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samba-mirror/source3/smbd/sec_ctx.c

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I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
/*
Removed version number from file header. Changed "SMB/Netbios" to "SMB/CIFS" in file header. (This used to be commit 6a58c9bd06d0d7502a24bf5ce5a2faf0a146edfa)
2002-01-30 09:08:46 +03:00
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
uid/user handling
Copyright (C) Tim Potter 2000
s3: Fix some nonempty blank lines
2011-02-14 23:39:10 +03:00
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
r23779: Change from v2 or later to v3 or later. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 407e6e695b8366369b7c76af1ff76869b45347b3)
2007-07-09 23:25:36 +04:00
the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
(at your option) any later version.
s3: Fix some nonempty blank lines
2011-02-14 23:39:10 +03:00
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
s3: Fix some nonempty blank lines
2011-02-14 23:39:10 +03:00
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
r23784: use the GPLv3 boilerplate as recommended by the FSF and the license text (This used to be commit b0132e94fc5fef936aa766fb99a306b3628e9f07)
2007-07-10 04:52:41 +04:00
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
*/
#include "includes.h"
Include uid_wrapper correctly.
2011-10-27 14:00:53 +04:00
#include "system/passwd.h"
s3: include smbd/smbd.h where needed. Guenther
2011-03-22 18:57:01 +03:00
#include "smbd/smbd.h"
s3:smbd: move all globals and static variables in globals.[ch] The goal is to move all this variables into a big context structure. metze
2009-01-08 14:03:45 +03:00
#include "smbd/globals.h"
s3-auth Use security_token_debug() from common code This prints the security token including the privileges as strings instead of just a bitmap. Andrew Bartlett Signed-off-by: Andrew Tridgell <tridge@samba.org>
2010-09-17 09:31:28 +04:00
#include "libcli/security/security_token.h"
s3-auth: smbd needs auth.h Guenther
2011-03-24 15:46:20 +03:00
#include "auth.h"
s3: only include smb profiling where needed. Guenther Autobuild-User: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org> Autobuild-Date: Thu Apr 14 01:31:39 CEST 2011 on sn-devel-104
2011-04-14 02:36:23 +04:00
#include "smbprofile.h"
Replace all uses of setXX[ug]id() and setgroups with samba_setXX[ug]id() calls. Will allow thread-specific credentials to be added by modifying the central definitions. Deliberately left the setXX[ug]id() call in popt as this is not used in Samba.
2012-06-28 22:59:51 +04:00
#include "../lib/util/setid.h"
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
extern struct current_user current_user;
Don't switch user contexts unless you have to. Saves a bunch of syscalls on close. Noticed by Volker. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 3caeeaea162e2083a087c242b850c107a3be1bf9)
2008-01-11 03:35:54 +03:00
/****************************************************************************
Are two UNIX tokens equal ?
****************************************************************************/
s3-auth struct security_unix_token replaces UNIX_USER_TOKEN
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bool unix_token_equal(const struct security_unix_token *t1, const struct security_unix_token *t2)
Don't switch user contexts unless you have to. Saves a bunch of syscalls on close. Noticed by Volker. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 3caeeaea162e2083a087c242b850c107a3be1bf9)
2008-01-11 03:35:54 +03:00
{
if (t1->uid != t2->uid || t1->gid != t2->gid ||
t1->ngroups != t2->ngroups) {
return false;
}
if (memcmp(t1->groups, t2->groups,
t1->ngroups*sizeof(gid_t)) != 0) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
Added an NT_USER_TOKEN structure that is copied/passed around associated with the current user. This will allow se_access_check() to quickly do a SD check without having to translate uid/gid's to SIDs. Still needs work on pipe calls. Jeremy. (This used to be commit e28d01b744b3dbd33e0e54af4e7f426fa8c082b8)
2000-08-04 02:38:43 +04:00
/****************************************************************************
Become the specified uid.
****************************************************************************/
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
RIP BOOL. Convert BOOL -> bool. I found a few interesting bugs in various places whilst doing this (places that assumed BOOL == int). I also need to fix the Samba4 pidl generation (next checkin). Jeremy. (This used to be commit f35a266b3cbb3e5fa6a86be60f34fe340a3ca71f)
2007-10-19 04:40:25 +04:00
static bool become_uid(uid_t uid)
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
{
/* Check for dodgy uid values */
if (uid == (uid_t)-1 ||
((sizeof(uid_t) == 2) && (uid == (uid_t)65535))) {
s3:smbd: move all globals and static variables in globals.[ch] The goal is to move all this variables into a big context structure. metze
2009-01-08 14:03:45 +03:00
if (!become_uid_done) {
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
DEBUG(1,("WARNING: using uid %d is a security risk\n",
(int)uid));
s3:smbd: move all globals and static variables in globals.[ch] The goal is to move all this variables into a big context structure. metze
2009-01-08 14:03:45 +03:00
become_uid_done = true;
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
}
}
/* Set effective user id */
set_effective_uid(uid);
return True;
}
Added an NT_USER_TOKEN structure that is copied/passed around associated with the current user. This will allow se_access_check() to quickly do a SD check without having to translate uid/gid's to SIDs. Still needs work on pipe calls. Jeremy. (This used to be commit e28d01b744b3dbd33e0e54af4e7f426fa8c082b8)
2000-08-04 02:38:43 +04:00
/****************************************************************************
Become the specified gid.
****************************************************************************/
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
RIP BOOL. Convert BOOL -> bool. I found a few interesting bugs in various places whilst doing this (places that assumed BOOL == int). I also need to fix the Samba4 pidl generation (next checkin). Jeremy. (This used to be commit f35a266b3cbb3e5fa6a86be60f34fe340a3ca71f)
2007-10-19 04:40:25 +04:00
static bool become_gid(gid_t gid)
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
{
/* Check for dodgy gid values */
if (gid == (gid_t)-1 || ((sizeof(gid_t) == 2) &&
(gid == (gid_t)65535))) {
s3:smbd: move all globals and static variables in globals.[ch] The goal is to move all this variables into a big context structure. metze
2009-01-08 14:03:45 +03:00
if (!become_gid_done) {
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
DEBUG(1,("WARNING: using gid %d is a security risk\n",
(int)gid));
s3:smbd: move all globals and static variables in globals.[ch] The goal is to move all this variables into a big context structure. metze
2009-01-08 14:03:45 +03:00
become_gid_done = true;
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
}
}
s3: Fix some nonempty blank lines
2011-02-14 23:39:10 +03:00
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
/* Set effective group id */
set_effective_gid(gid);
return True;
}
Added an NT_USER_TOKEN structure that is copied/passed around associated with the current user. This will allow se_access_check() to quickly do a SD check without having to translate uid/gid's to SIDs. Still needs work on pipe calls. Jeremy. (This used to be commit e28d01b744b3dbd33e0e54af4e7f426fa8c082b8)
2000-08-04 02:38:43 +04:00
/****************************************************************************
Become the specified uid and gid.
