IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO GET AN ACCOUNT, please write an
email to Administrator. User accounts are meant only to access repo
and report issues and/or generate pull requests.
This is a purpose-specific Git hosting for
BaseALT
projects. Thank you for your understanding!
Только зарегистрированные пользователи имеют доступ к сервису!
Для получения аккаунта, обратитесь к администратору.
[abartlet@samba.org Squashed with TODO commit from Gary that provided
HEIMDAL_UNUSED_ATTRIBUTE etc]
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is in preperation for the Heimdal upgrade (which otherwise
can be compiled with stricter flags).
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
The loading function should be in the same SAMBA_LIBRARY()
as the modules.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Nov 30 16:44:57 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
Over the last month I got more and more reports,
that it's not possible to use a custom Samba version
on systems with sssd being installed, which depends on some
specific samba libraries installed in the system.
One major problem is that the custom libnss_winbind.so.2
depends on the libreplace-samba4.so of the custom build
and also injects an RPATH into the running process.
When sssd uses any nss library call it will get this,
when it then tries to load some of its plugins via dlopen(),
e.g.
ldd /usr/lib64/sssd/libsss_ad.so| grep samba
libsamba-util.so.0 => /lib64/libsamba-util.so.0
libreplace-samba4.so => /usr/lib64/samba/libreplace-samba4.so
libsamba-security-samba4.so => /usr/lib64/samba/libsamba-security-samba4.so
libsamba-errors.so.1 => /lib64/libsamba-errors.so.1
libsamba-debug-samba4.so => /usr/lib64/samba/libsamba-debug-samba4.so
libgenrand-samba4.so => /usr/lib64/samba/libgenrand-samba4.so
libsocket-blocking-samba4.so => /usr/lib64/samba/libsocket-blocking-samba4.so
libtime-basic-samba4.so => /usr/lib64/samba/libtime-basic-samba4.so
libsys-rw-samba4.so => /usr/lib64/samba/libsys-rw-samba4.so
libiov-buf-samba4.so => /usr/lib64/samba/libiov-buf-samba4.so
When that loads dlopen() will fail as a soname libreplace-samba4.so is
already loaded, but the symbol version within the other one don't match, as the
contain the exact version, e.g. replace_dummy@@SAMBA_4.13.3.
This is just an example and similar things can happen in all situations
where we provide libraries, which are potentially injected into every
process of the running system. These should only depend on libc.so and
related basic system libraries in order to avoid the problem.
We have the following libraries, which are in the that category:
- libnss_winbind.so.2
- libnss_wins.so.2
- pam_winbind.so
- winbind_krb5_locator.so
- async_dns_krb5_locator.so
The rules of library loading are really complex and symbol versioning
is not enough to solve it, only the combination of unique soname and
unique symbol version suffix seem to solve the problem, but injecting
an RPATH is still a problem.
In order to solve the problem I experimented with adding SAMBA_SUBSYSTEM()
definitions with 'hide_symbols=True' in order to do some static linking
of selected components, e.g.
bld.SAMBA_SUBSYSTEM('replace-hidden',
source=REPLACE_SOURCE,
group='base_libraries',
hide_symbols=True,
deps='dl attr' + extra_libs)
It's relatively simple to get to the point where the following are
completely static:
- libnss_winbind.so.2
- libnss_wins.so.2
- pam_winbind.so
- winbind_krb5_locator.so
But 'async_dns_krb5_locator.so' links in almost everything!
It seems we install the krb5 plugins into our own $MODULESDIR/krb5/,
so it may not be so critical, as long it's the admin who created
the desired symlinks into the location the kerberos libraries search
for plugins. Note the at least the locator plugins are always loaded
without any configuration, every .so in a special path are loaded with dlopen().
This is done by every application using kerberos, so we load a lot of samba libraries
into them.
Packagers should not put async_dns_krb5_locator.so (nor a symlink) into
the path that's reachable by libkrb5.so.
As a longterm solution we may want to change async_dns_krb5_locator.so
to use a helper process with posix_spawn() instead of doing everything
within the process.
Note I added hiden_symbols=True to the nss modules for Linux and
FreeBSD only, because these are the only platforms I'm able to test
on. We most likely should do the same on other platforms, but some
with access to the platform should provide a tested patch.
