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/*
Unix SMB / CIFS implementation .
Kerberos backend for GENSEC
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Copyright ( C ) Andrew Bartlett < abartlet @ samba . org > 2004 - 2005
Copyright ( C ) Stefan Metzmacher < metze @ samba . org > 2004 - 2005
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This program is free software ; you can redistribute it and / or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation ; either version 2 of the License , or
( at your option ) any later version .
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful ,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY ; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE . See the
GNU General Public License for more details .
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program ; if not , write to the Free Software
Foundation , Inc . , 675 Mass Ave , Cambridge , MA 0213 9 , USA .
*/
# include "includes.h"
# include "system/kerberos.h"
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# include "heimdal/lib/gssapi/gssapi/gssapi.h"
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# include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
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# include "librpc/gen_ndr/krb5pac.h"
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# include "auth/auth.h"
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# include "lib/ldb/include/ldb.h"
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# include "auth/auth_sam.h"
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# include "librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h"
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# include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
# include "auth/credentials/credentials_krb5.h"
# include "auth/gensec/gensec.h"
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enum gensec_gssapi_sasl_state
{
STAGE_GSS_NEG ,
STAGE_SASL_SSF_NEG ,
STAGE_SASL_SSF_ACCEPT ,
STAGE_DONE
} ;
# define NEG_SEAL 0x4
# define NEG_SIGN 0x2
# define NEG_NONE 0x1
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struct gensec_gssapi_state {
gss_ctx_id_t gssapi_context ;
struct gss_channel_bindings_struct * input_chan_bindings ;
gss_name_t server_name ;
gss_name_t client_name ;
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OM_uint32 want_flags , got_flags ;
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const gss_OID_desc * gss_oid ;
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DATA_BLOB session_key ;
DATA_BLOB pac ;
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struct smb_krb5_context * smb_krb5_context ;
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struct gssapi_creds_container * client_cred ;
r11995: A big kerberos-related update.
This merges Samba4 up to current lorikeet-heimdal, which includes a
replacement for some Samba-specific hacks.
In particular, the credentials system now supplies GSS client and
server credentials. These are imported into GSS with
gss_krb5_import_creds(). Unfortunetly this can't take an MEMORY
keytab, so we now create a FILE based keytab as provision and join
time.
Because the keytab is now created in advance, we don't spend .4s at
negprot doing sha1 s2k calls. Also, because the keytab is read in
real time, any change in the server key will be correctly picked up by
the the krb5 code.
To mark entries in the secrets which should be exported to a keytab,
there is a new kerberosSecret objectClass. The new routine
cli_credentials_update_all_keytabs() searches for these, and updates
the keytabs.
This is called in the provision.js via the ejs wrapper
credentials_update_all_keytabs().
We can now (in theory) use a system-provided /etc/krb5.keytab, if
krb5Keytab: FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab
is added to the secrets.ldb record. By default the attribute
privateKeytab: secrets.keytab
is set, pointing to allow the whole private directory to be moved
without breaking the internal links.
(This used to be commit 6b75573df49c6210e1b9d71e108a9490976bd41d)
2005-12-01 08:20:39 +03:00
struct gssapi_creds_container * server_cred ;
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gss_cred_id_t delegated_cred_handle ;
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BOOL sasl ; /* We have two different mechs in this file: One
* for SASL wrapped GSSAPI and another for normal
* GSSAPI */
enum gensec_gssapi_sasl_state sasl_state ;
uint8_t sasl_protection ; /* What was negotiated at the SASL
* layer , independent of the GSSAPI
* layer . . . */
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size_t max_wrap_buf_size ;
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int gss_exchange_count ;
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} ;
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static size_t gensec_gssapi_max_input_size ( struct gensec_security * gensec_security ) ;
static size_t gensec_gssapi_max_wrapped_size ( struct gensec_security * gensec_security ) ;
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static char * gssapi_error_string ( TALLOC_CTX * mem_ctx ,
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OM_uint32 maj_stat , OM_uint32 min_stat ,
const gss_OID_desc * mech )
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{
OM_uint32 disp_min_stat , disp_maj_stat ;
gss_buffer_desc maj_error_message ;
gss_buffer_desc min_error_message ;
OM_uint32 msg_ctx = 0 ;
char * ret ;
maj_error_message . value = NULL ;
min_error_message . value = NULL ;
disp_maj_stat = gss_display_status ( & disp_min_stat , maj_stat , GSS_C_GSS_CODE ,
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mech , & msg_ctx , & maj_error_message ) ;
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disp_maj_stat = gss_display_status ( & disp_min_stat , min_stat , GSS_C_MECH_CODE ,
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mech , & msg_ctx , & min_error_message ) ;
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ret = talloc_asprintf ( mem_ctx , " %s: %s " , ( char * ) maj_error_message . value , ( char * ) min_error_message . value ) ;
gss_release_buffer ( & disp_min_stat , & maj_error_message ) ;
gss_release_buffer ( & disp_min_stat , & min_error_message ) ;
return ret ;
}
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static int gensec_gssapi_destructor ( struct gensec_gssapi_state * gensec_gssapi_state )
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{
OM_uint32 maj_stat , min_stat ;
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if ( gensec_gssapi_state - > delegated_cred_handle ! = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL ) {
maj_stat = gss_release_cred ( & min_stat ,
& gensec_gssapi_state - > delegated_cred_handle ) ;
}
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if ( gensec_gssapi_state - > gssapi_context ! = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT ) {
maj_stat = gss_delete_sec_context ( & min_stat ,
& gensec_gssapi_state - > gssapi_context ,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER ) ;
}
if ( gensec_gssapi_state - > server_name ! = GSS_C_NO_NAME ) {
maj_stat = gss_release_name ( & min_stat , & gensec_gssapi_state - > server_name ) ;
}
if ( gensec_gssapi_state - > client_name ! = GSS_C_NO_NAME ) {
maj_stat = gss_release_name ( & min_stat , & gensec_gssapi_state - > client_name ) ;
}
return 0 ;
}
static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_start ( struct gensec_security * gensec_security )
{
struct gensec_gssapi_state * gensec_gssapi_state ;
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krb5_error_code ret ;
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struct gsskrb5_send_to_kdc send_to_kdc ;
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gensec_gssapi_state = talloc ( gensec_security , struct gensec_gssapi_state ) ;
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if ( ! gensec_gssapi_state ) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
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gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_exchange_count = 0 ;
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gensec_gssapi_state - > max_wrap_buf_size
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= lp_parm_int ( - 1 , " gensec_gssapi " , " max wrap buf size " , 65536 ) ;
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gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl = False ;
gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl_state = STAGE_GSS_NEG ;
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gensec_security - > private_data = gensec_gssapi_state ;
gensec_gssapi_state - > gssapi_context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT ;
gensec_gssapi_state - > server_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME ;
gensec_gssapi_state - > client_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME ;
/* TODO: Fill in channel bindings */
gensec_gssapi_state - > input_chan_bindings = GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS ;
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gensec_gssapi_state - > want_flags = 0 ;
if ( lp_parm_bool ( - 1 , " gensec_gssapi " , " mutual " , True ) ) {
gensec_gssapi_state - > want_flags | = GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG ;
}
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if ( lp_parm_bool ( - 1 , " gensec_gssapi " , " delegation " , True ) ) {
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gensec_gssapi_state - > want_flags | = GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG ;
}
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if ( lp_parm_bool ( - 1 , " gensec_gssapi " , " replay " , True ) ) {
gensec_gssapi_state - > want_flags | = GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG ;
}
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if ( lp_parm_bool ( - 1 , " gensec_gssapi " , " sequence " , True ) ) {
gensec_gssapi_state - > want_flags | = GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG ;
}
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gensec_gssapi_state - > got_flags = 0 ;
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gensec_gssapi_state - > session_key = data_blob ( NULL , 0 ) ;
gensec_gssapi_state - > pac = data_blob ( NULL , 0 ) ;
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gensec_gssapi_state - > delegated_cred_handle = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL ;
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talloc_set_destructor ( gensec_gssapi_state , gensec_gssapi_destructor ) ;
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if ( gensec_security - > want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN ) {
gensec_gssapi_state - > want_flags | = GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG ;
}
if ( gensec_security - > want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL ) {
gensec_gssapi_state - > want_flags | = GSS_C_CONF_FLAG ;
}
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if ( gensec_security - > want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_DCE_STYLE ) {
gensec_gssapi_state - > want_flags | = GSS_C_DCE_STYLE ;
}
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gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid = GSS_C_NULL_OID ;
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send_to_kdc . func = smb_krb5_send_and_recv_func ;
send_to_kdc . ptr = gensec_security - > event_ctx ;
ret = gsskrb5_set_send_to_kdc ( & send_to_kdc ) ;
if ( ret ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " gensec_krb5_start: gsskrb5_set_send_to_kdc failed \n " ) ) ;
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talloc_free ( gensec_gssapi_state ) ;
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return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
}
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if ( lp_realm ( ) & & * lp_realm ( ) ) {
char * upper_realm = strupper_talloc ( gensec_gssapi_state , lp_realm ( ) ) ;
if ( ! upper_realm ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " gensec_krb5_start: could not uppercase realm: %s \n " , lp_realm ( ) ) ) ;
talloc_free ( gensec_gssapi_state ) ;
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
ret = gsskrb5_set_default_realm ( upper_realm ) ;
talloc_free ( upper_realm ) ;
if ( ret ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " gensec_krb5_start: gsskrb5_set_default_realm failed \n " ) ) ;
talloc_free ( gensec_gssapi_state ) ;
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
}
}
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/* don't do DNS lookups of any kind, it might/will fail for a netbios name */
ret = gsskrb5_set_dns_canonicalize ( FALSE ) ;
if ( ret ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " gensec_krb5_start: gsskrb5_set_dns_canonicalize failed \n " ) ) ;
talloc_free ( gensec_gssapi_state ) ;
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
}
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ret = smb_krb5_init_context ( gensec_gssapi_state ,
& gensec_gssapi_state - > smb_krb5_context ) ;
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if ( ret ) {
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DEBUG ( 1 , ( " gensec_krb5_start: krb5_init_context failed (%s) \n " ,
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error_message ( ret ) ) ) ;
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talloc_free ( gensec_gssapi_state ) ;
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return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
}
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return NT_STATUS_OK ;
}
static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_server_start ( struct gensec_security * gensec_security )
{
NTSTATUS nt_status ;
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int ret ;
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struct gensec_gssapi_state * gensec_gssapi_state ;
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struct cli_credentials * machine_account ;
r11995: A big kerberos-related update.
This merges Samba4 up to current lorikeet-heimdal, which includes a
replacement for some Samba-specific hacks.
In particular, the credentials system now supplies GSS client and
server credentials. These are imported into GSS with
gss_krb5_import_creds(). Unfortunetly this can't take an MEMORY
keytab, so we now create a FILE based keytab as provision and join
time.
Because the keytab is now created in advance, we don't spend .4s at
negprot doing sha1 s2k calls. Also, because the keytab is read in
real time, any change in the server key will be correctly picked up by
the the krb5 code.
To mark entries in the secrets which should be exported to a keytab,
there is a new kerberosSecret objectClass. The new routine
cli_credentials_update_all_keytabs() searches for these, and updates
the keytabs.
