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samba-mirror/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c

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/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
SMB client generic functions
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1994-1998
Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 2007.
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "includes.h"
/*******************************************************************
Setup the word count and byte count for a client smb message.
********************************************************************/
int cli_set_message(char *buf,int num_words,int num_bytes,bool zero)
{
if (zero && (num_words || num_bytes)) {
memset(buf + smb_size,'\0',num_words*2 + num_bytes);
}
SCVAL(buf,smb_wct,num_words);
SSVAL(buf,smb_vwv + num_words*SIZEOFWORD,num_bytes);
smb_setlen(buf,smb_size + num_words*2 + num_bytes - 4);
return (smb_size + num_words*2 + num_bytes);
}
/****************************************************************************
Change the timeout (in milliseconds).
****************************************************************************/
unsigned int cli_set_timeout(struct cli_state *cli, unsigned int timeout)
{
unsigned int old_timeout = cli->timeout;
cli->timeout = timeout;
return old_timeout;
}
/****************************************************************************
Change the port number used to call on.
****************************************************************************/
void cli_set_port(struct cli_state *cli, int port)
{
cli->port = port;
}
2009-01-25 23:55:05 +03:00
/****************************************************************************
convenience routine to find if we negotiated ucs2
****************************************************************************/
bool cli_ucs2(struct cli_state *cli)
{
return ((cli->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) != 0);
}
/****************************************************************************
Read an smb from a fd ignoring all keepalive packets.
The timeout is in milliseconds
This is exactly the same as receive_smb except that it never returns
a session keepalive packet (just as receive_smb used to do).
receive_smb was changed to return keepalives as the oplock processing means this call
should never go into a blocking read.
****************************************************************************/
static ssize_t client_receive_smb(struct cli_state *cli, size_t maxlen)
{
size_t len;
for(;;) {
NTSTATUS status;
set_smb_read_error(&cli->smb_rw_error, SMB_READ_OK);
status = receive_smb_raw(cli->fd, cli->inbuf, cli->bufsize,
cli->timeout, maxlen, &len);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(10,("client_receive_smb failed\n"));
show_msg(cli->inbuf);
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_END_OF_FILE)) {
set_smb_read_error(&cli->smb_rw_error,
SMB_READ_EOF);
return -1;
}
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_IO_TIMEOUT)) {
set_smb_read_error(&cli->smb_rw_error,
SMB_READ_TIMEOUT);
return -1;
}
set_smb_read_error(&cli->smb_rw_error, SMB_READ_ERROR);
return -1;
}
/*
* I don't believe len can be < 0 with NT_STATUS_OK
* returned above, but this check doesn't hurt. JRA.
*/
if ((ssize_t)len < 0) {
return len;
}
/* Ignore session keepalive packets. */
if(CVAL(cli->inbuf,0) != SMBkeepalive) {
break;
}
}
if (cli_encryption_on(cli)) {
NTSTATUS status = cli_decrypt_message(cli);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(0, ("SMB decryption failed on incoming packet! Error %s\n",
nt_errstr(status)));
cli->smb_rw_error = SMB_READ_BAD_DECRYPT;
return -1;
}
}
show_msg(cli->inbuf);
return len;
}
static bool cli_state_set_seqnum(struct cli_state *cli, uint16_t mid, uint32_t seqnum)
{
struct cli_state_seqnum *c;
for (c = cli->seqnum; c; c = c->next) {
if (c->mid == mid) {
c->seqnum = seqnum;
return true;
}
}
c = talloc_zero(cli, struct cli_state_seqnum);
if (!c) {
return false;
}
c->mid = mid;
c->seqnum = seqnum;
c->persistent = false;
DLIST_ADD_END(cli->seqnum, c, struct cli_state_seqnum *);
return true;
}
bool cli_state_seqnum_persistent(struct cli_state *cli,
uint16_t mid)
{
struct cli_state_seqnum *c;
for (c = cli->seqnum; c; c = c->next) {
if (c->mid == mid) {
c->persistent = true;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
bool cli_state_seqnum_remove(struct cli_state *cli,
uint16_t mid)
{
struct cli_state_seqnum *c;
for (c = cli->seqnum; c; c = c->next) {
if (c->mid == mid) {
DLIST_REMOVE(cli->seqnum, c);
TALLOC_FREE(c);
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
static uint32_t cli_state_get_seqnum(struct cli_state *cli, uint16_t mid)
{
struct cli_state_seqnum *c;
for (c = cli->seqnum; c; c = c->next) {
if (c->mid == mid) {
uint32_t seqnum = c->seqnum;
if (!c->persistent) {
DLIST_REMOVE(cli->seqnum, c);
TALLOC_FREE(c);
}
return seqnum;
}
}
return 0;
}
/****************************************************************************
Recv an smb.
