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CVE-2015-5252: s3: smbd: Fix symlink verification (file access outside the share).

Ensure matching component ends in '/' or '\0'.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11395

Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
This commit is contained in:
Jeremy Allison 2015-07-09 10:58:11 -07:00 committed by Karolin Seeger
parent 5b730ab846
commit 4278ef25f6

View File

@ -982,6 +982,7 @@ NTSTATUS check_reduced_name_with_privilege(connection_struct *conn,
struct smb_filename *smb_fname_cwd = NULL;
struct privilege_paths *priv_paths = NULL;
int ret;
bool matched;
DEBUG(3,("check_reduced_name_with_privilege [%s] [%s]\n",
fname,
@ -1076,7 +1077,10 @@ NTSTATUS check_reduced_name_with_privilege(connection_struct *conn,
}
rootdir_len = strlen(conn_rootdir);
if (strncmp(conn_rootdir, resolved_name, rootdir_len) != 0) {
matched = (strncmp(conn_rootdir, resolved_name, rootdir_len) == 0);
if (!matched || (resolved_name[rootdir_len] != '/' &&
resolved_name[rootdir_len] != '\0')) {
DEBUG(2, ("check_reduced_name_with_privilege: Bad access "
"attempt: %s is a symlink outside the "
"share path\n",
@ -1216,6 +1220,7 @@ NTSTATUS check_reduced_name(connection_struct *conn, const char *fname)
if (!allow_widelinks || !allow_symlinks) {
const char *conn_rootdir;
size_t rootdir_len;
bool matched;
conn_rootdir = SMB_VFS_CONNECTPATH(conn, fname);
if (conn_rootdir == NULL) {
@ -1226,8 +1231,10 @@ NTSTATUS check_reduced_name(connection_struct *conn, const char *fname)
}
rootdir_len = strlen(conn_rootdir);
if (strncmp(conn_rootdir, resolved_name,
rootdir_len) != 0) {
matched = (strncmp(conn_rootdir, resolved_name,
rootdir_len) == 0);
if (!matched || (resolved_name[rootdir_len] != '/' &&
resolved_name[rootdir_len] != '\0')) {
DEBUG(2, ("check_reduced_name: Bad access "
"attempt: %s is a symlink outside the "
"share path\n", fname));