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r6711: Clarify that we are dealing with a salting principal in the kerberos

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code, which is certainly not in the form of machine$.

Rework the default salt to match what I just added to the heimdal
server (Samba4 is back on speaking terms with lorikeet heimdal now),
from Luke Howard's post to samba-technical in Nov 2004.

Now to test compatability with MS...

Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit d719a0093bfe37fc62f28c7c02f17f93eec16abf)
This commit is contained in:
Andrew Bartlett 2005-05-10 14:24:23 +00:00 committed by Gerald (Jerry) Carter
parent e8eccd22ee
commit 369c53ccf4
1 changed files with 60 additions and 40 deletions
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100
source4/auth/kerberos/kerberos_verify.c
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@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static krb5_error_code ads_secrets_verify_ticket(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct cli_credentials *machine_account,
krb5_context context,
krb5_auth_context auth_context,
krb5_principal host_princ,
krb5_principal salt_princ,
const DATA_BLOB *ticket, krb5_data *p_packet,
krb5_ticket **pp_tkt,
krb5_keyblock *keyblock)
@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ static krb5_error_code ads_secrets_verify_ticket(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
DEBUG(1, ("ads_secrets_verify_ticket: Could not obtain password for our local machine account!\n"));
return ENOENT;
}
ZERO_STRUCTP(keyblock);
password.data = password_s;
@ -248,6 +248,8 @@ static krb5_error_code ads_secrets_verify_ticket(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
if ((ret = get_kerberos_allowed_etypes(context, &enctypes))) {
DEBUG(1,("ads_secrets_verify_ticket: krb5_get_permitted_enctypes failed (%s)\n",
error_message(ret)));
krb5_free_principal(context, salt_princ);
return ret;
}
@ -264,7 +266,7 @@ static krb5_error_code ads_secrets_verify_ticket(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
break;
}
if (create_kerberos_key_from_string(context, host_princ, &password, key, enctypes[i])) {
if (create_kerberos_key_from_string(context, salt_princ, &password, key, enctypes[i])) {
SAFE_FREE(key);
continue;
}
@ -318,16 +320,62 @@ static krb5_error_code ads_secrets_verify_ticket(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_rcache rcache = NULL;
int ret;
krb5_principal host_princ = NULL;
char *host_princ_s = NULL;
BOOL got_replay_mutex = False;
char *malloc_principal;
char *machine_username;
krb5_principal salt_princ = NULL;
NTSTATUS creds_nt_status;
struct cli_credentials *machine_account;
ZERO_STRUCT(packet);
ZERO_STRUCTP(auth_data);
ZERO_STRUCTP(ap_rep);
machine_account = cli_credentials_init(mem_ctx);
cli_credentials_set_conf(machine_account);
creds_nt_status = cli_credentials_set_machine_account(machine_account);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(creds_nt_status)) {
DEBUG(3, ("Could not obtain machine account credentials from the local database\n"));
/* This just becomes a locking key, if we don't have creds, we must be using the keytab */
ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &salt_princ, lp_realm(),
"host", lp_netbios_name(), NULL);
} else {
machine_username = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, cli_credentials_get_username(machine_account));
if (!machine_username) {
ret = ENOMEM;
} else {
char *salt_body;
char *lower_realm = strlower_talloc(mem_ctx, cli_credentials_get_realm(machine_account));;
if (machine_username[strlen(machine_username)-1] == '$') {
machine_username[strlen(machine_username)-1] = '\0';
}
if (!lower_realm) {
ret = ENOMEM;
} else {
salt_body = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s.%s", machine_username,
lower_realm);
if (!salt_body) {
ret = ENOMEM;
} else {
ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &salt_princ, cli_credentials_get_realm(machine_account),
"host", salt_body, NULL);
}
}
}
}
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: maksing salt principal failed (%s)\n",
error_message(ret)));
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
/* This whole process is far more complex than I would
like. We have to go through all this to allow us to store
the secret internally, instead of using /etc/krb5.keytab */
@ -346,7 +394,7 @@ static krb5_error_code ads_secrets_verify_ticket(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
* JRA. We must set the rcache here. This will prevent replay attacks.
*/
ret = krb5_get_server_rcache(context, krb5_princ_component(context, host_princ, 0), &rcache);
ret = krb5_get_server_rcache(context, krb5_princ_component(context, salt_princ, 0), &rcache);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_get_server_rcache failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret)));
goto out;
@ -361,35 +409,9 @@ static krb5_error_code ads_secrets_verify_ticket(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
ret = ads_keytab_verify_ticket(mem_ctx, context, auth_context,
service, ticket, &packet, &tkt, keyblock);
if (ret) {
NTSTATUS creds_nt_status;
struct cli_credentials *credentials;
credentials = cli_credentials_init(mem_ctx);
cli_credentials_set_conf(credentials);
creds_nt_status = cli_credentials_set_machine_account(credentials);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(creds_nt_status)) {
DEBUG(3, ("Could not obtain machine account credentials from the local database\n"));
} else {
host_princ_s = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s$", lp_netbios_name());
host_princ_s = strlower_talloc(mem_ctx, host_princ_s);
if (!host_princ_s) {
ret = ENOMEM;
} else {
ret = krb5_parse_name(context, host_princ_s, &host_princ);
}
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_parse_name(%s) failed (%s)\n",
host_princ_s, error_message(ret)));
} else {
DEBUG(10, ("ads_secrets_verify_ticket: using host principal: [%s]\n", host_princ_s));
ret = ads_secrets_verify_ticket(mem_ctx, credentials, context, auth_context,
host_princ, ticket,
&packet, &tkt, keyblock);
}
}
ret = ads_secrets_verify_ticket(mem_ctx, machine_account, context, auth_context,
salt_princ, ticket,
&packet, &tkt, keyblock);
}
release_server_mutex();
@ -458,15 +480,13 @@ static krb5_error_code ads_secrets_verify_ticket(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
data_blob_free(ap_rep);
}
if (host_princ) {
krb5_free_principal(context, host_princ);
}
if (tkt != NULL) {
krb5_free_ticket(context, tkt);
}
SAFE_FREE(host_princ_s);
if (salt_princ != NULL) {
krb5_free_principal(context, salt_princ);
}
return sret;
}