****************************************************************************/
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
RIP BOOL. Convert BOOL -> bool. I found a few interesting bugs in various places whilst doing this (places that assumed BOOL == int). I also need to fix the Samba4 pidl generation (next checkin). Jeremy. (This used to be commit f35a266b3cbb3e5fa6a86be60f34fe340a3ca71f)
2007-10-19 04:40:25 +04:00
static bool become_id(uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
{
return become_gid(gid) && become_uid(uid);
}
Added an NT_USER_TOKEN structure that is copied/passed around associated with the current user. This will allow se_access_check() to quickly do a SD check without having to translate uid/gid's to SIDs. Still needs work on pipe calls. Jeremy. (This used to be commit e28d01b744b3dbd33e0e54af4e7f426fa8c082b8)
2000-08-04 02:38:43 +04:00
/****************************************************************************
Drop back to root privileges in order to change to another user.
****************************************************************************/
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
static void gain_root(void)
{
Remove warning about trapdoor systems for non-root mode. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit b33000cdc0cafd4888c3f07c56050626743abd14)
2001-06-26 07:45:45 +04:00
if (non_root_mode()) {
return;
}
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
if (geteuid() != 0) {
set_effective_uid(0);
if (geteuid() != 0) {
DEBUG(0,
("Warning: You appear to have a trapdoor "
"uid system\n"));
}
}
if (getegid() != 0) {
set_effective_gid(0);
if (getegid() != 0) {
DEBUG(0,
("Warning: You appear to have a trapdoor "
"gid system\n"));
}
}
}
Added an NT_USER_TOKEN structure that is copied/passed around associated with the current user. This will allow se_access_check() to quickly do a SD check without having to translate uid/gid's to SIDs. Still needs work on pipe calls. Jeremy. (This used to be commit e28d01b744b3dbd33e0e54af4e7f426fa8c082b8)
2000-08-04 02:38:43 +04:00
/****************************************************************************
Get the list of current groups.
****************************************************************************/
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
Fix warning introduced by changing the size of UNIX_USER_TOKEN->ngroups from size_t to uint32_t.
2011-02-28 23:31:53 +03:00
static int get_current_groups(gid_t gid, uint32_t *p_ngroups, gid_t **p_groups)
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
{
Started to canonicalize our handling of uid -> sid code in order to get ready and fix se_access_check(). Added cannonical lookup_name(), lookup_sid(), uid_to_sid(), gid_to_sid() functions that look via winbind first the fall back on local lookup. All Samba should use these rather than trying to call winbindd code directly. Added NT_USER_TOKEN struct in user_struct, contains list of NT sids associated with this user. se_access_check() should use this (cached) value rather than attempting to do the same thing itself when given a uid/gid pair. More work needs to be done to preserve these things accross security context changes (especially with the tricky pipe problem) but I'm beginning to see how this will be done..... probably by registering a new vuid for an authenticated RPC pipe and not treating the pipe calls specially. More thoughts needed - but we're almost there... Jeremy. (This used to be commit 5e5cc6efe2e4687be59085f562caea1e2e05d0a8)
2000-08-02 06:11:55 +04:00
int i;
updated the 3.0 branch from the head branch - ready for alpha18 (This used to be commit 03ac082dcb375b6f3ca3d810a6a6367542bc23ce)
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
int ngroups;
gid_t *groups = NULL;
Started to canonicalize our handling of uid -> sid code in order to get ready and fix se_access_check(). Added cannonical lookup_name(), lookup_sid(), uid_to_sid(), gid_to_sid() functions that look via winbind first the fall back on local lookup. All Samba should use these rather than trying to call winbindd code directly. Added NT_USER_TOKEN struct in user_struct, contains list of NT sids associated with this user. se_access_check() should use this (cached) value rather than attempting to do the same thing itself when given a uid/gid pair. More work needs to be done to preserve these things accross security context changes (especially with the tricky pipe problem) but I'm beginning to see how this will be done..... probably by registering a new vuid for an authenticated RPC pipe and not treating the pipe calls specially. More thoughts needed - but we're almost there... Jeremy. (This used to be commit 5e5cc6efe2e4687be59085f562caea1e2e05d0a8)
2000-08-02 06:11:55 +04:00
(*p_ngroups) = 0;
(*p_groups) = NULL;
updated the 3.0 branch from the head branch - ready for alpha18 (This used to be commit 03ac082dcb375b6f3ca3d810a6a6367542bc23ce)
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
/* this looks a little strange, but is needed to cope with
systems that put the current egid in the group list
returned from getgroups() (tridge) */
save_re_gid();
set_effective_gid(gid);
Replace all uses of setXX[ug]id() and setgroups with samba_setXX[ug]id() calls. Will allow thread-specific credentials to be added by modifying the central definitions. Deliberately left the setXX[ug]id() call in popt as this is not used in Samba.