In order to avoid manual definitions of SAMBA_SUBSYSTEMS() with
'-hidden', I added the 'provide_builtin_linking=True' option,
as the logic is very similar to what we already have with the
'--builtin-libraries=BUILTIN_LIBRARIES' configure option.
SAMBA_PLUGIN() is used in order to use SAMBA_LIBRARY() in order
to make it more strict that these plugins can't be used as
normal depedency by other subsystems and libraries.
While being there it was easy enough to make libwbclient.so
also standalone without dependecies to other samba libraries.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14780
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
We should try to route everything through libwbclient.so, because we'll
soon don't have a single library providing winbindd_request_response().
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14780
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This simplifies a lot and makes sure we always use the
same rules for private libraries.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14780
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
For private libraries we don't want versioned sonames,
it's also pointless to use the upstream heimdal vnum values
for our private libraries as the soname is different anyway.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14780
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14780
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Nov 30 03:33:26 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
Normally samba_wdc_get_pac() is used to generate the PAC for a TGT, but
when generating a service ticket for S4U2Self, we want to avoid adding
the additional PAC_ATTRIBUTES_INFO and PAC_REQUESTER_SID buffers.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
If we decided not to put a PAC into the ticket, mspac would be NULL
here, and the resulting ticket would not contain a PAC. This could
happen if there was a request to omit the PAC or the service did not
require authorization data. Ensure that we always generate a PAC.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Windows ignores PAC_TYPE_ATTRIBUTES_INFO and always issues a PAC when
presented with an RODC-issued TGT. By removing this PAC buffer from
RODC-issued tickets, we ensure that an RODC-issued ticket will still
result in a PAC if it is first renewed or validated by the main DC.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This reverts commit fa4c9bcefd.
We should not be generating these additional PAC buffers for service
tickets, only for TGTs.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We were checking the wrong variable to see whether a PAC was found or not.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We set EXPECT_EXTRA_PAC_BUFFERS to 0 for the moment. This signifies that
these checks are currently not enforced, which avoids a lot of test
failures.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We were instead only checking the expected error.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
See also
ac8865a221
Pair-Programmed-With: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Nov 29 09:32:26 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
This puts all the detail on one line so it can be searched
by IP address and connecting SID.
This relies on the anr handling as otherwise this log
becomes the expanded query, not the original one.
RN: Provide clear logs of the LDAP search and who made it, including
a warning (at log level 3) for queries that are 1/4 of the hard timeout.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14694
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Douglas Bagnall <dbagnall@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Nov 25 02:30:42 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
RN: Do not modify the caller-supplied memory in the anr=* handling to
allow clear logging of the actual caller request after it has been processed.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14694
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
We allow a timeout of 2x over to avoid this being a flapping test.
Samba is not very accurate on the timeout, which is not otherwise an
issue but makes this test fail sometimes.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14694
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14901
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
[metze@samba.org removed unused tests for a feature that
was removed before merging]
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
In reality environments without 'nss_winbind' make use of 'idmap_nss'.
For testing, DOMAIN/bob is mapped to the local 'bob',
while DOMAIN/jane gets the uid based on the local 'jane'
vis idmap_nss.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14901
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
[metze@samba.org avoid to create a new ad_member_idmap_nss environment
and merge it with ad_member_no_nss_wb instead]
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This has not materialized since 2005. We can easily add it once we
create libsmbclient4.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
This avoids a crash that's triggered by windows clients using
handles from samr_Connect*() on across multiple connections within
an association group.
In other cases is not strictly required, but it makes it easier to audit that
source4/rpc_server no longer calls samdb_connect() directly and also
improves the auditing for the dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system() case.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jule Anger <janger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Nov 9 20:37:30 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
This is not strictly required, but it makes it easier to audit that
source4/rpc_server no longer calls samdb_connect() directly and
also improves auditing for the dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system() case.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This avoids a crash that's triggered by windows clients using
handles from OpenPolicy[2]() on across multiple connections within
an association group.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is not strictly required, but it makes it easier to audit that
source4/rpc_server no longer calls samdb_connect() directly.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This avoids a crash that's triggered by windows clients using
DsCrackNames across multiple connections within an association group
on the same DsBind context(policy) handle.
It also improves the auditing for the dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system() case.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We already had dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system(), but it uses the per
connection memory of auth_session_info and remote_address.
But in order to use the samdb connection on a per association group
context/policy handle, we need to make copies, which last for the
whole lifetime of the 'samdb' context.