This is called in the provision.js via the ejs wrapper
credentials_update_all_keytabs().
We can now (in theory) use a system-provided /etc/krb5.keytab, if
krb5Keytab: FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab
is added to the secrets.ldb record. By default the attribute
privateKeytab: secrets.keytab
is set, pointing to allow the whole private directory to be moved
without breaking the internal links.
(This used to be commit 6b75573df49c6210e1b9d71e108a9490976bd41d)
2005-12-01 08:20:39 +03:00
struct gssapi_creds_container * gcc ;
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nt_status = gensec_gssapi_start ( gensec_security ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( nt_status ) ) {
return nt_status ;
}
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gensec_gssapi_state = talloc_get_type ( gensec_security - > private_data , struct gensec_gssapi_state ) ;
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machine_account = gensec_get_credentials ( gensec_security ) ;
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if ( ! machine_account ) {
DEBUG ( 3 , ( " No machine account credentials specified \n " ) ) ;
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return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO ;
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} else {
r11995: A big kerberos-related update.
This merges Samba4 up to current lorikeet-heimdal, which includes a
replacement for some Samba-specific hacks.
In particular, the credentials system now supplies GSS client and
server credentials. These are imported into GSS with
gss_krb5_import_creds(). Unfortunetly this can't take an MEMORY
keytab, so we now create a FILE based keytab as provision and join
time.
Because the keytab is now created in advance, we don't spend .4s at
negprot doing sha1 s2k calls. Also, because the keytab is read in
real time, any change in the server key will be correctly picked up by
the the krb5 code.
To mark entries in the secrets which should be exported to a keytab,
there is a new kerberosSecret objectClass. The new routine
cli_credentials_update_all_keytabs() searches for these, and updates
the keytabs.
This is called in the provision.js via the ejs wrapper
credentials_update_all_keytabs().
We can now (in theory) use a system-provided /etc/krb5.keytab, if
krb5Keytab: FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab
is added to the secrets.ldb record. By default the attribute
privateKeytab: secrets.keytab
is set, pointing to allow the whole private directory to be moved
without breaking the internal links.
(This used to be commit 6b75573df49c6210e1b9d71e108a9490976bd41d)
2005-12-01 08:20:39 +03:00
ret = cli_credentials_get_server_gss_creds ( machine_account , & gcc ) ;
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if ( ret ) {
r11995: A big kerberos-related update.
This merges Samba4 up to current lorikeet-heimdal, which includes a
replacement for some Samba-specific hacks.
In particular, the credentials system now supplies GSS client and
server credentials. These are imported into GSS with
gss_krb5_import_creds(). Unfortunetly this can't take an MEMORY
keytab, so we now create a FILE based keytab as provision and join
time.
Because the keytab is now created in advance, we don't spend .4s at
negprot doing sha1 s2k calls. Also, because the keytab is read in
real time, any change in the server key will be correctly picked up by
the the krb5 code.
To mark entries in the secrets which should be exported to a keytab,
there is a new kerberosSecret objectClass. The new routine
cli_credentials_update_all_keytabs() searches for these, and updates
the keytabs.
This is called in the provision.js via the ejs wrapper
credentials_update_all_keytabs().
We can now (in theory) use a system-provided /etc/krb5.keytab, if
krb5Keytab: FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab
is added to the secrets.ldb record. By default the attribute
privateKeytab: secrets.keytab
is set, pointing to allow the whole private directory to be moved
without breaking the internal links.
(This used to be commit 6b75573df49c6210e1b9d71e108a9490976bd41d)
2005-12-01 08:20:39 +03:00
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " Aquiring acceptor credentials failed: %s \n " ,
error_message ( ret ) ) ) ;
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return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO ;
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}
}
r11995: A big kerberos-related update.
This merges Samba4 up to current lorikeet-heimdal, which includes a
replacement for some Samba-specific hacks.
In particular, the credentials system now supplies GSS client and
server credentials. These are imported into GSS with
gss_krb5_import_creds(). Unfortunetly this can't take an MEMORY
keytab, so we now create a FILE based keytab as provision and join
time.
Because the keytab is now created in advance, we don't spend .4s at
negprot doing sha1 s2k calls. Also, because the keytab is read in
real time, any change in the server key will be correctly picked up by
the the krb5 code.
To mark entries in the secrets which should be exported to a keytab,
there is a new kerberosSecret objectClass. The new routine
cli_credentials_update_all_keytabs() searches for these, and updates
the keytabs.
This is called in the provision.js via the ejs wrapper
credentials_update_all_keytabs().
We can now (in theory) use a system-provided /etc/krb5.keytab, if
krb5Keytab: FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab
is added to the secrets.ldb record. By default the attribute
privateKeytab: secrets.keytab
is set, pointing to allow the whole private directory to be moved
without breaking the internal links.
(This used to be commit 6b75573df49c6210e1b9d71e108a9490976bd41d)
2005-12-01 08:20:39 +03:00
gensec_gssapi_state - > server_cred = gcc ;
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return NT_STATUS_OK ;
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}
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static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_sasl_server_start ( struct gensec_security * gensec_security )
{
NTSTATUS nt_status ;
struct gensec_gssapi_state * gensec_gssapi_state ;
nt_status = gensec_gssapi_server_start ( gensec_security ) ;
if ( NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( nt_status ) ) {
gensec_gssapi_state = talloc_get_type ( gensec_security - > private_data , struct gensec_gssapi_state ) ;
gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl = True ;
}
return nt_status ;
}
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static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_client_start ( struct gensec_security * gensec_security )
{
struct gensec_gssapi_state * gensec_gssapi_state ;
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struct cli_credentials * creds = gensec_get_credentials ( gensec_security ) ;
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krb5_error_code ret ;
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NTSTATUS nt_status ;
gss_buffer_desc name_token ;
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gss_OID name_type ;
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OM_uint32 maj_stat , min_stat ;
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const char * hostname = gensec_get_target_hostname ( gensec_security ) ;
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const char * principal ;
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struct gssapi_creds_container * gcc ;
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if ( ! hostname ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " Could not determine hostname for target computer, cannot use kerberos \n " ) ) ;
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER ;
}
if ( is_ipaddress ( hostname ) ) {
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DEBUG ( 2 , ( " Cannot do GSSAPI to an IP address \n " ) ) ;
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER ;
}
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if ( strcmp ( hostname , " localhost " ) = = 0 ) {
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DEBUG ( 2 , ( " GSSAPI to 'localhost' does not make sense \n " ) ) ;
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return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER ;
}
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2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
nt_status = gensec_gssapi_start ( gensec_security ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( nt_status ) ) {
return nt_status ;
}
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
gensec_gssapi_state = talloc_get_type ( gensec_security - > private_data , struct gensec_gssapi_state ) ;
2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
2006-11-10 05:44:38 +03:00
gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid = gss_mech_krb5 ;
2005-09-17 13:46:20 +04:00
principal = gensec_get_target_principal ( gensec_security ) ;
if ( principal & & lp_client_use_spnego_principal ( ) ) {
2005-10-24 19:38:07 +04:00
name_token . value = discard_const_p ( uint8_t , principal ) ;
name_token . length = strlen ( principal ) ;
2005-09-17 13:46:20 +04:00
name_type = GSS_C_NULL_OID ;
} else {
2005-10-24 19:38:07 +04:00
principal = talloc_asprintf ( gensec_gssapi_state , " %s@%s " ,
gensec_get_target_service ( gensec_security ) ,
hostname ) ;
name_token . value = discard_const_p ( uint8_t , principal ) ;
name_token . length = strlen ( principal ) ;
2005-09-17 13:46:20 +04:00
name_type = GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE ;
}
2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
maj_stat = gss_import_name ( & min_stat ,
& name_token ,
2005-09-17 13:46:20 +04:00
name_type ,
2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
& gensec_gssapi_state - > server_name ) ;
2005-05-16 03:42:11 +04:00
if ( maj_stat ) {
2005-07-26 09:07:15 +04:00
DEBUG ( 2 , ( " GSS Import name of %s failed: %s \n " ,
2005-05-16 03:42:11 +04:00
( char * ) name_token . value ,
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
gssapi_error_string ( gensec_gssapi_state , maj_stat , min_stat , gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid ) ) ) ;
2005-07-20 14:54:50 +04:00
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER ;
2005-05-16 03:42:11 +04:00
}
2005-11-02 03:31:22 +03:00
ret = cli_credentials_get_client_gss_creds ( creds , & gcc ) ;
switch ( ret ) {
case 0 :
break ;
case KRB5_KDC_UNREACH :
DEBUG ( 3 , ( " Cannot reach a KDC we require \n " ) ) ;
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER ; /* Make SPNEGO ignore us, we can't go any further here */
default :
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " Aquiring initiator credentails failed \n " ) ) ;
return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL ;
2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
}
2005-05-16 03:42:11 +04:00
2005-11-02 03:31:22 +03:00
gensec_gssapi_state - > client_cred = gcc ;
2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
}
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_sasl_client_start ( struct gensec_security * gensec_security )
{
NTSTATUS nt_status ;
struct gensec_gssapi_state * gensec_gssapi_state ;
nt_status = gensec_gssapi_client_start ( gensec_security ) ;
if ( NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( nt_status ) ) {
gensec_gssapi_state = talloc_get_type ( gensec_security - > private_data , struct gensec_gssapi_state ) ;
gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl = True ;
}
return nt_status ;
}
2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
2005-06-22 06:12:26 +04:00
/**
* Check if the packet is one for this mechansim
*
* @ param gensec_security GENSEC state
* @ param in The request , as a DATA_BLOB
* @ return Error , INVALID_PARAMETER if it ' s not a packet for us
* or NT_STATUS_OK if the packet is ok .
*/
static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_magic ( struct gensec_security * gensec_security ,
const DATA_BLOB * in )
{
if ( gensec_gssapi_check_oid ( in , GENSEC_OID_KERBEROS5 ) ) {
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
} else {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER ;
}
}
2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
/**
* Next state function for the GSSAPI GENSEC mechanism
*
* @ param gensec_gssapi_state GSSAPI State
* @ param out_mem_ctx The TALLOC_CTX for * out to be allocated on
* @ param in The request , as a DATA_BLOB
* @ param out The reply , as an talloc ( ) ed DATA_BLOB , on * out_mem_ctx
* @ return Error , MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED if a reply is sent ,
* or NT_STATUS_OK if the user is authenticated .
