mirror of
https://github.com/samba-team/samba.git
synced 2024-12-25 23:21:54 +03:00
split session setup code out of reply.c in preparation for adding
NTLMSSP and kerberos support in smbd
This commit is contained in:
Andrew Tridgell
parent
f283011c28
commit
38a43d75e2
@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ SMBD_OBJ1 = smbd/server.o smbd/files.o smbd/chgpasswd.o smbd/connection.o \
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smbd/dfree.o smbd/dir.o smbd/password.o smbd/conn.o smbd/fileio.o \
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smbd/ipc.o smbd/lanman.o smbd/mangle.o smbd/negprot.o \
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smbd/message.o smbd/nttrans.o smbd/pipes.o \
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smbd/reply.o smbd/trans2.o smbd/uid.o \
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smbd/reply.o smbd/sesssetup.o smbd/trans2.o smbd/uid.o \
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smbd/dosmode.o smbd/filename.o smbd/open.o smbd/close.o \
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smbd/blocking.o smbd/sec_ctx.o \
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smbd/vfs.o smbd/vfs-wrap.o smbd/statcache.o \
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@ -44,20 +44,6 @@ unsigned int smb_echo_count = 0;
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extern fstring remote_machine;
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extern BOOL global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated;
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/****************************************************************************
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report a possible attack via the password buffer overflow bug
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****************************************************************************/
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static void overflow_attack(int len)
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{
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if( DEBUGLVL( 0 ) ) {
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dbgtext( "ERROR: Invalid password length %d.\n", len );
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dbgtext( "Your machine may be under attack by someone " );
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dbgtext( "attempting to exploit an old bug.\n" );
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dbgtext( "Attack was from IP = %s.\n", client_addr() );
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}
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}
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/****************************************************************************
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reply to an special message
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@ -231,8 +217,7 @@ int reply_tcon_and_X(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf,char *outbuf,int lengt
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}
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if (passlen > MAX_PASS_LEN) {
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overflow_attack(passlen);
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return(ERROR_DOS(ERRDOS,ERRbuftoosmall));
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return ERROR_DOS(ERRDOS,ERRbuftoosmall);
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}
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memcpy(password,smb_buf(inbuf),passlen);
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@ -372,334 +357,6 @@ int reply_ioctl(connection_struct *conn,
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return outsize;
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}
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/****************************************************************************
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reply to a session setup command
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****************************************************************************/
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int reply_sesssetup_and_X(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf,char *outbuf,int length,int bufsize)
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{
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int sess_vuid;
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gid_t gid;
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uid_t uid;
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char* full_name;
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int smb_bufsize;
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int smb_apasslen = 0;
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pstring smb_apasswd;
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int smb_ntpasslen = 0;
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pstring smb_ntpasswd;
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pstring user;
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pstring orig_user;
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fstring domain;
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fstring native_os;
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fstring native_lanman;
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BOOL guest=False;
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static BOOL done_sesssetup = False;
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BOOL doencrypt = global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated;
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START_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
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*smb_apasswd = *smb_ntpasswd = 0;
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smb_bufsize = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv2);
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if (Protocol < PROTOCOL_NT1) {
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smb_apasslen = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv7);
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if (smb_apasslen > MAX_PASS_LEN) {
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overflow_attack(smb_apasslen);
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return(ERROR_DOS(ERRDOS,ERRbuftoosmall));
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}
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memcpy(smb_apasswd,smb_buf(inbuf),smb_apasslen);
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srvstr_pull(inbuf, user, smb_buf(inbuf)+smb_apasslen, sizeof(user), -1, STR_TERMINATE);
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if (!doencrypt && (lp_security() != SEC_SERVER)) {
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smb_apasslen = strlen(smb_apasswd);
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}
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} else {
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uint16 passlen1 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv7);
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uint16 passlen2 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv8);
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enum remote_arch_types ra_type = get_remote_arch();
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char *p = smb_buf(inbuf);
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if(global_client_caps == 0)
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global_client_caps = IVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv11);
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/* client_caps is used as final determination if client is NT or Win95.
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This is needed to return the correct error codes in some
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circumstances.