2012-06-28 22:59:51 +04:00
samba_setgid(gid);
Started to canonicalize our handling of uid -> sid code in order to get ready and fix se_access_check(). Added cannonical lookup_name(), lookup_sid(), uid_to_sid(), gid_to_sid() functions that look via winbind first the fall back on local lookup. All Samba should use these rather than trying to call winbindd code directly. Added NT_USER_TOKEN struct in user_struct, contains list of NT sids associated with this user. se_access_check() should use this (cached) value rather than attempting to do the same thing itself when given a uid/gid pair. More work needs to be done to preserve these things accross security context changes (especially with the tricky pipe problem) but I'm beginning to see how this will be done..... probably by registering a new vuid for an authenticated RPC pipe and not treating the pipe calls specially. More thoughts needed - but we're almost there... Jeremy. (This used to be commit 5e5cc6efe2e4687be59085f562caea1e2e05d0a8)
2000-08-02 06:11:55 +04:00
s3:smbd: Fix incorrect use of sys_getgroups() Second arg must be NULL when first arg is 0 (it is in all other places). Bug report and patch from Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de> BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12747 Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org> Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org> Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Apr 18 15:43:02 CEST 2017 on sn-devel-144
2017-04-18 00:30:54 +03:00
ngroups = sys_getgroups(0, NULL);
updated the 3.0 branch from the head branch - ready for alpha18 (This used to be commit 03ac082dcb375b6f3ca3d810a6a6367542bc23ce)
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
if (ngroups <= 0) {
goto fail;
}
r4088: Get medieval on our ass about malloc.... :-). Take control of all our allocation functions so we can funnel through some well known functions. Should help greatly with malloc checking. HEAD patch to follow. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 620f2e608f70ba92f032720c031283d295c5c06a)
2004-12-07 21:25:53 +03:00
if((groups = SMB_MALLOC_ARRAY(gid_t, ngroups+1)) == NULL) {
Started to canonicalize our handling of uid -> sid code in order to get ready and fix se_access_check(). Added cannonical lookup_name(), lookup_sid(), uid_to_sid(), gid_to_sid() functions that look via winbind first the fall back on local lookup. All Samba should use these rather than trying to call winbindd code directly. Added NT_USER_TOKEN struct in user_struct, contains list of NT sids associated with this user. se_access_check() should use this (cached) value rather than attempting to do the same thing itself when given a uid/gid pair. More work needs to be done to preserve these things accross security context changes (especially with the tricky pipe problem) but I'm beginning to see how this will be done..... probably by registering a new vuid for an authenticated RPC pipe and not treating the pipe calls specially. More thoughts needed - but we're almost there... Jeremy. (This used to be commit 5e5cc6efe2e4687be59085f562caea1e2e05d0a8)
2000-08-02 06:11:55 +04:00
DEBUG(0,("setup_groups malloc fail !\n"));
updated the 3.0 branch from the head branch - ready for alpha18 (This used to be commit 03ac082dcb375b6f3ca3d810a6a6367542bc23ce)
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
goto fail;
Started to canonicalize our handling of uid -> sid code in order to get ready and fix se_access_check(). Added cannonical lookup_name(), lookup_sid(), uid_to_sid(), gid_to_sid() functions that look via winbind first the fall back on local lookup. All Samba should use these rather than trying to call winbindd code directly. Added NT_USER_TOKEN struct in user_struct, contains list of NT sids associated with this user. se_access_check() should use this (cached) value rather than attempting to do the same thing itself when given a uid/gid pair. More work needs to be done to preserve these things accross security context changes (especially with the tricky pipe problem) but I'm beginning to see how this will be done..... probably by registering a new vuid for an authenticated RPC pipe and not treating the pipe calls specially. More thoughts needed - but we're almost there... Jeremy. (This used to be commit 5e5cc6efe2e4687be59085f562caea1e2e05d0a8)
2000-08-02 06:11:55 +04:00
}
rpcclient/rpcclient.c: Non-void return in void function. smbd/sec_ctx.c: Fixed potential memory leak spotted by Kenichi Okuyama@Tokyo Research Lab, IBM-Japan, Co. utils/nmblookup.c: gcc warning on Solaris fix. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 1be60597cd62af2b30a1496d06ea5704e87d3b7d)
2001-04-28 04:05:11 +04:00
if ((ngroups = sys_getgroups(ngroups,groups)) == -1) {
updated the 3.0 branch from the head branch - ready for alpha18 (This used to be commit 03ac082dcb375b6f3ca3d810a6a6367542bc23ce)
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
goto fail;
rpcclient/rpcclient.c: Non-void return in void function. smbd/sec_ctx.c: Fixed potential memory leak spotted by Kenichi Okuyama@Tokyo Research Lab, IBM-Japan, Co. utils/nmblookup.c: gcc warning on Solaris fix. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 1be60597cd62af2b30a1496d06ea5704e87d3b7d)
2001-04-28 04:05:11 +04:00
}
Started to canonicalize our handling of uid -> sid code in order to get ready and fix se_access_check(). Added cannonical lookup_name(), lookup_sid(), uid_to_sid(), gid_to_sid() functions that look via winbind first the fall back on local lookup. All Samba should use these rather than trying to call winbindd code directly. Added NT_USER_TOKEN struct in user_struct, contains list of NT sids associated with this user. se_access_check() should use this (cached) value rather than attempting to do the same thing itself when given a uid/gid pair. More work needs to be done to preserve these things accross security context changes (especially with the tricky pipe problem) but I'm beginning to see how this will be done..... probably by registering a new vuid for an authenticated RPC pipe and not treating the pipe calls specially. More thoughts needed - but we're almost there... Jeremy. (This used to be commit 5e5cc6efe2e4687be59085f562caea1e2e05d0a8)
2000-08-02 06:11:55 +04:00
updated the 3.0 branch from the head branch - ready for alpha18 (This used to be commit 03ac082dcb375b6f3ca3d810a6a6367542bc23ce)
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
restore_re_gid();
Started to canonicalize our handling of uid -> sid code in order to get ready and fix se_access_check(). Added cannonical lookup_name(), lookup_sid(), uid_to_sid(), gid_to_sid() functions that look via winbind first the fall back on local lookup. All Samba should use these rather than trying to call winbindd code directly. Added NT_USER_TOKEN struct in user_struct, contains list of NT sids associated with this user. se_access_check() should use this (cached) value rather than attempting to do the same thing itself when given a uid/gid pair. More work needs to be done to preserve these things accross security context changes (especially with the tricky pipe problem) but I'm beginning to see how this will be done..... probably by registering a new vuid for an authenticated RPC pipe and not treating the pipe calls specially. More thoughts needed - but we're almost there... Jeremy. (This used to be commit 5e5cc6efe2e4687be59085f562caea1e2e05d0a8)
2000-08-02 06:11:55 +04:00
(*p_ngroups) = ngroups;
(*p_groups) = groups;
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
s3-smbd: Increase debug level von context messages.
2011-03-08 19:47:36 +03:00
DEBUG( 4, ( "get_current_groups: user is in %u groups: ", ngroups));
Started to canonicalize our handling of uid -> sid code in order to get ready and fix se_access_check(). Added cannonical lookup_name(), lookup_sid(), uid_to_sid(), gid_to_sid() functions that look via winbind first the fall back on local lookup. All Samba should use these rather than trying to call winbindd code directly. Added NT_USER_TOKEN struct in user_struct, contains list of NT sids associated with this user. se_access_check() should use this (cached) value rather than attempting to do the same thing itself when given a uid/gid pair. More work needs to be done to preserve these things accross security context changes (especially with the tricky pipe problem) but I'm beginning to see how this will be done..... probably by registering a new vuid for an authenticated RPC pipe and not treating the pipe calls specially. More thoughts needed - but we're almost there... Jeremy. (This used to be commit 5e5cc6efe2e4687be59085f562caea1e2e05d0a8)
2000-08-02 06:11:55 +04:00
for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++ ) {
s3-smbd: Increase debug level von context messages.
2011-03-08 19:47:36 +03:00
DEBUG( 4, ( "%s%d", (i ? ", " : ""), (int)groups[i] ) );
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
}
s3-smbd: Increase debug level von context messages.
2011-03-08 19:47:36 +03:00
DEBUG( 4, ( "\n" ) );
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
updated the 3.0 branch from the head branch - ready for alpha18 (This used to be commit 03ac082dcb375b6f3ca3d810a6a6367542bc23ce)
2002-07-15 14:35:28 +04:00
return ngroups;
fail:
SAFE_FREE(groups);
restore_re_gid();
return -1;
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
}
Added an NT_USER_TOKEN structure that is copied/passed around associated with the current user. This will allow se_access_check() to quickly do a SD check without having to translate uid/gid's to SIDs. Still needs work on pipe calls. Jeremy. (This used to be commit e28d01b744b3dbd33e0e54af4e7f426fa8c082b8)
2000-08-04 02:38:43 +04:00
/****************************************************************************
Create a new security context on the stack. It is the same as the old
one. User changes are done using the set_sec_ctx() function.