*/
static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_update ( struct gensec_security * gensec_security ,
TALLOC_CTX * out_mem_ctx ,
const DATA_BLOB in , DATA_BLOB * out )
{
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
struct gensec_gssapi_state * gensec_gssapi_state
= talloc_get_type ( gensec_security - > private_data , struct gensec_gssapi_state ) ;
2005-11-02 03:31:22 +03:00
NTSTATUS nt_status = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE ;
2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
OM_uint32 maj_stat , min_stat ;
OM_uint32 min_stat2 ;
gss_buffer_desc input_token , output_token ;
2006-11-10 05:44:38 +03:00
gss_OID gss_oid_p = NULL ;
2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
input_token . length = in . length ;
input_token . value = in . data ;
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
switch ( gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl_state ) {
case STAGE_GSS_NEG :
2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
{
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
switch ( gensec_security - > gensec_role ) {
case GENSEC_CLIENT :
{
maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context ( & min_stat ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > client_cred - > creds ,
& gensec_gssapi_state - > gssapi_context ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > server_name ,
discard_const_p ( gss_OID_desc , gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid ) ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > want_flags ,
0 ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > input_chan_bindings ,
& input_token ,
2006-11-10 05:44:38 +03:00
& gss_oid_p ,
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
& output_token ,
& gensec_gssapi_state - > got_flags , /* ret flags */
NULL ) ;
2006-11-10 05:44:38 +03:00
if ( gss_oid_p ) {
gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid = gss_oid_p ;
}
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
break ;
}
case GENSEC_SERVER :
{
maj_stat = gss_accept_sec_context ( & min_stat ,
& gensec_gssapi_state - > gssapi_context ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > server_cred - > creds ,
& input_token ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > input_chan_bindings ,
& gensec_gssapi_state - > client_name ,
& gss_oid_p ,
2006-02-04 14:19:09 +03:00
& output_token ,
& gensec_gssapi_state - > got_flags ,
NULL ,
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
& gensec_gssapi_state - > delegated_cred_handle ) ;
2006-11-10 05:44:38 +03:00
if ( gss_oid_p ) {
gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid = gss_oid_p ;
}
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
break ;
}
default :
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER ;
}
2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
2006-11-07 09:59:56 +03:00
gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_exchange_count + + ;
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
if ( maj_stat = = GSS_S_COMPLETE ) {
* out = data_blob_talloc ( out_mem_ctx , output_token . value , output_token . length ) ;
gss_release_buffer ( & min_stat2 , & output_token ) ;
if ( gensec_gssapi_state - > got_flags & GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG ) {
DEBUG ( 5 , ( " gensec_gssapi: credentials were delegated \n " ) ) ;
} else {
DEBUG ( 5 , ( " gensec_gssapi: NO credentials were delegated \n " ) ) ;
}
r10066: This is the second in my patches to work on Samba4's kerberos support,
with an aim to make the code simpiler and more correct.
Gone is the old (since the very early Samba 3.0 krb5 days) 'iterate over
all keytypes)' code in gensec_krb5, we now follow the approach used in
gensec_gssapi, and use a keytab.
I have also done a lot of work in the GSSAPI code, to try and reduce
the diff between us and upstream heimdal. It was becoming hard to
track patches in this code, and I also want this patch (the DCE_STYLE
support) to be in a 'manageable' state for when lha considers it for
merging. (metze assures me it still has memory leak problems, but
I've started to address some of that).
This patch also includes a simple update of other code to current
heimdal, as well as changes we need for better PAC verification.
On the PAC side of things we now match windows member servers by
checking the name and authtime on an incoming PAC. Not generating these
right was the cause of the PAC pain, and so now both the main code and
torture test validate this behaviour.
One thing doesn't work with this patch:
- the sealing of RPC pipes with kerberos, Samba -> Samba seems
broken. I'm pretty sure this is related to AES, and the need to break
apart the gss_wrap interface.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit a3aba57c00a9c5318f4706db55d03f64e8bea60c)
2005-09-08 01:52:50 +04:00
2006-02-04 14:19:09 +03:00
/* We may have been invoked as SASL, so there
* is more work to do */
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
if ( gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl ) {
2006-02-04 14:19:09 +03:00
/* Due to a very subtle interaction
* with SASL and the LDAP libs , we
* must ensure the data pointer is
* ! = NULL , but the length is 0.
*
* This ensures we send a ' zero
* length ' ( rather than NULL ) response
*/
if ( ! out - > data ) {
out - > data = ( uint8_t * ) talloc_strdup ( out_mem_ctx , " \0 " ) ;
}
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl_state = STAGE_SASL_SSF_NEG ;
return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED ;
} else {
gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl_state = STAGE_DONE ;
if ( gensec_have_feature ( gensec_security , GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL ) ) {
2006-03-25 03:50:26 +03:00
DEBUG ( 5 , ( " GSSAPI Connection will be cryptographicly sealed \n " ) ) ;
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
} else if ( gensec_have_feature ( gensec_security , GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN ) ) {
2006-03-25 03:50:26 +03:00
DEBUG ( 5 , ( " GSSAPI Connection will be cryptographicly signed \n " ) ) ;
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
} else {
2006-03-25 03:50:26 +03:00
DEBUG ( 5 , ( " GSSAPI Connection will have no cryptographic protection \n " ) ) ;
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
}
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
}
} else if ( maj_stat = = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED ) {
* out = data_blob_talloc ( out_mem_ctx , output_token . value , output_token . length ) ;
gss_release_buffer ( & min_stat2 , & output_token ) ;
return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED ;
2006-11-10 05:44:38 +03:00
} else if ( gss_oid_equal ( gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid , gss_mech_krb5 ) ) {
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
switch ( min_stat ) {
case KRB5_KDC_UNREACH :
DEBUG ( 3 , ( " Cannot reach a KDC we require: %s \n " ,
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
gssapi_error_string ( gensec_gssapi_state , maj_stat , min_stat , gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid ) ) ) ;
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER ; /* Make SPNEGO ignore us, we can't go any further here */
case KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN :
DEBUG ( 3 , ( " Server is not registered with our KDC: %s \n " ,
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
gssapi_error_string ( gensec_gssapi_state , maj_stat , min_stat , gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid ) ) ) ;
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER ; /* Make SPNEGO ignore us, we can't go any further here */
case KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE :
/* garbage input, possibly from the auto-mech detection */
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER ;
default :
2006-11-07 09:59:56 +03:00
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " GSS Update(krb5)(%d) Update failed: %s \n " ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_exchange_count ,
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
gssapi_error_string ( out_mem_ctx , maj_stat , min_stat , gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid ) ) ) ;
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
return nt_status ;
}
2005-11-02 03:31:22 +03:00
} else {
2006-11-07 09:59:56 +03:00
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " GSS Update(%d) failed: %s \n " ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_exchange_count ,
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
gssapi_error_string ( out_mem_ctx , maj_stat , min_stat , gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid ) ) ) ;
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
return nt_status ;
2005-11-02 03:31:22 +03:00
}
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
break ;
}
2006-07-21 05:44:24 +04:00
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
/* These last two stages are only done if we were invoked as SASL */
case STAGE_SASL_SSF_NEG :
{
switch ( gensec_security - > gensec_role ) {
case GENSEC_CLIENT :
{
uint8_t maxlength_proposed [ 4 ] ;
2006-07-21 05:44:24 +04:00
uint8_t maxlength_accepted [ 4 ] ;
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
uint8_t security_supported ;
int conf_state ;
gss_qop_t qop_state ;
input_token . length = in . length ;
input_token . value = in . data ;
2006-07-21 05:44:24 +04:00
/* As a client, we have just send a
* zero - length blob to the server ( after the
* normal GSSAPI exchange ) , and it has replied
* with it ' s SASL negotiation */
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
maj_stat = gss_unwrap ( & min_stat ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > gssapi_context ,
& input_token ,
& output_token ,
& conf_state ,
& qop_state ) ;
if ( GSS_ERROR ( maj_stat ) ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " gensec_gssapi_update: GSS UnWrap of SASL protection negotiation failed: %s \n " ,
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
gssapi_error_string ( out_mem_ctx , maj_stat , min_stat , gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid ) ) ) ;
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
}
if ( output_token . length < 4 ) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER ;
}
2005-11-02 03:31:22 +03:00
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
memcpy ( maxlength_proposed , output_token . value , 4 ) ;
gss_release_buffer ( & min_stat , & output_token ) ;
2006-07-21 05:44:24 +04:00
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
/* first byte is the proposed security */
security_supported = maxlength_proposed [ 0 ] ;
maxlength_proposed [ 0 ] = ' \0 ' ;
2006-07-21 05:44:24 +04:00
/* Rest is the proposed max wrap length */
gensec_gssapi_state - > max_wrap_buf_size = MIN ( RIVAL ( maxlength_proposed , 0 ) ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > max_wrap_buf_size ) ;
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl_protection = 0 ;
if ( gensec_have_feature ( gensec_security , GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL ) ) {
if ( security_supported & NEG_SEAL ) {
gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl_protection | = NEG_SEAL ;
}
} else if ( gensec_have_feature ( gensec_security , GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN ) ) {
if ( security_supported & NEG_SIGN ) {
gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl_protection | = NEG_SIGN ;
}
} else if ( security_supported & NEG_NONE ) {
gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl_protection | = NEG_NONE ;
} else {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " Remote server does not support unprotected connections " ) ) ;
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
}
2006-07-21 05:44:24 +04:00
/* Send back the negotiated max length */
RSIVAL ( maxlength_accepted , 0 , gensec_gssapi_state - > max_wrap_buf_size ) ;
maxlength_accepted [ 0 ] = gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl_protection ;
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
2006-07-21 05:44:24 +04:00
input_token . value = maxlength_accepted ;
input_token . length = sizeof ( maxlength_accepted ) ;
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
maj_stat = gss_wrap ( & min_stat ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > gssapi_context ,
False ,
GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT ,
& input_token ,
& conf_state ,
& output_token ) ;
if ( GSS_ERROR ( maj_stat ) ) {
2006-11-07 09:59:56 +03:00
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " GSS Update(SSF_NEG): GSS Wrap failed: %s \n " ,
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
gssapi_error_string ( out_mem_ctx , maj_stat , min_stat , gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid ) ) ) ;
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
}
* out = data_blob_talloc ( out_mem_ctx , output_token . value , output_token . length ) ;
gss_release_buffer ( & min_stat , & output_token ) ;
/* quirk: This changes the value that gensec_have_feature returns, to be that after SASL negotiation */
gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl_state = STAGE_DONE ;
if ( gensec_have_feature ( gensec_security , GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL ) ) {
2006-02-04 14:19:09 +03:00
DEBUG ( 3 , ( " SASL/GSSAPI Connection to server will be cryptographicly sealed \n " ) ) ;
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
} else if ( gensec_have_feature ( gensec_security , GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN ) ) {
2006-02-04 14:19:09 +03:00
DEBUG ( 3 , ( " SASL/GSSAPI Connection to server will be cryptographicly signed \n " ) ) ;
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
} else {
2006-02-04 14:19:09 +03:00
DEBUG ( 3 , ( " SASL/GSSAPI Connection to server will have no cryptographicly protection \n " ) ) ;
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
}
r10066: This is the second in my patches to work on Samba4's kerberos support,
with an aim to make the code simpiler and more correct.
Gone is the old (since the very early Samba 3.0 krb5 days) 'iterate over
all keytypes)' code in gensec_krb5, we now follow the approach used in
gensec_gssapi, and use a keytab.
I have also done a lot of work in the GSSAPI code, to try and reduce
the diff between us and upstream heimdal. It was becoming hard to
track patches in this code, and I also want this patch (the DCE_STYLE
support) to be in a 'manageable' state for when lha considers it for
merging. (metze assures me it still has memory leak problems, but
I've started to address some of that).
This patch also includes a simple update of other code to current
heimdal, as well as changes we need for better PAC verification.
