035a4dfe6b40c99)
2001-11-24 15:12:38 +03:00
if (!*auth_method) {
DEBUG(0,("make_auth_method: malloc failed!\n"));
return False;
}
ZERO_STRUCTP(*auth_method);
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
This is another rather major change to the samba authenticaion subystem. The particular aim is to modularized the interface - so that we can have arbitrary password back-ends. This code adds one such back-end, a 'winbind' module to authenticate against the winbind_auth_crap functionality. While fully-functional this code is mainly useful as a demonstration, because we don't get back the info3 as we would for direct ntdomain authentication. This commit introduced the new 'auth methods' parameter, in the spirit of the 'auth order' discussed on the lists. It is renamed because not all the methods may be consulted, even if previous methods fail - they may not have a suitable challenge for example. Also, we have a 'local' authentication method, for old-style 'unix if plaintext, sam if encrypted' authentication and a 'guest' module to handle guest logins in a single place. While this current design is not ideal, I feel that it does provide a better infrastructure than the current design, and can be built upon. The following parameters have changed: - use rhosts = This has been replaced by the 'rhosts' authentication method, and can be specified like 'auth methods = guest rhosts' - hosts equiv = This needs both this parameter and an 'auth methods' entry to be effective. (auth methods = guest hostsequiv ....) - plaintext to smbpasswd = This is replaced by specifying 'sam' rather than 'local' in the auth methods. The security = parameter is unchanged, and now provides defaults for the 'auth methods' parameter. The available auth methods are: guest rhosts hostsequiv sam (passdb direct hash access) unix (PAM, crypt() etc) local (the combination of the above, based on encryption) smbserver (old security=server) ntdomain (old security=domain) winbind (use winbind to cache DC connections) Assistance in testing, or the production of new and interesting authentication modules is always appreciated. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 8d31eae52a9757739711dbb82035a4dfe6b40c99)
2001-11-24 15:12:38 +03:00
return True;
}
/**
* Verify whether or not given domain is trusted.
*
* @param domain_name name of the domain to be verified
2009-11-14 03:23:05 +03:00
* @return true if domain is one of the trusted ones or
* false if otherwise
**/
bool is_trusted_domain(const char* dom_name)
{
DOM_SID trustdom_sid;
bool ret;
/* no trusted domains for a standalone server */
if ( lp_server_role() == ROLE_STANDALONE )
return False;
if (dom_name == NULL || dom_name[0] == '\0') {
return false;
}
if (strequal(dom_name, get_global_sam_name())) {
return false;
}
/* if we are a DC, then check for a direct trust relationships */
if ( IS_DC ) {
become_root();
DEBUG (5,("is_trusted_domain: Checking for domain trust with "
"[%s]\n", dom_name ));
ret = pdb_get_trusteddom_pw(dom_name, NULL, NULL, NULL);
unbecome_root();
if (ret)
return True;
}
else {
wbcErr result;
/* If winbind is around, ask it */
result = wb_is_trusted_domain(dom_name);
if (result == WBC_ERR_SUCCESS) {
return True;
}
if (result == WBC_ERR_DOMAIN_NOT_FOUND) {
/* winbind could not find the domain */
return False;
}
/* The only other possible result is that winbind is not up
and running. We need to update the trustdom_cache
ourselves */
2010-02-17 00:07:22 +03:00
update_trustdom_cache();
}
/* now the trustdom cache should be available a DC could still
* have a transitive trust so fall back to the cache of trusted
* domains (like a domain member would use */
if ( trustdom_cache_fetch(dom_name, &trustdom_sid) ) {
return True;
}
return False;
}