****************************************************************************/
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
RIP BOOL. Convert BOOL -> bool. I found a few interesting bugs in various places whilst doing this (places that assumed BOOL == int). I also need to fix the Samba4 pidl generation (next checkin). Jeremy. (This used to be commit f35a266b3cbb3e5fa6a86be60f34fe340a3ca71f)
2007-10-19 04:40:25 +04:00
bool push_sec_ctx(void)
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
{
Fix a malloc of zero problem. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 2aa21db960666736331b18956422b7c13aad0f0f)
2000-06-23 23:57:42 +04:00
struct sec_ctx *ctx_p;
s3:smbprofile: improve profiling for the security context switching. Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2014-11-17 14:52:35 +03:00
START_PROFILE(push_sec_ctx);
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
/* Check we don't overflow our stack */
Fixed memory leak with NT tokens. Added debug messages to se_access_check(). Added FULL_ACCESS acl to default acl on printers. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 7507f6f408cf8b0f8d7e2b3da54ce5fb5ef5343b)
2000-08-09 22:40:48 +04:00
if (sec_ctx_stack_ndx == MAX_SEC_CTX_DEPTH) {
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
DEBUG(0, ("Security context stack overflow!\n"));
r23510: Tidy calls to smb_panic by removing trailing newlines. Print the failed expression in SMB_ASSERT. (This used to be commit 171dc060e2a576d724eed1ca65636bdafffd7713)
2007-06-16 01:58:49 +04:00
smb_panic("Security context stack overflow!");
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
}
/* Store previous user context */
sec_ctx_stack_ndx++;
Fix a malloc of zero problem. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 2aa21db960666736331b18956422b7c13aad0f0f)
2000-06-23 23:57:42 +04:00
ctx_p = &sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx];
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
r13293: Rather a big patch I'm afraid, but this should fix bug #3347 by saving the UNIX token used to set a delete on close flag, and using it when doing the delete. libsmbsharemodes.so still needs updating to cope with this change. Samba4 torture tests to follow. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 23f16cbc2e8cde97c486831e26bcafd4ab4a9654)
2006-02-02 23:44:50 +03:00
ctx_p->ut.uid = geteuid();
ctx_p->ut.gid = getegid();
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
s3-smbd: Increase debug level von context messages.
2011-03-08 19:47:36 +03:00
DEBUG(4, ("push_sec_ctx(%u, %u) : sec_ctx_stack_ndx = %d\n",
r13293: Rather a big patch I'm afraid, but this should fix bug #3347 by saving the UNIX token used to set a delete on close flag, and using it when doing the delete. libsmbsharemodes.so still needs updating to cope with this change. Samba4 torture tests to follow. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 23f16cbc2e8cde97c486831e26bcafd4ab4a9654)
2006-02-02 23:44:50 +03:00
(unsigned int)ctx_p->ut.uid, (unsigned int)ctx_p->ut.gid, sec_ctx_stack_ndx ));
Added uid and gid to push_sec_ctx() debug. (This used to be commit 2817b6cc8af3edbaa63b5db67689ab94cb240d4f)
2000-10-05 07:28:58 +04:00
r13316: Let the carnage begin.... Sync with trunk as off r13315 (This used to be commit 17e63ac4ed8325c0d44fe62b2442449f3298559f)
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
ctx_p->token = dup_nt_token(NULL,
sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx-1].token);
Added an NT_USER_TOKEN structure that is copied/passed around associated with the current user. This will allow se_access_check() to quickly do a SD check without having to translate uid/gid's to SIDs. Still needs work on pipe calls. Jeremy. (This used to be commit e28d01b744b3dbd33e0e54af4e7f426fa8c082b8)
2000-08-04 02:38:43 +04:00
r13293: Rather a big patch I'm afraid, but this should fix bug #3347 by saving the UNIX token used to set a delete on close flag, and using it when doing the delete. libsmbsharemodes.so still needs updating to cope with this change. Samba4 torture tests to follow. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 23f16cbc2e8cde97c486831e26bcafd4ab4a9654)
2006-02-02 23:44:50 +03:00
ctx_p->ut.ngroups = sys_getgroups(0, NULL);
Fix a malloc of zero problem. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 2aa21db960666736331b18956422b7c13aad0f0f)
2000-06-23 23:57:42 +04:00
r13293: Rather a big patch I'm afraid, but this should fix bug #3347 by saving the UNIX token used to set a delete on close flag, and using it when doing the delete. libsmbsharemodes.so still needs updating to cope with this change. Samba4 torture tests to follow. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 23f16cbc2e8cde97c486831e26bcafd4ab4a9654)
2006-02-02 23:44:50 +03:00
if (ctx_p->ut.ngroups != 0) {
if (!(ctx_p->ut.groups = SMB_MALLOC_ARRAY(gid_t, ctx_p->ut.ngroups))) {
Fix a malloc of zero problem. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 2aa21db960666736331b18956422b7c13aad0f0f)
2000-06-23 23:57:42 +04:00
DEBUG(0, ("Out of memory in push_sec_ctx()\n"));
r13571: Replace all calls to talloc_free() with thye TALLOC_FREE() macro which sets the freed pointer to NULL. (This used to be commit b65be8874a2efe5a4b167448960a4fcf6bd995e2)
2006-02-20 20:59:58 +03:00
TALLOC_FREE(ctx_p->token);
Fix a malloc of zero problem. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 2aa21db960666736331b18956422b7c13aad0f0f)
2000-06-23 23:57:42 +04:00
return False;
}
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
r13293: Rather a big patch I'm afraid, but this should fix bug #3347 by saving the UNIX token used to set a delete on close flag, and using it when doing the delete. libsmbsharemodes.so still needs updating to cope with this change. Samba4 torture tests to follow. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 23f16cbc2e8cde97c486831e26bcafd4ab4a9654)
2006-02-02 23:44:50 +03:00
sys_getgroups(ctx_p->ut.ngroups, ctx_p->ut.groups);
Fix a malloc of zero problem. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 2aa21db960666736331b18956422b7c13aad0f0f)
2000-06-23 23:57:42 +04:00
} else {
r13293: Rather a big patch I'm afraid, but this should fix bug #3347 by saving the UNIX token used to set a delete on close flag, and using it when doing the delete. libsmbsharemodes.so still needs updating to cope with this change. Samba4 torture tests to follow. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 23f16cbc2e8cde97c486831e26bcafd4ab4a9654)
2006-02-02 23:44:50 +03:00
ctx_p->ut.groups = NULL;
Fix a malloc of zero problem. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 2aa21db960666736331b18956422b7c13aad0f0f)
2000-06-23 23:57:42 +04:00
}
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
s3:smbprofile: improve profiling for the security context switching. Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2014-11-17 14:52:35 +03:00
END_PROFILE(push_sec_ctx);
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
return True;
}
r23391: Second part of the patch for Apple. Change the sequence : gain_root(); sys_setgroups(ngroups, groups); become_id(uid, gid); to a function call : set_unix_security_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups) James - should be safe for you to create a Darwin-specific version of this function now. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 8ee982b3678be41ce8b4f4c1df428dcbf897ccbe)
2007-06-08 23:58:32 +04:00
/****************************************************************************
Change UNIX security context. Calls panic if not successful so no return value.
