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r9415: Remove old kerberos code (including salt guessing code) that has only

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caused me pain (and covourty warnings).

Simply gensec_gssapi to assume the properties of lorikeet-heimdal,
rather than having #ifdef around critical features.  This simplifies
the code rather a lot.

Andrew Bartlett
This commit is contained in:
Andrew Bartlett 2005-08-20 06:08:52 +00:00 committed by Gerald (Jerry) Carter
parent f21c31c7e1
commit 11156f556d
3 changed files with 8 additions and 713 deletions
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24
source/auth/gensec/gensec_gssapi.c
View File

@ -128,14 +128,6 @@ static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_start(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
talloc_set_destructor(gensec_gssapi_state, gensec_gssapi_destory);
if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SESSION_KEY) {
#ifndef HAVE_GSSKRB5_GET_INITIATOR_SUBKEY
/* GSSAPI won't give us the session keys, without the
* right hooks. This is critical when requested, so
* fail outright. */
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
#endif
}
if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN) {
gensec_gssapi_state->want_flags |= GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG;
}
@ -143,13 +135,7 @@ static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_start(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
gensec_gssapi_state->want_flags |= GSS_C_CONF_FLAG;
}
if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_DCE_STYLE) {
#ifndef GSS_C_DCE_STYLE
/* GSSAPI DCE_STYLE is critical when requested, so
* fail outright */
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
#else
gensec_gssapi_state->want_flags |= GSS_C_DCE_STYLE;
#endif
}
gensec_gssapi_state->gss_oid = gss_mech_krb5;
@ -678,12 +664,16 @@ static BOOL gensec_gssapi_have_feature(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
return gensec_gssapi_state->got_flags & GSS_C_CONF_FLAG;
}
if (feature & GENSEC_FEATURE_SESSION_KEY) {
#ifdef HAVE_GSSKRB5_GET_INITIATOR_SUBKEY
if ((gensec_gssapi_state->gss_oid->length == gss_mech_krb5->length)
&& (memcmp(gensec_gssapi_state->gss_oid->elements, gss_mech_krb5->elements, gensec_gssapi_state->gss_oid->length) == 0)) {
return True;
}
#endif
}
if (feature & GENSEC_FEATURE_DCE_STYLE) {
return True;
}
if (feature & GENSEC_FEATURE_ASYNC_REPLIES) {
return True;
}
return False;
}
@ -698,7 +688,6 @@ static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_session_key(struct gensec_security *gensec_securit
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
#ifdef HAVE_GSSKRB5_GET_INITIATOR_SUBKEY
/* Ensure we only call this for GSSAPI/krb5, otherwise things could get very ugly */
if ((gensec_gssapi_state->gss_oid->length == gss_mech_krb5->length)
&& (memcmp(gensec_gssapi_state->gss_oid->elements, gss_mech_krb5->elements,
@ -723,7 +712,6 @@ static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_session_key(struct gensec_security *gensec_securit
}
return NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY;
}
#endif
DEBUG(1, ("NO session key for this mech\n"));
return NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY;

25
source/auth/kerberos/clikrb5.c
View File

@ -76,7 +76,7 @@
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_PRINCIPAL2SALT) && defined(HAVE_KRB5_USE_ENCTYPE) && defined(HAVE_KRB5_STRING_TO_KEY) && defined(HAVE_KRB5_ENCRYPT_BLOCK)
int create_kerberos_key_from_string_direct(krb5_context context,
int create_kerberos_key_from_string(krb5_context context,
krb5_principal host_princ,
krb5_data *password,
krb5_keyblock *key,
@ -97,7 +97,7 @@
return ret;
}
#elif defined(HAVE_KRB5_GET_PW_SALT) && defined(HAVE_KRB5_STRING_TO_KEY_SALT)
int create_kerberos_key_from_string_direct(krb5_context context,
int create_kerberos_key_from_string(krb5_context context,
krb5_principal host_princ,
krb5_data *password,
krb5_keyblock *key,
@ -118,27 +118,6 @@
#error UNKNOWN_CREATE_KEY_FUNCTIONS
#endif
int create_kerberos_key_from_string(krb5_context context,
krb5_principal host_princ,
krb5_data *password,
krb5_keyblock *key,
krb5_enctype enctype)
{
krb5_principal salt_princ = NULL;
int ret;
/*
* Check if we've determined that the KDC is salting keys for this
* principal/enctype in a non-obvious way. If it is, try to match
* its behavior.
