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Jeremy, in 3.0 we allowed get_mydnsdomname and get_mydnsfullname to fail
without filling in anything useful. Worked fine. Without this patch and a empty
/etc/hosts and no DNS configured, session setup would return
NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME. This is confusing at best, BAD_NETWORK_NAME afaik
is only ever returned from tcon normally.
This restores the 3.0 behaviour.
Comments?
Volker
have been able to reproduce with smbtorture4 for bug number 4059. It's too
late here now to check with W2k native, I'll do that tomorrow or over the
weekend. I'll then also check in a samba4 torture test to walk this from now
on.
Abartlet, can you do me a favor and look over this? It is a 1:1 copy of the
corresponding Samba4 code.
Thanks,
Volker
a copy of the plaintext password, only the NT and LM
hashes (all it needs). Fix smbencrypt to expose hash
verions of plaintext function. Andrew Bartlett, you
might want to look at this for gensec.
This should make it easier for winbindd to store
cached credentials without having to store plaintext
passwords in an NTLM-only environment (non krb5).
Jeremy.
A patch to make ntlm_auth recognize three new commands in
ntlmssp-client-1 and squid-2.5-ntlmssp:
The commands are the following:
Command: SF <hex number>
Reply: OK
Description: Takes feature request flags similar to samba4's
gensec_want_feature() call. So far, only NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SESSION_KEY,
NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SIGN and NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SEAL are implemented, using the same
values as the corresponding GENSEC_FEATURE_* flags in samba4.
Command: GF
Reply: GF <hex number>
Description: Returns the negotiated flags.
Command: GK
Reply: GK <base64 encoded session key>
Description: Returns the negotiated session key.
(These commands assist a wine project to use ntlm_auth for signing and
sealing of bulk data).
Andrew Bartlett
-----------------------------------
Thanks to a report from VL:
We were causing mayhem by weakening the keys at the wrong point in time.
I think this is the correct place to do it. The session key for SMB
signing, and the 'smb session key' (used for encrypting password sets)
is never weakened.
The session key used for bulk data encryption/signing is weakened.
This also makes more sense, when we look at the NTLM2 code.
Andrew Bartlett
-----------------------------------
With more 'try all options' testing, I found this 'simple' but in the
NTLM2 signing code.
Andrew Bartlett
-----------------------------------
After Volker's advise, try every combination of parameters. This
isn't every parameter on NTLMSSP, but it is most of the important
ones.
This showed up that we had the '128bit && LM_KEY' case messed up.
This isn't supported, so we must look instead at the 56 bit flag.
Andrew Bartlett
-----------------------------------
We should now try retesting with NT4. This should be standalone
enough to port into a SAMBA_3_0_RELEASE branch fix.
Jeremy.
* \PIPE\unixinfo
* winbindd's {group,alias}membership new functions
* winbindd's lookupsids() functionality
* swat (trunk changes to be reverted as per discussion with Deryck)
On systems with /dev/urandom, this avoids a change to secrets.tdb for every fork().
For other systems, we now only re-seed after a fork, and on startup.
No need to do it per-operation. This removes the 'need_reseed'
parameter from generate_random_buffer().
Andrew Bartlett
another NTLMv2 combination.
We should allow the NTLMv2 response to be calculated with either the domain
as supplied, or the domain in UPPER case (as we always did in the past).
As a client, we always UPPER case it (as per the spec), but we also
make sure to UPPER case the domain, when we send it. This should give
us maximum compatability.
Andrew Bartlett
it sent 'INVALID_PARAMETER', when it was us as the server that could not
come up with a session key. Instead, allow normal authentication to take
place, but do not setup a session key.
Andrew Bartlett
This fixes a problem joining a Samba domain from a
vanilla win2k client that doesn't set the
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2 flag.
Reported on samba ml as "decode_pw: incorrect password length"
when handling a samr_set_userinfo(23 or 24) RPC.
defaults specified by the caller to prevail.
Don't use NTLM2 for RPC pipes, until we know how it works in signing or sealing.
Call ntlmssp_sign_init() unconditionally in the client - we setup the
session key, why not setup the rest of the data.
Andrew Bartlett
- NTLM2 support in the server
- KEY_EXCH support in the server
- variable length session keys.
In detail:
- NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing
domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade).
* This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' *
(This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may
well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password
changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of
NTLM2 on RPC pipes.)
This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we
must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm
being changed. This also needs to be turned off for
'security=server', which does not support this.
- KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key
actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being
the shared-secret directly or indirectly.
- As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem
needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the
backend.
- There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation.
- The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii.
Don't make an ascii version ever.
- The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We
have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded
to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes
long, when the krb5 login uses DES.
* This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. *
- Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of
misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This
should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues.
- Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when
passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate)
REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures...