****************************************************************************/
r23398: Support membership of >16 groups on Darwin by making sure we opt in to the dynamic group resolution mechanism when switching UNIX credentials. (This used to be commit b5cb21e951550fe836b0ef5febc037af9a7f51ec)
2007-06-09 04:10:26 +04:00
#ifndef HAVE_DARWIN_INITGROUPS
/* Normal credential switch path. */
r23391: Second part of the patch for Apple. Change the sequence : gain_root(); sys_setgroups(ngroups, groups); become_id(uid, gid); to a function call : set_unix_security_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups) James - should be safe for you to create a Darwin-specific version of this function now. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 8ee982b3678be41ce8b4f4c1df428dcbf897ccbe)
2007-06-08 23:58:32 +04:00
static void set_unix_security_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups)
{
/* Start context switch */
gain_root();
#ifdef HAVE_SETGROUPS
r25161: Don't panic if setgroups fails in non-root mode. (This used to be commit ea226c5ed97d47649833546d5499213093d1925e)
2007-09-14 19:08:07 +04:00
if (sys_setgroups(gid, ngroups, groups) != 0 && !non_root_mode()) {
r25142: Panic if setting the group list fails while switching security contexts. Patch from Tim Prouty <tim.prouty@isilon.com>. (This used to be commit a136de663f122603e8d34e06027896ff39b35e11)
2007-09-14 08:17:17 +04:00
smb_panic("sys_setgroups failed");
}
r23391: Second part of the patch for Apple. Change the sequence : gain_root(); sys_setgroups(ngroups, groups); become_id(uid, gid); to a function call : set_unix_security_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups) James - should be safe for you to create a Darwin-specific version of this function now. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 8ee982b3678be41ce8b4f4c1df428dcbf897ccbe)
2007-06-08 23:58:32 +04:00
#endif
become_id(uid, gid);
/* end context switch */
}
r23398: Support membership of >16 groups on Darwin by making sure we opt in to the dynamic group resolution mechanism when switching UNIX credentials. (This used to be commit b5cb21e951550fe836b0ef5febc037af9a7f51ec)
2007-06-09 04:10:26 +04:00
#else /* HAVE_DARWIN_INITGROUPS */
/* The Darwin groups implementation is a little unusual. The list of
* groups in the kernel credential is not exhaustive, but more like
* a cache. The full group list is held in userspace and checked
* dynamically.
*
* This is an optional mechanism, and setgroups(2) opts out
* of it. That is, if you call setgroups, then the list of groups you
* set are the only groups that are ever checked. This is not what we
* want. We want to opt in to the dynamic resolution mechanism, so we
* need to specify the uid of the user whose group list (cache) we are
* setting.
*
* The Darwin rules are:
* 1. Thou shalt setegid, initgroups and seteuid IN THAT ORDER
* 2. Thou shalt not pass more that NGROUPS_MAX to initgroups
* 3. Thou shalt leave the first entry in the groups list well alone
*/
#include <sys/syscall.h>
static void set_unix_security_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups)
{
int max = groups_max();
/* Start context switch */
gain_root();
become_gid(gid);
if (syscall(SYS_initgroups, (ngroups > max) ? max : ngroups,
r25161: Don't panic if setgroups fails in non-root mode. (This used to be commit ea226c5ed97d47649833546d5499213093d1925e)
2007-09-14 19:08:07 +04:00
groups, uid) == -1 && !non_root_mode()) {
r23398: Support membership of >16 groups on Darwin by making sure we opt in to the dynamic group resolution mechanism when switching UNIX credentials. (This used to be commit b5cb21e951550fe836b0ef5febc037af9a7f51ec)
2007-06-09 04:10:26 +04:00
DEBUG(0, ("WARNING: failed to set group list "
uid_t is a synonym for int on osX This function is clearly osX oriented so we adapt the modifier to the target
2012-09-08 11:19:33 +04:00
"(%d groups) for UID %d: %s\n",
r23398: Support membership of >16 groups on Darwin by making sure we opt in to the dynamic group resolution mechanism when switching UNIX credentials. (This used to be commit b5cb21e951550fe836b0ef5febc037af9a7f51ec)
2007-06-09 04:10:26 +04:00
ngroups, uid, strerror(errno)));
r25142: Panic if setting the group list fails while switching security contexts. Patch from Tim Prouty <tim.prouty@isilon.com>. (This used to be commit a136de663f122603e8d34e06027896ff39b35e11)
2007-09-14 08:17:17 +04:00
smb_panic("sys_setgroups failed");
r23398: Support membership of >16 groups on Darwin by making sure we opt in to the dynamic group resolution mechanism when switching UNIX credentials. (This used to be commit b5cb21e951550fe836b0ef5febc037af9a7f51ec)
2007-06-09 04:10:26 +04:00
}
become_uid(uid);
/* end context switch */
}
#endif /* HAVE_DARWIN_INITGROUPS */
Added an NT_USER_TOKEN structure that is copied/passed around associated with the current user. This will allow se_access_check() to quickly do a SD check without having to translate uid/gid's to SIDs. Still needs work on pipe calls. Jeremy. (This used to be commit e28d01b744b3dbd33e0e54af4e7f426fa8c082b8)
2000-08-04 02:38:43 +04:00
/****************************************************************************
Set the current security context to a given user.
****************************************************************************/
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
s3:smbprofile: improve profiling for the security context switching. Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2014-11-17 14:52:35 +03:00
static void set_sec_ctx_internal(uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
int ngroups, gid_t *groups,
const struct security_token *token)
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
{
Fix a malloc of zero problem. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 2aa21db960666736331b18956422b7c13aad0f0f)
2000-06-23 23:57:42 +04:00
struct sec_ctx *ctx_p = &sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx];
s3: Fix some nonempty blank lines
2011-02-14 23:39:10 +03:00
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
/* Set the security context */
s3-smbd: Increase debug level von context messages.