On the PAC side of things we now match windows member servers by
checking the name and authtime on an incoming PAC. Not generating these
right was the cause of the PAC pain, and so now both the main code and
torture test validate this behaviour.
One thing doesn't work with this patch:
- the sealing of RPC pipes with kerberos, Samba -> Samba seems
broken. I'm pretty sure this is related to AES, and the need to break
apart the gss_wrap interface.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit a3aba57c00a9c5318f4706db55d03f64e8bea60c)
2005-09-08 01:52:50 +04:00
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
}
case GENSEC_SERVER :
{
uint8_t maxlength_proposed [ 4 ] ;
uint8_t security_supported = 0x0 ;
int conf_state ;
2006-07-21 05:44:24 +04:00
/* As a server, we have just been sent a zero-length blob (note this, but it isn't fatal) */
if ( in . length ! = 0 ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " SASL/GSSAPI: client sent non-zero length starting SASL negotiation! \n " ) ) ;
}
/* Give the client some idea what we will support */
RSIVAL ( maxlength_proposed , 0 , gensec_gssapi_state - > max_wrap_buf_size ) ;
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
/* first byte is the proposed security */
maxlength_proposed [ 0 ] = ' \0 ' ;
gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl_protection = 0 ;
if ( gensec_have_feature ( gensec_security , GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL ) ) {
security_supported | = NEG_SEAL ;
}
if ( gensec_have_feature ( gensec_security , GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN ) ) {
security_supported | = NEG_SIGN ;
}
if ( security_supported = = 0 ) {
/* If we don't support anything, this must be 0 */
RSIVAL ( maxlength_proposed , 0 , 0x0 ) ;
}
2006-07-21 05:44:24 +04:00
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
/* TODO: We may not wish to support this */
security_supported | = NEG_NONE ;
maxlength_proposed [ 0 ] = security_supported ;
input_token . value = maxlength_proposed ;
input_token . length = sizeof ( maxlength_proposed ) ;
maj_stat = gss_wrap ( & min_stat ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > gssapi_context ,
False ,
GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT ,
& input_token ,
& conf_state ,
& output_token ) ;
if ( GSS_ERROR ( maj_stat ) ) {
2006-11-07 09:59:56 +03:00
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " GSS Update(SSF_NEG): GSS Wrap failed: %s \n " ,
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
gssapi_error_string ( out_mem_ctx , maj_stat , min_stat , gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid ) ) ) ;
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
}
* out = data_blob_talloc ( out_mem_ctx , output_token . value , output_token . length ) ;
gss_release_buffer ( & min_stat , & output_token ) ;
gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl_state = STAGE_SASL_SSF_ACCEPT ;
return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED ;
}
2005-09-28 08:50:02 +04:00
default :
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER ;
}
}
/* This is s server-only stage */
case STAGE_SASL_SSF_ACCEPT :
{
2006-07-21 05:44:24 +04:00
uint8_t maxlength_accepted [ 4 ] ;
uint8_t security_accepted ;
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
int conf_state ;
gss_qop_t qop_state ;
input_token . length = in . length ;
input_token . value = in . data ;
maj_stat = gss_unwrap ( & min_stat ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > gssapi_context ,
& input_token ,
& output_token ,
& conf_state ,
& qop_state ) ;
if ( GSS_ERROR ( maj_stat ) ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " gensec_gssapi_update: GSS UnWrap of SASL protection negotiation failed: %s \n " ,
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
gssapi_error_string ( out_mem_ctx , maj_stat , min_stat , gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid ) ) ) ;
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
2005-05-16 05:31:22 +04:00
}
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
if ( output_token . length < 4 ) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER ;
}
2006-07-21 05:44:24 +04:00
memcpy ( maxlength_accepted , output_token . value , 4 ) ;
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
gss_release_buffer ( & min_stat , & output_token ) ;
/* first byte is the proposed security */
2006-07-21 05:44:24 +04:00
security_accepted = maxlength_accepted [ 0 ] ;
maxlength_accepted [ 0 ] = ' \0 ' ;
/* Rest is the proposed max wrap length */
gensec_gssapi_state - > max_wrap_buf_size = MIN ( RIVAL ( maxlength_accepted , 0 ) ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > max_wrap_buf_size ) ;
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl_protection = 0 ;
if ( gensec_have_feature ( gensec_security , GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL ) ) {
2006-07-21 05:44:24 +04:00
if ( security_accepted & NEG_SEAL ) {
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl_protection | = NEG_SEAL ;
}
} else if ( gensec_have_feature ( gensec_security , GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN ) ) {
2006-07-21 05:44:24 +04:00
if ( security_accepted & NEG_SIGN ) {
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl_protection | = NEG_SIGN ;
}
2006-07-21 05:44:24 +04:00
} else if ( security_accepted & NEG_NONE ) {
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl_protection | = NEG_NONE ;
} else {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " Remote client does not support unprotected connections, but we failed to negotiate anything better " ) ) ;
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
}
/* quirk: This changes the value that gensec_have_feature returns, to be that after SASL negotiation */
gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl_state = STAGE_DONE ;
if ( gensec_have_feature ( gensec_security , GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL ) ) {
2006-03-25 03:50:26 +03:00
DEBUG ( 5 , ( " SASL/GSSAPI Connection from client will be cryptographicly sealed \n " ) ) ;
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
} else if ( gensec_have_feature ( gensec_security , GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN ) ) {
2006-03-25 03:50:26 +03:00
DEBUG ( 5 , ( " SASL/GSSAPI Connection from client will be cryptographicly signed \n " ) ) ;
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
} else {
2006-03-25 03:50:26 +03:00
DEBUG ( 5 , ( " SASL/GSSAPI Connection from client will have no cryptographic protection \n " ) ) ;
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
}
* out = data_blob ( NULL , 0 ) ;
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
}
default :
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER ;
2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
}
}
static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_wrap ( struct gensec_security * gensec_security ,
TALLOC_CTX * mem_ctx ,
const DATA_BLOB * in ,
DATA_BLOB * out )
{
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
struct gensec_gssapi_state * gensec_gssapi_state
= talloc_get_type ( gensec_security - > private_data , struct gensec_gssapi_state ) ;
2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
OM_uint32 maj_stat , min_stat ;
gss_buffer_desc input_token , output_token ;
int conf_state ;
input_token . length = in - > length ;
input_token . value = in - > data ;
2006-07-21 05:44:24 +04:00
2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
maj_stat = gss_wrap ( & min_stat ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > gssapi_context ,
gensec_have_feature ( gensec_security , GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL ) ,
GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT ,
& input_token ,
& conf_state ,
& output_token ) ;
if ( GSS_ERROR ( maj_stat ) ) {
r10066: This is the second in my patches to work on Samba4's kerberos support,
with an aim to make the code simpiler and more correct.
Gone is the old (since the very early Samba 3.0 krb5 days) 'iterate over
all keytypes)' code in gensec_krb5, we now follow the approach used in
gensec_gssapi, and use a keytab.
I have also done a lot of work in the GSSAPI code, to try and reduce
the diff between us and upstream heimdal. It was becoming hard to
track patches in this code, and I also want this patch (the DCE_STYLE
support) to be in a 'manageable' state for when lha considers it for
merging. (metze assures me it still has memory leak problems, but
I've started to address some of that).
This patch also includes a simple update of other code to current
heimdal, as well as changes we need for better PAC verification.
On the PAC side of things we now match windows member servers by
checking the name and authtime on an incoming PAC. Not generating these
right was the cause of the PAC pain, and so now both the main code and
torture test validate this behaviour.
One thing doesn't work with this patch:
- the sealing of RPC pipes with kerberos, Samba -> Samba seems
broken. I'm pretty sure this is related to AES, and the need to break
apart the gss_wrap interface.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit a3aba57c00a9c5318f4706db55d03f64e8bea60c)
2005-09-08 01:52:50 +04:00
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " gensec_gssapi_wrap: GSS Wrap failed: %s \n " ,
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
gssapi_error_string ( mem_ctx , maj_stat , min_stat , gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid ) ) ) ;
2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
}
r10066: This is the second in my patches to work on Samba4's kerberos support,
with an aim to make the code simpiler and more correct.
Gone is the old (since the very early Samba 3.0 krb5 days) 'iterate over
all keytypes)' code in gensec_krb5, we now follow the approach used in
gensec_gssapi, and use a keytab.
I have also done a lot of work in the GSSAPI code, to try and reduce
the diff between us and upstream heimdal. It was becoming hard to
track patches in this code, and I also want this patch (the DCE_STYLE
support) to be in a 'manageable' state for when lha considers it for
merging. (metze assures me it still has memory leak problems, but
I've started to address some of that).
This patch also includes a simple update of other code to current
heimdal, as well as changes we need for better PAC verification.
On the PAC side of things we now match windows member servers by
checking the name and authtime on an incoming PAC. Not generating these
right was the cause of the PAC pain, and so now both the main code and
torture test validate this behaviour.
One thing doesn't work with this patch:
- the sealing of RPC pipes with kerberos, Samba -> Samba seems
broken. I'm pretty sure this is related to AES, and the need to break
apart the gss_wrap interface.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit a3aba57c00a9c5318f4706db55d03f64e8bea60c)
2005-09-08 01:52:50 +04:00
* out = data_blob_talloc ( mem_ctx , output_token . value , output_token . length ) ;
2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
gss_release_buffer ( & min_stat , & output_token ) ;
2006-07-21 06:05:45 +04:00
if ( gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl ) {
size_t max_wrapped_size = gensec_gssapi_max_wrapped_size ( gensec_security ) ;
if ( max_wrapped_size < out - > length ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " gensec_gssapi_wrap: when wrapped, INPUT data (%u) is grew to be larger than SASL negotiated maximum output size (%u > %u) \n " ,
2006-09-09 14:05:58 +04:00
( unsigned ) in - > length ,
( unsigned ) out - > length ,
2006-07-21 06:05:45 +04:00
( unsigned int ) max_wrapped_size ) ) ;
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER ;
}
}
2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
if ( gensec_have_feature ( gensec_security , GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL )
& & ! conf_state ) {
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
}
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
}
static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_unwrap ( struct gensec_security * gensec_security ,
TALLOC_CTX * mem_ctx ,
const DATA_BLOB * in ,
DATA_BLOB * out )
{
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
struct gensec_gssapi_state * gensec_gssapi_state
= talloc_get_type ( gensec_security - > private_data , struct gensec_gssapi_state ) ;
2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
OM_uint32 maj_stat , min_stat ;
gss_buffer_desc input_token , output_token ;
int conf_state ;
gss_qop_t qop_state ;
input_token . length = in - > length ;
input_token . value = in - > data ;
2006-07-21 05:44:24 +04:00
if ( gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl ) {
size_t max_wrapped_size = gensec_gssapi_max_wrapped_size ( gensec_security ) ;
if ( max_wrapped_size < in - > length ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " gensec_gssapi_unwrap: WRAPPED data is larger than SASL negotiated maximum size \n " ) ) ;
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER ;
}
}
2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
maj_stat = gss_unwrap ( & min_stat ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > gssapi_context ,
& input_token ,
& output_token ,
& conf_state ,
& qop_state ) ;
if ( GSS_ERROR ( maj_stat ) ) {
r10066: This is the second in my patches to work on Samba4's kerberos support,
with an aim to make the code simpiler and more correct.
