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samba-mirror/source3/include/client.h

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/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
SMB parameters and setup
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1998
Copyright (C) Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton 1996-1998
Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 1998
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
*/
#ifndef _CLIENT_H
#define _CLIENT_H
/* the client asks for a smaller buffer to save ram and also to get more
overlap on the wire. This size gives us a nice read/write size, which
will be a multiple of the page size on almost any system */
#define CLI_BUFFER_SIZE (0xFFFF)
#define CLI_SAMBA_MAX_LARGE_READX_SIZE (127*1024) /* Works for Samba servers */
#define CLI_WINDOWS_MAX_LARGE_READX_SIZE ((64*1024)-2) /* Windows servers are broken.... */
#define CLI_SAMBA_MAX_POSIX_LARGE_READX_SIZE (0xFFFF00) /* 24-bit len. */
/*
* These definitions depend on smb.h
*/
struct print_job_info {
uint16 id;
uint16 priority;
size_t size;
fstring user;
fstring name;
time_t t;
};
struct cli_pipe_auth_data {
enum pipe_auth_type auth_type; /* switch for the union below. Defined in ntdomain.h */
enum pipe_auth_level auth_level; /* defined in ntdomain.h */
union {
struct schannel_auth_struct *schannel_auth;
NTLMSSP_STATE *ntlmssp_state;
struct kerberos_auth_struct *kerberos_auth;
} a_u;
void (*cli_auth_data_free_func)(struct cli_pipe_auth_data *);
};
struct rpc_pipe_client {
struct rpc_pipe_client *prev, *next;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
struct cli_state *cli;
int pipe_idx;
const char *pipe_name;
uint16 fnum;
const char *domain;
const char *user_name;
struct pwd_info pwd;
uint16 max_xmit_frag;
uint16 max_recv_frag;
struct cli_pipe_auth_data auth;
/* The following is only non-null on a netlogon pipe. */
struct dcinfo *dc;
};
/* Transport encryption state. */
enum smb_trans_enc_type { SMB_TRANS_ENC_NTLM, SMB_TRANS_ENC_GSS };
#if defined(HAVE_GSSAPI) && defined(HAVE_KRB5)
struct smb_tran_enc_state_gss {
gss_ctx_id_t gss_ctx;
gss_cred_id_t creds;
};
#endif
struct smb_trans_enc_state {
enum smb_trans_enc_type smb_enc_type;
uint16 enc_ctx_num;
BOOL enc_on;
union {
NTLMSSP_STATE *ntlmssp_state;
#if defined(HAVE_GSSAPI) && defined(HAVE_KRB5)
struct smb_tran_enc_state_gss *gss_state;
#endif
} s;
};
struct cli_state {
int port;
int fd;
int smb_rw_error; /* Copy of last read or write error. */
uint16 cnum;
uint16 pid;
uint16 mid;
uint16 vuid;
int protocol;
int sec_mode;
int rap_error;
int privileges;
fstring desthost;
/* The credentials used to open the cli_state connection. */
fstring domain;
fstring user_name;
struct pwd_info pwd;
/*
* The following strings are the
* ones returned by the server if
* the protocol > NT1.
*/
fstring server_type;
fstring server_os;
fstring server_domain;
fstring share;
fstring dev;
struct nmb_name called;
struct nmb_name calling;
fstring full_dest_host_name;
struct in_addr dest_ip;
DATA_BLOB secblob; /* cryptkey or negTokenInit */
uint32 sesskey;
int serverzone;
uint32 servertime;
int readbraw_supported;
int writebraw_supported;
int timeout; /* in milliseconds. */
size_t max_xmit;
size_t max_mux;
char *outbuf;
char *inbuf;
unsigned int bufsize;
int initialised;
int win95;
BOOL is_samba;
uint32 capabilities;
uint32 posix_capabilities;
BOOL dfsroot;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
smb_sign_info sign_info;
struct smb_trans_enc_state *trans_enc_state; /* Setup if we're encrypting SMB's. */
/* the session key for this CLI, outside
any per-pipe authenticaion */
Changes all over the shop, but all towards: - NTLM2 support in the server - KEY_EXCH support in the server - variable length session keys. In detail: - NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade). * This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' * (This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of NTLM2 on RPC pipes.) This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm being changed. This also needs to be turned off for 'security=server', which does not support this. - KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being the shared-secret directly or indirectly. - As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the backend. - There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation. - The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii. Don't make an ascii version ever. - The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes long, when the krb5 login uses DES. * This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. * - Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues. - Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate) REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures... (This used to be commit f3bbc87b0dac63426cda6fac7a295d3aad810ecc)
2003-11-22 16:19:38 +03:00
DATA_BLOB user_session_key;
/* The list of pipes currently open on this connection. */
struct rpc_pipe_client *pipe_list;
Jeremy requested that I get my NTLMSSP patch into CVS. He didn't request the schannel code, but I've included that anyway. :-) This patch revives the client-side NTLMSSP support for RPC named pipes in Samba, and cleans up the client and server schannel code. The use of the new code is enabled by the 'sign', 'seal' and 'schannel' commands in rpcclient. The aim was to prove that our separate NTLMSSP client library actually implements NTLMSSP signing and sealing as per Microsoft's NTLMv1 implementation, in the hope that knowing this will assist us in correctly implementing NTLMSSP signing for SMB packets. (Still not yet functional) This patch replaces the NTLMSSP implementation in rpc_client/cli_pipe.c with calls to libsmb/ntlmssp.c. In the process, we have gained the ability to use the more secure NT password, and the ability to sign-only, instead of having to seal the pipe connection. (Previously we were limited to sealing, and could only use the LM-password derived key). Our new client-side NTLMSSP code also needed alteration to cope with our comparatively simple server-side implementation. A future step is to replace it with calls to the same NTLMSSP library. Also included in this patch is the schannel 'sign only' patch I submitted to the team earlier. While not enabled (and not functional, at this stage) the work in this patch makes the code paths *much* easier to follow. I have also included similar hooks in rpccleint to allow the use of schannel on *any* pipe. rpcclient now defaults to not using schannel (or any other extra per-pipe authenticiation) for any connection. The 'schannel' command enables schannel for all pipes until disabled. This code is also much more secure than the previous code, as changes to our cli_pipe routines ensure that the authentication footer cannot be removed by an attacker, and more error states are correctly handled. (The same needs to be done to our server) Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 5472ddc9eaf4e79c5b2e1c8ee8c7f190dc285f19)
2003-07-14 12:46:32 +04:00
BOOL use_kerberos;
BOOL fallback_after_kerberos;
BOOL use_spnego;
BOOL use_oplocks; /* should we use oplocks? */
BOOL use_level_II_oplocks; /* should we use level II oplocks? */
/* a oplock break request handler */
BOOL (*oplock_handler)(struct cli_state *cli, int fnum, unsigned char level);
BOOL force_dos_errors;
BOOL case_sensitive; /* False by default. */
};
typedef struct file_info {
struct cli_state *cli;
SMB_BIG_UINT size;
uint16 mode;
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
/* these times are normally kept in GMT */
struct timespec mtime_ts;
struct timespec atime_ts;
struct timespec ctime_ts;
pstring name;
pstring dir;
char short_name[13*3]; /* the *3 is to cope with multi-byte */
} file_info;
#define CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_DONT_SPNEGO 0x0001
#define CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_USE_KERBEROS 0x0002
#define CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_ANONYMOUS_FALLBACK 0x0004
#endif /* _CLIENT_H */