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*/
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if(ra_type == RA_WINNT || ra_type == RA_WIN2K || ra_type == RA_WIN95) {
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if(!(global_client_caps & (CAP_NT_SMBS | CAP_STATUS32))) {
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set_remote_arch( RA_WIN95);
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}
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}
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if (passlen1 != 24 && passlen2 < 24)
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doencrypt = False;
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if (passlen1 > MAX_PASS_LEN) {
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overflow_attack(passlen1);
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return ERROR_DOS(ERRDOS,ERRbuftoosmall);
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}
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passlen1 = MIN(passlen1, MAX_PASS_LEN);
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passlen2 = MIN(passlen2, MAX_PASS_LEN);
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if (!doencrypt) {
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/* both Win95 and WinNT stuff up the password lengths for
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non-encrypting systems. Uggh.
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if passlen1==24 its a win95 system, and its setting the
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password length incorrectly. Luckily it still works with the
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default code because Win95 will null terminate the password
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anyway
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if passlen1>0 and passlen2>0 then maybe its a NT box and its
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setting passlen2 to some random value which really stuffs
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things up. we need to fix that one. */
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if (passlen1 > 0 && passlen2 > 0 && passlen2 != 24 && passlen2 != 1)
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passlen2 = 0;
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}
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if (lp_restrict_anonymous()) {
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/* there seems to be no reason behind the differences in MS clients formatting
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* various info like the domain, NativeOS, and NativeLanMan fields. Win95
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* in particular seems to have an extra null byte between the username and the
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* domain, or the password length calculation is wrong, which throws off the
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* string extraction routines below. This makes the value of domain be the
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* empty string, which fails the restrict anonymous check further down.
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* This compensates for that, and allows browsing to work in mixed NT and
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* win95 environments even when restrict anonymous is true. AAB
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*/
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dump_data(100, p, 0x70);
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DEBUG(9, ("passlen1=%d, passlen2=%d\n", passlen1, passlen2));
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if (ra_type == RA_WIN95 && !passlen1 && !passlen2 && p[0] == 0 && p[1] == 0) {
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DEBUG(0, ("restrict anonymous parameter used in a win95 environment!\n"));
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DEBUG(0, ("client is win95 and broken passlen1 offset -- attempting fix\n"));
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DEBUG(0, ("if win95 cilents are having difficulty browsing, you will be unable to use restrict anonymous\n"));
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passlen1 = 1;
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}
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}
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/* Save the lanman2 password and the NT md4 password. */
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smb_apasslen = passlen1;
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memcpy(smb_apasswd,p,smb_apasslen);
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smb_ntpasslen = passlen2;
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memcpy(smb_ntpasswd,p+passlen1,smb_ntpasslen);
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if (smb_apasslen != 24 || !doencrypt) {
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/* trim the password */
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smb_apasslen = strlen(smb_apasswd);
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/* wfwg sometimes uses a space instead of a null */
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if (strequal(smb_apasswd," ")) {
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smb_apasslen = 0;
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*smb_apasswd = 0;
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}
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}
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p += passlen1 + passlen2;
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p += srvstr_pull(inbuf, user, p, sizeof(user), -1,
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STR_TERMINATE);
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/*
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* Incoming user and domain are in DOS codepage format. Convert
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* to UNIX.
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*/
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p += srvstr_pull(inbuf, domain, p, sizeof(domain),
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-1, STR_TERMINATE);
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p += srvstr_pull(inbuf, native_os, p, sizeof(native_os),
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-1, STR_TERMINATE);
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p += srvstr_pull(inbuf, native_lanman, p, sizeof(native_lanman),
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-1, STR_TERMINATE);
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DEBUG(3,("Domain=[%s] NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s]\n",
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domain,native_os,native_lanman));
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}
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/* don't allow for weird usernames or domains */
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alpha_strcpy(user, user, ". _-$", sizeof(user));
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alpha_strcpy(domain, domain, ". _-", sizeof(domain));
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if (strstr(user, "..") || strstr(domain,"..")) {
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return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
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}
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if (lp_security() == SEC_SHARE) {
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/* in share level we should ignore any passwords */
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smb_ntpasslen = 0;
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smb_apasslen = 0;
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guest = True;
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}
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DEBUG(3,("sesssetupX:name=[%s]\\[%s]@[%s]\n",user, domain, remote_machine));
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if (done_sesssetup && lp_restrict_anonymous()) {
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/* tests show that even if browsing is done over already validated connections
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* without a username and password the domain is still provided, which it
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* wouldn't be if it was a purely anonymous connection. So, in order to
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* restrict anonymous, we only deny connections that have no session
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* information. If a domain has been provided, then it's not a purely
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* anonymous connection. AAB
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*/
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if (!*user && !*smb_apasswd && !*domain) {
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DEBUG(0, ("restrict anonymous is True and anonymous connection attempted. Denying access.\n"));
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END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
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return ERROR_DOS(ERRDOS,ERRnoaccess);
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}
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}
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/* If no username is sent use the guest account */
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if (!*user) {
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pstrcpy(user,lp_guestaccount(-1));
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guest = True;
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}
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pstrcpy(current_user_info.smb_name,user);
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reload_services(True);
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/*
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* Save the username before mapping. We will use
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* the original username sent to us for security=server
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* and security=domain checking.
