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Accounts in the Protected Users group acting as clients lack support for
the RC4 encryption type. TGTs issued to such accounts have a lifetime
restricted to four hours, and are unable to be proxied or forwarded.
To determine at lookup time whether a client account is a member of
Protected Users, we now also create an auth_user_info_dc structure when
creating the database entry for an AS-REQ, rather than only when
creating a PAC for a TGT, or when recreating the PAC from an RODC-issued
TGT.
This means that the user's groups are now expanded even for AS-REQs that
result in an error (such as a PREAUTH_REQUIRED error), but this is
required to be able to correctly determine the account's available
encryption types, which are needed soon after fetching the user account.
Currently, the TGT lifetime may exceed four hours (for Heimdal
specifically). This may happen if PKINIT is used, and either the
pkinit_max_life_from_cert_extension option is TRUE and
pkinit_max_life_bound is greater than four hours, or
pkinit_max_life_from_cert is greater than four hours.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Otherwise useful information gets lost while converting
from NTSTATUS to krb5_error and back to NTSTATUS again.
E.g. NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_DISABLED would be audited as
NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15015
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Cases to handle KDC_AUTH_EVENT_VALIDATED_LONG_TERM_KEY and
KDC_AUTH_EVENT_PREAUTH_SUCCEEDED were removed in:
commit 791be84c3e
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Wed Mar 2 10:10:08 2022 +1300
s4:kdc: hdb_samba4_audit() is only called once per request
Normally these auth event types are overwritten with the
KDC_AUTH_EVENT_CLIENT_AUTHORIZED event type, but if a client passes the
pre-authentication check, and happens to fail the client access check
(e.g. because the account is disabled), we get error messages of the
form:
hdb_samba4_audit: Unhandled hdb_auth_status=9 => INTERNAL_ERROR
To avoid such errors, use the error code provided in the request
structure to obtain a relevant status code in cases not handled
explicitly.
For unexpected values we return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC
in order to hopefully prevent success. And within make test
we panic in order let a ci run fail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15015
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The call to sdb_free_entry() was forgotten.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15000
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Mar 11 11:05:55 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
mapped_state is completely irrelevant for audit logging and
will also be removed in the next commits.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13879
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The most important case is that we still have a previous
password cached at the RODC and the inbound replication
hasn't wiped the cache yet and we also haven't triggered
a new replication yet.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14865
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
So we need to restructure the logic a bit.
NOTE: This commit finally works again!
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14995
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Joseph Sutton <jsutton@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Mar 1 23:28:22 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
This is to adapt to:
commit 6530021f09a5cab631be19a1b5898a0ba6b32f16
Author: Luke Howard <lukeh@padl.com>
Date: Thu Jan 13 14:37:29 2022 +1100
kdc: move auth event definitions into KDC header
Move KDC auth event macro definitions out of hdb.h and into a new KDC header,
kdc-audit.h.
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON'T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14995
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Rather than having a 'free_entry' member that can be called to free an
hdb_entry, we now implement the free function in HDB. We perform the
free only if the context pointer is non-NULL.
We also remove the ZERO_STRUCTP() in sdb_entry_to_hdb_entry(), as the
context pointer is now part of the 'hdb_entry' structure itself, and
this would undesirably zero it out.
This is an adaptation to Heimdal commits:
commit c5551775e204d00c7ee8055ab6ddbba7e0590584
Author: Luke Howard <lukeh@padl.com>
Date: Fri Jan 7 12:15:55 2022 +1100
hdb: decorate HDB_entry with context member
Decorate HDB_entry with context and move free_entry callback into HDB structure
itself. Requires updating hdb_free_entry() signature to include HDB parameter.
A follow-up commit will consolidate hdb_entry_ex (which has a single hdb_entry
member) into hdb_entry.
commit 0e8c4ccc6ee0123ea39e53e8917fc3f6bb74e8c8
Author: Luke Howard <lukeh@padl.com>
Date: Fri Jan 7 12:54:40 2022 +1100
hdb: eliminate hdb_entry_ex
Remove hdb_entry_ex and revert to the original design of hdb_entry (except with
an additional context member in hdb_entry which is managed by the free_entry
method in HDB).