*/
salt_princ = kerberos_fetch_salt_princ_for_host_princ(context, host_princ, enctype);
ret = create_kerberos_key_from_string_direct(context, salt_princ ? salt_princ : host_princ, password, key, enctype);
if (salt_princ) {
krb5_free_principal(context, salt_princ);
}
return ret;
}
#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_GET_PERMITTED_ENCTYPES)
krb5_error_code get_kerberos_allowed_etypes(krb5_context context,
krb5_enctype **enctypes)

672
source/auth/kerberos/kerberos.c
View File

@ -167,677 +167,5 @@ kerb_prompter(krb5_context ctx, void *data,
return 0;
}
/*
simulate a kinit, putting the tgt in the given credentials cache.
If cache_name == NULL place in default cache location.
Orignally by remus@snapserver.com
*/
int kerberos_kinit_password(const char *principal,
const char *password,
int time_offset,
time_t *expire_time,
const char *cache_name,
time_t *kdc_time)
{
int code;
krb5_context ctx = NULL;
krb5_ccache cc = NULL;
if ((code = krb5_init_context(&ctx)))
return code;
if (time_offset != 0) {
krb5_set_real_time(ctx, time(NULL) + time_offset, 0);
}
if ((code = krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, cache_name ?
cache_name : krb5_cc_default_name(ctx), &cc))) {
krb5_free_context(ctx);
return code;
}
code = kerberos_kinit_password_cc(ctx, cc, principal, password, expire_time, kdc_time);
krb5_cc_close(ctx, cc);
krb5_free_context(ctx);
return code;
}
/* run kinit to setup our ccache */
int ads_kinit_password(struct ads_struct *ads)
{
char *s;
int ret;
if (asprintf(&s, "%s@%s", ads->auth.user_name, ads->auth.realm) == -1) {
return KRB5_CC_NOMEM;
}
if (!ads->auth.password) {
return KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD;
}
ret = kerberos_kinit_password(s, ads->auth.password, ads->auth.time_offset,
&ads->auth.expire, NULL, NULL);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(0,("kerberos_kinit_password %s failed: %s\n",
s, error_message(ret)));
}
free(s);
return ret;
}
int ads_kdestroy(const char *cc_name)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_context ctx = NULL;
krb5_ccache cc = NULL;
if ((code = krb5_init_context (&ctx))) {
DEBUG(3, ("ads_kdestroy: kdb5_init_context failed: %s\n",
error_message(code)));
return code;
}
if (!cc_name) {
if ((code = krb5_cc_default(ctx, &cc))) {
krb5_free_context(ctx);
return code;
}
} else {
if ((code = krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, cc_name, &cc))) {
DEBUG(3, ("ads_kdestroy: krb5_cc_resolve failed: %s\n",
error_message(code)));
krb5_free_context(ctx);
return code;
}
}
if ((code = krb5_cc_destroy (ctx, cc))) {
DEBUG(3, ("ads_kdestroy: krb5_cc_destroy failed: %s\n",
error_message(code)));
}
krb5_free_context (ctx);
return code;
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to fetch the salting principal for a service. Active
Directory may use a non-obvious principal name to generate the salt
when it determines the key to use for encrypting tickets for a service,
and hopefully we detected that when we joined the domain.
************************************************************************/
static char *kerberos_secrets_fetch_salting_principal(const char *service, int enctype)
{
char *ret = NULL;
#if 0
asprintf(&key, "%s/%s/enctype=%d", SECRETS_SALTING_PRINCIPAL, service, enctype);
if (!key) {
return NULL;
}
ret = (char *)secrets_fetch(key, NULL);
SAFE_FREE(key);
#endif
return ret;
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to get the salting principal for this service. Active
Directory may use a non-obvious principal name to generate the salt
when it determines the key to use for encrypting tickets for a service,
and hopefully we detected that when we joined the domain.