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*/
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pstrcpy( orig_user, user);
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/*
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* Always try the "DOMAIN\user" lookup first, as this is the most
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* specific case. If this fails then try the simple "user" lookup.
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* But don't do this for guests, as this is always a local user.
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*/
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if (!guest) {
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pstring dom_user;
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/* Work out who's who */
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slprintf(dom_user, sizeof(dom_user) - 1,"%s%s%s",
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domain, lp_winbind_separator(), user);
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if (sys_getpwnam(dom_user) != NULL) {
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pstrcpy(user, dom_user);
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DEBUG(3,("Using unix username %s\n", dom_user));
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}
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/*
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* Pass the user through the NT -> unix user mapping
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* function.
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*/
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(void)map_username(user);
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/*
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* Do any UNIX username case mangling.
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*/
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smb_getpwnam(user, True);
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}
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add_session_user(user);
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if (!guest) {
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NTSTATUS nt_status;
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nt_status = pass_check_smb(orig_user, user,
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domain, remote_machine,
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(unsigned char *)smb_apasswd,
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smb_apasslen,
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(unsigned char *)smb_ntpasswd,
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smb_ntpasslen);
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if NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status) {
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} else if NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER) {
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if ((lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_USER) ||
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(lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_PASSWORD)) {
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DEBUG(3,("No such user %s [%s] - using guest account\n",user, domain));
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pstrcpy(user,lp_guestaccount(-1));
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guest = True;
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} else {
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/* Match WinXP and don't give the game away */
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return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
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}
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} else if NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD) {
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if (lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_PASSWORD) {
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pstrcpy(user,lp_guestaccount(-1));
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DEBUG(3,("Registered username %s for guest access\n",user));
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guest = True;
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} else {
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/* Match WinXP and don't give the game away */
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return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
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}
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} else {
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return ERROR_NT(nt_status);
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}
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}
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if (!strequal(user,lp_guestaccount(-1)) &&
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lp_servicenumber(user) < 0)
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{
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add_home_service(user,get_user_home_dir(user));
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}
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/* it's ok - setup a reply */
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if (Protocol < PROTOCOL_NT1) {
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set_message(outbuf,3,0,True);
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} else {
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char *p;
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set_message(outbuf,3,0,True);
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p = smb_buf(outbuf);
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p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, "Unix", -1, STR_TERMINATE);
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p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, "Samba", -1, STR_TERMINATE);
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p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, lp_workgroup(), -1, STR_TERMINATE);
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set_message_end(outbuf,p);
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/* perhaps grab OS version here?? */
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}
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/* Set the correct uid in the outgoing and incoming packets
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We will use this on future requests to determine which
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user we should become.
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*/
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{
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const struct passwd *pw = smb_getpwnam(user,False);
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if (!pw) {
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DEBUG(1,("Username %s is invalid on this system\n",user));
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END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
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return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
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}
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gid = pw->pw_gid;
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uid = pw->pw_uid;
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full_name = pw->pw_gecos;
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}
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if (guest)
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SSVAL(outbuf,smb_vwv2,1);
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/* register the name and uid as being validated, so further connections
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to a uid can get through without a password, on the same VC */
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sess_vuid = register_vuid(uid,gid,user,orig_user,domain,guest, full_name);
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if (sess_vuid == -1) {
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return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
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}
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SSVAL(outbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
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SSVAL(inbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
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if (!done_sesssetup)
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max_send = MIN(max_send,smb_bufsize);
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DEBUG(6,("Client requested max send size of %d\n", max_send));
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done_sesssetup = True;
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END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
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return chain_reply(inbuf,outbuf,length,bufsize);
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}
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/****************************************************************************
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reply to a chkpth
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****************************************************************************/
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355
source/smbd/sesssetup.c
Normal file
355
source/smbd/sesssetup.c
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,355 @@
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/*
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Unix SMB/Netbios implementation.
