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...and instead use the fsctl to infer required behaviour in the VFS
backends.
Note that this removes the check from vfs_default because there we only
handle FSCTL_SRV_COPYCHUNK(_WRITE) and must always perform the lock
checks.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
A previous commit removed the special hook from the SMB layer, so we
don't need this anymore.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Remove the source fsp argument and instead pass the offload token
generated with SMB_VFS_OFFLOAD_READ_SEND/RECV.
An actual offload fsctl is not implemented yet, neither in the VFS nor
at the SMB ioctl layer, and returns NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED
With these changes we now pass the copy-chunk-across-shares test.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
The copy-chunk request chunk_count can be 0 and Windows server just
returns success saying number of copied chunks is 0.
macOS client overload this after negotiating AAPL via their SMB2
extensions, meaning it's a so called copyfile request (copy whole file
and all streams).
We previously checked this at the SMB layer, with this patch we just
send this down the VFS, if vfs_fruit is loaded it implements the macOS
copyile semantics, otherwise we get Windows behavour..
No change in behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
As we won't have the source fsp around with the coming token based
offload read/write based code, we can't merge chunks as that requires
checking against the source file size.
We could still merge chunks without checking, but getting the error
handling correct would require comlicated logic for the SMB2 ioctl
copy-chunk error reporting.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
By adding a SMB2 specific CHECK_READ_SMB2 macro called that always
grants read access if execute was granted, we can get rid of the flags2
hack.
All callers in the SMB2 code are converted to use the CHECK_READ_SMB2
macro.
Amongs other things, this later allows moving the handle checks in
copychunk_check_handles() down into the VFS layer where we don't have
access to the smbreq.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
No change in behaviour, just a rename in preperation of more changes to
SMB_VFS_OFFLOAD_WRITE_SEND. It helps keeping the diff of the actual
changes smaller.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
No change in behaviour, this just uses the new SMB_VFS_OFFLOAD_READ_SEND
in the duplicate extents and the resume key ioctls.
In the copy-chunk/resume-key case this means using
SMB_VFS_OFFLOAD_READ_SEND to create the resume-key token that is
returned to the client.
In the duplicate-extents case this ensures we can later call
offload-write, which requires a previous call to offload-read that
associates a token with a file-handle.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Add SMB_VFS_OFFLOAD_READ_SEND an SMB_VFS_OFFLOAD_READ_RECV.
This paves the way for supporting server-side copy-chunk with source and
destination file-handles on different shares. It can be used to
implement copy offload fsctl in the future, but for now this will be
used as a mere copy-chunk replacement.
SMB_VFS_OFFLOAD_READ generates a token that associates an fsp with the
token and stores the fsp in a in-memory db.
Initially only a copy-chunk resume key fsctl is supported. In the future
this can be enhanced to support real offload fsctl.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This need to create a temporary messaging context in order to do
the auth logging. This can only be done as root.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12850
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Garming Sam <garming@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Jul 3 08:15:29 CEST 2017 on sn-devel-144
We need to migrate all pathname based VFS calls to use a struct
to finish modernising the VFS with extra timestamp and flags parameters.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Sharpe <realrichardsharpe@gmail.com>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sat Jul 1 07:20:28 CEST 2017 on sn-devel-144
We need to migrate all pathname based VFS calls to use a struct
to finish modernising the VFS with extra timestamp and flags parameters.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Sharpe <realrichardsharpe@gmail.com>
We need to migrate all pathname based VFS calls to use a struct
to finish modernising the VFS with extra timestamp and flags parameters.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Sharpe <realrichardsharpe@gmail.com>
We need to migrate all pathname based VFS calls to use a struct
to finish modernising the VFS with extra timestamp and flags parameters.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Sharpe <realrichardsharpe@gmail.com>
This removes important entries winbindd created during startup!
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12868
Pair-Programmed-With: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
There's no point in running it twice with the old ccache.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This reverts commit 4eb29ce3266a8c05047ecf33a98d1dbdbbbd63c6.
This will be passed by the caller in a following commit.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This will make it possible to test with -mNT1 as well as -mSMB3
in a following patch.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This makes sure only the "creating a bad symlink and deleting it"
is failing with -mSMB3.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
On interactive sessions we print the following instead now:
Try "help" do get a list of possible commands.
smb: >
The reason for this is that we don't get these information via SMB2
and the we only get the domain name via some layering violations
from the NTLMSSP state.
It's better to remove this consitently for all SMB and auth
protocol combinations.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This finishes commits 4e4376164bafbd3a883b6ce8033dcd714f971d51
and 8da5a0f1e33a85281610700b58b534bc985894f0.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
As the caller ("smbd_smb2_request_process_create()") already sets the callback,
the first time, it's not safe to reuse the tevent_req structure.
The typical 'tevent_req_nterror(); return tevent_req_post()' will
crash as the tevent_req_nterror() already triggered the former callback,
which calls smbd_smb2_create_recv(), were tevent_req_received() invalidates
the tevent_req structure, so that tevent_req_post() will crash.
We just remember the required values from the old state
and move them to the new state.
We tried to write reproducers for this, but sadly weren't able to trigger
the backtrace we had from a create a customer (using recent code)
with commit 6beba782f1bf951236813e0b46115b8102212c03
included. And this patch fixed the situation for the
customer.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12832
Pair-Programmed-With: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
We use secrets_{prepare,failed,defer,finish}_password_change() to make
the process more robust.
Even if we just just verified the current password with the DC
it can still happen that the remote password change will fail.
If a server has the RefusePasswordChange=1 under
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netlogon\Parameters,
it will reject NetrServerPasswordSet2() with NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD.
This results in a successful local change, but a failing remote change,
which means the domain membership is broken (as we don't fallback to
the previous password for ntlmssp nor kerberos yet).
An (at least Samba) RODC will also reject a password change,
see https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12773.
Even with this change we still have open problems, e.g. if the password was
changed, but we didn't get the servers response. In order to fix that we need
to use only netlogon and lsa over unprotected transports, just using schannel
authentication (which supports the fallback to the old password).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12782
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
We now store various hashed keys at change time and maintain a lot of details
that will help debugging failed password changes.
We keep storing the legacy values:
SECRETS/SID/
SECRETS/DOMGUID/
SECRETS/MACHINE_LAST_CHANGE_TIME/
SECRETS/MACHINE_PASSWORD/
SECRETS/MACHINE_PASSWORD.PREV/
SECRETS/SALTING_PRINCIPAL/DES/
This allows downgrades to older Samba versions.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12782
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This blob will be store in secrets.tdb. It makes it possible to store much
more useful details about the workstation trust.
The key feature that that triggered this change is the ability
to store details for the next password change before doing
the remote change. This will allow us to recover from failures.
While being there I also thought about possible new features,
which we may implement in the near future.
We also store the raw UTF16 like cleartext buffer as well as derived
keys like the NTHASH (arcfour-hmac-md5 key) and other kerberos keys.
This will allow us to avoid recalculating the keys for an in memory
keytab in future.
I also added pointer to an optional lsa_ForestTrustInformation structure,
which might be useful to implement multi-tenancy in future.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12782
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Even in the case where only the password is known to the server, we should
try to leave a valid authentication behind.
We have better ways to indentify which password worked than only using
the current one.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12782
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