Caller must free if return is not null.
************************************************************************/
krb5_principal kerberos_fetch_salt_princ_for_host_princ(krb5_context context,
krb5_principal host_princ,
int enctype)
{
char *unparsed_name = NULL, *salt_princ_s = NULL;
krb5_principal ret_princ = NULL;
if (krb5_unparse_name(context, host_princ, &unparsed_name) != 0) {
return (krb5_principal)NULL;
}
if ((salt_princ_s = kerberos_secrets_fetch_salting_principal(unparsed_name, enctype)) == NULL) {
krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, unparsed_name);
return (krb5_principal)NULL;
}
if (krb5_parse_name(context, salt_princ_s, &ret_princ) != 0) {
krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, unparsed_name);
SAFE_FREE(salt_princ_s);
return (krb5_principal)NULL;
}
krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, unparsed_name);
SAFE_FREE(salt_princ_s);
return ret_princ;
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to set the salting principal for this service. Active
Directory may use a non-obvious principal name to generate the salt
when it determines the key to use for encrypting tickets for a service,
and hopefully we detected that when we joined the domain.
Setting principal to NULL deletes this entry.
************************************************************************/
BOOL kerberos_secrets_store_salting_principal(const char *service,
int enctype,
const char *principal)
{
char *key = NULL;
BOOL ret = False;
krb5_context context = NULL;
krb5_principal princ = NULL;
char *princ_s = NULL;
char *unparsed_name = NULL;
krb5_init_context(&context);
if (!context) {
return False;
}
if (strchr_m(service, '@')) {
asprintf(&princ_s, "%s", service);
} else {
asprintf(&princ_s, "%s@%s", service, lp_realm());
}
if (krb5_parse_name(context, princ_s, &princ) != 0) {
goto out;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(context, princ, &unparsed_name) != 0) {
goto out;
}
asprintf(&key, "%s/%s/enctype=%d", SECRETS_SALTING_PRINCIPAL, unparsed_name, enctype);
if (!key) {
goto out;
}
#if 0
if ((principal != NULL) && (strlen(principal) > 0)) {
ret = secrets_store(key, principal, strlen(principal) + 1);
} else {
ret = secrets_delete(key);
}
#endif
out:
SAFE_FREE(key);
SAFE_FREE(princ_s);
if (unparsed_name) {
krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, unparsed_name);
}
if (context) {
krb5_free_context(context);
}
return ret;
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to get initial credentials as a service ticket for the local machine.
Returns a buffer initialized with krb5_mk_req_extended.
************************************************************************/
static krb5_error_code get_service_ticket(krb5_context ctx,
krb5_ccache ccache,
const char *service_principal,
int enctype,
krb5_data *p_outbuf)
{
krb5_creds creds, *new_creds = NULL;
char *service_s = NULL;
char *machine_account = NULL, *password = NULL;
krb5_data in_data;
krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
krb5_error_code err = 0;
ZERO_STRUCT(creds);
asprintf(&machine_account, "%s$@%s", lp_netbios_name(), lp_realm());
if (machine_account == NULL) {
goto out;
}
password = secrets_fetch_machine_password(lp_workgroup());
if (password == NULL) {
goto out;
}
if ((err = kerberos_kinit_password(machine_account, password, 0, NULL, LIBADS_CCACHE_NAME, NULL)) != 0) {
DEBUG(0,("get_service_ticket: kerberos_kinit_password %s@%s failed: %s\n",
machine_account,
lp_realm(),
error_message(err)));
goto out;
}
/* Ok - the above call has gotten a TGT. Now we need to get a service
ticket to ourselves. */
/* Set up the enctype and client and server principal fields for krb5_get_credentials. */
kerberos_set_creds_enctype(&creds, enctype);
if ((err = krb5_cc_get_principal(ctx, ccache, &creds.client))) {
DEBUG(3, ("get_service_ticket: krb5_cc_get_principal failed: %s\n",
error_message(err)));