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Version 3.0
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handle SMBsessionsetup
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Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1998-2001
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Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2001
|
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|
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This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
|
||||
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
|
||||
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
|
||||
(at your option) any later version.
|
||||
|
||||
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
|
||||
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
|
||||
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
|
||||
GNU General Public License for more details.
|
||||
|
||||
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
|
||||
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
|
||||
Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
|
||||
*/
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#include "includes.h"
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/****************************************************************************
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reply to a session setup command
|
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****************************************************************************/
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int reply_sesssetup_and_X(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf,char *outbuf,
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int length,int bufsize)
|
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{
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int sess_vuid;
|
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gid_t gid;
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uid_t uid;
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char* full_name;
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int smb_bufsize;
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int smb_apasslen = 0;
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pstring smb_apasswd;
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int smb_ntpasslen = 0;
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pstring smb_ntpasswd;
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pstring user;
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pstring orig_user;
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fstring domain;
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fstring native_os;
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fstring native_lanman;
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BOOL guest=False;
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static BOOL done_sesssetup = False;
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extern BOOL global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated;
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extern uint32 global_client_caps;
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extern int Protocol;
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extern fstring remote_machine;
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extern userdom_struct current_user_info;
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extern int max_send;
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BOOL doencrypt = global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated;
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START_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
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*smb_apasswd = *smb_ntpasswd = 0;
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smb_bufsize = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv2);
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if (Protocol < PROTOCOL_NT1) {
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smb_apasslen = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv7);
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if (smb_apasslen > MAX_PASS_LEN) {
|
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return ERROR_DOS(ERRDOS,ERRbuftoosmall);
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}
|
||||
|
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memcpy(smb_apasswd,smb_buf(inbuf),smb_apasslen);
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srvstr_pull(inbuf, user, smb_buf(inbuf)+smb_apasslen, sizeof(user), -1, STR_TERMINATE);
|
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|
||||
if (!doencrypt && (lp_security() != SEC_SERVER)) {
|
||||
smb_apasslen = strlen(smb_apasswd);
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
uint16 passlen1 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv7);
|
||||
uint16 passlen2 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv8);
|
||||
enum remote_arch_types ra_type = get_remote_arch();
|
||||
char *p = smb_buf(inbuf);
|
||||
|
||||
if(global_client_caps == 0)
|
||||
global_client_caps = IVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv11);
|
||||
|
||||
/* client_caps is used as final determination if client is NT or Win95.
|
||||
This is needed to return the correct error codes in some
|
||||
circumstances.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
if(ra_type == RA_WINNT || ra_type == RA_WIN2K || ra_type == RA_WIN95) {
|
||||
if(!(global_client_caps & (CAP_NT_SMBS | CAP_STATUS32))) {
|
||||
set_remote_arch( RA_WIN95);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (passlen1 != 24 && passlen2 < 24)
|
||||
doencrypt = False;
|
||||
|
||||
if (passlen1 > MAX_PASS_LEN) {
|
||||
return ERROR_DOS(ERRDOS,ERRbuftoosmall);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
passlen1 = MIN(passlen1, MAX_PASS_LEN);
|
||||
passlen2 = MIN(passlen2, MAX_PASS_LEN);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!doencrypt) {
|
||||
/* both Win95 and WinNT stuff up the password lengths for
|
||||
non-encrypting systems. Uggh.