2011-03-08 19:47:36 +03:00
DEBUG(4, ("setting sec ctx (%u, %u) - sec_ctx_stack_ndx = %d\n",
Tidy up args to DEBUG Statements - found by gcc on Solaris. Jeremy. (This used to be commit a60ecb4e53a6c8a3a6a37a89042ae943202263fe)
2001-04-28 01:14:18 +04:00
(unsigned int)uid, (unsigned int)gid, sec_ctx_stack_ndx));
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
s3-auth Use security_token_debug() from common code This prints the security token including the privileges as strings instead of just a bitmap. Andrew Bartlett Signed-off-by: Andrew Tridgell <tridge@samba.org>
2010-09-17 09:31:28 +04:00
security_token_debug(DBGC_CLASS, 5, token);
sync'ing up for 3.0alpha20 release (This used to be commit 65e7b5273bb58802bf0c389b77f7fcae0a1f6139)
2002-09-25 19:19:00 +04:00
debug_unix_user_token(DBGC_CLASS, 5, uid, gid, ngroups, groups);
Changes from APPLIANCE_HEAD: source/Makefile.in - changes to ctags and etags rules that somehow got lost along the way. source/include/proto.h - make proto source/smbd/sec_ctx.c source/smbd/password.c - merge debugs for debugging user groups and NT token stuff. source/lib/util_str.c - capitalise domain name returned from parse_domain_user() source/nsswitch/wb_client.c - fix broken conditional in debug statement. source/include/rpc_secdes.h source/include/rpc_spoolss.h source/printing/nt_printing.c source/lib/util_seaccess.c - fix printer permission bugs related to ACE masks for printers. This adds mapping of generic access rights to object specific rights for NT printers. Still need to work out whether or not to ignore ACEs with certain flags set, though. See comments in util_seaccess.c:check_ace() for details. source/printing/nt_printing.c source/printing/printing.c - use PRINTER_ACCESS_ADMINISTER instead of JOB_ACCESS_ADMINISTER until we sort out printer/printjob permission stuff. (This used to be commit 1dba9c5cd1e6389734c648f6903abcb7c8d5b2f0)
2001-01-04 22:27:08 +03:00
r23391: Second part of the patch for Apple. Change the sequence : gain_root(); sys_setgroups(ngroups, groups); become_id(uid, gid); to a function call : set_unix_security_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups) James - should be safe for you to create a Darwin-specific version of this function now. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 8ee982b3678be41ce8b4f4c1df428dcbf897ccbe)
2007-06-08 23:58:32 +04:00
/* Change uid, gid and supplementary group list. */
set_unix_security_ctx(uid, gid, ngroups, groups);
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
r13293: Rather a big patch I'm afraid, but this should fix bug #3347 by saving the UNIX token used to set a delete on close flag, and using it when doing the delete. libsmbsharemodes.so still needs updating to cope with this change. Samba4 torture tests to follow. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 23f16cbc2e8cde97c486831e26bcafd4ab4a9654)
2006-02-02 23:44:50 +03:00
ctx_p->ut.ngroups = ngroups;
lib/util_unistr.c: Off-by-one fix for dos_PutUniStr from John Reilly jreilly@hp.com. Memory leak fix for new sec_ctx code (sorry Tim :-). Jeremy. (This used to be commit edaf49c66d5a5ccf6689b358c301e208599a468f)
2000-06-23 21:31:38 +04:00
r13293: Rather a big patch I'm afraid, but this should fix bug #3347 by saving the UNIX token used to set a delete on close flag, and using it when doing the delete. libsmbsharemodes.so still needs updating to cope with this change. Samba4 torture tests to follow. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 23f16cbc2e8cde97c486831e26bcafd4ab4a9654)
2006-02-02 23:44:50 +03:00
SAFE_FREE(ctx_p->ut.groups);
r16582: Fix Klocwork #1997 and all generic class of problems where we don't correctly check the return from memdup. Jeremy. (This used to be commit ce14daf51c7ee2f9c68c77f7f4674e6f0e35c9ca)
2006-06-28 04:50:14 +04:00
if (token && (token == ctx_p->token)) {
Fixed memory leak with NT tokens. Added debug messages to se_access_check(). Added FULL_ACCESS acl to default acl on printers. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 7507f6f408cf8b0f8d7e2b3da54ce5fb5ef5343b)
2000-08-09 22:40:48 +04:00
smb_panic("DUPLICATE_TOKEN");
r16582: Fix Klocwork #1997 and all generic class of problems where we don't correctly check the return from memdup. Jeremy. (This used to be commit ce14daf51c7ee2f9c68c77f7f4674e6f0e35c9ca)
2006-06-28 04:50:14 +04:00
}
Fixed memory leak with NT tokens. Added debug messages to se_access_check(). Added FULL_ACCESS acl to default acl on printers. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 7507f6f408cf8b0f8d7e2b3da54ce5fb5ef5343b)
2000-08-09 22:40:48 +04:00
r13571: Replace all calls to talloc_free() with thye TALLOC_FREE() macro which sets the freed pointer to NULL. (This used to be commit b65be8874a2efe5a4b167448960a4fcf6bd995e2)
2006-02-20 20:59:58 +03:00
TALLOC_FREE(ctx_p->token);
s3: Fix some nonempty blank lines
2011-02-14 23:39:10 +03:00
r16582: Fix Klocwork #1997 and all generic class of problems where we don't correctly check the return from memdup. Jeremy. (This used to be commit ce14daf51c7ee2f9c68c77f7f4674e6f0e35c9ca)
2006-06-28 04:50:14 +04:00
if (ngroups) {
s3: use smb_xmemdup instead of smb_memdup and smb_panic Signed-off-by: Björn Baumbach <bb@sernet.de> Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org> Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Apr 16 22:53:42 CEST 2014 on sn-devel-104
2014-04-14 16:42:56 +04:00
ctx_p->ut.groups = (gid_t *)smb_xmemdup(groups,
sizeof(gid_t) * ngroups);
r16582: Fix Klocwork #1997 and all generic class of problems where we don't correctly check the return from memdup. Jeremy. (This used to be commit ce14daf51c7ee2f9c68c77f7f4674e6f0e35c9ca)
2006-06-28 04:50:14 +04:00
} else {
ctx_p->ut.groups = NULL;
}
if (token) {
ctx_p->token = dup_nt_token(NULL, token);
if (!ctx_p->token) {
smb_panic("dup_nt_token failed");
}
} else {
ctx_p->token = NULL;
}
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
r13293: Rather a big patch I'm afraid, but this should fix bug #3347 by saving the UNIX token used to set a delete on close flag, and using it when doing the delete. libsmbsharemodes.so still needs updating to cope with this change. Samba4 torture tests to follow. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 23f16cbc2e8cde97c486831e26bcafd4ab4a9654)
2006-02-02 23:44:50 +03:00
ctx_p->ut.uid = uid;
ctx_p->ut.gid = gid;
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
/* Update current_user stuff */
r13293: Rather a big patch I'm afraid, but this should fix bug #3347 by saving the UNIX token used to set a delete on close flag, and using it when doing the delete. libsmbsharemodes.so still needs updating to cope with this change. Samba4 torture tests to follow. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 23f16cbc2e8cde97c486831e26bcafd4ab4a9654)
2006-02-02 23:44:50 +03:00
current_user.ut.uid = uid;
current_user.ut.gid = gid;
current_user.ut.ngroups = ngroups;
current_user.ut.groups = groups;
Excellent patch from Anselm Kruis <A.Kruis@science-computing.de> to fix problem with wrong token being used in current_user. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 2c7d2a1d533052d3556715439fcd66c5233d3137)
2001-07-25 22:07:36 +04:00
current_user.nt_user_token = ctx_p->token;
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
}
s3:smbprofile: improve profiling for the security context switching. Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2014-11-17 14:52:35 +03:00
void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups, const struct security_token *token)
{
START_PROFILE(set_sec_ctx);
set_sec_ctx_internal(uid, gid, ngroups, groups, token);
END_PROFILE(set_sec_ctx);
}
Added an NT_USER_TOKEN structure that is copied/passed around associated with the current user. This will allow se_access_check() to quickly do a SD check without having to translate uid/gid's to SIDs. Still needs work on pipe calls. Jeremy. (This used to be commit e28d01b744b3dbd33e0e54af4e7f426fa8c082b8)
2000-08-04 02:38:43 +04:00
/****************************************************************************
Become root context.
