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It can happen that the paged_results() failes, e.g. due to
LDB_ERR_TIME_LIMIT_EXCEEDED, if that happens we should not
dereference ares->response, if ares is NULL.
We also should not call ldb_module_done() if paged_results()
fails, as it was already called.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14952
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit 19fa22b1fb)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14936
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Jan 11 22:03:03 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
(cherry picked from commit 1243f52f7a)
A netapp diag tool uses a NTLMv2_CLIENT_CHALLENGE with invalid bytes
as av_pair blob. Which is supposed to be ignored by DCs.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14932
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
(similar to commit e7e521fe9b)
This demonstrates the problem with guest access being rejected
by default.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14935
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0a808f6b53)
smb2.fileid_unique.fileid_unique
smb2.fileid_unique.fileid_unique-dir
Create 100 files or directories as fast as we can
against a "normal" share, then read info on them
and ensure (a) top bit is set (generated from itime)
and (b) uniqueness across all generated objects
(checks poor timestamp resolution doesn't create
duplicate fileids).
This shows that even on ext4, this is enough to
cause duplicate fileids to be returned.
Add knownfail.d/fileid-unique
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14928
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
(back-ported picked from commit 30fea0d311)
Demonstrate that smbd fails FSCTL_VALIDATE_NEGOTIATE_INFO
only because the user doesn't have permissions on the share root.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14788
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 735fc34682)
This puts all the detail on one line so it can be searched
by IP address and connecting SID.
This relies on the anr handling as otherwise this log
becomes the expanded query, not the original one.
RN: Provide clear logs of the LDAP search and who made it, including
a warning (at log level 3) for queries that are 1/4 of the hard timeout.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14694
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Douglas Bagnall <dbagnall@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Nov 25 02:30:42 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
(cherry picked from commit 3507e96b3d)
RN: Do not modify the caller-supplied memory in the anr=* handling to
allow clear logging of the actual caller request after it has been processed.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14694
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit 5f0590362c)
We allow a timeout of 2x over to avoid this being a flapping test.
Samba is not very accurate on the timeout, which is not otherwise an
issue but makes this test fail sometimes.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14694
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit dcfcafdbf7)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14901
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
[metze@samba.org removed unused tests for a feature that
was removed before merging]
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 494bf7de6f)
In reality environments without 'nss_winbind' make use of 'idmap_nss'.
For testing, DOMAIN/bob is mapped to the local 'bob',
while DOMAIN/jane gets the uid based on the local 'jane'
vis idmap_nss.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14901
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
[metze@samba.org avoid to create a new ad_member_idmap_nss environment
and merge it with ad_member_no_nss_wb instead]
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8a9f2aa2c1)
This avoids a crash that's triggered by windows clients using
handles from samr_Connect*() on across multiple connections within
an association group.
In other cases is not strictly required, but it makes it easier to audit that
source4/rpc_server no longer calls samdb_connect() directly and also
improves the auditing for the dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system() case.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is not strictly required, but it makes it easier to audit that
source4/rpc_server no longer calls samdb_connect() directly and
also improves auditing for the dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system() case.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This avoids a crash that's triggered by windows clients using
handles from OpenPolicy[2]() on across multiple connections within
an association group.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is not strictly required, but it makes it easier to audit that
source4/rpc_server no longer calls samdb_connect() directly.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This avoids a crash that's triggered by windows clients using
DsCrackNames across multiple connections within an association group
on the same DsBind context(policy) handle.
It also improves the auditing for the dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system() case.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We already had dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system(), but it uses the per
connection memory of auth_session_info and remote_address.
But in order to use the samdb connection on a per association group
context/policy handle, we need to make copies, which last for the
whole lifetime of the 'samdb' context.
We need the same logic also for all cases we make use of
the almost same logic where we want to create a samdb context
on behalf of the authenticated user (without allowing system access),
so we introduce dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_user().
In the end we need to replace all direct callers to samdb_connect()
from source4/rpc_server.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This adds a reproducer for an invalid memory access, when
using the context handle from DsBind across multiple connections
within an association group.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This will be used in the next commits.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
[abartlet@samba.org Backported from patch for master to use
the older popt functions as master has the new common command
line handling]
We want to use the credentials of the joined dc account
in future tests.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
All other fragments blindly inherit it.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14875
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
This means yet another library, but having to depend on gensec just
for dcerpc_parse_binding() and basic packet parsing seems like a bit
overkill to me.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Apr 6 23:33:14 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14875
(cherry picked from commit 4d3b6506d3)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14564
If one of the objectClass checks passed, samldb_add() could return
through one of the samldb_fill_*() functions and skip the
servicePrincipalName uniqueness checking.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This is tested in other places already, but this ensures a global
check that a TGS-REP has a PAC, regardless.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14561
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This reverts an earlier commit that was incorrect.
It is not Samba practice to include a revert, but at this point in
the patch preperation the ripple though the knownfail files is
more trouble than can be justified.
It is not correct to refuse to parse all tickets with no authorization
data, only for the KDC to require that a PAC is found, which is done
in "heimdal:kdc: Require PAC to be present"
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This allows us to use it when validating user-to-user.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14873
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
If the structural objectclass is allowed to change, then the restrictions
locking an object to remaining a user or computer will not be enforcable.