****************************************************************************/
bool cli_receive_smb(struct cli_state *cli)
{
ssize_t len;
uint16_t mid;
uint32_t seqnum;
/* fd == -1 causes segfaults -- Tom (tom@ninja.nl) */
if (cli->fd == -1)
return false;
again:
len = client_receive_smb(cli, 0);
if (len > 0) {
/* it might be an oplock break request */
if (!(CVAL(cli->inbuf, smb_flg) & FLAG_REPLY) &&
CVAL(cli->inbuf,smb_com) == SMBlockingX &&
SVAL(cli->inbuf,smb_vwv6) == 0 &&
SVAL(cli->inbuf,smb_vwv7) == 0) {
if (cli->oplock_handler) {
int fnum = SVAL(cli->inbuf,smb_vwv2);
unsigned char level = CVAL(cli->inbuf,smb_vwv3+1);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(cli->oplock_handler(cli, fnum, level))) {
return false;
}
}
/* try to prevent loops */
SCVAL(cli->inbuf,smb_com,0xFF);
goto again;
}
}
/* If the server is not responding, note that now */
if (len < 0) {
DEBUG(0, ("Receiving SMB: Server stopped responding\n"));
close(cli->fd);
cli->fd = -1;
return false;
}
mid = SVAL(cli->inbuf,smb_mid);
seqnum = cli_state_get_seqnum(cli, mid);
if (!cli_check_sign_mac(cli, cli->inbuf, seqnum+1)) {
/*
* If we get a signature failure in sessionsetup, then
* the server sometimes just reflects the sent signature
* back to us. Detect this and allow the upper layer to
* retrieve the correct Windows error message.
*/
if (CVAL(cli->outbuf,smb_com) == SMBsesssetupX &&
(smb_len(cli->inbuf) > (smb_ss_field + 8 - 4)) &&
(SVAL(cli->inbuf,smb_flg2) & FLAGS2_SMB_SECURITY_SIGNATURES) &&
memcmp(&cli->outbuf[smb_ss_field],&cli->inbuf[smb_ss_field],8) == 0 &&
cli_is_error(cli)) {
/*
* Reflected signature on login error.
* Set bad sig but don't close fd.
*/
cli->smb_rw_error = SMB_READ_BAD_SIG;
return true;
}
DEBUG(0, ("SMB Signature verification failed on incoming packet!\n"));
cli->smb_rw_error = SMB_READ_BAD_SIG;
close(cli->fd);
cli->fd = -1;
return false;
};
return true;
}
/****************************************************************************
Read the data portion of a readX smb.
The timeout is in milliseconds
****************************************************************************/
ssize_t cli_receive_smb_data(struct cli_state *cli, char *buffer, size_t len)
{
NTSTATUS status;
set_smb_read_error(&cli->smb_rw_error, SMB_READ_OK);
status = read_fd_with_timeout(
cli->fd, buffer, len, len, cli->timeout, NULL);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
return len;
}
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_END_OF_FILE)) {
set_smb_read_error(&cli->smb_rw_error, SMB_READ_EOF);
return -1;
}
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_IO_TIMEOUT)) {
set_smb_read_error(&cli->smb_rw_error, SMB_READ_TIMEOUT);
return -1;
}
set_smb_read_error(&cli->smb_rw_error, SMB_READ_ERROR);
return -1;
}
static ssize_t write_socket(int fd, const char *buf, size_t len)
{
ssize_t ret=0;
DEBUG(6,("write_socket(%d,%d)\n",fd,(int)len));
ret = write_data(fd,buf,len);
DEBUG(6,("write_socket(%d,%d) wrote %d\n",fd,(int)len,(int)ret));
if(ret <= 0)
DEBUG(0,("write_socket: Error writing %d bytes to socket %d: ERRNO = %s\n",
(int)len, fd, strerror(errno) ));
return(ret);
}
/****************************************************************************
Send an smb to a fd.
