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This demonstration should never be enabled in production, if
echo service is required other software is far better positioned
to provide it. Reflection attacks on echo are a known issue.
This is removed for consistency with the removal of rpcecho, but was
never enabled in the default smb.conf so is mostly harmless.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The rpcecho server is useful in development and testing, but should never
have been allowed into production, as it includes the facility to
do a blocking sleep() in the single-threaded rpc worker.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15474
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This makes LDAP_DIRSYNC_OBJECT_SECURITY the only behaviour provided by
Samba.
Having a second access control system withing the LDAP stack is unsafe
and this layer is incomplete.
The current system gives all accounts that have been given the
GUID_DRS_GET_CHANGES extended right SYSTEM access. Currently in Samba
this equates to full access to passwords as well as "RODC Filtered
attributes" (often used with confidential attributes).
Rather than attempting to correctly filter for secrets (passwords) and
these filtered attributes, as well as preventing search expressions for
both, we leave this complexity to the acl_read module which has this
facility already well tested.
The implication is that callers will only see and filter by attribute
in DirSync that they could without DirSync.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15424
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The aim here is to document the expected (even if not implemented)
SEARCH_FLAG_RODC_ATTRIBUTE vs SEARCH_FLAG_CONFIDENTIAL, behaviour, so
that any change once CVE-2023-4154 is fixed can be noted.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15424
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
SEARCH_FLAG_RODC_ATTRIBUTE should be like SEARCH_FLAG_CONFIDENTIAL,
but for DirSync and DRS replication. Accounts with
GUID_DRS_GET_CHANGES rights should not be able to read this
attribute.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15424
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
When we (expect to) get back a result, do not waste time against a potentially
slow server confirming we also get back results for all the other attribute
combinations.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15424
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Rather than fail, if the last run failed to reset things, just force
the DC into the required state.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15424
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
To re-use setup code, the super-class must have no test_*() methods
otherwise these will be run as well as the class-local tests.
We rename tests that would otherwise have duplicate names
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15424
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Let PIDL take care of encoding SMB2_FILE_POSIX_INFORMATION. This way
we also get parsing.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
With embedded Heimdal, we can mark a PAC as being trusted (i.e. not
issued by an RODC). This is convenient, as it saves us needing to carry
that information in flags, hoping it isn’t inadvertently lost.
System Heimdal and MIT Kerberos, however, don’t provide a way to mark a
PAC trusted. So we add a new wrapper type, ‘samba_kdc_entry_pac’, that
contains this extra information if ‘krb5_const_pac’ doesn’t contain it
already. As it also stores a pointer to the client entry, the
structure’s lifetime must therefore be carefully managed. Finally, it
keeps track of whether the PAC came across a trust, to know which is
useful in some circumstances.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
In the first place, this check was only applicable to the Heimdal KDC,
the MIT KDC not having support for compounded authentication. Secondly,
it was redundant, because _kdc_fast_check_armor_pac() would have already
been called to verify the armor ticket; a second round of validation
achieved nothing. And finally, the check was flawed: it checked only
*explicitly* armored PACs, and so would have done nothing for an armored
*AS‐REQ*.
In short, this check was useless; remove it.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
samba_kdc_get_user_info_dc() does too much. It should be responsible
only for getting account information, not for adding extra SIDs.
By extracting the call to samba_kdc_add_asserted_identity() into the
former function’s callers, we’ll be able to remove the
‘asserted_identity’ parameter in the next commit, reducing the
function’s complexity.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
samba_kdc_get_user_info_dc() does too much. It should be responsible
only for getting account information, not for adding extra SIDs.
By extracting the call to samba_kdc_add_claims_valid() into the former
function’s callers, we’ll be able to remove the ‘claims_valid’ parameter
in the next commit, reducing the function’s complexity.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
These structures have been zero‐initialized already.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Rob van der Linde <rob@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is a test using conditional ACEs and claims to confirm that we understand
the full end-to-end network behaviour of these all the way from the PAC to the
application in the access check of the KDC.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Pair-programmed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Sep 28 04:35:05 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
The new ‘claims_data’ structure can store claims in three different
representations — as an encoded blob, as a CLAIMS_SET structure, or as a
series of CLAIM_SECURITY_ATTRIBUTE_RELATIVE_V1 claims. Given a set of
claims, the accompanying functions provide a way to convert them into
the desired format.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Some functions in the auth_session subsystem will need to be able to
call encode_claims_set(). Moving said function lets them do that whilst
avoiding circular dependencies and additional public dependencies.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Future callers will rely on resource_groups_out being talloc‐allocated.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