|
||||
|
||||
if passlen1==24 its a win95 system, and its setting the
|
||||
password length incorrectly. Luckily it still works with the
|
||||
default code because Win95 will null terminate the password
|
||||
anyway
|
||||
|
||||
if passlen1>0 and passlen2>0 then maybe its a NT box and its
|
||||
setting passlen2 to some random value which really stuffs
|
||||
things up. we need to fix that one. */
|
||||
|
||||
if (passlen1 > 0 && passlen2 > 0 && passlen2 != 24 && passlen2 != 1)
|
||||
passlen2 = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (lp_restrict_anonymous()) {
|
||||
/* there seems to be no reason behind the
|
||||
* differences in MS clients formatting
|
||||
* various info like the domain, NativeOS, and
|
||||
* NativeLanMan fields. Win95 in particular
|
||||
* seems to have an extra null byte between
|
||||
* the username and the domain, or the
|
||||
* password length calculation is wrong, which
|
||||
* throws off the string extraction routines
|
||||
* below. This makes the value of domain be
|
||||
* the empty string, which fails the restrict
|
||||
* anonymous check further down. This
|
||||
* compensates for that, and allows browsing
|
||||
* to work in mixed NT and win95 environments
|
||||
* even when restrict anonymous is true. AAB
|
||||
* */
|
||||
dump_data(100, p, 0x70);
|
||||
DEBUG(9, ("passlen1=%d, passlen2=%d\n", passlen1, passlen2));
|
||||
if (ra_type == RA_WIN95 && !passlen1 && !passlen2 && p[0] == 0 && p[1] == 0) {
|
||||
DEBUG(0, ("restrict anonymous parameter used in a win95 environment!\n"));
|
||||
DEBUG(0, ("client is win95 and broken passlen1 offset -- attempting fix\n"));
|
||||
DEBUG(0, ("if win95 cilents are having difficulty browsing, you will be unable to use restrict anonymous\n"));
|
||||
passlen1 = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Save the lanman2 password and the NT md4 password. */
|
||||
smb_apasslen = passlen1;
|
||||
memcpy(smb_apasswd,p,smb_apasslen);
|
||||
|
||||
smb_ntpasslen = passlen2;
|
||||
memcpy(smb_ntpasswd,p+passlen1,smb_ntpasslen);
|
||||
|
||||
if (smb_apasslen != 24 || !doencrypt) {
|
||||
/* trim the password */
|
||||
smb_apasslen = strlen(smb_apasswd);
|
||||
|
||||
/* wfwg sometimes uses a space instead of a null */
|
||||
if (strequal(smb_apasswd," ")) {
|
||||
smb_apasslen = 0;
|
||||
*smb_apasswd = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
p += passlen1 + passlen2;
|
||||
p += srvstr_pull(inbuf, user, p, sizeof(user), -1,
|
||||
STR_TERMINATE);
|
||||
p += srvstr_pull(inbuf, domain, p, sizeof(domain),
|
||||
-1, STR_TERMINATE);
|
||||
p += srvstr_pull(inbuf, native_os, p, sizeof(native_os),
|
||||
-1, STR_TERMINATE);
|
||||
p += srvstr_pull(inbuf, native_lanman, p, sizeof(native_lanman),
|
||||
-1, STR_TERMINATE);
|
||||
DEBUG(3,("Domain=[%s] NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s]\n",
|
||||
domain,native_os,native_lanman));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* don't allow for weird usernames or domains */
|
||||
alpha_strcpy(user, user, ". _-$", sizeof(user));
|
||||
alpha_strcpy(domain, domain, ". _-", sizeof(domain));
|
||||
if (strstr(user, "..") || strstr(domain,"..")) {
|
||||
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (lp_security() == SEC_SHARE) {
|
||||
/* in share level we should ignore any passwords */
|
||||
smb_ntpasslen = 0;
|
||||
smb_apasslen = 0;
|
||||
guest = True;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
DEBUG(3,("sesssetupX:name=[%s]\\[%s]@[%s]\n",user, domain, remote_machine));
|
||||
|
||||
if (done_sesssetup && lp_restrict_anonymous()) {
|
||||
/* tests show that even if browsing is done over
|
||||
* already validated connections without a username
|
||||
* and password the domain is still provided, which it
|
||||
* wouldn't be if it was a purely anonymous
|
||||
* connection. So, in order to restrict anonymous, we
|
||||
* only deny connections that have no session
|
||||
* information. If a domain has been provided, then
|
||||
* it's not a purely anonymous connection. AAB */
|
||||
if (!*user && !*smb_apasswd && !*domain) {
|
||||
DEBUG(0, ("restrict anonymous is True and anonymous connection attempted. Denying access.\n"));
|
||||
END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
|
||||
return ERROR_DOS(ERRDOS,ERRnoaccess);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* If no username is sent use the guest account */
|
||||
if (!*user) {
|
||||
pstrcpy(user,lp_guestaccount(-1));
|
||||
guest = True;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pstrcpy(current_user_info.smb_name,user);
|
||||
|
||||
reload_services(True);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Save the username before mapping. We will use
|
||||
* the original username sent to us for security=server
|
||||
* and security=domain checking.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
pstrcpy( orig_user, user);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Always try the "DOMAIN\user" lookup first, as this is the most
|
||||
* specific case. If this fails then try the simple "user" lookup.