****************************************************************************/
bool cli_send_smb(struct cli_state *cli)
{
size_t len;
size_t nwritten=0;
ssize_t ret;
char *buf_out = cli->outbuf;
bool enc_on = cli_encryption_on(cli);
uint32_t seqnum;
/* fd == -1 causes segfaults -- Tom (tom@ninja.nl) */
if (cli->fd == -1)
return false;
cli_calculate_sign_mac(cli, cli->outbuf, &seqnum);
if (!cli_state_set_seqnum(cli, cli->mid, seqnum)) {
DEBUG(0,("Failed to store mid[%u]/seqnum[%u]\n",
(unsigned int)cli->mid,
(unsigned int)seqnum));
return false;
}
if (enc_on) {
NTSTATUS status = cli_encrypt_message(cli, cli->outbuf,
&buf_out);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
close(cli->fd);
cli->fd = -1;
cli->smb_rw_error = SMB_WRITE_ERROR;
DEBUG(0,("Error in encrypting client message. Error %s\n",
nt_errstr(status) ));
return false;
}
}
len = smb_len(buf_out) + 4;
while (nwritten < len) {
ret = write_socket(cli->fd,buf_out+nwritten,len - nwritten);
if (ret <= 0) {
if (enc_on) {
cli_free_enc_buffer(cli, buf_out);
}
close(cli->fd);
cli->fd = -1;
cli->smb_rw_error = SMB_WRITE_ERROR;
DEBUG(0,("Error writing %d bytes to client. %d (%s)\n",
(int)len,(int)ret, strerror(errno) ));
return false;
}
nwritten += ret;
}
if (enc_on) {
cli_free_enc_buffer(cli, buf_out);
}
/* Increment the mid so we can tell between responses. */
cli->mid++;
if (!cli->mid)
cli->mid++;
return true;
}
/****************************************************************************
Send a "direct" writeX smb to a fd.
****************************************************************************/
bool cli_send_smb_direct_writeX(struct cli_state *cli,
const char *p,
size_t extradata)
{
/* First length to send is the offset to the data. */
size_t len = SVAL(cli->outbuf,smb_vwv11) + 4;
size_t nwritten=0;
struct iovec iov[2];
/* fd == -1 causes segfaults -- Tom (tom@ninja.nl) */
if (cli->fd == -1) {
return false;
}
if (client_is_signing_on(cli)) {
DEBUG(0,("cli_send_smb_large: cannot send signed packet.\n"));
return false;
}
iov[0].iov_base = (void *)cli->outbuf;
iov[0].iov_len = len;
iov[1].iov_base = CONST_DISCARD(void *, p);
iov[1].iov_len = extradata;
nwritten = write_data_iov(cli->fd, iov, 2);
if (nwritten < (len + extradata)) {
close(cli->fd);
cli->fd = -1;
cli->smb_rw_error = SMB_WRITE_ERROR;
DEBUG(0,("Error writing %d bytes to client. (%s)\n",
(int)(len+extradata), strerror(errno)));
return false;
}
/* Increment the mid so we can tell between responses. */
cli->mid++;
if (!cli->mid)
cli->mid++;
return true;
}
/****************************************************************************
Setup basics in a outgoing packet.