Gone is the old (since the very early Samba 3.0 krb5 days) 'iterate over
all keytypes)' code in gensec_krb5, we now follow the approach used in
gensec_gssapi, and use a keytab.
I have also done a lot of work in the GSSAPI code, to try and reduce
the diff between us and upstream heimdal. It was becoming hard to
track patches in this code, and I also want this patch (the DCE_STYLE
support) to be in a 'manageable' state for when lha considers it for
merging. (metze assures me it still has memory leak problems, but
I've started to address some of that).
This patch also includes a simple update of other code to current
heimdal, as well as changes we need for better PAC verification.
On the PAC side of things we now match windows member servers by
checking the name and authtime on an incoming PAC. Not generating these
right was the cause of the PAC pain, and so now both the main code and
torture test validate this behaviour.
One thing doesn't work with this patch:
- the sealing of RPC pipes with kerberos, Samba -> Samba seems
broken. I'm pretty sure this is related to AES, and the need to break
apart the gss_wrap interface.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit a3aba57c00a9c5318f4706db55d03f64e8bea60c)
2005-09-08 01:52:50 +04:00
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " gensec_gssapi_unwrap: GSS UnWrap failed: %s \n " ,
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
gssapi_error_string ( mem_ctx , maj_stat , min_stat , gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid ) ) ) ;
2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
}
r10066: This is the second in my patches to work on Samba4's kerberos support,
with an aim to make the code simpiler and more correct.
Gone is the old (since the very early Samba 3.0 krb5 days) 'iterate over
all keytypes)' code in gensec_krb5, we now follow the approach used in
gensec_gssapi, and use a keytab.
I have also done a lot of work in the GSSAPI code, to try and reduce
the diff between us and upstream heimdal. It was becoming hard to
track patches in this code, and I also want this patch (the DCE_STYLE
support) to be in a 'manageable' state for when lha considers it for
merging. (metze assures me it still has memory leak problems, but
I've started to address some of that).
This patch also includes a simple update of other code to current
heimdal, as well as changes we need for better PAC verification.
On the PAC side of things we now match windows member servers by
checking the name and authtime on an incoming PAC. Not generating these
right was the cause of the PAC pain, and so now both the main code and
torture test validate this behaviour.
One thing doesn't work with this patch:
- the sealing of RPC pipes with kerberos, Samba -> Samba seems
broken. I'm pretty sure this is related to AES, and the need to break
apart the gss_wrap interface.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit a3aba57c00a9c5318f4706db55d03f64e8bea60c)
2005-09-08 01:52:50 +04:00
* out = data_blob_talloc ( mem_ctx , output_token . value , output_token . length ) ;
2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
gss_release_buffer ( & min_stat , & output_token ) ;
if ( gensec_have_feature ( gensec_security , GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL )
& & ! conf_state ) {
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
}
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
}
2006-07-21 05:44:24 +04:00
/* Find out the maximum input size negotiated on this connection */
static size_t gensec_gssapi_max_input_size ( struct gensec_security * gensec_security )
{
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
struct gensec_gssapi_state * gensec_gssapi_state
= talloc_get_type ( gensec_security - > private_data , struct gensec_gssapi_state ) ;
2006-07-21 05:44:24 +04:00
OM_uint32 maj_stat , min_stat ;
OM_uint32 max_input_size ;
maj_stat = gss_wrap_size_limit ( & min_stat ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > gssapi_context ,
gensec_have_feature ( gensec_security , GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL ) ,
GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > max_wrap_buf_size ,
& max_input_size ) ;
if ( GSS_ERROR ( maj_stat ) ) {
TALLOC_CTX * mem_ctx = talloc_new ( NULL ) ;
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " gensec_gssapi_max_input_size: determinaing signature size with gss_wrap_size_limit failed: %s \n " ,
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
gssapi_error_string ( mem_ctx , maj_stat , min_stat , gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid ) ) ) ;
2006-07-21 05:44:24 +04:00
talloc_free ( mem_ctx ) ;
return 0 ;
}
return max_input_size ;
}
/* Find out the maximum output size negotiated on this connection */
static size_t gensec_gssapi_max_wrapped_size ( struct gensec_security * gensec_security )
{
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
struct gensec_gssapi_state * gensec_gssapi_state = talloc_get_type ( gensec_security - > private_data , struct gensec_gssapi_state ) ; ;
2006-07-21 05:44:24 +04:00
return gensec_gssapi_state - > max_wrap_buf_size ;
}
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_seal_packet ( struct gensec_security * gensec_security ,
TALLOC_CTX * mem_ctx ,
uint8_t * data , size_t length ,
const uint8_t * whole_pdu , size_t pdu_length ,
DATA_BLOB * sig )
{
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
struct gensec_gssapi_state * gensec_gssapi_state
= talloc_get_type ( gensec_security - > private_data , struct gensec_gssapi_state ) ;
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
OM_uint32 maj_stat , min_stat ;
gss_buffer_desc input_token , output_token ;
int conf_state ;
2005-09-11 15:19:02 +04:00
ssize_t sig_length ;
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
input_token . length = length ;
input_token . value = data ;
maj_stat = gss_wrap ( & min_stat ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > gssapi_context ,
gensec_have_feature ( gensec_security , GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL ) ,
GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT ,
& input_token ,
& conf_state ,
& output_token ) ;
if ( GSS_ERROR ( maj_stat ) ) {
r10066: This is the second in my patches to work on Samba4's kerberos support,
with an aim to make the code simpiler and more correct.
Gone is the old (since the very early Samba 3.0 krb5 days) 'iterate over
all keytypes)' code in gensec_krb5, we now follow the approach used in
gensec_gssapi, and use a keytab.
I have also done a lot of work in the GSSAPI code, to try and reduce
the diff between us and upstream heimdal. It was becoming hard to
track patches in this code, and I also want this patch (the DCE_STYLE
support) to be in a 'manageable' state for when lha considers it for
merging. (metze assures me it still has memory leak problems, but
I've started to address some of that).
This patch also includes a simple update of other code to current
heimdal, as well as changes we need for better PAC verification.
On the PAC side of things we now match windows member servers by
checking the name and authtime on an incoming PAC. Not generating these
right was the cause of the PAC pain, and so now both the main code and
torture test validate this behaviour.
One thing doesn't work with this patch:
- the sealing of RPC pipes with kerberos, Samba -> Samba seems
broken. I'm pretty sure this is related to AES, and the need to break
apart the gss_wrap interface.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit a3aba57c00a9c5318f4706db55d03f64e8bea60c)
2005-09-08 01:52:50 +04:00
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " gensec_gssapi_seal_packet: GSS Wrap failed: %s \n " ,
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
gssapi_error_string ( mem_ctx , maj_stat , min_stat , gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid ) ) ) ;
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
}
2006-10-23 10:08:25 +04:00
if ( output_token . length < input_token . length ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " gensec_gssapi_seal_packet: GSS Wrap length [%ld] *less* than caller length [%ld] \n " ,
( long ) output_token . length , ( long ) length ) ) ;
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
}
2006-10-23 10:08:25 +04:00
sig_length = output_token . length - input_token . length ;
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
memcpy ( data , ( ( uint8_t * ) output_token . value ) + sig_length , length ) ;
* sig = data_blob_talloc ( mem_ctx , ( uint8_t * ) output_token . value , sig_length ) ;
2005-05-16 03:42:11 +04:00
dump_data_pw ( " gensec_gssapi_seal_packet: sig \n " , sig - > data , sig - > length ) ;
dump_data_pw ( " gensec_gssapi_seal_packet: clear \n " , data , length ) ;
dump_data_pw ( " gensec_gssapi_seal_packet: sealed \n " , ( ( uint8_t * ) output_token . value ) + sig_length , output_token . length - sig_length ) ;
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
gss_release_buffer ( & min_stat , & output_token ) ;
if ( gensec_have_feature ( gensec_security , GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL )
& & ! conf_state ) {
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
}
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
}
static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_unseal_packet ( struct gensec_security * gensec_security ,
TALLOC_CTX * mem_ctx ,
uint8_t * data , size_t length ,
const uint8_t * whole_pdu , size_t pdu_length ,
const DATA_BLOB * sig )
{
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
struct gensec_gssapi_state * gensec_gssapi_state
= talloc_get_type ( gensec_security - > private_data , struct gensec_gssapi_state ) ;
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
OM_uint32 maj_stat , min_stat ;
gss_buffer_desc input_token , output_token ;
int conf_state ;
gss_qop_t qop_state ;
DATA_BLOB in ;
r10066: This is the second in my patches to work on Samba4's kerberos support,
with an aim to make the code simpiler and more correct.
Gone is the old (since the very early Samba 3.0 krb5 days) 'iterate over
all keytypes)' code in gensec_krb5, we now follow the approach used in
gensec_gssapi, and use a keytab.
I have also done a lot of work in the GSSAPI code, to try and reduce
the diff between us and upstream heimdal. It was becoming hard to
track patches in this code, and I also want this patch (the DCE_STYLE
support) to be in a 'manageable' state for when lha considers it for
merging. (metze assures me it still has memory leak problems, but
I've started to address some of that).
This patch also includes a simple update of other code to current
heimdal, as well as changes we need for better PAC verification.
On the PAC side of things we now match windows member servers by
checking the name and authtime on an incoming PAC. Not generating these
right was the cause of the PAC pain, and so now both the main code and
torture test validate this behaviour.
One thing doesn't work with this patch:
- the sealing of RPC pipes with kerberos, Samba -> Samba seems
broken. I'm pretty sure this is related to AES, and the need to break
apart the gss_wrap interface.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit a3aba57c00a9c5318f4706db55d03f64e8bea60c)
2005-09-08 01:52:50 +04:00
dump_data_pw ( " gensec_gssapi_unseal_packet: sig \n " , sig - > data , sig - > length ) ;
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
in = data_blob_talloc ( mem_ctx , NULL , sig - > length + length ) ;
memcpy ( in . data , sig - > data , sig - > length ) ;
memcpy ( in . data + sig - > length , data , length ) ;
input_token . length = in . length ;
input_token . value = in . data ;
maj_stat = gss_unwrap ( & min_stat ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > gssapi_context ,
& input_token ,
& output_token ,
& conf_state ,
& qop_state ) ;
if ( GSS_ERROR ( maj_stat ) ) {
r10066: This is the second in my patches to work on Samba4's kerberos support,
with an aim to make the code simpiler and more correct.
Gone is the old (since the very early Samba 3.0 krb5 days) 'iterate over
all keytypes)' code in gensec_krb5, we now follow the approach used in
gensec_gssapi, and use a keytab.
I have also done a lot of work in the GSSAPI code, to try and reduce
the diff between us and upstream heimdal. It was becoming hard to
track patches in this code, and I also want this patch (the DCE_STYLE
support) to be in a 'manageable' state for when lha considers it for
merging. (metze assures me it still has memory leak problems, but
I've started to address some of that).
This patch also includes a simple update of other code to current
heimdal, as well as changes we need for better PAC verification.