We need the same logic also for all cases we make use of
the almost same logic where we want to create a samdb context
on behalf of the authenticated user (without allowing system access),
so we introduce dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_user().
In the end we need to replace all direct callers to samdb_connect()
from source4/rpc_server.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This adds a reproducer for an invalid memory access, when
using the context handle from DsBind across multiple connections
within an association group.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This will be used in the next commits.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We want to use the credentials of the joined dc account
in future tests.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
All other fragments blindly inherit it.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14875
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14564
If one of the objectClass checks passed, samldb_add() could return
through one of the samldb_fill_*() functions and skip the
servicePrincipalName uniqueness checking.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This is tested in other places already, but this ensures a global
check that a TGS-REP has a PAC, regardless.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14561
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This reverts an earlier commit that was incorrect.
It is not Samba practice to include a revert, but at this point in
the patch preperation the ripple though the knownfail files is
more trouble than can be justified.
It is not correct to refuse to parse all tickets with no authorization
data, only for the KDC to require that a PAC is found, which is done
in "heimdal:kdc: Require PAC to be present"
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This allows us to use it when validating user-to-user.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14873
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
If the structural objectclass is allowed to change, then the restrictions
locking an object to remaining a user or computer will not be enforcable.
Likewise other LDAP inheritance rules, which allow only certain
child objects can be bypassed, which can in turn allow creation of
(unprivileged) users where only DNS objects were expected.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14753
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14889
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Looking up the DB twice is subject to a race and is a poor
use of resources, so instead just pass in the record we
already got when trying to confirm that the server in
S4U2Self is the same as the requesting client.
The client record has already been bound to the the
original client by the SID check in the PAC.
Likewise by looking up server only once we ensure
that the keys looked up originally are in the record
we confirm the SID for here.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14686
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
These common routines will assist the KDC to do the same access
checking as the RPC servers need to do regarding which accounts
a RODC can act with regard to.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14558
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
These are added for the uncommon cases.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14558
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
In particular the objectGUID is no longer used, and in the NETLOGON case
the special case for msDS-KrbTgtLink does not apply.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14558
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This shares the lookup of the tokenGroups attribute.
There will be a new caller that does not want to do this step,
so this is a wrapper of samdb_confirm_rodc_allowed_to_repl_to_sid_list()
rather than part of it
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14558
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
While these checks were not in the NETLOGON case, there is no sense where
an RODC should be resetting a bad password count on either a
UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT nor a RODC krbtgt account.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14558
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This will allow the creation of a common helper routine that
takes the token SID list (from tokenGroups or struct auth_user_info_dc)
and returns the allowed/denied result.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14558
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This is instead of an array of struct dom_sid *.
The reason is that auth_user_info_dc has an array of struct dom_sid
(the user token) and for checking if an RODC should be allowed
to print a particular ticket, we want to reuse that a rather
then reconstruct it via tokenGroups.
This also avoids a lot of memory allocation.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14558
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This does the same check as the hdb plugin now. The client check is already
done earlier.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14561
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Nobody uses it now. It never really did what it said it did. Almost
every use was wrong. It was a trap.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14876
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This tightens the logic a bit, in that a message with trailing DELETE
elements is no longer accepted when the bypass flag is set. In any case
this is an unlikely scenario as this is an internal flag set by a private
control in pdb_samba_dsdb_replace_by_sam().
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14876
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
dsdb_get_single_valued_attr() was finding the last non-delete element for
userAccountControl and changing its value to the computed value.
Unfortunately, the last non-delete element might not be the last element,
and a subsequent delete might remove it.
Instead we just add a replace on the end.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14876
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
There is another call to dsdb_get_expected_new_values() in this function
that we change in the next commit.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14876
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Using dsdb_get_expected_new_values().
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14876
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
using dsdb_get_expected_new_values().
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14876
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This function collects a superset of all the new values for the specified
attribute that could result from an ldb add or modify message.