****************************************************************************/
void cli_setup_packet_buf(struct cli_state *cli, char *buf)
{
uint16 flags2;
cli->rap_error = 0;
SIVAL(buf,smb_rcls,0);
SSVAL(buf,smb_pid,cli->pid);
memset(buf+smb_pidhigh, 0, 12);
SSVAL(buf,smb_uid,cli->vuid);
SSVAL(buf,smb_mid,cli->mid);
if (cli->protocol <= PROTOCOL_CORE) {
return;
}
if (cli->case_sensitive) {
SCVAL(buf,smb_flg,0x0);
} else {
/* Default setting, case insensitive. */
SCVAL(buf,smb_flg,0x8);
}
flags2 = FLAGS2_LONG_PATH_COMPONENTS;
if (cli->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE)
flags2 |= FLAGS2_UNICODE_STRINGS;
if ((cli->capabilities & CAP_DFS) && cli->dfsroot)
flags2 |= FLAGS2_DFS_PATHNAMES;
if (cli->capabilities & CAP_STATUS32)
flags2 |= FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES;
if (cli->use_spnego)
flags2 |= FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY;
SSVAL(buf,smb_flg2, flags2);
}
void cli_setup_packet(struct cli_state *cli)
{
cli_setup_packet_buf(cli, cli->outbuf);
}
/****************************************************************************
Setup the bcc length of the packet from a pointer to the end of the data.
****************************************************************************/
void cli_setup_bcc(struct cli_state *cli, void *p)
{
set_message_bcc(cli->outbuf, PTR_DIFF(p, smb_buf(cli->outbuf)));
}
/****************************************************************************
Initialize Domain, user or password.
****************************************************************************/
NTSTATUS cli_set_domain(struct cli_state *cli, const char *domain)
{
TALLOC_FREE(cli->domain);
cli->domain = talloc_strdup(cli, domain ? domain : "");
if (cli->domain == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
NTSTATUS cli_set_username(struct cli_state *cli, const char *username)
{
TALLOC_FREE(cli->user_name);
cli->user_name = talloc_strdup(cli, username ? username : "");
if (cli->user_name == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
NTSTATUS cli_set_password(struct cli_state *cli, const char *password)
{
TALLOC_FREE(cli->password);
/* Password can be NULL. */
if (password) {
cli->password = talloc_strdup(cli, password);
if (cli->password == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
} else {
/* Use zero NTLMSSP hashes and session key. */
cli->password = NULL;
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/****************************************************************************
Initialise credentials of a client structure.
****************************************************************************/
NTSTATUS cli_init_creds(struct cli_state *cli, const char *username, const char *domain, const char *password)
{
NTSTATUS status = cli_set_username(cli, username);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
return status;
}
status = cli_set_domain(cli, domain);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
return status;
}
DEBUG(10,("cli_init_creds: user %s domain %s\n", cli->user_name, cli->domain));
return cli_set_password(cli, password);
}
/****************************************************************************
Initialise a client structure. Always returns a talloc'ed struct.
Set the signing state (used from the command line).
****************************************************************************/
struct cli_state *cli_initialise_ex(int signing_state)
{
struct cli_state *cli = NULL;
bool allow_smb_signing = false;
bool mandatory_signing = false;
/* Check the effective uid - make sure we are not setuid */
if (is_setuid_root()) {
DEBUG(0,("libsmb based programs must *NOT* be setuid root.\n"));
return NULL;
}
2008-09-13 21:41:42 +04:00
cli = TALLOC_ZERO_P(NULL, struct cli_state);
if (!cli) {
return NULL;
}
cli->dfs_mountpoint = talloc_strdup(cli, "");
if (!cli->dfs_mountpoint) {
goto error;
}
cli->port = 0;
cli->fd = -1;
cli->cnum = -1;
cli->pid = (uint16)sys_getpid();
cli->mid = 1;
cli->vuid = UID_FIELD_INVALID;
cli->protocol = PROTOCOL_NT1;