goto out;
}
if (strchr_m(service_principal, '@')) {
asprintf(&service_s, "%s", service_principal);
} else {
asprintf(&service_s, "%s@%s", service_principal, lp_realm());
}
if ((err = krb5_parse_name(ctx, service_s, &creds.server))) {
DEBUG(0,("get_service_ticket: krb5_parse_name %s failed: %s\n",
service_s, error_message(err)));
goto out;
}
if ((err = krb5_get_credentials(ctx, 0, ccache, &creds, &new_creds))) {
DEBUG(5,("get_service_ticket: krb5_get_credentials for %s enctype %d failed: %s\n",
service_s, enctype, error_message(err)));
goto out;
}
memset(&in_data, '\0', sizeof(in_data));
if ((err = krb5_mk_req_extended(ctx, &auth_context, 0, &in_data,
new_creds, p_outbuf)) != 0) {
DEBUG(0,("get_service_ticket: krb5_mk_req_extended failed: %s\n",
error_message(err)));
goto out;
}
out:
if (auth_context) {
krb5_auth_con_free(ctx, auth_context);
}
if (new_creds) {
krb5_free_creds(ctx, new_creds);
}
if (creds.server) {
krb5_free_principal(ctx, creds.server);
}
if (creds.client) {
krb5_free_principal(ctx, creds.client);
}
SAFE_FREE(service_s);
SAFE_FREE(password);
SAFE_FREE(machine_account);
return err;
}
/************************************************************************
Check if the machine password can be used in conjunction with the salting_principal
to generate a key which will successfully decrypt the AP_REQ already
gotten as a message to the local machine.
************************************************************************/
static BOOL verify_service_password(krb5_context ctx,
int enctype,
const char *salting_principal,
krb5_data *in_data)
{
BOOL ret = False;
krb5_principal salting_kprinc = NULL;
krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL;
krb5_keyblock key;
krb5_data passdata;
char *salting_s = NULL;
char *password = NULL;
krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
krb5_error_code err;
memset(&passdata, '\0', sizeof(passdata));
memset(&key, '\0', sizeof(key));
password = secrets_fetch_machine_password(lp_workgroup());
if (password == NULL) {
goto out;
}
if (strchr_m(salting_principal, '@')) {
asprintf(&salting_s, "%s", salting_principal);
} else {
asprintf(&salting_s, "%s@%s", salting_principal, lp_realm());
}
if ((err = krb5_parse_name(ctx, salting_s, &salting_kprinc))) {
DEBUG(0,("verify_service_password: krb5_parse_name %s failed: %s\n",
salting_s, error_message(err)));
goto out;
}
passdata.length = strlen(password);
passdata.data = (char*)password;
if ((err = create_kerberos_key_from_string_direct(ctx, salting_kprinc, &passdata, &key, enctype))) {
DEBUG(0,("verify_service_password: create_kerberos_key_from_string %d failed: %s\n",
enctype, error_message(err)));
goto out;
}
if ((err = krb5_auth_con_init(ctx, &auth_context)) != 0) {
DEBUG(0,("verify_service_password: krb5_auth_con_init failed %s\n", error_message(err)));
goto out;
}
if ((err = krb5_auth_con_setuseruserkey(ctx, auth_context, &key)) != 0) {
DEBUG(0,("verify_service_password: krb5_auth_con_setuseruserkey failed %s\n", error_message(err)));
goto out;
}
if (!(err = krb5_rd_req(ctx, &auth_context, in_data, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ticket))) {
DEBUG(10,("verify_service_password: decrypted message with enctype %u salt %s!\n",
(unsigned int)enctype, salting_s));
ret = True;
}
out:
memset(&passdata, 0, sizeof(passdata));
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(ctx, &key);
if (ticket != NULL) {
krb5_free_ticket(ctx, ticket);
}
if (salting_kprinc) {
krb5_free_principal(ctx, salting_kprinc);
}
SAFE_FREE(salting_s);
SAFE_FREE(password);
return ret;
}
/************************************************************************
*
* From the current draft of kerberos-clarifications:
*
* It is not possible to reliably generate a user's key given a pass
* phrase without contacting the KDC, since it will not be known
* whether alternate salt or parameter values are required.