In most cases -- where there is a single add or modify -- the exact set
of added values is returned, and this is done reasonably efficiently
using the existing element. Where it gets complicated is when there are
multiple elements for the same attribute in a message. Anything added
before a replace or delete will be included in these results but may not
end up in the database if the message runs its course. Examples:
sequence result
1. ADD the element is returned (exact)
2. REPLACE the element is returned (exact)
3. ADD, ADD both elements are concatenated together (exact)
4. ADD, REPLACE both elements are concatenated together (superset)
5. REPLACE, ADD both elements are concatenated together (exact)
6. ADD, DEL, ADD adds are concatenated together (superset)
7. REPLACE, REPLACE both concatenated (superset)
8. DEL, ADD last element is returned (exact)
Why this? In the past we have treated dsdb_get_single_valued_attr() as if
it returned the complete set of possible database changes, when in fact it
only returned the last non-delete. That is, it could have missed values
in examples 3-7 above.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14876
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Not only should it not be possible to add a servicePrincipalName that
is already present in the domain, it should not be possible to add one
that is implied by an entry in sPNMappings, unless the user is adding
an alias to another SPN and has rights to alter that one.
For example, with the default sPNMappings, cifs/ is an alias pointing to
host/, meaning if there is no cifs/example.com SPN, the host/example.com
one will be used instead. A user can add the cifs/example.com SPN only
if they can also change the host/example.com one (because adding the
cifs/ effectively changes the host/). The reverse is refused in all cases,
unless they happen to be on the same object. That is, if there is a
cifs/example.com SPN, there is no way to add host/example.com elsewhere.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14564
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This only for the real account name, not the account name implicit in
a UPN. It doesn't matter if a UPN implies an illegal sAMAccountName,
since that is not going to conflict with a real one.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14564
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We already know duplicate sAMAccountNames and UserPrincipalNames are bad,
but we also have to check against the values these imply in each other.
For example, imagine users with SAM account names "Alice" and "Bob" in
the realm "example.com". If they do not have explicit UPNs, by the logic
of MS-ADTS 5.1.1.1.1 they use the implict UPNs "alice@example.com" and
"bob@example.com", respectively. If Bob's UPN gets set to
"alice@example.com", it will clash with Alice's implicit one.
Therefore we refuse to allow a UPN that implies an existing SAM account
name and vice versa.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14564
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This takes a string of logic out of samldb_unique_attr_check() that we
are going to need in other places, and that would be very tedious to
repeat.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14564
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
These need to stay a little bit in sync. The reverse comment is there.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14564
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Because the sam account name + the dns host name is used as the
default user principal name, we need to check for collisions between
these. Fixes are coming in upcoming patches.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14564
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We need to have the SPNs there before someone else nabs them, which
makes the re-provisioned old releases different from the reference
versions that we keep for this comparison.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14564
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
There are two reasons for this. Firstly, leaving SPNs unclaimed is
dangerous, as someone else could grab them first. Secondly, in some
circumstances (self join) we try to add a DNS/ SPN a little bit later
in provision. Under the rules we are introducing for CVE-2020-25722,
this will make our later attempts to add HOST/ fail.
This causes a few errors in samba4.blackbox.dbcheck.* tests, which
assert that revivified old domains match stored reference versions.
Now they don't, because they have servicePrincipalNames.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14564
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
It is soon going to be impossible to add duplicate SPNs (short of
going behind DSDB's back on the local filesystem). Our test of adding
SPNs on non-admin users doubled as the test for adding a duplicate (using
--force). As --force is gone, we add these tests on Guest after the SPN
on Administrator is gone.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14564
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This did not actually *force* the creation of a duplicate SPN, it just
ignored the client-side check for the existing copy. Soon we are going
to enforce SPN uniqueness on the server side, and this --force will not
work. This will make the --force test fail, and if that tests fail, so
will others that depend the duplicate values. So we remove those tests.
It is wrong-headed to try to make duplicate SPNs in any case, which is
probably why there is no sign of anyone ever having used this option.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14564
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We should not fail open on error.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14876
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Thankfully we are aleady in a loop over all the message elements in
acl_modify() so this is an easy and safe change to make.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14876
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Validate Writes and Control Access Rights only grant access if the
object is of the type listed in the Right's appliesTo attribute. For
example, even though a Validated-SPN access may be granted to a user
object in the SD, it should only pass if the object is of class
computer This patch enforces the appliesTo attribute classes for
access checks from within the ldb stack.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14832
Signed-off-by: Nadezhda Ivanova <nivanova@symas.com>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Validate Writes and Control Access Rights should only grant access if the
object is of the type listed in the Right's appliesTo attribute.