cli->timeout = 20000; /* Timeout is in milliseconds. */
cli->bufsize = CLI_BUFFER_SIZE+4;
cli->max_xmit = cli->bufsize;
cli->outbuf = (char *)SMB_MALLOC(cli->bufsize+SAFETY_MARGIN);
cli->seqnum = 0;
cli->inbuf = (char *)SMB_MALLOC(cli->bufsize+SAFETY_MARGIN);
cli->oplock_handler = cli_oplock_ack;
cli->case_sensitive = false;
cli->smb_rw_error = SMB_READ_OK;
cli->use_spnego = lp_client_use_spnego();
cli->capabilities = CAP_UNICODE | CAP_STATUS32 | CAP_DFS;
/* Set the CLI_FORCE_DOSERR environment variable to test
client routines using DOS errors instead of STATUS32
ones. This intended only as a temporary hack. */
if (getenv("CLI_FORCE_DOSERR"))
cli->force_dos_errors = true;
if (lp_client_signing()) {
allow_smb_signing = true;
}
if (lp_client_signing() == Required) {
mandatory_signing = true;
}
if (signing_state != Undefined) {
allow_smb_signing = true;
}
if (signing_state == false) {
allow_smb_signing = false;
mandatory_signing = false;
}
if (signing_state == Required) {
mandatory_signing = true;
}
if (!cli->outbuf || !cli->inbuf)
goto error;
memset(cli->outbuf, 0, cli->bufsize);
memset(cli->inbuf, 0, cli->bufsize);
#if defined(DEVELOPER)
/* just because we over-allocate, doesn't mean it's right to use it */
clobber_region(FUNCTION_MACRO, __LINE__, cli->outbuf+cli->bufsize, SAFETY_MARGIN);
clobber_region(FUNCTION_MACRO, __LINE__, cli->inbuf+cli->bufsize, SAFETY_MARGIN);
#endif
/* initialise signing */
cli->signing_state = smb_signing_init(cli,
allow_smb_signing,
mandatory_signing);
if (!cli->signing_state) {
goto error;
}
cli->outgoing = tevent_queue_create(cli, "cli_outgoing");
if (cli->outgoing == NULL) {
goto error;
}
cli->pending = NULL;
cli->initialised = 1;
return cli;
/* Clean up after malloc() error */
error:
SAFE_FREE(cli->inbuf);
SAFE_FREE(cli->outbuf);
TALLOC_FREE(cli);
return NULL;
}
struct cli_state *cli_initialise(void)
{
return cli_initialise_ex(Undefined);
}
Jeremy requested that I get my NTLMSSP patch into CVS. He didn't request the schannel code, but I've included that anyway. :-) This patch revives the client-side NTLMSSP support for RPC named pipes in Samba, and cleans up the client and server schannel code. The use of the new code is enabled by the 'sign', 'seal' and 'schannel' commands in rpcclient. The aim was to prove that our separate NTLMSSP client library actually implements NTLMSSP signing and sealing as per Microsoft's NTLMv1 implementation, in the hope that knowing this will assist us in correctly implementing NTLMSSP signing for SMB packets. (Still not yet functional) This patch replaces the NTLMSSP implementation in rpc_client/cli_pipe.c with calls to libsmb/ntlmssp.c. In the process, we have gained the ability to use the more secure NT password, and the ability to sign-only, instead of having to seal the pipe connection. (Previously we were limited to sealing, and could only use the LM-password derived key). Our new client-side NTLMSSP code also needed alteration to cope with our comparatively simple server-side implementation. A future step is to replace it with calls to the same NTLMSSP library. Also included in this patch is the schannel 'sign only' patch I submitted to the team earlier. While not enabled (and not functional, at this stage) the work in this patch makes the code paths *much* easier to follow. I have also included similar hooks in rpccleint to allow the use of schannel on *any* pipe. rpcclient now defaults to not using schannel (or any other extra per-pipe authenticiation) for any connection. The 'schannel' command enables schannel for all pipes until disabled. This code is also much more secure than the previous code, as changes to our cli_pipe routines ensure that the authentication footer cannot be removed by an attacker, and more error states are correctly handled. (The same needs to be done to our server) Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 5472ddc9eaf4e79c5b2e1c8ee8c7f190dc285f19)
2003-07-14 12:46:32 +04:00
/****************************************************************************
Close all pipes open on this session.
