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These are fdeploy, scripts + psscripts as well as the GPT.ini at the top
level. Note that GPT.ini has a different character encoding and we
specify it here.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Currently, we do not look inside the .pol files for any settings (and do
not generalize any so far).
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Currently because no parsers have been written, this just copies the old
files and puts them in their places.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The idea behind this command is that you will eventually backup a number
of XML files which can be user-editable and have generic entities to be
later restored in the same domain or a different domain.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is the default parser which will cause the file to be restored
as-is -- leaving only an effectively blank XML file as a placeholder.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We need to make a duplicate in order to have reasonable python bindings.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
It seems that there might be pre-existing endianness issues which would be fixed by the ndr_push.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This will be useful when exporting registry.pol files.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This means that git grep will no longer show TDB dumps. This can be
changed at runtime using -a for all to include these files, while -I
will also omit any references to the files (no Binary file * matches).
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This allows files to have a space in the filename within the Samba git tree.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
The --kerberos=yes and --no-secrets options didn't work in combination
for domain backups. The problem was creds.get_username() might not
necessarily match the kerberos user (such as in the selftest
environment). If this was the case, then trying to reset the admin
password failed (because the creds.get_username() didn't exist in
the DB).
Because the admin user always has a fixed RID, we can work out the
administrator based on its object SID, instead of relying on the
username in the creds.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13566
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Aug 15 10:19:09 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
Minor code cleanup. The last 2 patches gutted this function, to the
point where there's no longer any value in keeping it.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13566
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
The previous fix still didn't work if you specified --kerberos=yes (in
which case the creds still doesn't have a password).
credopts.get_credentials(lp) should be enough to ensure a user/password
is set (it's all that the other commands seem to do).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13566
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
The online/rename backups only worked if you specified both the username
and password in the actual command itself. If you just entered the
username (expecting to be prompted for the password later), then the
command was rejected.
The problem was the order the code was doing things in. We were checking
credopts.creds.get_password() *before* we'd called
credopts.get_credentials(lp), whereas it should be the other way
around.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13566
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Make amd64 SYSTEM_UNAME_MACHINE an alias for x86_64.
Signed-off-by: Timur I. Bakeyev <timur@iXsystems.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
While using script/traffic_replay to generate users and groups, we get
autogenerated group name like:
$2A6F42B2-39FAF4556E2BE379
This patch specify sAMAccountName to overwriten the name.
Signed-off-by: Joe Guo <joeg@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Make sure --average-groups-per-user is not more than --number-of-users
Signed-off-by: Joe Guo <joeg@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
The original code is trying to output different data format for tty or file.
This is unnecessary and cause confusion while writing script to parse result.
The human-readable one is also easy for code to parse.
Remove if check for isatty(), just make output the same.
Signed-off-by: Joe Guo <joeg@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
In commit b0c9de820c, line 343:
self.next_conversation_id = itertools.count().next
was changed to:
self.next_conversation_id = next(itertools.count())
which is not correct, the first one is a function, the second one is a
int. This patch fixed it.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13573
Signed-off-by: Joe Guo <joeg@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
The default value is "NONE", need to specify it to use SAMBA_INTERNAL so
that the DNS partitions are replicated.
Signed-off-by: Joe Guo <joeg@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
By using the new ldb_dn_add_child_val() we ensure that the user-controlled values are
not parsed as DN seperators.
Additionally, the casefold DN is obtained before the search to trigger
a full parse of the DN before being handled to the LDB search.
This is not normally required but is done here due to the nature
of the untrusted input.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13466
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
This changes our DNS server to be much more careful when constructing DNS names
into LDB DN values.
This avoids a segfault deep in the LDB code if the ldb_dn_get_casefold() fails there.
A seperate patch will address that part of the issue, and a later patch
will re-work this code to use single API: ldb_dn_add_child_val(). This
is not squahed with this work because this patch does not rely on a new
LDB release, and so may be helpful for a backport.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13466
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
* New API ldb_dn_add_child_val() avoids passing untrusted input to
ldb_dn_add_child_fmt() (bug 13466)
* Free memory nearer to the allocation in calls made by ldbsearch
* Do not overwrite ldb_transaction_commit failure error messages
with a pointless del_transaction()
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
These additional API tests just check that an invalid base DN
is never accepted.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
This is safer for untrusted input than ldb_dn_add_child_fmt()
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13466
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
If the DN is not valid the ltdb_search_dn1() will catch it with ldb_dn_validate() which
is the only safe way to check this. ldb_dn_is_valid() does not actually check, but instead
returns only the result of the previous checks, if there was one.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrej Gessel <Andrej.Gessel@janztec.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrej Gessel <Andrej.Gessel@janztec.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
No matter commit succeeded or failed, transation will be delete afterwards.
So there is no need to delete it here.
Aganst Samba this causes an `LDAP error 51 LDAP_BUSY` error when the transaction
fails, say while we try to add users to groups in large amount and
the original error is lost.
In Samba, the rootdse module fails early in the del part of the
start/end/del pattern, and in ldb_tdb and ldb_mdb a failed commit
always ends the transaction, even on failure.
Signed-off-by: Joe Guo <joeg@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Introduced by dbdbd4875e
CID 1438395
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13567
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Aug 14 22:02:06 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
We are allocating msg02, but check in assertion msg01, which makes no
sense here.