****************************************************************************/
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
void set_root_sec_ctx(void)
{
/* May need to worry about supplementary groups at some stage */
s3:smbprofile: improve profiling for the security context switching. Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2014-11-17 14:52:35 +03:00
START_PROFILE(set_root_sec_ctx);
set_sec_ctx_internal(0, 0, 0, NULL, NULL);
END_PROFILE(set_root_sec_ctx);
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
}
Added an NT_USER_TOKEN structure that is copied/passed around associated with the current user. This will allow se_access_check() to quickly do a SD check without having to translate uid/gid's to SIDs. Still needs work on pipe calls. Jeremy. (This used to be commit e28d01b744b3dbd33e0e54af4e7f426fa8c082b8)
2000-08-04 02:38:43 +04:00
/****************************************************************************
Pop a security context from the stack.
****************************************************************************/
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
RIP BOOL. Convert BOOL -> bool. I found a few interesting bugs in various places whilst doing this (places that assumed BOOL == int). I also need to fix the Samba4 pidl generation (next checkin). Jeremy. (This used to be commit f35a266b3cbb3e5fa6a86be60f34fe340a3ca71f)
2007-10-19 04:40:25 +04:00
bool pop_sec_ctx(void)
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
{
Fix a malloc of zero problem. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 2aa21db960666736331b18956422b7c13aad0f0f)
2000-06-23 23:57:42 +04:00
struct sec_ctx *ctx_p;
struct sec_ctx *prev_ctx_p;
s3:smbprofile: improve profiling for the security context switching. Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2014-11-17 14:52:35 +03:00
START_PROFILE(pop_sec_ctx);
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
/* Check for stack underflow */
if (sec_ctx_stack_ndx == 0) {
DEBUG(0, ("Security context stack underflow!\n"));
r23510: Tidy calls to smb_panic by removing trailing newlines. Print the failed expression in SMB_ASSERT. (This used to be commit 171dc060e2a576d724eed1ca65636bdafffd7713)
2007-06-16 01:58:49 +04:00
smb_panic("Security context stack underflow!");
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
}
Fix a malloc of zero problem. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 2aa21db960666736331b18956422b7c13aad0f0f)
2000-06-23 23:57:42 +04:00
ctx_p = &sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx];
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
/* Clear previous user info */
r13293: Rather a big patch I'm afraid, but this should fix bug #3347 by saving the UNIX token used to set a delete on close flag, and using it when doing the delete. libsmbsharemodes.so still needs updating to cope with this change. Samba4 torture tests to follow. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 23f16cbc2e8cde97c486831e26bcafd4ab4a9654)
2006-02-02 23:44:50 +03:00
ctx_p->ut.uid = (uid_t)-1;
ctx_p->ut.gid = (gid_t)-1;
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
r13293: Rather a big patch I'm afraid, but this should fix bug #3347 by saving the UNIX token used to set a delete on close flag, and using it when doing the delete. libsmbsharemodes.so still needs updating to cope with this change. Samba4 torture tests to follow. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 23f16cbc2e8cde97c486831e26bcafd4ab4a9654)
2006-02-02 23:44:50 +03:00
SAFE_FREE(ctx_p->ut.groups);
ctx_p->ut.ngroups = 0;
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
r13571: Replace all calls to talloc_free() with thye TALLOC_FREE() macro which sets the freed pointer to NULL. (This used to be commit b65be8874a2efe5a4b167448960a4fcf6bd995e2)
2006-02-20 20:59:58 +03:00
TALLOC_FREE(ctx_p->token);
Added an NT_USER_TOKEN structure that is copied/passed around associated with the current user. This will allow se_access_check() to quickly do a SD check without having to translate uid/gid's to SIDs. Still needs work on pipe calls. Jeremy. (This used to be commit e28d01b744b3dbd33e0e54af4e7f426fa8c082b8)
2000-08-04 02:38:43 +04:00
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
/* Pop back previous user */
sec_ctx_stack_ndx--;
Fix a malloc of zero problem. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 2aa21db960666736331b18956422b7c13aad0f0f)
2000-06-23 23:57:42 +04:00
prev_ctx_p = &sec_ctx_stack[sec_ctx_stack_ndx];
r23391: Second part of the patch for Apple. Change the sequence : gain_root(); sys_setgroups(ngroups, groups); become_id(uid, gid); to a function call : set_unix_security_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups) James - should be safe for you to create a Darwin-specific version of this function now. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 8ee982b3678be41ce8b4f4c1df428dcbf897ccbe)
2007-06-08 23:58:32 +04:00
/* Change uid, gid and supplementary group list. */
set_unix_security_ctx(prev_ctx_p->ut.uid,
prev_ctx_p->ut.gid,
prev_ctx_p->ut.ngroups,
prev_ctx_p->ut.groups);
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
/* Update current_user stuff */
r13293: Rather a big patch I'm afraid, but this should fix bug #3347 by saving the UNIX token used to set a delete on close flag, and using it when doing the delete. libsmbsharemodes.so still needs updating to cope with this change. Samba4 torture tests to follow. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 23f16cbc2e8cde97c486831e26bcafd4ab4a9654)
2006-02-02 23:44:50 +03:00
current_user.ut.uid = prev_ctx_p->ut.uid;
current_user.ut.gid = prev_ctx_p->ut.gid;
current_user.ut.ngroups = prev_ctx_p->ut.ngroups;
current_user.ut.groups = prev_ctx_p->ut.groups;
Added an NT_USER_TOKEN structure that is copied/passed around associated with the current user. This will allow se_access_check() to quickly do a SD check without having to translate uid/gid's to SIDs. Still needs work on pipe calls. Jeremy. (This used to be commit e28d01b744b3dbd33e0e54af4e7f426fa8c082b8)
2000-08-04 02:38:43 +04:00
current_user.nt_user_token = prev_ctx_p->token;
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
s3:smbprofile: improve profiling for the security context switching. Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2014-11-17 14:52:35 +03:00
END_PROFILE(pop_sec_ctx);
s3-smbd: Increase debug level von context messages.