Jeremy requested that I get my NTLMSSP patch into CVS. He didn't request the schannel code, but I've included that anyway. :-) This patch revives the client-side NTLMSSP support for RPC named pipes in Samba, and cleans up the client and server schannel code. The use of the new code is enabled by the 'sign', 'seal' and 'schannel' commands in rpcclient. The aim was to prove that our separate NTLMSSP client library actually implements NTLMSSP signing and sealing as per Microsoft's NTLMv1 implementation, in the hope that knowing this will assist us in correctly implementing NTLMSSP signing for SMB packets. (Still not yet functional) This patch replaces the NTLMSSP implementation in rpc_client/cli_pipe.c with calls to libsmb/ntlmssp.c. In the process, we have gained the ability to use the more secure NT password, and the ability to sign-only, instead of having to seal the pipe connection. (Previously we were limited to sealing, and could only use the LM-password derived key). Our new client-side NTLMSSP code also needed alteration to cope with our comparatively simple server-side implementation. A future step is to replace it with calls to the same NTLMSSP library. Also included in this patch is the schannel 'sign only' patch I submitted to the team earlier. While not enabled (and not functional, at this stage) the work in this patch makes the code paths *much* easier to follow. I have also included similar hooks in rpccleint to allow the use of schannel on *any* pipe. rpcclient now defaults to not using schannel (or any other extra per-pipe authenticiation) for any connection. The 'schannel' command enables schannel for all pipes until disabled. This code is also much more secure than the previous code, as changes to our cli_pipe routines ensure that the authentication footer cannot be removed by an attacker, and more error states are correctly handled. (The same needs to be done to our server) Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 5472ddc9eaf4e79c5b2e1c8ee8c7f190dc285f19)
2003-07-14 12:46:32 +04:00
****************************************************************************/
void cli_nt_pipes_close(struct cli_state *cli)
Jeremy requested that I get my NTLMSSP patch into CVS. He didn't request the schannel code, but I've included that anyway. :-) This patch revives the client-side NTLMSSP support for RPC named pipes in Samba, and cleans up the client and server schannel code. The use of the new code is enabled by the 'sign', 'seal' and 'schannel' commands in rpcclient. The aim was to prove that our separate NTLMSSP client library actually implements NTLMSSP signing and sealing as per Microsoft's NTLMv1 implementation, in the hope that knowing this will assist us in correctly implementing NTLMSSP signing for SMB packets. (Still not yet functional) This patch replaces the NTLMSSP implementation in rpc_client/cli_pipe.c with calls to libsmb/ntlmssp.c. In the process, we have gained the ability to use the more secure NT password, and the ability to sign-only, instead of having to seal the pipe connection. (Previously we were limited to sealing, and could only use the LM-password derived key). Our new client-side NTLMSSP code also needed alteration to cope with our comparatively simple server-side implementation. A future step is to replace it with calls to the same NTLMSSP library. Also included in this patch is the schannel 'sign only' patch I submitted to the team earlier. While not enabled (and not functional, at this stage) the work in this patch makes the code paths *much* easier to follow. I have also included similar hooks in rpccleint to allow the use of schannel on *any* pipe. rpcclient now defaults to not using schannel (or any other extra per-pipe authenticiation) for any connection. The 'schannel' command enables schannel for all pipes until disabled. This code is also much more secure than the previous code, as changes to our cli_pipe routines ensure that the authentication footer cannot be removed by an attacker, and more error states are correctly handled. (The same needs to be done to our server) Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 5472ddc9eaf4e79c5b2e1c8ee8c7f190dc285f19)
2003-07-14 12:46:32 +04:00
{
while (cli->pipe_list != NULL) {
/*
* No TALLOC_FREE here!
*/
talloc_free(cli->pipe_list);
Jeremy requested that I get my NTLMSSP patch into CVS. He didn't request the schannel code, but I've included that anyway. :-) This patch revives the client-side NTLMSSP support for RPC named pipes in Samba, and cleans up the client and server schannel code. The use of the new code is enabled by the 'sign', 'seal' and 'schannel' commands in rpcclient. The aim was to prove that our separate NTLMSSP client library actually implements NTLMSSP signing and sealing as per Microsoft's NTLMv1 implementation, in the hope that knowing this will assist us in correctly implementing NTLMSSP signing for SMB packets. (Still not yet functional) This patch replaces the NTLMSSP implementation in rpc_client/cli_pipe.c with calls to libsmb/ntlmssp.c. In the process, we have gained the ability to use the more secure NT password, and the ability to sign-only, instead of having to seal the pipe connection. (Previously we were limited to sealing, and could only use the LM-password derived key). Our new client-side NTLMSSP code also needed alteration to cope with our comparatively simple server-side implementation. A future step is to replace it with calls to the same NTLMSSP library. Also included in this patch is the schannel 'sign only' patch I submitted to the team earlier. While not enabled (and not functional, at this stage) the work in this patch makes the code paths *much* easier to follow. I have also included similar hooks in rpccleint to allow the use of schannel on *any* pipe. rpcclient now defaults to not using schannel (or any other extra per-pipe authenticiation) for any connection. The 'schannel' command enables schannel for all pipes until disabled. This code is also much more secure than the previous code, as changes to our cli_pipe routines ensure that the authentication footer cannot be removed by an attacker, and more error states are correctly handled. (The same needs to be done to our server) Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 5472ddc9eaf4e79c5b2e1c8ee8c7f190dc285f19)
2003-07-14 12:46:32 +04:00
}
}
/****************************************************************************
Shutdown a client structure.