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON'T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14995
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is an adaptation to Heimdal:
commit 06f8985c55fcd23e3efe0017ed2480c5b3c4524f
Author: Luke Howard <lukeh@padl.com>
Date: Wed Jan 5 09:42:03 2022 +1100
hdb: consolidate preauth audit event types
Instead of having distinct preauth success/failure events for different
mechanisms, have a single event; the mechanism can be disambiguated by querying
the HDB_REQUEST_KV_PA_NAME key.
Note: there is still an explicit event for long-term key-based success/failure
in order to help the backend implement lockout.
Audit failure (HDB_AUTH_EVENT_PREAUTH_FAILED) in the main preauth loop, rather
than in each mechanism. Success is still audited in the mechanism to allow
client pre-authentication success to be noted even if something subsequent
(e.g. encoding a reply, memory allocation) fails. The generic catch-all for
success remains.
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON'T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14995
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is an adaptation to Heimdal:
commit d683780b1d728bf8c5b794a1f66842e5a25bd360
Author: Luke Howard <lukeh@padl.com>
Date: Sat Jan 1 23:44:05 2022 +1100
kdc: separate PKINIT/GSS authorization failure
Create a new audit event for PKINIT/GSS authorization (impersonation) failure
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON'T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14995
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is an adaptation to Heimdal:
commit e15e711b13e2fb33f4480a054cba60b6c4c0183b
Author: Luke Howard <lukeh@padl.com>
Date: Sat Jan 1 18:05:51 2022 +1100
kdc: remove auth_event_details audit key
The auth event details audit key (formerly, parameter to auth_status)
contained, variously, an encryption type name; a PKINIT client certificate
name; or, a GSS initiator name. Audit these instead using individual keys that
reflect the values' contents.
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON'T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14995
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is an adaptation to Heimdal:
commit b1dcc1a47485165ada778ef3c3463cfc0779d183
Author: Luke Howard <lukeh@padl.com>
Date: Fri Dec 31 17:24:58 2021 +1100
kdc: refactor Samba-specific auditing API in terms of existing API
Make Samba-specific HDB auth status API a wrapper on the existing auditing API,
with a view towards unifying the two APIs in a future commit.
The term "auth status" is replaced with "auth event", and the HDB auth_status
method is replaced with a more general purpose audit method which has access to
the entire request structure.
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON'T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14995
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We used to have a 1 to 1 mapping, but now we have
a conflict with these:
#define SDB_F_FORCE_CANON 16384
#define HDB_F_PRECHECK 16384
We currently don't really care about HDB_F_PRECHECK,
so we can just filter it out.
In the long run we may change the SDB flags space to uint64...
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14960
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Jan 28 13:33:22 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
Note Windows uses the string "MICROSOFT" as cookie,
so it's wrong to have a per DC cookie, but we need to
adjust the Heimdal logic to support that.
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON'T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Including updates to hook into the improved hdb_auth_status
by Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> from his Heimdal
upgrade branch.
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON'T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Additional fields may be added to this structure without us explicitly
initialising them. This could cause Heimdal to crash upon reading
garbage data, so we should zero-initialise the structure.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Dec 9 02:47:27 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
Looking up the DB twice is subject to a race and is a poor
use of resources, so instead just pass in the record we
already got when trying to confirm that the server in
S4U2Self is the same as the requesting client.
The client record has already been bound to the the
original client by the SID check in the PAC.
Likewise by looking up server only once we ensure
that the keys looked up originally are in the record
we confirm the SID for here.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14686
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Fold the two 32 bit values logon_id_high and logon_id_low into a single
64 bit logon_id in netr_identity_info. This will be used to tie
together winbind and SamLogon requests in audit logging.
Summary of the of the Query and Response from Microsoft on it's usage.
[REG:119013019612095] [MS-NRPC]: NETLOGON_LOGON_IDENTITY_INFO: Does
the Reserved field have LogonId meaning?
Questions:
In NetrLogonSamLogonEx does the Reserved field
(of NETLOGON_LOGON_IDENTITY_INFO) have LogonId meaning?
What is a valid LogonID, and does have any audit usage?
Samba is sending a constant "deadbeef" in hex and would like to
understand any usage of this field.
Response:
The NRPC spec is accurate in defining the field as Reserved, and without
protocol significance. In the header file in our source code, it is
defined as LogonId and commented as such, but it’s effectively not used.
