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This function is longwinded and needlessly allocates intermediary
buffers. Simplify it.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
If the account has been locked out in the meantime (indicated by
NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT), we should return the appropriate error
code.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
If we find that the user has been locked out sometime during the request
(due to a race), we will now return an error code.
Note that we cannot avoid the MIT KDC aspect of the issue by checking
the return status of mit_samba_zero_bad_password_count(), because
kdb_vftabl::audit_as_req() returning void means we cannot pass on the
result.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This simplifies the code for the following commit.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Sep 12 03:27:55 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Sep 8 23:34:15 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
If TGTs can be used as kpasswd tickets, the two-minute lifetime of a
authentic kpasswd ticket may be bypassed. Furthermore, kpasswd tickets
are not supposed to be cached, but using this flaw, a stolen credentials
cache containing a TGT may be used to change that account's password,
and thus is made more valuable to an attacker.
Since all TGTs should be issued with a REQUESTER_SID PAC buffer, and
service tickets without it, we assert the absence of this buffer to
ensure we're not accepting a TGT.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15047
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15049
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
To ensure that, when decrypting the kpasswd ticket, we look up the
correct principal and don't trust the sname from the ticket, we should
pass the principal name of the kpasswd service into krb5_rd_req_ctx().
However, gensec_krb5_update_internal() will pass in NULL unless the
principal in our credentials is CRED_SPECIFIED.
At present, our principal will be considered obtained as CRED_SMB_CONF
(from the cli_credentials_set_conf() a few lines up), so we explicitly
set the realm again, but this time as CRED_SPECIFIED. Now the value of
server_in_keytab that we provide to smb_krb5_rd_req_decoded() will not
be NULL.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15074
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This plugin is now only used by the kpasswd service. Thus, ensuring we
only look up the kadmin/changepw principal means we can't be fooled into
accepting tickets for other service principals. We make sure not to
specify a specific kvno, to ensure that we do not accept RODC-issued
tickets.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15074
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This makes explicitly clear the purpose of this keytab.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15074
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
We would only compare the first 'n' characters, where 'n' is the length
of the principal component string, so 'k@REALM' would erroneously be
considered equal to 'krbtgt@REALM'.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15047
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
A fallback in krb5_rd_req_ctx() means that Samba's kpasswd service will
try many inappropriate keys to decrypt the ticket supplied to it. For
example, it will accept a ticket encrypted with the Administrator's key,
when it should rather accept only tickets encrypted with the krbtgt's
key (and not an RODC krbtgt). To fix this, declare the HDB keytab using
the HDBGET ops, which do not support iteration.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15074
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
For Heimdal, this now matches the behaviour of Windows. The object of
this requirement is to ensure we don't allow kpasswd tickets, not having
a lifetime of more than two minutes, to be passed off as TGTs.
An existing requirement for TGTs to contain a REQUESTER_SID PAC buffer
suffices to prevent kpasswd ticket misuse, so this is just an additional
precaution on top.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15047
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This matches the behaviour of Windows.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15047
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Since this principal goes through the samba_kdc_fetch_server() path,
setting the canonicalisation flag would cause the principal to be
replaced with the sAMAccountName; this meant requests to
kadmin/changepw@REALM would result in a ticket to krbtgt@REALM. Now we
properly handle canonicalisation for the kadmin/changepw principal.
View with 'git show -b'.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15047
Pair-Programmed-With: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This eliminates some duplicate branches.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15047
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Pair-Programmed-With: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
The error_data we create already has an explicit length, and should not
be zero-terminated, so we omit the trailing null byte. Previously,
Heimdal builds would leave a superfluous trailing null byte on error
strings, while MIT builds would omit the final character.
The two bytes added to the string's length are for the prepended error
code.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15047
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15049
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15074
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
The target principal and realm fields of the setpw structure are
supposed to be optional, but in MIT Kerberos they are mandatory. For
better compatibility and ease of testing, fall back to parsing the
simpler (containing only the new password) structure if the MIT function
fails to decode it.
