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s3:auth: pass the whole auth_session_info from copy_session_info_serverinfo_guest() to create_local_token()

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We only need to adjust sanitized_username in order to keep the same behaviour.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13328

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This commit is contained in:
Stefan Metzmacher 2018-03-02 17:07:11 +01:00 committed by Ralph Boehme
parent e8402ec048
commit a2a289d044
2 changed files with 23 additions and 33 deletions
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51
source3/auth/auth_util.c
View File

@ -472,6 +472,26 @@ NTSTATUS create_local_token(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
}
if (server_info->cached_session_info != NULL) {
session_info = copy_session_info(mem_ctx,
server_info->cached_session_info);
if (session_info == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
/* This is a potentially untrusted username for use in %U */
alpha_strcpy(tmp, smb_username, ". _-$", sizeof(tmp));
session_info->unix_info->sanitized_username =
talloc_strdup(session_info->unix_info, tmp);
if (session_info->unix_info->sanitized_username == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(session_info);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
*session_info_out = session_info;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
session_info = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct auth_session_info);
if (!session_info) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
@ -526,30 +546,6 @@ NTSTATUS create_local_token(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
return status;
}
if (server_info->security_token) {
/* Just copy the token, it has already been finalised
* (nasty hack to support a cached guest/system session_info
*/
session_info->security_token = dup_nt_token(session_info, server_info->security_token);
if (!session_info->security_token) {
TALLOC_FREE(session_info);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
session_info->unix_token->ngroups = server_info->utok.ngroups;
if (server_info->utok.ngroups != 0) {
session_info->unix_token->groups = (gid_t *)talloc_memdup(
session_info->unix_token, server_info->utok.groups,
sizeof(gid_t)*session_info->unix_token->ngroups);
} else {
session_info->unix_token->groups = NULL;
}
*session_info_out = session_info;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/*
* If winbind is not around, we can not make much use of the SIDs the
* domain controller provided us with. Likewise if the user name was
@ -1565,12 +1561,6 @@ static struct auth_serversupplied_info *copy_session_info_serverinfo_guest(TALLO
* to take the wrong path */
SMB_ASSERT(src->security_token);
dst->security_token = dup_nt_token(dst, src->security_token);
if (!dst->security_token) {
TALLOC_FREE(dst);
return NULL;
}
dst->session_key = data_blob_talloc( dst, src->session_key.data,
src->session_key.length);
@ -1593,6 +1583,7 @@ static struct auth_serversupplied_info *copy_session_info_serverinfo_guest(TALLO
return NULL;
}
dst->cached_session_info = src;
return dst;
}

5
source3/include/auth.h
View File

@ -34,15 +34,14 @@ struct auth_serversupplied_info {
struct security_unix_token utok;
/*
* NT group information taken from the info3 structure
* A complete auth_session_info
*
* This is not normally filled in, during the typical
* authentication process. If filled in, it has already been
* finalised by a nasty hack to support a cached guest/system
* session_info
*/
struct security_token *security_token;
const struct auth_session_info *cached_session_info;
/* These are the intermediate session keys, as provided by a
* NETLOGON server and used by NTLMSSP to negotiate key