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We don't need "seq", bash can do that itself, and we assume bash here
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
If there is more than one server we will have for example nt4_dc.smbd,
nt4_dc.nmbd and nt4_dc.winbind as daemon environments, together with
the commandline environment "nt4_dc" coming last. Before this patch we
would have deleted all previous tmpfiles in the commandline environment.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
We can not process on the basis of a DN, as the DN may have changed in a rename,
not only that this module can see, but also from repl_meta_data below.
Therefore remove all the complex tree-based change processing, leaving only
a tree-based sort of the possible objects to be changed, and a single
stopped_dn variable containing the DN to stop processing below (after
a no-op change).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12497
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Previously if there was a conflict, but the incoming object would still
win, this was not marked as a rename, and so inheritence was not done.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12497
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
When contending a WRITE with an existing READ, the contender puts
himself into the exclusive slot, waiting for the READers to go
away. If the async lock request is canceled before we got the lock, we
need to remove ourselves again. This is done in the destructor of the
g_lock_lock_state. In the successful case, the destructor needs to go
away.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sun Dec 22 18:57:17 UTC 2019 on sn-devel-184
This walks different code paths in the subsequent locker. And the one
that we did not test so far is in fact buggy
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
This simply matches the behaviour from before e7b1acaddf2ccc7de0301cc67f72187ab450e7b5
when the logic for a trailing . was added. This matches what is added in
the dnsRecord attribute for a name of "." over the dnsserver RPC
management interface and is based on what Windows does for that name
in (eg) an MX record.
No a security bug because we use talloc and so name will be just the
end of the talloc header.
Credit to OSS-Fuzz
Found using the fuzz_ndr_X fuzzer
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Dec 20 11:33:52 UTC 2019 on sn-devel-184
Ensure that the '-lock' files for the dns partitions as well as the data
files are linked when running
samba_dnsupgrade --dns-backend=BIND9_DLZ
failure to create these links can cause corruption of the corresponding
data file.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14199
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Add tests to check that the '-lock' files for the dns partitions as well as
the data files are linked when running
samba_dnsupgrade --dns-backend=BIND9_DLZ
failure to create these links can cause corruption of the corresponding
data file.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14199
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Dec 20 07:34:42 UTC 2019 on sn-devel-184
The rpc.netlogon testsuite has a test that verifies LSA over netlogon which is
only enabled in the ad_dc_ntvfs env.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Credit to OSS-Fuzz
Found using the ndr_fuzz_X target.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Found by Douglas Bagnall using Hongfuzz and the new fuzz_ndr_X
fuzzer.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13876
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
The set was within the switch, the get was before the switch.
The difference is shown when there is an empty default element.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13876
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Found by Douglas Bagnall using Hongfuzz and the new fuzz_ndr_X
fuzzer.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13876
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
There are two concerns here, assuming the attacker can place arbitary values
in a dnsProperty attribute over LDAP (eg is a DNS administrator).
This comes from the fact that id is used as the switch value at the C layer
but at the NDR layer the wDataLength value is considered first.
One concern is that a pull/push round-trip could include server memory:
The previous switch_is() behaviour could store the server memory back
into the attribute.
However this pattern of pull/push only happens in ndrdump and fuzzing tools, as
dnsserver_db_do_reset_dword() operates only on the uint32/bitmap union
arms, and fully initialises those.
The other is that a pull of the attacker-supplied value could
cause the server to expose memory.
This would be over the network via DNS or the RPC dnsserver protocols.
However at all times the ndr_pull_struct_blob is passed zeroed memory.
The final concern (which fuzz_ndr_X found) is that in the ndr_size_dnsPropertyData()
the union descriminent is only id.
This has no impact as only zeroed memory is used so there will be a
zero value in all scalars, including data->d_ns_servers.AddrArray.
Therefore the server will not crash processing the attacker-supplied blob
[MS-DNSP] 2.3.2.1 dnsProperty has no mention of this special behaviour.
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-dnsp/445c7843-e4a1-4222-8c0f-630c230a4c80
This was known as CVE-2019-14908 before being triaged back to a normal bug.
Found by Douglas Bagnall using Hongfuzz and the new fuzz_ndr_X fuzzer.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14206
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@samba.org>
Ensure that a dnsp_DnsProperty is rejected if the length data does not not
correspond to the length indicated by the union id. It was possible for
the union to be referencing memory past the end of the structure.
Found by Douglas Bagnall using Hongfuzz and the new fuzz_ndr_X fuzzer.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14206
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This will show a leases.tdb record leak. If you SIGSTOP the smbtorture
process while it's in the 10-second wait, you will find locking.tdb
and share_entries.tdb empty after the scavenger has cleaned up. But
there will be an entry in leases.tdb left.
I have no clue how to test this properly, or how to have a reasonably
cheap assert in smbd during normal operations. The problem is that
this leak can't really be distinguished from a "normal" leak that a
crashed smbd would leave behind. Possibly we need a background job
walking leases.tdb to clean this up properly.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
We only have ndrdump and the fuzzers set up for structures, not BITMAPS,
ENUMS etc.
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Dec 10 17:45:46 UTC 2019 on sn-devel-184
These are not passed by pointer so the structure dump system does not work
for these. It is best to dump the containing structure instead.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
The sort behaviour for child records is not correct in Samba so
we add a flapping entry.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14138
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Pair-programmed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is not a security issue as it only happens when printing the structure
during debugging, not normal production.
Found by Michael Hanselmann using an NDR fuzzer and Hongfuzz.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Thanks to Douglas Bagnall for the samples, produced from seeds
generated by Samba's make test traffic, fuzzed by ndr_fuzz_X
and Hongfuzz.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Dec 9 11:57:52 UTC 2019 on sn-devel-184