2011-03-08 19:47:36 +03:00
DEBUG(4, ("pop_sec_ctx (%u, %u) - sec_ctx_stack_ndx = %d\n",
Tidy up args to DEBUG Statements - found by gcc on Solaris. Jeremy. (This used to be commit a60ecb4e53a6c8a3a6a37a89042ae943202263fe)
2001-04-28 01:14:18 +04:00
(unsigned int)geteuid(), (unsigned int)getegid(), sec_ctx_stack_ndx));
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
return True;
}
/* Initialise the security context system */
void init_sec_ctx(void)
{
int i;
Fix a malloc of zero problem. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 2aa21db960666736331b18956422b7c13aad0f0f)
2000-06-23 23:57:42 +04:00
struct sec_ctx *ctx_p;
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
/* Initialise security context stack */
memset(sec_ctx_stack, 0, sizeof(struct sec_ctx) * MAX_SEC_CTX_DEPTH);
for (i = 0; i < MAX_SEC_CTX_DEPTH; i++) {
r13293: Rather a big patch I'm afraid, but this should fix bug #3347 by saving the UNIX token used to set a delete on close flag, and using it when doing the delete. libsmbsharemodes.so still needs updating to cope with this change. Samba4 torture tests to follow. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 23f16cbc2e8cde97c486831e26bcafd4ab4a9654)
2006-02-02 23:44:50 +03:00
sec_ctx_stack[i].ut.uid = (uid_t)-1;
sec_ctx_stack[i].ut.gid = (gid_t)-1;
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
}
/* Initialise first level of stack. It is the current context */
Fix a malloc of zero problem. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 2aa21db960666736331b18956422b7c13aad0f0f)
2000-06-23 23:57:42 +04:00
ctx_p = &sec_ctx_stack[0];
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
r13293: Rather a big patch I'm afraid, but this should fix bug #3347 by saving the UNIX token used to set a delete on close flag, and using it when doing the delete. libsmbsharemodes.so still needs updating to cope with this change. Samba4 torture tests to follow. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 23f16cbc2e8cde97c486831e26bcafd4ab4a9654)
2006-02-02 23:44:50 +03:00
ctx_p->ut.uid = geteuid();
ctx_p->ut.gid = getegid();
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
r13293: Rather a big patch I'm afraid, but this should fix bug #3347 by saving the UNIX token used to set a delete on close flag, and using it when doing the delete. libsmbsharemodes.so still needs updating to cope with this change. Samba4 torture tests to follow. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 23f16cbc2e8cde97c486831e26bcafd4ab4a9654)
2006-02-02 23:44:50 +03:00
get_current_groups(ctx_p->ut.gid, &ctx_p->ut.ngroups, &ctx_p->ut.groups);
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
Added an NT_USER_TOKEN structure that is copied/passed around associated with the current user. This will allow se_access_check() to quickly do a SD check without having to translate uid/gid's to SIDs. Still needs work on pipe calls. Jeremy. (This used to be commit e28d01b744b3dbd33e0e54af4e7f426fa8c082b8)
2000-08-04 02:38:43 +04:00
ctx_p->token = NULL; /* Maps to guest user. */
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
/* Initialise current_user global */
r13293: Rather a big patch I'm afraid, but this should fix bug #3347 by saving the UNIX token used to set a delete on close flag, and using it when doing the delete. libsmbsharemodes.so still needs updating to cope with this change. Samba4 torture tests to follow. Jeremy. (This used to be commit 23f16cbc2e8cde97c486831e26bcafd4ab4a9654)
2006-02-02 23:44:50 +03:00
current_user.ut.uid = ctx_p->ut.uid;
current_user.ut.gid = ctx_p->ut.gid;
current_user.ut.ngroups = ctx_p->ut.ngroups;
current_user.ut.groups = ctx_p->ut.groups;
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
/* The conn and vuid are usually taken care of by other modules.
We initialise them here. */
current_user.conn = NULL;
current_user.vuid = UID_FIELD_INVALID;
Added an NT_USER_TOKEN structure that is copied/passed around associated with the current user. This will allow se_access_check() to quickly do a SD check without having to translate uid/gid's to SIDs. Still needs work on pipe calls. Jeremy. (This used to be commit e28d01b744b3dbd33e0e54af4e7f426fa8c082b8)
2000-08-04 02:38:43 +04:00
current_user.nt_user_token = NULL;
I've been working on refactoring some of the mess that is the become_user() code. This code is now implemented as a stack of security contexts, where a security context is defined as a set of effective user, group and supplementary group ids. The following functions are implemented: BOOL push_sec_ctx(void); Create a new security context on the stack which is the same as the current security context. void set_sec_ctx(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, gid_t *groups); Set the current security context to a given set of user and group ids. void set_root_sec_ctx(void); Set to uid = gid = 0. No supplementary groups are set. BOOL pop_sec_ctx(void); Pop a security context from the stack and restore the user and group permissions of the previous context. void init_sec_ctx(void); Initialise the security context stack. This must be called before any of the other operations are used or weird things may happen. The idea is that there is a base security context which is either root or some authenticated unix user. Other security contexts can be pushed and popped as needed for things like changing passwords, or rpc pipe operations where the rpc pipe user is different from the smb user. (This used to be commit 87c78d6d5a6bf8d0907d6f8ef5ee0d642946cad3)
2000-06-23 09:49:11 +04:00
}
Fix bug #9329 - Directory listing with SeBackup can crash smbd. When we do a become_root()/unbecome_root() pair to temporarily raise privilege, this NULLs out the NT token. If we're within a become_root()/unbecome_root() pair then return the previous token on the stack as our NT token. This is what we should be using to check against NT ACLs in the file server. This copes with security context changing when removing a file on close under the context of another user (when 2 users have a file open, one sets delete on close and then the other user has to actually do the delete). Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org> Autobuild-User(master): Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org> Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Oct 29 16:26:20 CET 2012 on sn-devel-104
2012-10-26 04:07:29 +04:00
/*************************************************************
Called when we're inside a become_root() temporary escalation
of privileges and the nt_user_token is NULL. Return the last
active token on the context stack. We know there is at least
one valid non-NULL token on the stack so panic if we underflow.
*************************************************************/
const struct security_token *sec_ctx_active_token(void)
{
int stack_index = sec_ctx_stack_ndx;
struct sec_ctx *ctx_p = &sec_ctx_stack[stack_index];
while (ctx_p->token == NULL) {
stack_index--;
if (stack_index < 0) {
DEBUG(0, ("Security context active token "
"stack underflow!\n"));
smb_panic("Security context active token "
"stack underflow!");
}
ctx_p = &sec_ctx_stack[stack_index];
}
return ctx_p->token;
}
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