This is probably why the API structure has that field name. It may have
been intended as such but it’s not used.
Samba will send a random value in this field.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is not a general purpose profiling solution, but these JSON logs are already being
generated and stored, so this is worth adding.
Some administrators are very keen to know how long authentication
takes, particularly due to long replication transactions in other
processes.
This complements a similar patch set to log the transaction duration.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE indicated a very specific error on an RODC.
We should not map any error to HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE,
we should just pass errors along unmapped.
Otherwise we'll hit the logic bug in:
if (ret == KDC_PROXY_REQUEST) {
uint16_t port;
if (!sock->kdc_socket->kdc->am_rodc) {
DEBUG(0,("kdc_udp_call_loop: proxying requested when not RODC"));
talloc_free(call);
goto done;
}
And just don't send an error message to the client.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13132
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Dec 6 23:16:54 CET 2017 on sn-devel-144
This allows you to forward bad password count resets to 0. Currently,
there is a missing access check for the RODC to ensure it only applies
to cached users (msDS-Allowed-Password-Replication-Group).
(further patches still need to address forcing a RWDC contact)
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This means that a RWDC will be collecting the badPwdCount to ensure
domain wide lockout.
TODO The parameters should be better constructed.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We now pass on the original client name and the client address to allow
consistent audit logging in Samba across multiple protocols.
We use config->db[0] to find the first database to record incorrect
users.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
lastLogon is supposed to be updated for every interactive or kerberos
login, and (according to testing against Windows2012r2) when the bad
password count is non-zero but the lockout time is zero. It is not
replicated.
lastLogonTimestamp is updated if the old value is more than 14 -
random.choice([0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5]) days old, and it is replicated. The
14 in this calculation is the default, stored as
"msDS-LogonTimeSyncInterval", which we offer no interface for
changing.
The authsam_zero_bad_pwd_count() function is a convenient place to
update these values, as it is called upon a successful logon however
that logon is performed. That makes the function's name inaccurate, so
we rename it authsam_logon_success_accounting(). It also needs to be
told whet5her the login is interactive.
The password_lockout tests are extended to test lastLogon and
lasLogonTimestamp.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Guenther
Pair-Programmed-With: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Jul 30 13:29:27 CEST 2015 on sn-devel-104
Based on a patch by Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@zentyal.com>
This ensures we write the correct (implict, samAccountName) based UPN into
the ticket, rather than the userPrincipalName, which will have a different
realm.
Pair-programmed-with: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Change-Id: I91bb663dcf1b1033cf756a860404c677e4ac4ade
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Including a fix by Arvid Requate <requate@univention.de>
Change-Id: I25d10da50dd6119801cd37349cce970599531c6b
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This checks both if host system run-time Heimdal has changed version,
and that the build-time version is supported.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-By: Jelmer Vernooij <jelmer@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Jan 20 22:26:49 CET 2014 on sn-devel-104
This will help users who are used to the kadmin interface, and could
be extended to import existing MIT or Heimdal keys into a Samba4 AD
domain.
To use, add to your krb5.conf
[kdc]
database = {
dbname = samba4:
}
or
[kdc]
database = {
dbname = samba4:/usr/local/samba/etc/smb.conf
}
And copy hdb_samba4.so from PREFIX/modules/hdb to your Heimdal lib directory
Andrew Bartlett
Autobuild-User: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Wed Nov 30 03:22:11 CET 2011 on sn-devel-104
This includes rewriting the PAC if the original krbtgt isn't to be
trusted, and reading different entries from the DB for the krbtgt
depending on the krbtgt number.
Andrew Bartlett
This means we just set up the system_session etc in one place
and don't diverge between the MIT and Heimdal plugins.
We also now determine if we are an RODC and store some details
that we will need later.
Andrew Bartlett
"heimdal/waf: Initial work on making it possible to use the system"
as the hdb_check_s4u2self function handling is incorrect.
This reverts commit b099631f42.
Keep all heimdal related plugin code within hdb_samba4.c
Move interfaces needed by multiple plugins in db-glue.c
Move sequence context in main db context so that we do
not depend on db->hdb_dbc in the common code.