On the PAC side of things we now match windows member servers by
checking the name and authtime on an incoming PAC. Not generating these
right was the cause of the PAC pain, and so now both the main code and
torture test validate this behaviour.
One thing doesn't work with this patch:
- the sealing of RPC pipes with kerberos, Samba -> Samba seems
broken. I'm pretty sure this is related to AES, and the need to break
apart the gss_wrap interface.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit a3aba57c00a9c5318f4706db55d03f64e8bea60c)
2005-09-08 01:52:50 +04:00
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " gensec_gssapi_unseal_packet: GSS UnWrap failed: %s \n " ,
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
gssapi_error_string ( mem_ctx , maj_stat , min_stat , gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid ) ) ) ;
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
}
if ( output_token . length ! = length ) {
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
}
memcpy ( data , output_token . value , length ) ;
gss_release_buffer ( & min_stat , & output_token ) ;
if ( gensec_have_feature ( gensec_security , GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL )
& & ! conf_state ) {
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
}
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
}
static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_sign_packet ( struct gensec_security * gensec_security ,
TALLOC_CTX * mem_ctx ,
const uint8_t * data , size_t length ,
const uint8_t * whole_pdu , size_t pdu_length ,
DATA_BLOB * sig )
{
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
struct gensec_gssapi_state * gensec_gssapi_state
= talloc_get_type ( gensec_security - > private_data , struct gensec_gssapi_state ) ;
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
OM_uint32 maj_stat , min_stat ;
gss_buffer_desc input_token , output_token ;
int conf_state ;
ssize_t sig_length = 0 ;
input_token . length = length ;
input_token . value = discard_const_p ( uint8_t * , data ) ;
maj_stat = gss_wrap ( & min_stat ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > gssapi_context ,
0 ,
GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT ,
& input_token ,
& conf_state ,
& output_token ) ;
if ( GSS_ERROR ( maj_stat ) ) {
2005-05-16 03:42:11 +04:00
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " GSS Wrap failed: %s \n " ,
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
gssapi_error_string ( mem_ctx , maj_stat , min_stat , gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid ) ) ) ;
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
}
2006-10-23 10:08:25 +04:00
if ( output_token . length < input_token . length ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " gensec_gssapi_sign_packet: GSS Wrap length [%ld] *less* than caller length [%ld] \n " ,
( long ) output_token . length , ( long ) length ) ) ;
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
}
2005-09-11 15:19:02 +04:00
/* Caller must pad to right boundary */
2006-10-23 10:08:25 +04:00
sig_length = output_token . length - input_token . length ;
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
* sig = data_blob_talloc ( mem_ctx , ( uint8_t * ) output_token . value , sig_length ) ;
2005-05-16 03:42:11 +04:00
dump_data_pw ( " gensec_gssapi_seal_packet: sig \n " , sig - > data , sig - > length ) ;
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
gss_release_buffer ( & min_stat , & output_token ) ;
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
}
static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_check_packet ( struct gensec_security * gensec_security ,
TALLOC_CTX * mem_ctx ,
const uint8_t * data , size_t length ,
const uint8_t * whole_pdu , size_t pdu_length ,
const DATA_BLOB * sig )
{
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
struct gensec_gssapi_state * gensec_gssapi_state
= talloc_get_type ( gensec_security - > private_data , struct gensec_gssapi_state ) ;
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
OM_uint32 maj_stat , min_stat ;
gss_buffer_desc input_token , output_token ;
int conf_state ;
gss_qop_t qop_state ;
DATA_BLOB in ;
2005-05-16 03:42:11 +04:00
dump_data_pw ( " gensec_gssapi_seal_packet: sig \n " , sig - > data , sig - > length ) ;
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
in = data_blob_talloc ( mem_ctx , NULL , sig - > length + length ) ;
memcpy ( in . data , sig - > data , sig - > length ) ;
memcpy ( in . data + sig - > length , data , length ) ;
input_token . length = in . length ;
input_token . value = in . data ;
maj_stat = gss_unwrap ( & min_stat ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > gssapi_context ,
& input_token ,
& output_token ,
& conf_state ,
& qop_state ) ;
if ( GSS_ERROR ( maj_stat ) ) {
2005-05-16 03:42:11 +04:00
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " GSS UnWrap failed: %s \n " ,
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
gssapi_error_string ( mem_ctx , maj_stat , min_stat , gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid ) ) ) ;
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
}
if ( output_token . length ! = length ) {
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
}
gss_release_buffer ( & min_stat , & output_token ) ;
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
}
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
/* Try to figure out what features we actually got on the connection */
2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
static BOOL gensec_gssapi_have_feature ( struct gensec_security * gensec_security ,
2005-02-10 08:22:53 +03:00
uint32_t feature )
2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
{
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
struct gensec_gssapi_state * gensec_gssapi_state
= talloc_get_type ( gensec_security - > private_data , struct gensec_gssapi_state ) ;
2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
if ( feature & GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN ) {
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
/* If we are going GSSAPI SASL, then we honour the second negotiation */
if ( gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl
& & gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl_state = = STAGE_DONE ) {
return ( ( gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl_protection & NEG_SIGN )
& & ( gensec_gssapi_state - > got_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG ) ) ;
}
2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
return gensec_gssapi_state - > got_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG ;
}
if ( feature & GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL ) {
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
/* If we are going GSSAPI SASL, then we honour the second negotiation */
if ( gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl
& & gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl_state = = STAGE_DONE ) {
return ( ( gensec_gssapi_state - > sasl_protection & NEG_SEAL )
& & ( gensec_gssapi_state - > got_flags & GSS_C_CONF_FLAG ) ) ;
}
2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
return gensec_gssapi_state - > got_flags & GSS_C_CONF_FLAG ;
}
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
if ( feature & GENSEC_FEATURE_SESSION_KEY ) {
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
/* Only for GSSAPI/Krb5 */
2006-11-10 05:44:38 +03:00
if ( gss_oid_equal ( gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid , gss_mech_krb5 ) ) {
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
return True ;
}
2005-08-20 10:08:52 +04:00
}
if ( feature & GENSEC_FEATURE_DCE_STYLE ) {
r10066: This is the second in my patches to work on Samba4's kerberos support,
with an aim to make the code simpiler and more correct.
Gone is the old (since the very early Samba 3.0 krb5 days) 'iterate over
all keytypes)' code in gensec_krb5, we now follow the approach used in
gensec_gssapi, and use a keytab.
I have also done a lot of work in the GSSAPI code, to try and reduce
the diff between us and upstream heimdal. It was becoming hard to
track patches in this code, and I also want this patch (the DCE_STYLE
support) to be in a 'manageable' state for when lha considers it for
merging. (metze assures me it still has memory leak problems, but
I've started to address some of that).
This patch also includes a simple update of other code to current
heimdal, as well as changes we need for better PAC verification.
On the PAC side of things we now match windows member servers by
checking the name and authtime on an incoming PAC. Not generating these
right was the cause of the PAC pain, and so now both the main code and
torture test validate this behaviour.
One thing doesn't work with this patch:
- the sealing of RPC pipes with kerberos, Samba -> Samba seems
broken. I'm pretty sure this is related to AES, and the need to break
apart the gss_wrap interface.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit a3aba57c00a9c5318f4706db55d03f64e8bea60c)
2005-09-08 01:52:50 +04:00
return gensec_gssapi_state - > got_flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE ;
2005-08-20 10:08:52 +04:00
}
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
/* We can always do async (rather than strict request/reply) packets. */
2005-08-20 10:08:52 +04:00
if ( feature & GENSEC_FEATURE_ASYNC_REPLIES ) {
return True ;
2005-05-12 06:07:53 +04:00
}
2005-01-01 03:19:08 +03:00
return False ;
}
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
/*
* Extract the ' sesssion key ' needed by SMB signing and ncacn_np
* ( for encrypting some passwords ) .
*
* This breaks all the abstractions , but what do you expect . . .
*/
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_session_key ( struct gensec_security * gensec_security ,
DATA_BLOB * session_key )
{
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
struct gensec_gssapi_state * gensec_gssapi_state
= talloc_get_type ( gensec_security - > private_data , struct gensec_gssapi_state ) ;
OM_uint32 maj_stat , min_stat ;
krb5_keyblock * subkey ;
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
if ( gensec_gssapi_state - > session_key . data ) {
* session_key = gensec_gssapi_state - > session_key ;
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
}
2006-11-08 07:54:56 +03:00
maj_stat = gsskrb5_get_initiator_subkey ( & min_stat ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > gssapi_context ,
& subkey ) ;
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
if ( maj_stat ! = 0 ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " NO session key for this mech \n " ) ) ;
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
return NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY ;
}
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
DEBUG ( 10 , ( " Got KRB5 session key of length %d \n " ,
( int ) KRB5_KEY_LENGTH ( subkey ) ) ) ;
gensec_gssapi_state - > session_key = data_blob_talloc ( gensec_gssapi_state ,
KRB5_KEY_DATA ( subkey ) , KRB5_KEY_LENGTH ( subkey ) ) ;
krb5_free_keyblock ( gensec_gssapi_state - > smb_krb5_context - > krb5_context , subkey ) ;
* session_key = gensec_gssapi_state - > session_key ;
dump_data_pw ( " KRB5 Session Key: \n " , session_key - > data , session_key - > length ) ;
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
}
2006-02-04 12:53:50 +03:00
/* Get some basic (and authorization) information about the user on
* this session . This uses either the PAC ( if present ) or a local
* database lookup */
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_session_info ( struct gensec_security * gensec_security ,
2006-01-31 04:50:54 +03:00
struct auth_session_info * * _session_info )
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
{
NTSTATUS nt_status ;
2005-06-28 04:55:44 +04:00
TALLOC_CTX * mem_ctx ;
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
struct gensec_gssapi_state * gensec_gssapi_state
= talloc_get_type ( gensec_security - > private_data , struct gensec_gssapi_state ) ;
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
struct auth_serversupplied_info * server_info = NULL ;
struct auth_session_info * session_info = NULL ;
2005-06-28 04:55:44 +04:00
struct PAC_LOGON_INFO * logon_info ;
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
OM_uint32 maj_stat , min_stat ;
gss_buffer_desc name_token ;
2005-06-28 04:55:44 +04:00
gss_buffer_desc pac ;
2005-06-28 12:27:50 +04:00
krb5_keyblock * keyblock ;
r10066: This is the second in my patches to work on Samba4's kerberos support,
with an aim to make the code simpiler and more correct.
Gone is the old (since the very early Samba 3.0 krb5 days) 'iterate over
all keytypes)' code in gensec_krb5, we now follow the approach used in
gensec_gssapi, and use a keytab.
I have also done a lot of work in the GSSAPI code, to try and reduce
the diff between us and upstream heimdal. It was becoming hard to
track patches in this code, and I also want this patch (the DCE_STYLE
support) to be in a 'manageable' state for when lha considers it for
merging. (metze assures me it still has memory leak problems, but
I've started to address some of that).
This patch also includes a simple update of other code to current
heimdal, as well as changes we need for better PAC verification.
On the PAC side of things we now match windows member servers by
checking the name and authtime on an incoming PAC. Not generating these
right was the cause of the PAC pain, and so now both the main code and
torture test validate this behaviour.