****************************************************************************/
void cli_shutdown(struct cli_state *cli)
{
if (cli->prev == NULL) {
/*
* Possible head of a DFS list,
* shutdown all subsidiary DFS
* connections.
*/
struct cli_state *p, *next;
for (p = cli->next; p; p = next) {
next = p->next;
cli_shutdown(p);
}
} else {
/*
* We're a subsidiary connection.
* Just remove ourselves from the
* DFS list.
*/
DLIST_REMOVE(cli->prev, cli);
}
cli_nt_pipes_close(cli);
/*
* tell our peer to free his resources. Wihtout this, when an
* application attempts to do a graceful shutdown and calls
* smbc_free_context() to clean up all connections, some connections
* can remain active on the peer end, until some (long) timeout period
* later. This tree disconnect forces the peer to clean up, since the
* connection will be going away.
*
* Also, do not do tree disconnect when cli->smb_rw_error is SMB_DO_NOT_DO_TDIS
* the only user for this so far is smbmount which passes opened connection
* down to kernel's smbfs module.
*/
if ( (cli->cnum != (uint16)-1) && (cli->smb_rw_error != SMB_DO_NOT_DO_TDIS ) ) {
cli_tdis(cli);
}
SAFE_FREE(cli->outbuf);
SAFE_FREE(cli->inbuf);
data_blob_free(&cli->secblob);
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
data_blob_free(&cli->user_session_key);
if (cli->fd != -1) {
close(cli->fd);
}
cli->fd = -1;
cli->smb_rw_error = SMB_READ_OK;
/*
* Need to free pending first, they remove themselves
*/
while (cli->pending) {
talloc_free(cli->pending[0]);
}
TALLOC_FREE(cli);
}
/****************************************************************************
Set socket options on a open connection.
****************************************************************************/
void cli_sockopt(struct cli_state *cli, const char *options)
{
set_socket_options(cli->fd, options);
}
/****************************************************************************
Set the PID to use for smb messages. Return the old pid.
****************************************************************************/
uint16 cli_setpid(struct cli_state *cli, uint16 pid)
{
uint16 ret = cli->pid;
cli->pid = pid;
return ret;
}
/****************************************************************************
Set the case sensitivity flag on the packets. Returns old state.
