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To be used in rpcint_binding_handle, prepare to remove legacy api_struct
and S3 pidl generated code.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Found while trying to run winexe against Windows Server 2019.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14313
Guenther
Signed-off-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Limit the max_recursion on self recursive definitions in the idl to
20,000. This value is hopefully large eneough to not impact normal
operation, but small eneough to prevent stack over flow issues.
Credit to OSS-Fuzz
REF: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=19820
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14254
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Feb 27 02:29:21 UTC 2020 on sn-devel-184
Guenther
Signed-off-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Jan 16 21:34:27 UTC 2020 on sn-devel-184
This is like close-share, but kicks out only active users where share
access controls are changed such that now access would be denied
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Fix for
*** CID 1457529: Error handling issues (CHECKED_RETURN)
/librpc/ndr/ndr_basic.c: 786 in ndr_push_full_ptr()
...
ID 1457529: Error handling issues (CHECKED_RETURN)
Calling "ndr_token_store" without checking return value (as is done
elsewhere 14 out of 17 times).
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Gary Lockyer <gary@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Jan 9 21:49:00 UTC 2020 on sn-devel-184
The new macros allow the same macro convenience for enum functions without
level discriminator.
Guenther
Signed-off-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
The charset determination makes it more difficult to deal with the real
REG_MULTI_SZ nature of that element.
Guenther
Signed-off-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
This simply matches the behaviour from before e7b1acaddf
when the logic for a trailing . was added. This matches what is added in
the dnsRecord attribute for a name of "." over the dnsserver RPC
management interface and is based on what Windows does for that name
in (eg) an MX record.
No a security bug because we use talloc and so name will be just the
end of the talloc header.
Credit to OSS-Fuzz
Found using the fuzz_ndr_X fuzzer
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Dec 20 11:33:52 UTC 2019 on sn-devel-184
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Dec 20 09:01:30 UTC 2019 on sn-devel-184
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Dec 18 08:05:05 UTC 2019 on sn-devel-184
We need to focus the fuzzing effort on reachable code, and these IDL
are just historical artifacts, many are entirely [todo] and have
no samba client nor server.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Credit to OSS-Fuzz
Found using the ndr_fuzz_X target.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
This breaks the ABI so we merge this into the unreleased libndr-1.0.0.
The advantage of the new functions is there (except for print, which
is unchanged) is an error raised when the token is not found, so
we can be confident in the changes to the token behaviour.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13876
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Dec 12 03:56:23 UTC 2019 on sn-devel-184
By removing this we know we do not need to worry about this list
growing without bounds. We merge this into the recently created but
not yet released ABI 1.0.0
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13876
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
By removing this we know we do not need to worry about this list
growing without bounds.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13876
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Found by Douglas Bagnall using Hongfuzz and the new fuzz_ndr_X
fuzzer.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13876
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Found by Douglas Bagnall using Hongfuzz and the new fuzz_ndr_X
fuzzer.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13876
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
This avoids really long token lists for switch values
that will not be needed past this point.
The function name is changed to clarify what exactly is being
done here, and the old function is removed to ensure it is
not being used anywhere else.
Merge the removal of ndr_print_get_switch_value into
just-tagged librpc/ABI/ndr-1.0.0.sigs as this
has not been put into any release yet.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13876
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
This will allow generated code to instead push and pop union values onto the
switch_list stack, which is more memory efficient than creating a single large
list to be scannned and eventually discarded.
Merge into unreleased ABI 1.0.0
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13876
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
This is designed to stop a very large number of tokens from being stored for
arrays of structures containing relative pointers in particular.
This was one part of the minimum patch for CVE-2019-14908 before
being downgraded as not a security-release worthy issue.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13876
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
This was one part of the minimum patch for CVE-2019-14908 before
being downgraded as not a security-release worthy issue.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13876
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
The next commits will register legacy api_struct when the endpoint server
is initialized. This commit adds a shutdown function which will be used
to unregister the legacy api_struct.
The shutdown function will be also used to replace the rpc_srv_callbacks
struct shutdown member used, for example, by the spoolss service to
cleanup before exiting.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Clears all registered endpoints and interfaces, association groups and
broken connections.
To be used by S3 forked daemons.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The dcesrv_init_registered_ep_servers() will be used by the S3 server to
initialize all registered endpoint servers (for embedded services), and
the dcesrv_init_ep_server() function will be used by the external
daemons to initialize the required ones.
As serveral S3 services may require to initialize another one before
itself (svcctl and eventlog for example require winreg) a boolean flag is
added to track the initialization status.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The S4 server will initialize the endpoint servers specified in smb.conf,
but the S3 server need to initialize all registered endpoint servers (the
embedded ones).
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
There are two concerns here, assuming the attacker can place arbitary values
in a dnsProperty attribute over LDAP (eg is a DNS administrator).
This comes from the fact that id is used as the switch value at the C layer
but at the NDR layer the wDataLength value is considered first.
One concern is that a pull/push round-trip could include server memory:
The previous switch_is() behaviour could store the server memory back
into the attribute.
However this pattern of pull/push only happens in ndrdump and fuzzing tools, as
dnsserver_db_do_reset_dword() operates only on the uint32/bitmap union
arms, and fully initialises those.
The other is that a pull of the attacker-supplied value could
cause the server to expose memory.
This would be over the network via DNS or the RPC dnsserver protocols.
However at all times the ndr_pull_struct_blob is passed zeroed memory.
The final concern (which fuzz_ndr_X found) is that in the ndr_size_dnsPropertyData()
the union descriminent is only id.
This has no impact as only zeroed memory is used so there will be a
zero value in all scalars, including data->d_ns_servers.AddrArray.
Therefore the server will not crash processing the attacker-supplied blob
[MS-DNSP] 2.3.2.1 dnsProperty has no mention of this special behaviour.
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-dnsp/445c7843-e4a1-4222-8c0f-630c230a4c80
This was known as CVE-2019-14908 before being triaged back to a normal bug.
Found by Douglas Bagnall using Hongfuzz and the new fuzz_ndr_X fuzzer.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14206
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@samba.org>