One thing doesn't work with this patch:
- the sealing of RPC pipes with kerberos, Samba -> Samba seems
broken. I'm pretty sure this is related to AES, and the need to break
apart the gss_wrap interface.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit a3aba57c00a9c5318f4706db55d03f64e8bea60c)
2005-09-08 01:52:50 +04:00
time_t authtime ;
krb5_principal principal ;
char * principal_string ;
2005-10-20 14:15:31 +04:00
DATA_BLOB pac_blob ;
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
r10066: This is the second in my patches to work on Samba4's kerberos support,
with an aim to make the code simpiler and more correct.
Gone is the old (since the very early Samba 3.0 krb5 days) 'iterate over
all keytypes)' code in gensec_krb5, we now follow the approach used in
gensec_gssapi, and use a keytab.
I have also done a lot of work in the GSSAPI code, to try and reduce
the diff between us and upstream heimdal. It was becoming hard to
track patches in this code, and I also want this patch (the DCE_STYLE
support) to be in a 'manageable' state for when lha considers it for
merging. (metze assures me it still has memory leak problems, but
I've started to address some of that).
This patch also includes a simple update of other code to current
heimdal, as well as changes we need for better PAC verification.
On the PAC side of things we now match windows member servers by
checking the name and authtime on an incoming PAC. Not generating these
right was the cause of the PAC pain, and so now both the main code and
torture test validate this behaviour.
One thing doesn't work with this patch:
- the sealing of RPC pipes with kerberos, Samba -> Samba seems
broken. I'm pretty sure this is related to AES, and the need to break
apart the gss_wrap interface.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit a3aba57c00a9c5318f4706db55d03f64e8bea60c)
2005-09-08 01:52:50 +04:00
if ( ( gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid - > length ! = gss_mech_krb5 - > length )
| | ( memcmp ( gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid - > elements , gss_mech_krb5 - > elements ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid - > length ) ! = 0 ) ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " NO session info available for this mech \n " ) ) ;
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER ;
}
2005-06-28 04:55:44 +04:00
mem_ctx = talloc_named ( gensec_gssapi_state , 0 , " gensec_gssapi_session_info context " ) ;
NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY ( mem_ctx ) ;
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
maj_stat = gss_display_name ( & min_stat ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > client_name ,
& name_token ,
NULL ) ;
2006-11-07 03:47:36 +03:00
if ( GSS_ERROR ( maj_stat ) ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " GSS display_name failed: %s \n " ,
gssapi_error_string ( mem_ctx , maj_stat , min_stat , gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid ) ) ) ;
2006-01-31 05:01:52 +03:00
talloc_free ( mem_ctx ) ;
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
return NT_STATUS_FOOBAR ;
}
r10066: This is the second in my patches to work on Samba4's kerberos support,
with an aim to make the code simpiler and more correct.
Gone is the old (since the very early Samba 3.0 krb5 days) 'iterate over
all keytypes)' code in gensec_krb5, we now follow the approach used in
gensec_gssapi, and use a keytab.
I have also done a lot of work in the GSSAPI code, to try and reduce
the diff between us and upstream heimdal. It was becoming hard to
track patches in this code, and I also want this patch (the DCE_STYLE
support) to be in a 'manageable' state for when lha considers it for
merging. (metze assures me it still has memory leak problems, but
I've started to address some of that).
This patch also includes a simple update of other code to current
heimdal, as well as changes we need for better PAC verification.
On the PAC side of things we now match windows member servers by
checking the name and authtime on an incoming PAC. Not generating these
right was the cause of the PAC pain, and so now both the main code and
torture test validate this behaviour.
One thing doesn't work with this patch:
- the sealing of RPC pipes with kerberos, Samba -> Samba seems
broken. I'm pretty sure this is related to AES, and the need to break
apart the gss_wrap interface.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit a3aba57c00a9c5318f4706db55d03f64e8bea60c)
2005-09-08 01:52:50 +04:00
principal_string = talloc_strndup ( mem_ctx , name_token . value , name_token . length ) ;
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
gss_release_buffer ( & min_stat , & name_token ) ;
r10066: This is the second in my patches to work on Samba4's kerberos support,
with an aim to make the code simpiler and more correct.
Gone is the old (since the very early Samba 3.0 krb5 days) 'iterate over
all keytypes)' code in gensec_krb5, we now follow the approach used in
gensec_gssapi, and use a keytab.
I have also done a lot of work in the GSSAPI code, to try and reduce
the diff between us and upstream heimdal. It was becoming hard to
track patches in this code, and I also want this patch (the DCE_STYLE
support) to be in a 'manageable' state for when lha considers it for
merging. (metze assures me it still has memory leak problems, but
I've started to address some of that).
This patch also includes a simple update of other code to current
heimdal, as well as changes we need for better PAC verification.
On the PAC side of things we now match windows member servers by
checking the name and authtime on an incoming PAC. Not generating these
right was the cause of the PAC pain, and so now both the main code and
torture test validate this behaviour.
One thing doesn't work with this patch:
- the sealing of RPC pipes with kerberos, Samba -> Samba seems
broken. I'm pretty sure this is related to AES, and the need to break
apart the gss_wrap interface.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit a3aba57c00a9c5318f4706db55d03f64e8bea60c)
2005-09-08 01:52:50 +04:00
if ( ! principal_string ) {
2005-06-28 04:55:44 +04:00
talloc_free ( mem_ctx ) ;
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
2005-05-11 16:03:48 +04:00
2006-11-07 09:59:56 +03:00
maj_stat = gsskrb5_extract_authz_data_from_sec_context ( & min_stat ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > gssapi_context ,
KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC ,
& pac ) ;
2005-10-20 14:15:31 +04:00
if ( maj_stat = = 0 ) {
pac_blob = data_blob_talloc ( mem_ctx , pac . value , pac . length ) ;
gss_release_buffer ( & min_stat , & pac ) ;
2006-11-07 09:59:56 +03:00
} else {
pac_blob = data_blob ( NULL , 0 ) ;
2005-10-20 14:15:31 +04:00
}
2005-06-28 04:55:44 +04:00
2005-10-24 02:20:42 +04:00
/* IF we have the PAC - otherwise we need to get this
* data from elsewere - local ldb , or ( TODO ) lookup of some
* kind . . .
*/
2006-11-07 09:59:56 +03:00
if ( pac_blob . length ) {
r10066: This is the second in my patches to work on Samba4's kerberos support,
with an aim to make the code simpiler and more correct.
Gone is the old (since the very early Samba 3.0 krb5 days) 'iterate over
all keytypes)' code in gensec_krb5, we now follow the approach used in
gensec_gssapi, and use a keytab.
I have also done a lot of work in the GSSAPI code, to try and reduce
the diff between us and upstream heimdal. It was becoming hard to
track patches in this code, and I also want this patch (the DCE_STYLE
support) to be in a 'manageable' state for when lha considers it for
merging. (metze assures me it still has memory leak problems, but
I've started to address some of that).
This patch also includes a simple update of other code to current
heimdal, as well as changes we need for better PAC verification.
On the PAC side of things we now match windows member servers by
checking the name and authtime on an incoming PAC. Not generating these
right was the cause of the PAC pain, and so now both the main code and
torture test validate this behaviour.
One thing doesn't work with this patch:
- the sealing of RPC pipes with kerberos, Samba -> Samba seems
broken. I'm pretty sure this is related to AES, and the need to break
apart the gss_wrap interface.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit a3aba57c00a9c5318f4706db55d03f64e8bea60c)
2005-09-08 01:52:50 +04:00
krb5_error_code ret ;
2006-11-07 09:59:56 +03:00
union netr_Validation validation ;
r10066: This is the second in my patches to work on Samba4's kerberos support,
with an aim to make the code simpiler and more correct.
Gone is the old (since the very early Samba 3.0 krb5 days) 'iterate over
all keytypes)' code in gensec_krb5, we now follow the approach used in
gensec_gssapi, and use a keytab.
I have also done a lot of work in the GSSAPI code, to try and reduce
the diff between us and upstream heimdal. It was becoming hard to
track patches in this code, and I also want this patch (the DCE_STYLE
support) to be in a 'manageable' state for when lha considers it for
merging. (metze assures me it still has memory leak problems, but
I've started to address some of that).
This patch also includes a simple update of other code to current
heimdal, as well as changes we need for better PAC verification.
On the PAC side of things we now match windows member servers by
checking the name and authtime on an incoming PAC. Not generating these
right was the cause of the PAC pain, and so now both the main code and
torture test validate this behaviour.
One thing doesn't work with this patch:
- the sealing of RPC pipes with kerberos, Samba -> Samba seems
broken. I'm pretty sure this is related to AES, and the need to break
apart the gss_wrap interface.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit a3aba57c00a9c5318f4706db55d03f64e8bea60c)
2005-09-08 01:52:50 +04:00
2006-11-07 09:59:56 +03:00
maj_stat = gsskrb5_extract_authtime_from_sec_context ( & min_stat ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > gssapi_context ,
& authtime ) ;
if ( GSS_ERROR ( maj_stat ) ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " gsskrb5_extract_authtime_from_sec_context: %s \n " ,
gssapi_error_string ( mem_ctx , maj_stat , min_stat , gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid ) ) ) ;
talloc_free ( mem_ctx ) ;
return NT_STATUS_FOOBAR ;
}
maj_stat = gsskrb5_extract_service_keyblock ( & min_stat ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > gssapi_context ,
& keyblock ) ;
if ( GSS_ERROR ( maj_stat ) ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " gsskrb5_copy_service_keyblock failed: %s \n " ,
gssapi_error_string ( mem_ctx , maj_stat , min_stat , gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid ) ) ) ;
talloc_free ( mem_ctx ) ;
return NT_STATUS_FOOBAR ;
}
ret = krb5_parse_name_flags ( gensec_gssapi_state - > smb_krb5_context - > krb5_context ,
principal_string ,
KRB5_PRINCIPAL_PARSE_MUST_REALM ,
& principal ) ;
r10066: This is the second in my patches to work on Samba4's kerberos support,
with an aim to make the code simpiler and more correct.
Gone is the old (since the very early Samba 3.0 krb5 days) 'iterate over
all keytypes)' code in gensec_krb5, we now follow the approach used in
gensec_gssapi, and use a keytab.
I have also done a lot of work in the GSSAPI code, to try and reduce
the diff between us and upstream heimdal. It was becoming hard to
track patches in this code, and I also want this patch (the DCE_STYLE
support) to be in a 'manageable' state for when lha considers it for
merging. (metze assures me it still has memory leak problems, but
I've started to address some of that).
This patch also includes a simple update of other code to current
heimdal, as well as changes we need for better PAC verification.
On the PAC side of things we now match windows member servers by
checking the name and authtime on an incoming PAC. Not generating these
right was the cause of the PAC pain, and so now both the main code and
torture test validate this behaviour.
One thing doesn't work with this patch:
- the sealing of RPC pipes with kerberos, Samba -> Samba seems
broken. I'm pretty sure this is related to AES, and the need to break
apart the gss_wrap interface.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit a3aba57c00a9c5318f4706db55d03f64e8bea60c)
2005-09-08 01:52:50 +04:00
if ( ret ) {
2006-11-07 09:59:56 +03:00
krb5_free_keyblock ( gensec_gssapi_state - > smb_krb5_context - > krb5_context ,
keyblock ) ;
r10066: This is the second in my patches to work on Samba4's kerberos support,
with an aim to make the code simpiler and more correct.