Likewise other LDAP inheritance rules, which allow only certain
child objects can be bypassed, which can in turn allow creation of
(unprivileged) users where only DNS objects were expected.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14753
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14889
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Looking up the DB twice is subject to a race and is a poor
use of resources, so instead just pass in the record we
already got when trying to confirm that the server in
S4U2Self is the same as the requesting client.
The client record has already been bound to the the
original client by the SID check in the PAC.
Likewise by looking up server only once we ensure
that the keys looked up originally are in the record
we confirm the SID for here.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14686
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
These common routines will assist the KDC to do the same access
checking as the RPC servers need to do regarding which accounts
a RODC can act with regard to.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14558
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
These are added for the uncommon cases.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14558
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
In particular the objectGUID is no longer used, and in the NETLOGON case
the special case for msDS-KrbTgtLink does not apply.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14558
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This shares the lookup of the tokenGroups attribute.
There will be a new caller that does not want to do this step,
so this is a wrapper of samdb_confirm_rodc_allowed_to_repl_to_sid_list()
rather than part of it
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14558
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
While these checks were not in the NETLOGON case, there is no sense where
an RODC should be resetting a bad password count on either a
UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT nor a RODC krbtgt account.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14558
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This will allow the creation of a common helper routine that
takes the token SID list (from tokenGroups or struct auth_user_info_dc)
and returns the allowed/denied result.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14558
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This is instead of an array of struct dom_sid *.
The reason is that auth_user_info_dc has an array of struct dom_sid
(the user token) and for checking if an RODC should be allowed
to print a particular ticket, we want to reuse that a rather
then reconstruct it via tokenGroups.
This also avoids a lot of memory allocation.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14558
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This does the same check as the hdb plugin now. The client check is already
done earlier.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14561
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Nobody uses it now. It never really did what it said it did. Almost
every use was wrong. It was a trap.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14876
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This tightens the logic a bit, in that a message with trailing DELETE
elements is no longer accepted when the bypass flag is set. In any case
this is an unlikely scenario as this is an internal flag set by a private
control in pdb_samba_dsdb_replace_by_sam().
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14876
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
dsdb_get_single_valued_attr() was finding the last non-delete element for
userAccountControl and changing its value to the computed value.
Unfortunately, the last non-delete element might not be the last element,
and a subsequent delete might remove it.
Instead we just add a replace on the end.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14876
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
There is another call to dsdb_get_expected_new_values() in this function
that we change in the next commit.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14876
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Using dsdb_get_expected_new_values().
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14876
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
using dsdb_get_expected_new_values().
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14876
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This function collects a superset of all the new values for the specified
attribute that could result from an ldb add or modify message.
In most cases -- where there is a single add or modify -- the exact set
of added values is returned, and this is done reasonably efficiently
using the existing element. Where it gets complicated is when there are
multiple elements for the same attribute in a message. Anything added
before a replace or delete will be included in these results but may not
end up in the database if the message runs its course. Examples:
sequence result
1. ADD the element is returned (exact)
2. REPLACE the element is returned (exact)
3. ADD, ADD both elements are concatenated together (exact)
4. ADD, REPLACE both elements are concatenated together (superset)
5. REPLACE, ADD both elements are concatenated together (exact)
6. ADD, DEL, ADD adds are concatenated together (superset)
7. REPLACE, REPLACE both concatenated (superset)
8. DEL, ADD last element is returned (exact)
Why this? In the past we have treated dsdb_get_single_valued_attr() as if
it returned the complete set of possible database changes, when in fact it
only returned the last non-delete. That is, it could have missed values
in examples 3-7 above.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14876
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Not only should it not be possible to add a servicePrincipalName that
is already present in the domain, it should not be possible to add one
that is implied by an entry in sPNMappings, unless the user is adding
an alias to another SPN and has rights to alter that one.
For example, with the default sPNMappings, cifs/ is an alias pointing to
host/, meaning if there is no cifs/example.com SPN, the host/example.com
one will be used instead. A user can add the cifs/example.com SPN only
if they can also change the host/example.com one (because adding the
cifs/ effectively changes the host/). The reverse is refused in all cases,
unless they happen to be on the same object. That is, if there is a
cifs/example.com SPN, there is no way to add host/example.com elsewhere.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14564
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This only for the real account name, not the account name implicit in
a UPN. It doesn't matter if a UPN implies an illegal sAMAccountName,
since that is not going to conflict with a real one.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14564
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We already know duplicate sAMAccountNames and UserPrincipalNames are bad,
but we also have to check against the values these imply in each other.
For example, imagine users with SAM account names "Alice" and "Bob" in
the realm "example.com". If they do not have explicit UPNs, by the logic
of MS-ADTS 5.1.1.1.1 they use the implict UPNs "alice@example.com" and
"bob@example.com", respectively. If Bob's UPN gets set to
"alice@example.com", it will clash with Alice's implicit one.
Therefore we refuse to allow a UPN that implies an existing SAM account
name and vice versa.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14564
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This takes a string of logic out of samldb_unique_attr_check() that we
are going to need in other places, and that would be very tedious to
repeat.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14564
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
These need to stay a little bit in sync. The reverse comment is there.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14564
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