*
* And because our server has a password, we have this exact problem. We
* make multiple guesses as to which principal name provides the salt which
* the KDC is using.
*
************************************************************************/
static void kerberos_derive_salting_principal_for_enctype(const char *service_principal,
krb5_context ctx,
krb5_ccache ccache,
krb5_enctype enctype,
krb5_enctype *enctypes)
{
char *salting_principals[3] = {NULL, NULL, NULL}, *second_principal = NULL;
krb5_error_code err = 0;
krb5_data outbuf;
int i, j;
memset(&outbuf, '\0', sizeof(outbuf));
/* Check that the service_principal is useful. */
if ((service_principal == NULL) || (strlen(service_principal) == 0)) {
return;
}
/* Generate our first guess -- the principal as-given. */
asprintf(&salting_principals[0], "%s", service_principal);
if ((salting_principals[0] == NULL) || (strlen(salting_principals[0]) == 0)) {
return;
}
/* Generate our second guess -- the computer's principal, as Win2k3. */
asprintf(&second_principal, "host/%s.%s", lp_netbios_name(), lp_realm());
if (second_principal != NULL) {
strlower_m(second_principal);
asprintf(&salting_principals[1], "%s@%s", second_principal, lp_realm());
SAFE_FREE(second_principal);
}
if ((salting_principals[1] == NULL) || (strlen(salting_principals[1]) == 0)) {
goto out;
}
/* Generate our third guess -- the computer's principal, as Win2k. */
asprintf(&second_principal, "HOST/%s", lp_netbios_name());
if (second_principal != NULL) {
strlower_m(second_principal + 5);
asprintf(&salting_principals[2], "%s@%s",
second_principal, lp_realm());
SAFE_FREE(second_principal);
}
if ((salting_principals[2] == NULL) || (strlen(salting_principals[2]) == 0)) {
goto out;
}
/* Get a service ticket for ourselves into our memory ccache. */
/* This will commonly fail if there is no principal by that name (and we're trying
many names). So don't print a debug 0 error. */
if ((err = get_service_ticket(ctx, ccache, service_principal, enctype, &outbuf)) != 0) {
DEBUG(3, ("verify_service_password: get_service_ticket failed: %s\n",
error_message(err)));
goto out;
}
/* At this point we have a message to ourselves, salted only the KDC knows how. We
have to work out what that salting is. */
/* Try and find the correct salting principal. */
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(salting_principals) / sizeof(salting_principals[i]); i++) {
if (verify_service_password(ctx, enctype, salting_principals[i], &outbuf)) {
break;
}
}
/* If we failed to get a match, return. */
if (i >= sizeof(salting_principals) / sizeof(salting_principals[i])) {
goto out;
}
/* If we succeeded, store the principal for use for all enctypes which
* share the same cipher and string-to-key function. Doing this here
* allows servers which just pass a keytab to krb5_rd_req() to work
* correctly. */
for (j = 0; enctypes[j] != 0; j++) {
if (enctype != enctypes[j]) {
/* If this enctype isn't compatible with the one which
* we used, skip it. */
if (!kerberos_compatible_enctypes(ctx, enctypes[j], enctype))
continue;
}
/* If the principal which gives us the proper salt is the one
* which we would normally guess, don't bother noting anything
* in the secrets tdb. */
if (strcmp(service_principal, salting_principals[i]) != 0) {
kerberos_secrets_store_salting_principal(service_principal,
enctypes[j],
salting_principals[i]);
}
}
out :
kerberos_free_data_contents(ctx, &outbuf);
SAFE_FREE(salting_principals[0]);
SAFE_FREE(salting_principals[1]);
SAFE_FREE(salting_principals[2]);
SAFE_FREE(second_principal);
}
/************************************************************************
Go through all the possible enctypes for this principal.