Gone is the old (since the very early Samba 3.0 krb5 days) 'iterate over
all keytypes)' code in gensec_krb5, we now follow the approach used in
gensec_gssapi, and use a keytab.
I have also done a lot of work in the GSSAPI code, to try and reduce
the diff between us and upstream heimdal. It was becoming hard to
track patches in this code, and I also want this patch (the DCE_STYLE
support) to be in a 'manageable' state for when lha considers it for
merging. (metze assures me it still has memory leak problems, but
I've started to address some of that).
This patch also includes a simple update of other code to current
heimdal, as well as changes we need for better PAC verification.
On the PAC side of things we now match windows member servers by
checking the name and authtime on an incoming PAC. Not generating these
right was the cause of the PAC pain, and so now both the main code and
torture test validate this behaviour.
One thing doesn't work with this patch:
- the sealing of RPC pipes with kerberos, Samba -> Samba seems
broken. I'm pretty sure this is related to AES, and the need to break
apart the gss_wrap interface.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit a3aba57c00a9c5318f4706db55d03f64e8bea60c)
2005-09-08 01:52:50 +04:00
talloc_free ( mem_ctx ) ;
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER ;
}
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/* decode and verify the pac */
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nt_status = kerberos_pac_logon_info ( mem_ctx , & logon_info , pac_blob ,
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gensec_gssapi_state - > smb_krb5_context - > krb5_context ,
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NULL , keyblock , principal , authtime , NULL ) ;
r10066: This is the second in my patches to work on Samba4's kerberos support,
with an aim to make the code simpiler and more correct.
Gone is the old (since the very early Samba 3.0 krb5 days) 'iterate over
all keytypes)' code in gensec_krb5, we now follow the approach used in
gensec_gssapi, and use a keytab.
I have also done a lot of work in the GSSAPI code, to try and reduce
the diff between us and upstream heimdal. It was becoming hard to
track patches in this code, and I also want this patch (the DCE_STYLE
support) to be in a 'manageable' state for when lha considers it for
merging. (metze assures me it still has memory leak problems, but
I've started to address some of that).
This patch also includes a simple update of other code to current
heimdal, as well as changes we need for better PAC verification.
On the PAC side of things we now match windows member servers by
checking the name and authtime on an incoming PAC. Not generating these
right was the cause of the PAC pain, and so now both the main code and
torture test validate this behaviour.
One thing doesn't work with this patch:
- the sealing of RPC pipes with kerberos, Samba -> Samba seems
broken. I'm pretty sure this is related to AES, and the need to break
apart the gss_wrap interface.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit a3aba57c00a9c5318f4706db55d03f64e8bea60c)
2005-09-08 01:52:50 +04:00
krb5_free_principal ( gensec_gssapi_state - > smb_krb5_context - > krb5_context , principal ) ;
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krb5_free_keyblock ( gensec_gssapi_state - > smb_krb5_context - > krb5_context ,
keyblock ) ;
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if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( nt_status ) ) {
talloc_free ( mem_ctx ) ;
return nt_status ;
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}
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validation . sam3 = & logon_info - > info3 ;
nt_status = make_server_info_netlogon_validation ( gensec_gssapi_state ,
NULL ,
3 , & validation ,
& server_info ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( nt_status ) ) {
talloc_free ( mem_ctx ) ;
return nt_status ;
}
} else if ( ! lp_parm_bool ( - 1 , " gensec " , " require_pac " , False ) ) {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " Unable to find PAC, resorting to local user lookup: %s \n " ,
gssapi_error_string ( mem_ctx , maj_stat , min_stat , gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid ) ) ) ;
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nt_status = sam_get_server_info_principal ( mem_ctx , principal_string ,
& server_info ) ;
r10066: This is the second in my patches to work on Samba4's kerberos support,
with an aim to make the code simpiler and more correct.
Gone is the old (since the very early Samba 3.0 krb5 days) 'iterate over
all keytypes)' code in gensec_krb5, we now follow the approach used in
gensec_gssapi, and use a keytab.
I have also done a lot of work in the GSSAPI code, to try and reduce
the diff between us and upstream heimdal. It was becoming hard to
track patches in this code, and I also want this patch (the DCE_STYLE
support) to be in a 'manageable' state for when lha considers it for
merging. (metze assures me it still has memory leak problems, but
I've started to address some of that).
This patch also includes a simple update of other code to current
heimdal, as well as changes we need for better PAC verification.
On the PAC side of things we now match windows member servers by
checking the name and authtime on an incoming PAC. Not generating these
right was the cause of the PAC pain, and so now both the main code and
torture test validate this behaviour.
One thing doesn't work with this patch:
- the sealing of RPC pipes with kerberos, Samba -> Samba seems
broken. I'm pretty sure this is related to AES, and the need to break
apart the gss_wrap interface.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit a3aba57c00a9c5318f4706db55d03f64e8bea60c)
2005-09-08 01:52:50 +04:00
2005-06-28 04:55:44 +04:00
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( nt_status ) ) {
talloc_free ( mem_ctx ) ;
return nt_status ;
}
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} else {
DEBUG ( 1 , ( " Unable to find PAC in ticket from %s, failing to allow access: %s \n " ,
principal_string ,
gssapi_error_string ( mem_ctx , maj_stat , min_stat , gensec_gssapi_state - > gss_oid ) ) ) ;
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
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}
/* references the server_info into the session_info */
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nt_status = auth_generate_session_info ( mem_ctx , server_info , & session_info ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( nt_status ) ) {
talloc_free ( mem_ctx ) ;
return nt_status ;
}
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nt_status = gensec_gssapi_session_key ( gensec_security , & session_info - > session_key ) ;
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if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( nt_status ) ) {
talloc_free ( mem_ctx ) ;
return nt_status ;
}
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if ( ! ( gensec_gssapi_state - > got_flags & GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG ) ) {
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DEBUG ( 10 , ( " gensec_gssapi: NO delegated credentials supplied by client \n " ) ) ;
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} else {
krb5_error_code ret ;
DEBUG ( 10 , ( " gensec_gssapi: delegated credentials supplied by client \n " ) ) ;
session_info - > credentials = cli_credentials_init ( session_info ) ;
if ( ! session_info - > credentials ) {
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talloc_free ( mem_ctx ) ;
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return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
cli_credentials_set_conf ( session_info - > credentials ) ;
ret = cli_credentials_set_client_gss_creds ( session_info - > credentials ,
gensec_gssapi_state - > delegated_cred_handle ,
CRED_SPECIFIED ) ;
if ( ret ) {
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talloc_free ( mem_ctx ) ;
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return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY ;
}
/* It has been taken from this place... */
gensec_gssapi_state - > delegated_cred_handle = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL ;
}
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talloc_steal ( gensec_gssapi_state , session_info ) ;
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talloc_free ( mem_ctx ) ;
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* _session_info = session_info ;
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
}
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static const char * gensec_gssapi_krb5_oids [ ] = {
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GENSEC_OID_KERBEROS5_OLD ,
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GENSEC_OID_KERBEROS5 ,
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NULL
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} ;
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static const char * gensec_gssapi_spnego_oids [ ] = {
GENSEC_OID_SPNEGO ,
NULL
} ;
/* As a server, this could in theory accept any GSSAPI mech */
static const struct gensec_security_ops gensec_gssapi_spnego_security_ops = {
. name = " gssapi_spnego " ,
. sasl_name = " GSS-SPNEGO " ,
. auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO ,
. oid = gensec_gssapi_spnego_oids ,
. client_start = gensec_gssapi_client_start ,
. server_start = gensec_gssapi_server_start ,
. magic = gensec_gssapi_magic ,
. update = gensec_gssapi_update ,
. session_key = gensec_gssapi_session_key ,
. session_info = gensec_gssapi_session_info ,
. sign_packet = gensec_gssapi_sign_packet ,
. check_packet = gensec_gssapi_check_packet ,
. seal_packet = gensec_gssapi_seal_packet ,
. unseal_packet = gensec_gssapi_unseal_packet ,
. wrap = gensec_gssapi_wrap ,
. unwrap = gensec_gssapi_unwrap ,
. have_feature = gensec_gssapi_have_feature ,
. enabled = False ,
. kerberos = True ,
. priority = GENSEC_GSSAPI
} ;
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/* As a server, this could in theory accept any GSSAPI mech */
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static const struct gensec_security_ops gensec_gssapi_krb5_security_ops = {
. name = " gssapi_krb5 " ,
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. auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_KRB5 ,
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. oid = gensec_gssapi_krb5_oids ,
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. client_start = gensec_gssapi_client_start ,
. server_start = gensec_gssapi_server_start ,
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. magic = gensec_gssapi_magic ,
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. update = gensec_gssapi_update ,
. session_key = gensec_gssapi_session_key ,
. session_info = gensec_gssapi_session_info ,
. sign_packet = gensec_gssapi_sign_packet ,
. check_packet = gensec_gssapi_check_packet ,
. seal_packet = gensec_gssapi_seal_packet ,
. unseal_packet = gensec_gssapi_unseal_packet ,
. wrap = gensec_gssapi_wrap ,
. unwrap = gensec_gssapi_unwrap ,
. have_feature = gensec_gssapi_have_feature ,
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. enabled = True ,
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. kerberos = True ,
. priority = GENSEC_GSSAPI
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} ;
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/* As a server, this could in theory accept any GSSAPI mech */
static const struct gensec_security_ops gensec_gssapi_sasl_krb5_security_ops = {
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. name = " gssapi_krb5_sasl " ,
. sasl_name = " GSSAPI " ,
. client_start = gensec_gssapi_sasl_client_start ,
. server_start = gensec_gssapi_sasl_server_start ,
. update = gensec_gssapi_update ,
. session_key = gensec_gssapi_session_key ,
. session_info = gensec_gssapi_session_info ,
. max_input_size = gensec_gssapi_max_input_size ,
. max_wrapped_size = gensec_gssapi_max_wrapped_size ,
. wrap = gensec_gssapi_wrap ,
. unwrap = gensec_gssapi_unwrap ,
. have_feature = gensec_gssapi_have_feature ,
. enabled = True ,
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. kerberos = True ,
. priority = GENSEC_GSSAPI
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} ;
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NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_init ( void )
{
NTSTATUS ret ;
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ret = gensec_register ( & gensec_gssapi_spnego_security_ops ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( ret ) ) {
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " Failed to register '%s' gensec backend! \n " ,
gensec_gssapi_spnego_security_ops . name ) ) ;
return ret ;
}
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ret = gensec_register ( & gensec_gssapi_krb5_security_ops ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( ret ) ) {
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " Failed to register '%s' gensec backend! \n " ,
gensec_gssapi_krb5_security_ops . name ) ) ;
return ret ;
}
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ret = gensec_register ( & gensec_gssapi_sasl_krb5_security_ops ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( ret ) ) {
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " Failed to register '%s' gensec backend! \n " ,
gensec_gssapi_sasl_krb5_security_ops . name ) ) ;
return ret ;
}
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return ret ;
}