|
||||
* But don't do this for guests, as this is always a local user.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
if (!guest) {
|
||||
pstring dom_user;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Work out who's who */
|
||||
|
||||
slprintf(dom_user, sizeof(dom_user) - 1,"%s%s%s",
|
||||
domain, lp_winbind_separator(), user);
|
||||
|
||||
if (sys_getpwnam(dom_user) != NULL) {
|
||||
pstrcpy(user, dom_user);
|
||||
DEBUG(3,("Using unix username %s\n", dom_user));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Pass the user through the NT -> unix user mapping
|
||||
* function.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
(void)map_username(user);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Do any UNIX username case mangling.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
smb_getpwnam(user, True);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
add_session_user(user);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!guest) {
|
||||
NTSTATUS nt_status;
|
||||
nt_status = pass_check_smb(orig_user, user,
|
||||
domain, remote_machine,
|
||||
(unsigned char *)smb_apasswd,
|
||||
smb_apasslen,
|
||||
(unsigned char *)smb_ntpasswd,
|
||||
smb_ntpasslen);
|
||||
|
||||
if NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status) {
|
||||
|
||||
} else if NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER) {
|
||||
if ((lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_USER) ||
|
||||
(lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_PASSWORD)) {
|
||||
DEBUG(3,("No such user %s [%s] - using guest account\n",user, domain));
|
||||
pstrcpy(user,lp_guestaccount(-1));
|
||||
guest = True;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
/* Match WinXP and don't give the game away */
|
||||
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD) {
|
||||
if (lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_PASSWORD) {
|
||||
pstrcpy(user,lp_guestaccount(-1));
|
||||
DEBUG(3,("Registered username %s for guest access\n",user));
|
||||
guest = True;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
/* Match WinXP and don't give the game away */
|
||||
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
return ERROR_NT(nt_status);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!strequal(user,lp_guestaccount(-1)) &&
|
||||
lp_servicenumber(user) < 0) {
|
||||
add_home_service(user,get_user_home_dir(user));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/* it's ok - setup a reply */
|
||||
if (Protocol < PROTOCOL_NT1) {
|
||||
set_message(outbuf,3,0,True);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
char *p;
|
||||
set_message(outbuf,3,0,True);
|
||||
p = smb_buf(outbuf);
|
||||
p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, "Unix", -1, STR_TERMINATE);
|
||||
p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, "Samba", -1, STR_TERMINATE);
|
||||
p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, lp_workgroup(), -1, STR_TERMINATE);
|
||||
set_message_end(outbuf,p);
|
||||
/* perhaps grab OS version here?? */
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Set the correct uid in the outgoing and incoming packets
|
||||
We will use this on future requests to determine which
|
||||
user we should become.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
{
|
||||
const struct passwd *pw = smb_getpwnam(user,False);
|
||||
if (!pw) {
|
||||
DEBUG(1,("Username %s is invalid on this system\n",user));
|
||||
END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
|
||||
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
gid = pw->pw_gid;
|
||||
uid = pw->pw_uid;
|
||||
full_name = pw->pw_gecos;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (guest)
|
||||
SSVAL(outbuf,smb_vwv2,1);
|
||||
|
||||
/* register the name and uid as being validated, so further connections
|
||||
to a uid can get through without a password, on the same VC */
|
||||
|
||||
sess_vuid = register_vuid(uid,gid,user,orig_user,domain,guest, full_name);
|
||||
|
||||
if (sess_vuid == -1) {
|
||||
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SSVAL(outbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
|
||||
SSVAL(inbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!done_sesssetup)
|
||||
max_send = MIN(max_send,smb_bufsize);
|
||||
|
||||
done_sesssetup = True;
|
||||
|
||||
END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
|
||||
return chain_reply(inbuf,outbuf,length,bufsize);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user