Although the target principal and realm fields should be optional, one
is not supposed to specified without the other, so we don't have to deal
with the case where only one is specified.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15047
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15049
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15074
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
The KRB5_KDB_FLAG_REFERRAL_OK is to indicate wether a realm referral is
allowed. In AD this is always allowed. Also there is no way to pass that
indication to the SamDB layer.
Pair-Programmed-With: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Jul 4 12:22:16 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Windows only requires SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS for the check to pass.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Jun 14 15:38:23 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Because the KDC does not limit protocol transition (S4U2Self), two new
well-known SIDs are available to give this control to the resource
administrator. These SIDs identify whether protocol transition (S4U2Self) has
occurred, and can be used with standard access control lists to grant or limit
access as needed.
See
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/kerberos/kerberos-constrained-delegation-overview
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Apr 13 13:54:27 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
Tested also against Windows Server 2022.
Details:
https://lists.samba.org/archive/cifs-protocol/2022-April/003673.html
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This gives samba_kdc_update_pac() a chance to detect S4U2Self.
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
find $(pwd) -type f -name "*.c" | xargs sed -i -e '$a\'
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This allows the KDC to share the supplementalCredentials parsing code
with other parts of Samba that could use it.
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Mar 24 10:17:32 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
By putting this in the caller we potentially allow samba_kdc_message2entry_keys()
to be reused by a non-KDC caller.
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This avoids making a call out in samba_kdc_message2entry_keys() and allows
for potential reuse of the key parsing code.
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
We should not supprise the callers by returning more keys than we asked to
filter by and avoids duplicating the protected_users logic within
samba_kdc_set_fixed_keys().
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
We return the requested kvno if given, otherwise we include the
old and older keys for CLIENT|FOR_AS_REQ or SDB_F_ADMIN_DATA lookups.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14054
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is the first step to return the password history
in order to avoid badPwdCount updates for failing
pre-authentication with passwords from the recent history.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14054
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We need a ways to ask for a specific kvno if SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED
is requested. And also include the old and older keys from
the password history in the next commits.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14054
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We should avoid sdb_entry_ex, as it will be removed soon.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We should avoid sdb_entry_ex, as it will be removed soon.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
sdb_entry_ex only contains sdb_entry, so this is still doing
the same, but we want to remove sdb_entry_ex soon.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We should avoid using entry_ex->entry as sdb_entry_ex will be removed.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
sdb_entry_ex only contains sdb_entry, so this is still doing
the same, but we want to remove sdb_entry_ex soon.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We should avoid using entry_ex->entry as sdb_entry_ex will be removed.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
sdb_entry_ex will be removed as it just contains sdb_entry.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This will simplify further changes, e.g. asking for a specific kvno
or returning the password history in order to prevent
badPwdCount updates with passwords in the history.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Most likely the kerberos libraries don't support DES anymore, so
there's no point in exposing them at all.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
samba_kdc_[trust_]message2entry() always starts with
ZERO_STRUCTP(entry_ex) and cleans up on error with
sdb_free_entry(entry_ex), leaving a cleared structure again.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14054
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Both layers are owned by us so there's no need for an void
pointer.
This simplifies the code a lot and allows further cleanups.
Eventually we can remove sdb_entry_ex and only use sdb_entry,
as Heimdal also removed hdb_entry_ex.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
It will only ever point to an sdb_entry_ex
and becomes a stale pointer fast, as
sdb_free_entry() called before any talloc_free()
can happen (with a destructor still set).
Note the talloc parent of samba_kdc_entry
is the samba_kdc_db_context longterm context.
The next commits will fill samba_kdc_entry_destructor
with logic again, but for now remove the unused code.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
It's basically the same as free_sdb_entry(), but the next
step will make free_sdb_entry() private.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is much clearer than doing it in sdb_free_entry() already.
It also simplifies the next cleanups.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
It seems we need to take a closer look at the
memory hierachy of the sdb_entry related code.
I'll check that during the next commits,
but for now just remove use the unused hook.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