Remove unnecessary paremeters from function prototypes
This allows to use a common structure not tied to hdb_samba4
Also allows to avoid many casts within hdb_samba4 functions
This is the first step to abstract samba kdc databse functions
so they can be used by the MIT forthcoming plugin.
The change to use a common system_session broke replication as the KDC
forces CRED_DONT_USE_KERBEROS on session->credentials, which is shared
with other parts of the system.
This should be fixed once we confirm whether the ldap backend actually
relies on CRED_DONT_USE_KERBEROS
This extends the PKINIT code in Heimdal to ask the HDB layer if the
User Principal Name name in the certificate is an alias (perhaps just
by case change) of the name given in the AS-REQ. (This was a TODO in
the Heimdal KDC)
The testsuite is extended to test this behaviour, and the other PKINIT
certficate (using the standard method to specify a principal name in a
certificate) is updated to use a Administrator (not administrator).
(This fixes the kinit test).
Andrew Bartlett
This overloads the 'name' part of the keytab name to supply a context
pointer, and so avoids 3 global variables!
To do this, we had to stop putting the entry for kpasswd into the
secrets.ldb. (I don't consider this a big loss, and any entry left
there by an upgrade will be harmless).
Andrew Bartlett
This removes the last use of the prefix hdb_ldb and makes it clear
that we pass in 3 global variables to get state information into
hdb_samba4 when used as a keytab. (And that they belong to
hdb_samba4, not to the KDC)
Andrew Bartlett
To do this properly, we must use the PAC, but for now this is enough
to check that we are delegating to another name on the same host
(which must be safe).
(Windows 7 does this a lot, also noted in bug 6273)
Andrew Bartlett
Each attribute we request from LDB comes with a small cost, so don't
lookup any more than we must for the (very) frequent krbtgt lookup
case. Similarly, we don't need to build a PAC for a server (as a
target), so don't ask for the PAC attributes here either.
Andrew Bartlett
The previous code only allowed an KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE name (an e-mail
list user principal name) in an AS-REQ. Evidence from the wild
(Win2k8 reportadely) indicates that this is instead valid for all
types of requests.
While this is now handled in heimdal/kdc/misc.c, a flag is now defined
in Heimdal's hdb so that we can take over this handling in future (once we start
using a system Heimdal, and if we find out there is more to be done
here).
Andrew Bartlett
The function LDB_lookup_principal() has been eliminated, and it's
contents spread back to it's callers. Removing the abstraction makes
the code clearer.
Also ensure we never pass unescaped user input to a LDB search
function.
Andrew Bartlett
This requires a rework on Heimdal's windc plugin layer, as we want
full control over what tickets Heimdal will issue. (In particular, in
case our requirements become more complex in future).
The original problem was that Heimdal's check would permit the ticket,
but Samba would then deny it, not knowing it was for kadmin/changepw
Also (in hdb-samba4) be a bit more careful on what entries we will
make the 'change_pw' service mark that this depends on.
Andrew Bartlett
Also including the supporting changes required to pass make test
A number of heimdal functions and constants have changed since we last
imported a tree (for the better, but inconvenient for us).
Andrew Bartlett
Logs showed that every SAM authentication was causing a non-indexed
ldb search for member=XXX. This was previously indexed in Samba4, but
since we switched to using the indexes from the full AD schema it now
isn't.
The fix is to use the extended DN operations to allow us to ask the
server for the memberOf attribute instead, with with the SIDs attached
to the result. This also means one less search on every
authentication.
The patch is made more complex by the fact that some common routines
use the result of these user searches, so we had to update all
searches that uses user_attrs and those common routines to make sure
they all returned a ldb_message with a memberOf filled in and the SIDs
attached.
It turns out (seen in MS-SAMR 3.1.1.7.1 for example) that the primary
way the krbtgt account is recognised as special is that RID. This
should fix issues such as 'password expired' on the kpasswd service.
Andrew Bartlett
A single AD server can only host a single domain, so don't stuff about
with looking up our crossRef record in the cn=Partitions container.
We instead trust that lp_realm() and lp_workgroup() works correctly.
Andrew Bartlett
This avoids one more custom patch to the Heimdal code, and provides a
more standard way to produce hdb plugins in future.
I've renamed from hdb_ldb to hdb_samba4 as it really is not generic
ldb.
Andrew Bartlett