************************************************************************/
static void kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(krb5_context context,
krb5_ccache ccache,
krb5_enctype *enctypes,
char *service_principal)
{
int i;
/* Try for each enctype separately, because the rules are
* different for different enctypes. */
for (i = 0; enctypes[i] != 0; i++) {
/* Delete secrets entry first. */
kerberos_secrets_store_salting_principal(service_principal, 0, NULL);
#ifdef ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC
if (enctypes[i] == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
/* Of course this'll always work, so just save
* ourselves the effort. */
continue;
}
#endif
/* Try to figure out what's going on with this
* principal. */
kerberos_derive_salting_principal_for_enctype(service_principal,
context,
ccache,
enctypes[i],
enctypes);
}
}
/************************************************************************
Wrapper function for the above.
************************************************************************/
BOOL kerberos_derive_salting_principal(char *service_principal)
{
krb5_context context = NULL;
krb5_enctype *enctypes = NULL;
krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
initialize_krb5_error_table();
if ((ret = krb5_init_context(&context)) != 0) {
DEBUG(1,("kerberos_derive_cifs_salting_principals: krb5_init_context failed. %s\n",
error_message(ret)));
return False;
}
if ((ret = get_kerberos_allowed_etypes(context, &enctypes)) != 0) {
DEBUG(1,("kerberos_derive_cifs_salting_principals: get_kerberos_allowed_etypes failed. %s\n",
error_message(ret)));
goto out;
}
if ((ret = krb5_cc_resolve(context, LIBADS_CCACHE_NAME, &ccache)) != 0) {
DEBUG(3, ("get_service_ticket: krb5_cc_resolve for %s failed: %s\n",
LIBADS_CCACHE_NAME, error_message(ret)));
goto out;
}
kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service_principal);
out:
if (enctypes) {
free_kerberos_etypes(context, enctypes);
}
if (ccache) {
krb5_cc_destroy(context, ccache);
}
if (context) {
krb5_free_context(context);
}
return ret ? False : True;
}
/************************************************************************
Core function to try and determine what salt is being used for any keytab
keys.
************************************************************************/
BOOL kerberos_derive_cifs_salting_principals(void)
{
fstring my_fqdn;
char *service = NULL;
krb5_context context = NULL;
krb5_enctype *enctypes = NULL;
krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
BOOL retval = False;
initialize_krb5_error_table();
if ((ret = krb5_init_context(&context)) != 0) {
DEBUG(1,("kerberos_derive_cifs_salting_principals: krb5_init_context failed. %s\n",
error_message(ret)));
return False;
}
if ((ret = get_kerberos_allowed_etypes(context, &enctypes)) != 0) {
DEBUG(1,("kerberos_derive_cifs_salting_principals: get_kerberos_allowed_etypes failed. %s\n",
error_message(ret)));
goto out;
}
if ((ret = krb5_cc_resolve(context, LIBADS_CCACHE_NAME, &ccache)) != 0) {
DEBUG(3, ("get_service_ticket: krb5_cc_resolve for %s failed: %s\n",
LIBADS_CCACHE_NAME, error_message(ret)));
goto out;
}
if (asprintf(&service, "%s$", lp_netbios_name()) != -1) {
strlower_m(service);
kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
SAFE_FREE(service);
}
if (asprintf(&service, "cifs/%s", lp_netbios_name()) != -1) {
strlower_m(service);
kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
SAFE_FREE(service);
}
if (asprintf(&service, "host/%s", lp_netbios_name()) != -1) {
strlower_m(service);
kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
SAFE_FREE(service);
}
if (asprintf(&service, "cifs/%s.%s", lp_netbios_name(), lp_realm()) != -1) {
strlower_m(service);
kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
SAFE_FREE(service);
}
if (asprintf(&service, "host/%s.%s", lp_netbios_name(), lp_realm()) != -1) {
strlower_m(service);
kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
SAFE_FREE(service);
}
name_to_fqdn(my_fqdn, lp_netbios_name());
if (asprintf(&service, "cifs/%s", my_fqdn) != -1) {
strlower_m(service);
kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
SAFE_FREE(service);
}
if (asprintf(&service, "host/%s", my_fqdn) != -1) {
strlower_m(service);
kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
SAFE_FREE(service);
}
retval = True;
out:
if (enctypes) {
free_kerberos_etypes(context, enctypes);
}
if (ccache) {
krb5_cc_destroy(context, ccache);
}
if (context) {
krb5_free_context(context);
}
return retval;
}
#endif