Tests to verify this behavior
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14832
Signed-off-by: Nadezhda Ivanova <nivanova@symas.com>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Without these calls the tests could pass if an expected error did not
occur.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14832
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
[abartlet@samba.org Included in backport as changing ACLs while
ACL tests are not checking for unexpected success would be bad]
As we want to reduce use of 'classic domain controller' role but FreeIPA
relies on it internally, add a separate role to mark FreeIPA domain
controller role.
It means that role won't result in ROLE_STANDALONE.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14801
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is not strictly needed, but makes it easier to audit
that we don't miss important places.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is not strictly needed, but makes it easier to audit
that we don't miss important places.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is not strictly needed, but makes it easier to audit
that we don't miss important places.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We need to make sure that temporary failures don't trigger a fallback
to the local SAM that silently ignores the domain name part for users.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This new restriction breaks a large number of assumptions in the tests, like
that you can remove some UF_ flags, because it turns out doing so will
make the 'computer' a 'user' again, and this will fail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14753
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
This favors a test that confirms we got an error over getting exactly
the right error, at least for now.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14753
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Objects of objectclass computer are computers by default now and this changes
the sAMAccountType and primaryGroupID as well as userAccountControl
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14753
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
We now enforce that a trust account must be a user.
These can not be added over LDAP anyway, and our C
code in the RPC server gets this right in any case.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14753
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
The parts that create and delete a single object can be
safely split out into an individual test.
At this point the parts that fail against Windows 2019 are:
error: __main__.SamTests.test_userAccountControl_computer_add_normal [
_ldb.LdbError: (53, 'LDAP error 53 LDAP_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM - <0000052D: SvcErr: DSID-031A1236, problem 5003 (WILL_NOT_PERFORM), data 0\n> <>')
error: __main__.SamTests.test_userAccountControl_computer_modify [
_ldb.LdbError: (53, 'LDAP error 53 LDAP_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM - <0000052D: SvcErr: DSID-031A1236, problem 5003 (WILL_NOT_PERFORM), data 0\n> <>')
error: __main__.SamTests.test_userAccountControl_user_add_0_uac [
_ldb.LdbError: (53, 'LDAP error 53 LDAP_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM - <0000052D: SvcErr: DSID-031A1236, problem 5003 (WILL_NOT_PERFORM), data 0\n> <>')
error: __main__.SamTests.test_userAccountControl_user_add_normal [
_ldb.LdbError: (53, 'LDAP error 53 LDAP_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM - <0000052D: SvcErr: DSID-031A1236, problem 5003 (WILL_NOT_PERFORM), data 0\n> <>')
error: __main__.SamTests.test_userAccountControl_user_modify [
_ldb.LdbError: (53, 'LDAP error 53 LDAP_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM - <0000052D: SvcErr: DSID-031A1236, problem 5003 (WILL_NOT_PERFORM), data 0\n> <>')
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14753
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Objects with objectclass computer now have UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT
by default and so this test must adapt.
The changes to this test passes against Windows 2019 except for
the new behaviour around the UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT default.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14753
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
This makes the code less indented and simpler to understand.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14753
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
This makes many of our tests pass again. We do not pass against Windows 2019 on all
as this does not have this restriction at this time.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14753
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
There are a lot of knownfail entries added with this commit. These
all need to be addressed and removed in subsequent commits which
will restructure the tests to pass within this new reality.
The restriction is not applied to users with administrator rights,
as this breaks a lot of tests and provides no security benefit.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14753
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
This helps ensure we cover off all the cases that matter
for objectclass/trailing-doller/userAccountControl
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14753
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
There are a lot of knownfail entries added with this commit. These
all need to be addressed and removed in subsequent commits which
will restructure the tests to pass within this new reality.
This default applies even to users with administrator rights,
as changing the default based on permissions would break
to many assumptions.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14753
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
This will allow these to be listed in a knownfail shortly.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14753
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
This allows future patches to restrict changing the account type
without triggering an error.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14753
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
The idea here is to split out the restrictions seen on Windows 2019
at the schema level, as seen when acting as an administrator.
These pass against Windows 2019 except for the account type swapping
which is not wanted.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14753
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
The remaining failures in the priv_attrs (not the strict one) test are
due to missing objectclass constraints on the administrator which should
be addressed, but are not a security issue.
