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Thanks to a report from VL:
We were causing mayhem by weakening the keys at the wrong point in time.
I think this is the correct place to do it. The session key for SMB
signing, and the 'smb session key' (used for encrypting password sets)
is never weakened.
The session key used for bulk data encryption/signing is weakened.
This also makes more sense, when we look at the NTLM2 code.
Andrew Bartlett
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With more 'try all options' testing, I found this 'simple' but in the
NTLM2 signing code.
Andrew Bartlett
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After Volker's advise, try every combination of parameters. This
isn't every parameter on NTLMSSP, but it is most of the important
ones.
This showed up that we had the '128bit && LM_KEY' case messed up.
This isn't supported, so we must look instead at the 56 bit flag.
Andrew Bartlett
-----------------------------------
We should now try retesting with NT4. This should be standalone
enough to port into a SAMBA_3_0_RELEASE branch fix.
Jeremy.
* \PIPE\unixinfo
* winbindd's {group,alias}membership new functions
* winbindd's lookupsids() functionality
* swat (trunk changes to be reverted as per discussion with Deryck)
- NTLM2 support in the server
- KEY_EXCH support in the server
- variable length session keys.
In detail:
- NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing
domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade).
* This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' *
(This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may
well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password
changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of
NTLM2 on RPC pipes.)
This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we
must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm
being changed. This also needs to be turned off for
'security=server', which does not support this.
- KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key
actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being
the shared-secret directly or indirectly.
- As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem
needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the
backend.
- There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation.
- The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii.
Don't make an ascii version ever.
- The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We
have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded
to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes
long, when the krb5 login uses DES.
* This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. *
- Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of
misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This
should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues.
- Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when
passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate)
REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures...
the schannel code, but I've included that anyway. :-)
This patch revives the client-side NTLMSSP support for RPC named pipes
in Samba, and cleans up the client and server schannel code. The use of the
new code is enabled by the 'sign', 'seal' and 'schannel' commands in
rpcclient.
The aim was to prove that our separate NTLMSSP client library actually
implements NTLMSSP signing and sealing as per Microsoft's NTLMv1 implementation,
in the hope that knowing this will assist us in correctly implementing
NTLMSSP signing for SMB packets. (Still not yet functional)
This patch replaces the NTLMSSP implementation in rpc_client/cli_pipe.c with
calls to libsmb/ntlmssp.c. In the process, we have gained the ability to
use the more secure NT password, and the ability to sign-only, instead of
having to seal the pipe connection. (Previously we were limited to sealing,
and could only use the LM-password derived key).
Our new client-side NTLMSSP code also needed alteration to cope with our
comparatively simple server-side implementation. A future step is to replace
it with calls to the same NTLMSSP library.
Also included in this patch is the schannel 'sign only' patch I submitted to
the team earlier. While not enabled (and not functional, at this stage) the
work in this patch makes the code paths *much* easier to follow. I have also
included similar hooks in rpccleint to allow the use of schannel on *any* pipe.
rpcclient now defaults to not using schannel (or any other extra per-pipe
authenticiation) for any connection. The 'schannel' command enables schannel
for all pipes until disabled.
This code is also much more secure than the previous code, as changes to our
cli_pipe routines ensure that the authentication footer cannot be removed
by an attacker, and more error states are correctly handled.
(The same needs to be done to our server)
Andrew Bartlett
get Win2k to send a valid signiture in it's session setup reply - which it will
give to win2k clients.
So, I need to look at becoming 'more like MS', but for now I'll get this code
into the tree. It's actually based on the TNG cli_pipe_ntlmssp.c, as it was
slightly easier to understand than our own (but only the utility functions
remain in any way intact...).
This includes the mysical 'NTLM2' code - I have no idea if it actually works.
(I couldn't get TNG to use it for its pipes either).
Andrew Bartlett