Signed-off-by: Timur I. Bakeyev <timur@freebsd.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
This regression was introduced in Samba 4.7 by bug 12842 and in
master git commit eb2e77970e.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13552
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Aug 14 17:02:38 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13453
CVE-2018-10858: Insufficient input validation on client directory
listing in libsmbclient.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13453
CVE-2018-10858: Insufficient input validation on client directory
listing in libsmbclient.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
The acl_read.c code contains a special case to allow dirsync to
work-around having insufficient access rights. We had a concern that
the dirsync module could leak sensitive information for deleted objects.
This patch adds a test-case to prove whether or not this is happening.
The new test case is similar to the existing dirsync test except:
- We make the confidential attribute also preserve-on-delete, so it
hangs around for deleted objcts. Because the attributes now persist
across test case runs, I've used a different attribute to normal.
(Technically, the dirsync search expressions are now specific enough
that the regular attribute could be used, but it would make things
quite fragile if someone tried to add a new test case).
- To handle searching for deleted objects, the search expressions are
now more complicated. Currently dirsync adds an extra-filter to the
'!' searches to exclude deleted objects, i.e. samaccountname matches
the test-objects AND the object is not deleted. We now extend this to
include deleted objects with lastKnownParent equal to the test OU.
The search expression matches either case so that we can use the same
expression throughout the test (regardless of whether the object is
deleted yet or not).
This test proves that the dirsync corner-case does not actually leak
sensitive information on Samba. This is due to a bug in the dirsync
code - when the buggy line is removed, this new test promptly fails.
Test also passes against Windows.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
A user that doesn't have access to view an attribute can still guess the
attribute's value via repeated LDAP searches. This affects confidential
attributes, as well as ACLs applied to an object/attribute to deny
access.
Currently the code will hide objects if the attribute filter contains an
attribute they are not authorized to see. However, the code still
returns objects as results if confidential attribute is in the search
expression itself, but not in the attribute filter.
To fix this problem we have to check the access rights on the attributes
in the search-tree, as well as the attributes returned in the message.
Points of note:
- I've preserved the existing dirsync logic (the dirsync module code
suppresses the result as long as the replPropertyMetaData attribute is
removed). However, there doesn't appear to be any test that highlights
that this functionality is required for dirsync.
- To avoid this fix breaking the acl.py tests, we need to still permit
searches like 'objectClass=*', even though we don't have Read Property
access rights for the objectClass attribute. The logic that Windows
uses does not appear to be clearly documented, so I've made a best
guess that seems to mirror Windows behaviour.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
This better reflects the special case we're making for dirsync, and gets
rid of a 'if-else' clause.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Flip the dirsync check (to avoid a double negative), and use a helper
boolean variable.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
So we can re-use the same logic laster for checking the search-ops.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
An 'Object Access Allowed' ACE that assigned 'Control Access' (CR)
rights to a specific attribute would not actually grant access.
What was happening was the remaining_access mask for the object_tree
nodes would be Read Property (RP) + Control Access (CR). The ACE mapped
to the schemaIDGUID for a given attribute, which would end up being a
child node in the tree. So the CR bit was cleared for a child node, but
not the rest of the tree. We would then check the user had the RP access
right, which it did. However, the RP right was cleared for another node
in the tree, which still had the CR bit set in its remaining_access
bitmap, so Samba would not grant access.
Generally, the remaining_access only ever has one bit set, which means
this isn't a problem normally. However, in the Control Access case there
are 2 separate bits being checked, i.e. RP + CR.
One option to fix this problem would be to clear the remaining_access
for the tree instead of just the node. However, the Windows spec is
actually pretty clear on this: if the ACE has a CR right present, then
you can stop any further access checks.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
It is perfectly legal to search LDAP for an attribute that is not part
of the schema. That part of the query should simply not match.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Currently Samba is a bit disclosive with LDB_OP_PRESENT (i.e.
attribute=*) searches compared to Windows.
All the acl.py tests are based on objectClass=* searches, where Windows
will happily tell a user about objects they have List Contents rights,
but not Read Property rights for. However, if you change the attribute
being searched for, suddenly the objects are no longer visible on
Windows (whereas they are on Samba).
This is a problem, because Samba can tell you about which objects have
confidential attributes, which in itself could be disclosive.
This patch adds a acl.py test-case that highlights this behaviour. The
test passes against Windows but fails against Samba.
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Adds tests that assert that a confidential attribute cannot be guessed
by an unprivileged user through wildcard DB searches.
The tests basically consist of a set of DB searches/assertions that
get run for:
- basic searches against a confidential attribute
- confidential attributes that get overridden by giving access to the
user via an ACE (run against a variety of ACEs)
- protecting a non-confidential attribute via an ACL that denies read-
access (run against a variety of ACEs)
- querying confidential attributes via the dirsync controls
These tests all pass when run against a Windows Dc and all fail against
a Samba DC.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reading the spec and then reading the code makes sense, but we could
comment the code more so it makes sense on its own.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Object-specific access checks refer to a specific section of the
MS-ADTS, and the code closely matches the spec. We need to extend this
logic to properly handle the Control-Access Right (CR), so it makes
sense to split the logic out into its own function.
This patch just moves the code, and should not alter the logic (apart
from ading in the boolean grant_access return variable.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