A better test for confirming constraints between objectclass and
userAccountControl UF_NORMAL_ACCONT/UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST values would
be user_account_control.py.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14703
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14778
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14775
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
This allows the add of an RODC, before setting the password, to avoid
this module, which helps isolate testing of security around the
msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber attribute.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14703
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: David Mulder <dmulder@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Nov 1 21:16:43 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14874
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Oct 20 12:54:54 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
gssrpc/xdr.h:105:1: error: function declaration isn’t a prototype
[-Werror=strict-prototypes]
105 | typedef bool_t (*xdrproc_t)();
| ^~~~~~~
This can't be fixed, as the protoype is variadic. It can take up to three
arguments.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14870
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Commit f469fc6 (2010-10-02) inadvertently caused the previous hop realm
to not be added to the transit path of issued tickets. This may, in
some cases, enable bypass of capath policy in Heimdal versions 1.5
through 7.2.
Note, this may break sites that rely on the bug. With the bug some
incomplete [capaths] worked, that should not have. These may now break
authentication in some cross-realm configurations.
(similar to heimdal commit b1e699103f08d6a0ca46a122193c9da65f6cf837)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12998
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Oct 20 10:58:37 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED on a server/service account should cause
the PAC to be stripped not to given an error if the PAC was still
present.
Tested against Windows 2019
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14871
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Tests against Windows 2019 show that UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED
applies to services only, not to clients.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14871
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This lets us call it from Samba.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14642
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
When generating an AS-REQ, the TGS signature was incorrectly generated using
the server key, which would fail to validate if the server was not also the
TGS. Fix this.
Patch from Isaac Bourkis <iboukris@gmail.com>.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14642
[jsutton@samba.org Backported from Heimdal commit
e7863e2af922809dad25a2e948e98c408944d551
- Samba's Heimdal version does not have the generate_pac() helper
function.
- Samba's Heimdal version does not use the 'r' context variable.
]
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The principal in the PAC_LOGON_NAME buffer is expected to match the client name
in the ticket. Previously we were setting this to the canonical client name,
which would have broken PAC validation if the client did not request name
canonicalization
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14642
[jsutton@samba.org Backported from Heimdal commit
3b0856cab2b25624deb1f6e0e67637ba96a647ac
- Renamed variable to avoid shadowing existing variable
]
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14642
[jsutton@samba.org Backported from Heimdal commit
f1dd2b818aa0866960945edea02a6bc782ed697c
- Removed change to _kdc_find_etype() use_strongest_session_key
parameter since Samba's Heimdal version uses different logic
]
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM instead of EINVAL when verifying a PAC, if
the checksum is absent or unkeyed.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14642
[jsutton@samba.org Cherry-picked from Heimdal commit
c4b99b48c4b18f30d504b427bc1961d7a71f631e]
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Avoid allocating the PAC on error.
Closes: #836
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14642
[jsutton@samba.org Cherry-picked from Heimdal commit
6df8be5091363a1c9a9165465ab8292f817bec81]
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Split Windows PAC signing and verification logic, as the signing has to be when
the ticket is ready.
Create sign and verify the PAC KDC signature if the plugin did not, allowing
for S4U2Proxy to work, instead of KRB5SignedPath.
Use the header key to verify PAC server signature, as the same key used to
encrypt/decrypt the ticket should be used for PAC server signature, like U2U
tickets are signed witht the tgt session-key and not with the longterm key,
and so krbtgt should be no different and the header key should be used.
Lookup the delegated client in DB instead of passing the delegator DB entry.
Add PAC ticket-signatures and related functions.
Note: due to the change from KRB5SignedPath to PAC, S4U2Proxy requests
against new KDC will not work if the evidence ticket was acquired from
an old KDC, and vide versa.
Closes: #767
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14642
[jsutton@samba.org Backported from Heimdal commit
2ffaba9401d19c718764d4bd24180960290238e9
- Removed tests
- Adapted to Samba's version of Heimdal
- Addressed build failures with -O3
- Added knownfails
]
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
KRB5SignedPath was a Heimdal-specific authorization data element used to
protect the authenticity of evidence tickets when used in constrained
delegation (without a Windows PAC).
Remove this, to be replaced with the Windows PAC which itself now supports
signing the entire ticket in the TGS key.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14642
[jsutton@samba.org Backported from Heimdal commit
bb1d8f2a8c2545bccdf2c9179ce9259bf1050086
- Removed tests
- Removed auditing hook (only present in Heimdal master)
- Added knownfails
]
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This lets us indicate that service tickets should be issued with ticket
checksums in the PAC.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14642
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