****************************************************************************/
bool cli_set_case_sensitive(struct cli_state *cli, bool case_sensitive)
{
bool ret = cli->case_sensitive;
cli->case_sensitive = case_sensitive;
return ret;
}
/****************************************************************************
Send a keepalive packet to the server
****************************************************************************/
bool cli_send_keepalive(struct cli_state *cli)
{
if (cli->fd == -1) {
DEBUG(3, ("cli_send_keepalive: fd == -1\n"));
return false;
}
if (!send_keepalive(cli->fd)) {
close(cli->fd);
cli->fd = -1;
DEBUG(0,("Error sending keepalive packet to client.\n"));
return false;
}
return true;
}
2009-04-05 22:48:16 +04:00
struct cli_echo_state {
uint16_t vwv[1];
DATA_BLOB data;
int num_echos;
};
2009-04-05 22:48:16 +04:00
static void cli_echo_done(struct tevent_req *subreq);
2009-04-05 22:48:16 +04:00
struct tevent_req *cli_echo_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct event_context *ev,
struct cli_state *cli, uint16_t num_echos,
DATA_BLOB data)
{
struct tevent_req *req, *subreq;
struct cli_echo_state *state;
2009-04-05 22:48:16 +04:00
req = tevent_req_create(mem_ctx, &state, struct cli_echo_state);
if (req == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
2009-04-05 22:48:16 +04:00
SSVAL(state->vwv, 0, num_echos);
state->data = data;
state->num_echos = num_echos;
2009-04-05 22:48:16 +04:00
subreq = cli_smb_send(state, ev, cli, SMBecho, 0, 1, state->vwv,
data.length, data.data);
if (subreq == NULL) {
goto fail;
}
2009-04-05 22:48:16 +04:00
tevent_req_set_callback(subreq, cli_echo_done, req);
return req;
fail:
TALLOC_FREE(req);
return NULL;
}
2009-04-05 22:48:16 +04:00
static void cli_echo_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
{
2009-04-05 22:48:16 +04:00
struct tevent_req *req = tevent_req_callback_data(
subreq, struct tevent_req);
struct cli_echo_state *state = tevent_req_data(
req, struct cli_echo_state);
NTSTATUS status;
uint32_t num_bytes;
uint8_t *bytes;
2009-04-05 22:48:16 +04:00
status = cli_smb_recv(subreq, 0, NULL, NULL, &num_bytes, &bytes);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
tevent_req_nterror(req, status);
return;
}
2009-04-05 22:48:16 +04:00
if ((num_bytes != state->data.length)
|| (memcmp(bytes, state->data.data, num_bytes) != 0)) {
tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE);
return;
}
2009-04-05 22:48:16 +04:00
state->num_echos -=1;
if (state->num_echos == 0) {
tevent_req_done(req);
return;
}
2009-04-05 22:48:16 +04:00
if (!cli_smb_req_set_pending(subreq)) {
tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY);
return;
}
}
/**
* Get the result out from an echo request
* @param[in] req The async_req from cli_echo_send
* @retval Did the server reply correctly?
*/
2009-04-05 22:48:16 +04:00
NTSTATUS cli_echo_recv(struct tevent_req *req)
{
2009-04-05 22:48:16 +04:00
return tevent_req_simple_recv_ntstatus(req);
}
/**
* @brief Send/Receive SMBEcho requests
* @param[in] mem_ctx The memory context to put the async_req on
* @param[in] ev The event context that will call us back
* @param[in] cli The connection to send the echo to
* @param[in] num_echos How many times do we want to get the reply?
* @param[in] data The data we want to get back
* @retval Did the server reply correctly?
*/
NTSTATUS cli_echo(struct cli_state *cli, uint16_t num_echos, DATA_BLOB data)
{
TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
struct event_context *ev;
2009-04-05 22:48:16 +04:00
struct tevent_req *req;
NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK;
2009-04-05 22:48:16 +04:00
if (cli_has_async_calls(cli)) {
/*
* Can't use sync call while an async call is in flight
*/
2009-04-05 22:48:16 +04:00
status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
goto fail;
}
ev = event_context_init(frame);
if (ev == NULL) {
2009-04-05 22:48:16 +04:00
status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto fail;
}
req = cli_echo_send(frame, ev, cli, num_echos, data);
if (req == NULL) {
2009-04-05 22:48:16 +04:00
status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto fail;
}
2009-04-05 22:48:16 +04:00
if (!tevent_req_poll(req, ev)) {
status = map_nt_error_from_unix(errno);
goto fail;
}
status = cli_echo_recv(req);
fail:
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
2009-04-05 22:48:16 +04:00
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
cli_set_error(cli, status);
}
return status;
}
2009-01-31 01:29:37 +03:00
/**
* Is the SMB command able to hold an AND_X successor
* @param[in] cmd The SMB command in question
* @retval Can we add a chained request after "cmd"?
*/
bool is_andx_req(uint8_t cmd)
{
switch (cmd) {
case SMBtconX:
case SMBlockingX:
case SMBopenX:
case SMBreadX:
case SMBwriteX:
case SMBsesssetupX:
case SMBulogoffX:
case SMBntcreateX:
return true;
break;
default:
break;
}
return false;
}